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C A 







A SHORT HISTORY OF THE 
AMERICAN PEOPLE 


In Two Volume. 


A SHORT HISTORY OF THE 
AMERICAN PEOPLE 

Volume I. (To 1789) 

The Foundations of American Nationality 

By Evarts Boutell Greene 

Professor of History, University of Illinois 

Volume II. (1783 to the present time) 
The Development of American Nationality 
By Carl Russell Fish 

Professor of American History, University of Wisconsin 


































































































































• ‘ 


















































- 











































































George Washington 

















































THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
AMERICAN NATIONALITY 


BY 

CARL RUSSELL FISH 

v% 

PROFESSOR OF AMERICAN HISTORY 
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN 


REVISED 





AMERICAN BOOK COMPANY 

CINCINNATI CHICAGO 


NEW YORK 


BOSTON 


ATLANTA 




t_ /'7£ 

rs-s, 

m4 




Copyright, 1913, 1918, 1919, 1924, by 
CARL RUSSELL FISH. 
Copyright, 1913, in Great Britain. 


DEV. AMER. NATIONALITY. 

e. p. 3. 


MADE IN U. S. A, 


< 




GENERAL PREFACE 


i 
i 

The authors hope that this “ Short History of the American 
People ” may serve the purposes of two classes of readers. 
They have aimed, in the first instance, to provide for college 
undergraduates pursuing an introductory course in American 
history, a general manual which will embody, in some meas¬ 
ure at least, the enlarged knowledge and the new points of 
view made possible by the results of research in recent years. 
They believe also that this history will meet the requirements 
of the general reader who desires a comprehensive view of 
the subject within reasonable compass. For the student and 
the general reader alike, it is hoped that the bibliographical 
notes may point the way to more extended studies. 

The aim of the authors is not so much to present a bal¬ 
anced narrative of events, as to describe those movements 
and forces which have left their permanent impress upon 
the national character and institutions. The first volume 
{The Foundations of America?i Nationality, before 1789) deals 
with the molding of the varied European elements and the 
several detached colonies into an independent and united 
nation ; the second {The Development of American Nationality, 
1783 to the Present Time) deals with the development of the 
nation so formed. While any division of the subject matter 
of history occasions perplexity and disagreement, the authors 
believe that the character of the problems confronting the 
people of the time, and the character of the materials which 
the historian must employ, permanently differentiate the colo¬ 
nial period from the national, and that the two can best be 
treated by different men. In order, however, that each author 
might have full liberty to express his views, the volumes over¬ 
lap for the period 1783 to 1789. 


v 










* 



















« 


I 


















PREFACE TO VOLUME II 


The aim of the author, in writing this volume, has been to 
exhibit American history as a development. The central 
point of view has been the political, with the idea that the 
American people have expressed themselves more fully in 
their political life than elsewhere, and more so than has been 
the case with most other nations. To make clear this po¬ 
litical development, the various factors, economic, social, in¬ 
tellectual, and moral, which from time to time have, by their 
interaction, contributed to it, have been treated in as much 
detail as the author believes their relative importance entitles 
them to. It cannot be hoped that any such selection of con¬ 
tributing factors will prove universally satisfactory, but the 
greater vitality which this method gives is felt to more than 
counterbalance the criticism that might be avoided by a more 
conventional treatment. With respect to military history, the 
author has departed from the standard of relative values, and 
given it less space than its real importance demands, believ¬ 
ing that most persons possess a better knowledge of this than 
of other fields, owing to the interest which it seems to hold 
for them during their high school age. 

As the chief purpose of this book is to serve as a text 
for use in college classes, the author calls attention to three 
assumptions that he has made with reference to college 
students: first, that they have some general knowledge of 
American history; second, that they will make some use of 
collateral readingthird, that they have somewhat more ma¬ 
turity of mind than students in high schools, and may be 
expected to grasp more fundamental ideas and to compre¬ 
hend a greater complexity of causal relations. With these 

vii 


Vlll 


PREFACE TO VOLUME II 


assumptions in mind, it has been felt possible to eliminate 
some of the more commonly known facts, and to disregard 
chronology to a greater degree than is advisable in books for 
the use of less mature students. In thus adapting American 
history, the author has been guided by a ten years’ experi¬ 
ence in presenting the period under review to students of 
this type. 

The bibliographical notes given at the end of the chap¬ 
ters are not intended to supply references for extensive topic 
work, which must always be molded to the capacity of the 
libraries available; or to give authority to the text. Their 
sole purpose is to suggest supplementary reading. The aim 
has not been to make the lists long, but to give those refer¬ 
ences which have been found most useful in actual class-room 
work. In general, reference has not been made to rare works 
now out of print, but to material apt to be at hand in the 
average college library. With this point in mind extensive 
use has been made of publications of learned societies. Ref¬ 
erences to the same work have seldom been repeated at the 
end of the several chapters, and in the absence of the articles 
specifically noted, many general histories might well be used 
to supplement other chapters than those in connection with 
which they are mentioned. No attempt has been made to 
equalize the references at the close of the several chapters, 
and it is the belief of the author that reading on some sub¬ 
jects is much more valuable than on others, and that students 
should not be encouraged to expect mechanical assignments 
of equal length to supplement the work of each subject or 
each week. The author believes in the value of general 
reading in the sources even more than in the reading of 
important special documents, and the source references are 
to such material as is readily available. 


GENERAL REFERENCES 


Channing, E., Hart, A. B., and Turner, F. J., Guide to the Study and 
Reading of American History , Boston, 1912. This guide in its newest 
edition should be in the hands of all college teachers of history. Its 
bibliographical references are richer than those of any textbook can be, 
and its pedagogical suggestions represent the latest thought with refer¬ 
ence to college teaching. 


McLaughlin, A. C., and Hart, A. B., Cyclopedia of American Govern - 
ment , N. Y., 1913. 

Stanwood, E., History of the Presidency (to 1909), 2 vols., Boston, 
1898, 1912. This contains party platforms and votes. 

The following general histories are valuable through the periods 
mentioned : 

1801-1817. Adams, H., History of the United States , N. Y., 1889-1891. 
1492-1789. Bancroft, G., A History of the United States , 6 vols., N. Y., 
1883-1885. 


1783-1865. 

1789-1900. 

1300-1907. 

1783-1860. 

1849-1877. 

1783-1865. 


Curtis, G. T., Constitutional History of the United States, 
2 vols., N. Y., 1889-1896. 

Dewey, D. R., Finaticial History of the United States , N. Y., 

1907. 

Hart, A. B. [editor], The American Nation: A History , 
27 vols., N. Y., 1904-1908. Each volume has a separate 
author, and several of them are referred to in the chapter 
bibliographies. 

McMaster, J. B., History of the People of the United States 
from the Revolution to the Civil War, 8 vols., N. Y., 1884- 
1913. 

Rhodes, J. F., History of the United States, 7 vols., N. Y., 

1891-1906. 

Schouler, J., History of the United States , 7 vols., N. Y., 

1894-1914. 


The following series are of especial value: for biography, the 
American Statesmen , edited by J. T. Morse; and for state history, the 
American Commonwealths, edited by H. E. Scudder, and the Stories of 
the States, edited by E. S. Brooks. 


IX 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 

General Bibliography .ix 

CHAPTER 

I. The United States in 1783 1 

II. The History of the Confederation ... 17 

III. The Formation of the Constitution . 31 

IV. The Organization and Establishment of the 

National Government.44 

V. Problems of the Frontier and of Commerce . 59 

VI. The Administration of John Adams ... 74 

VII. Jeffersonian Democracy.86 

VIII. The War of 1812.108 

IX. The Period of Transition — New Social, Eco¬ 
nomic, and Political Conditions . . . 128 

X. Politics during the Period of Transition, 1815 

to 1829 156 

XI. Frontier Policies.184 

XII. Jackson and South Carolina.197 

XIII. Jackson and the Bank.210 

XIV. Jackson’s Second Term.220 

XV. The Van Buren Administration .... 234 

XVI. Harrison and Tyler.249 

XVII. New Economic and Social Conditions, 1830 to 

1860 264 

XVIII. Intellectual and Moral Renaissance . . .281 

XIX. Territorial Expansion and Slavery . . . 302 

XX. Breaking of the Bonds of Union .... 327 

XXI. Division.360 

XXII. The Civil War.373 

XXIII. Politics during the War . . . . . . 396 


x 






CONTENTS 


XI 


CHAPTER PAGE 

XXIV. Reconstruction to 1872 . 407 

XXV. Reconstruction Completed. 433 

XXVI. The Currency and the Tariff, 1880 to 1900 . 454 

XXVII. The Spanish War and Diplomacy . . . 483 

XXVIII. Industrial and Social Changes .... 500 
XXIX. Political Adjustments and Legislation . . 519 

XXX. The New Democracy t . 535 

XXXI. The United States in the Great War . . 549 


PORTRAITS 


PAGE 

George Washington. Frontispiece 

Alexander Hamilton.56 

Thomas Jefferson.86 

Andrew Jackson.184 

Abraham Lincoln.366 

Robert E. Lee.. 374 

MAPS 

United States, 1783-1790 22 

Density of Population in the United States, 1810, and Indian 

Cessions to that Date.114 

Roads and Trunk Canals in 1825 . 137 

Railroad Development in the United States, 1860 . . . 266 

Presidential Election in the United States, 1860 .... 356 

The Seat of the Civil War.388 

The Advance of Population in the United States, 1790 to 1890 . 438 

Election of 1892 475 

Election of 1896 480 

Territorial Expansion of the United States.486 

The United States and its Possessions ...... 492 


xh 
















THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
AMERICAN NATIONALITY 


CHAPTER I 

THE UNITED STATES IN 1783 

The history of the American people from the landing at 
Jamestown to the present day is one and indivisible. It is, 
moreover, indissolubly connected with the development of 
European civilization. History does not occur in epochs, 
and each great event is at the same time the culmination of 
one line of causation and the starting point of another. For 
the purposes of study as well as of writing, however, some¬ 
thing less than the whole must be taken, and the attempt 
should be made to divide at the point where fewest threads 
will be broken. In a history like this, where the main interest 
is political, the meeting of the first Continental Congress or the 
adoption of the Constitution might seem to be more logical 
dates for separation than 1783 . In fact, 1789 is to serve as 
the real point of departure, but to treat of the Constitution 
without giving the conditions and the struggles out of which 
it came seemed impossible; and so this book and the pre¬ 
ceding volume overlap for the period 1783 to 1789 . In 
addition, this first chapter attempts to summarize those con¬ 
ditions resulting from colonial development which are most 
essential for an understanding of the subsequent history. 

The event which makes 1783 significant is that in that year Independ- 
American independence was finally achieved and formally 
acknowledged in the treaty of Paris. This treaty marked 
the failure of the attempt to govern the English settlements 

s 


2 


THE UNITED STATES IN 1783 


Territory. 


States and 
sections. 


New Eng¬ 
land. 


on the Atlantic coast of America as a portion of the British 
empire. It left them free to guide their own future develop¬ 
ment, and face to face with the problem of making of them¬ 
selves a new nation. The territory assigned them by the 
treaty was amply sufficient for present needs, amounting to 
about 850,000 square miles; but the descriptions of its 
boundaries, owing to the lack of geographical knowledge 
at the time, were inaccurate, and occasioned years of con¬ 
troversy and sometimes danger of war. The national popu¬ 
lation amounted to less than 3 , 500 , 000 , and occupied less 
than a third of the territory to which the treaty gave title. 
The remaining area was waste, or was peopled by Indians, 
and portions were still held by foreign powers. It was years 
before the actual situation was made to conform to the title 
we received in 1783 , — before it became certain that the 
United States would be a great continental power. 

The lack of unity within made our title the more pre¬ 
carious. There were thirteen distinct and separate state 
governments, united by but a loose bond of confederation, 
and Vermont had its own local authority which defied the 
rest. The effort to bind these separate states into one 
effective government was the first great national task, and 
was successful; but there was another element of disunion, 
still more important and destined to prove more obstinate. 
Differences in the original stock, emphasized by different phys¬ 
ical conditions and by the isolated life of the colonial period, 
had created several great sections or divisions of the country, 
which had sufficient similarity within themselves, and 
sufficient unlikeness to each other, to make them permanent 
entities, and to cause sectionalism to be a permanent factor 
in American history. 

In the northeast lay New England. From its mountains, 
the White and the Green, the land sloped away south and east 
to the sea. Excepting a fringe of sandy plain only a few 
miles wade on the south shore, the whole region had been 


NEW ENGLAND 


3 


glacier swept. The tops of the granite ridges which radiated 
from Mount Washington toward the coast had been ground 
down, and the debris covered the intervening valleys with a 
soil, rough, filled with bowlders, and hard to work, but inex¬ 
haustible. These valleys, widening as they approached the 
sea, gathered up the waters into rivers, generally not navi¬ 
gable for long distances, but strong and rapid. At the falls 
of these rivers there stood already mills to grind flour and 
to saw the timber which covered nearly the whole region. 
Where the mountain ridges breasted the ocean they formed 
headlands and islands, and the intervening inlets and bays, 
into which the rivers flowed, afforded sheltering harbors for 
ships of all sizes, and were rich in all kinds of fish. 

The New Englanders were of nearly pure English descent, 
and the ancestors of a majority of them had been Puritans 
who came to America during the brief period between 1620 
and 1640 . They were, therefore, remarkably homogeneous. 
Religion had been an important cause of the first migration, 
and still played a large part in their lives. They were accus¬ 
tomed to look even at political matters from a religious 
point of view, and this tended to make them peculiarly tena¬ 
cious of their opinions, and to consider their opponents not 
only as mistaken but as bad. This “New England con¬ 
science” was accompanied by a strong missionary spirit, 
under the impulse of which they tried firmly, and not always 
sympathetically, to impress upon others New England 
beliefs and usages. Their religion was Calvinistic. They 
held that the relations between God and man were regulated 
by contract, and this idea of contract they transferred to the 
other relations of life. Thus they had long based their 
political systems upon the theory, afterwards formulated by 
Locke and expressed in the Declaration of Independence, that 
government must rest on the consent of the governed, prefer¬ 
ably expressed in the form of a written contract or consti¬ 
tution. 


New Eng¬ 
land stock 
and ideas. 


4 


THE UNITED STATES IN 1783 


The town. 


Area, 


Owing in part to the physical characteristics of New 
England, the numberless little harbors of the coast and 
the hills of the interior, the people lived mostly in vil¬ 
lages, rather than on farms. The village settlement was 
the center of the town, which was a geographical area 
corresponding to the modern western township. Towns 
differed in size and were irregular in shape, but those lately 
founded averaged about six miles square. The town was 
also the smallest unit of local government and was a very 
busy one. It attended to practically all government matters 
not managed by the state; for, although counties existed, they 
did little except judicial business. Moreover, the recognized 
functions of government were unusually extensive. The 
town managed nearty all church affairs, and it exercised a 
very close supervision over the lives of the townspeople. 
All this business was done in the town meeting, which all 
voters could attend, and, between meetings, by a committee 
of selectmen. New Englanders, therefore, were accustomed 
to a government which actively interfered in their everyday 
life, to a government in which they took a direct part, and as 
a result of this direct participation, political education was 
more widely diffused there than in any other part of the 
world at that time. In most New England town meetings, 
due regard was paid to family and wealth and learning. 
As John Cotton had said, New England was neither “meerly 
democratical” nor “meerly aristocratical.” 

This population of New Englanders in 1783 occupied the 
four states of Massachusetts (which included Maine), New 
Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Connecticut, and also the un¬ 
recognized state of Vermont. Nearly all the 900,000 inhab¬ 
itants lived south of a line drawn across the middle of New 
Hampshire and Vermont. A desire to escape the rigid 
scrutiny of New England town life, combined with a restless 
seeking for better lands and climate, had caused many to 
migrate to other colonies, and now others were forced to do 


NEW ENGLAND 


5 


the same as the increasing population pressed up the narrow¬ 
ing valleys, where the soil became more and more difficult to 
cultivate. Thus a New England element was to be found 
in neighboring parts of New York and New Jersey, and 
was beginning to enter northern Pennsylvania and the 
Mohawk valley. 

The majority depended for a living upon agriculture, Occupations, 
eking out the scanty returns of their rock-strewn glacial soil 
by weaving, or making shoes, or nails, of winter nights. A 
large number on the coast hoped, with the return of peace, 
to resume their fishing on the banks of Newfoundland. 

Most of those who hoped to grow wealthy engaged in com¬ 
merce. They were accustomed to carry their fish to Spain 
and the West Indies; of West Indian molasses they made 
rum, with which to purchase in Africa negroes to sell in 
America; they served as carriers and agents for the less 
commercial people of the other colonies. The ships for all 
this trade were built in New England, where ship timber 
grew to the water’s edge of many snug little harbors, which 
afforded equal security for construction, and facility for 
putting to sea. The economic life of the people, therefore, 
was varied. One man had several occupations. Mechanical 
skill and commercial shrewdness were developed. Many 
of the things to which they turned their hands, moreover, 
such as trading and fishing beyond the national boundaries, 
were of such a character as to thrive or droop according to 
the degree of protection and encouragement afforded by the 
government. Politics and industry were, therefore, closely 
connected. Boston, although surpassed in population by Phila¬ 
delphia and New York, had the most widespread commercial 
connections of all the cities in the country. For years Ameri¬ 
cans were known in many parts of the world as Bostonese. 

On the great Atlantic coast plain, with its sinuous, slow- The coast 
moving rivers, and its rich, thin, alluvial soil, a very different p^adon^ 6 
type of civilization had developed. The characteristic in- s >’ 3tem - 


6 


THE UNITED STATES IN 1783 


Extension of 

plantation 

system. 


stitution was the plantation. Back from the road or the 
river stood the mansion house of the owner; behind it clus¬ 
tered the cabins of the slaves, while beyond, the fields 
stretched away to the surrounding woods. This little village 
was the absolute possession of the master, and its object was 
the production of as large a crop as possible of the staple : to¬ 
bacco or rice or indigo. Food was raised, and some simple 
trades were practiced, but these were of subsidiary interest. 
Its economic relations with the outside world consisted 
chiefly of shipping the crop to England, and receiving in 
return clothes, tools, and such other necessities or luxuries 
as might be ordered for the ensuing year. The one-crop 
system of cultivation used up the soil rapidly, and most plan¬ 
tations were surrounded by great tracts of land exhausted 
in the past, or reserved for future use. 

When the land had been long used, and when there 
came to be great numbers of old and useless slaves, the plan¬ 
tation became less profitable. The planter, however, was not 
willing to reduce his standard of living. Many of the great 
families of Virginia had been founded by cavaliers, sup¬ 
porters of Charles I in the great English civil war, who had 
migrated to America during the Commonwealth, between 
1648 and 1660 , and who had tried to reproduce the conditions 
of their old English homes. The style of living they adopted 
became the aspiration of all planters, of whatever origin, 
who made money; to curtail it, was to admit defeat. Some 
borrowed money and increased their holdings of land and 
slaves. Others sold out, and, investing in new land beyond 
the settlements, opened new plantations. This increasing 
area of production constantly lowered the price of the staple, 
whether tobacco, rice, indigo, or, later, cotton; and this 
again reduced the profits of the planter on each slave and 
each acre. It again became necessary to enlarge the in¬ 
vestment, or to move on. This same story continually re¬ 
peated itself; the plantations growing in size, and the plan- 


THE PLANTATION COUNTRY 


7 


tation system stretching inward from the coast, across the 
tidewater region, and up into the piedmont or foothills. In 
the old plantation area, there remained the more successful, 
and to them succeeded their eldest sons. The community 
became wealthy and conservative. To the back country 
went the more adventurous, the younger sons, the successful 
merchants, and small farmers who aspired to become planters, 
taking with them some little capital, represented by young 
and able-bodied slaves. 

In the tidewater region, lawyers, doctors, and the wealth¬ 
iest merchants associated with the planters, but the remainder 
of the white population, consisting largely of the descendants 
of white servants brought over under conditions of practical 
slavery, were, for the most part, in poverty and dependence. 
In the piedmont, planters like Jefferson and Patrick Henry 
lived on terms approaching equality with independent farmers 
who came down from the mountain valleys, and plantation 
and small farm existed peaceably side by side. 

The smallest unit of government was the parish, which 
had civil as well as religious duties, and which was governed 
by a vestry composed of the wealthier planters. More im¬ 
portant was the county, governed by a county court, com¬ 
posed of a number of the greater planters appointed by the 
governor. Members of the legislature were elected by the 
people, who, having come together and heard speeches and 
eaten and drunk at the candidates’ expense, divided into two 
crowds to be counted. The government exercised few func¬ 
tions. Poor relief, education, and often road and bridge mak¬ 
ing were largely left to the individual planter. Under these 
conditions the planter class came to be all-powerful, and the 
planters came to believe strongly in democratic principles, 
meaning, thereby, the least government possible. In the 
management of their large plantations, with sometimes 
hundreds of souls dependent upon them, many acquired great 
administrative ability and a strong sense of public duty. 


Government 
and ideals. 


8 


THE UNITED STATES IN 1783 


Area. 


The Middle 
States. 


It was by no accident that for more than two thirds of the 
period before the Civil War our presidents were of this 
class. 

In 1783 plantations occupied nearly all the Atlantic 
coast plains of Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, the Carolinas, 
and Georgia. The system had a foothold in the piedmont 
region of these states, and some veterans of the Revolution 
were planning to establish plantations in the beautiful blue- 
grass district along the banks of the Kentucky. The popula¬ 
tion of this area was about 1,200,000, of whom nearly half 
were slaves. There was only one really important city, 
Charleston, whither the South Carolina planters had to flee, 
at certain seasons, to escape the fever. 

The region between the plantation country and New 
England consisted of the valleys of three great rivers, the 
Hudson, the Delaware, and the Susquehanna, which ran into 
three great bays, and near whose mouths stood the busy 
cities of New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore. Each val¬ 
ley had distinguishing characteristics. The Hudson had 
been settled by the Dutch, and although many English, New 
Englanders, Germans, and others had mixed with them, they 
were still an important factor. The Delaware region was 
largely occupied by English and German Quakers, whose 
kindly humanity had made Philadelphia a real abode of 
brotherly love and social betterment, but the extreme toler¬ 
ance of whose creed caused them to be less influential than 
the New Englanders in impressing their ideas upon others. 
Quaker shrewdness and honest dealing, moreover, had built 
up many substantial fortunes, and Philadelphia was one of 
the few places in the United States where capital was seek¬ 
ing investment on a large scale. The Susquehanna valley 
contained a large proportion of Germans, still using their na¬ 
tive tongue. Generally known as :i Pennsylvania Dutch,” 
they constituted about one fourtn the population of that 
state. They lived to a considerable extent in separate com- 


THE MIDDLE STATES 


9 


munities, and clung tenaciously to their national customs. 
It was many years before they ceased to be a distinct ele¬ 
ment, and many of their characteristics remained to their 
descendants long after their unity was broken up by inter¬ 
marriage and dispersal. The Susquehanna valley contained 
also many Scotch-Xrish and English. Its natural port, Bal¬ 
timore, lay in Maryland, and so was affiliated politically with 
the plantation area. 

Throughout the whole region there was a varied agricul¬ 
ture, producing every year a surplus for export, the han¬ 
dling of which supported a mercantile community in the three 
leading cities. This trade, although, unlike that of New 
England, it was confined almost entirely to the local needs 
of the section, was already sufficient to make New York the 
most cosmopolitan city in America, and Philadelphia the 
financial center. There were those, too, who even in 1783 
foresaw unlimited possibilities of expansion. The headwaters 
of the three great rivers of the region are in the Appalachian 
mountains, where they interlace with those of the rivers of 
the Ohio and Great Lake systems. Where these rivers break 
through the mountain ridges and plateaus, some to flow 
eastward, some westward, they form low passes, which even 
in Indian times afforded routes for war and trade and mi¬ 
gration between the coast and the Mississippi valley. It 
was felt that when the Middle States developed, if only 
the passes could be made convenient highways, these 
cities would become the gateways of western commerce. 
This, however, was a dream of the future; and, moreover, 
as yet the great mineral resources of the mountains had but 
little effect on the life of the people. 

The Dutch, the Germans, and the Scotch-Irish were com¬ 
paratively inexperienced in the political institutions by which 
they were governed, and the Quakers largely indifferent to 
politics. In New York, as a result of the method of settle¬ 
ment, great tracts of land were held by landlords who rented 


Economic 

conditions. 


Political 

conditions. 


Local 

government. 


The frontier. 


IO THE UNITED STATES IN 1783 

it to tenant farmers, whose votes they controlled. Self-gov¬ 
ernment, therefore, did not work so smoothly as in New Eng¬ 
land and Virginia. There existed, also, well-defined interests, 
the mercantile, the agricultural; the German, the Dutch, 
and the Quakers; the city, the country. To lead such a 
population required men who could organize their supporters; 
and the germs of party organization and the spoils system 
were already to be found. To adjust the conflicting forces 
required men clever at shifting political alliances to suit the 
needs of the moment. These problems resembled, on a 
small scale, those of the nation as a whole, and many of the 
politicians trained in the Middle States came to exercise 
great influence in national affairs, harmonizing, conciliating, 
and manipulating the divergent sections and parties. 

The system of local government combined some of the 
characteristics of the sections to the east and south. In 
Pennsylvania, the county was all-important, but its officials 
were elected by the people. In New York, township and 
county divided the local powers, the county being governed 
by representatives from all the townships of which it was 
composed. Lying in the road between the coast and the 
West, the Middle States were to contribute much to the traits 
of that section which was yet to be developed, and among 
other things, one or the other of these methods of managing 
local affairs has been adopted by every state north of the 
Ohio and the Missouri. In some respects the Middle States 
were in 1783 the most American of the sections; the pop¬ 
ulation of this region was somewhat over 700,000. 

From central Pennsylvania to northern Georgia, south¬ 
erly and southwesterly, there sweeps a broad mountain belt, 
one hundred and fifty miles wide, seven hundred miles long, 
and composed of almost unbroken parallel ridges, with val¬ 
leys, now fertile with a rich limestone soil, now waste and 
fruitless, lying between. About 1720, pioneers began to 
enter these mountain troughs in Pennsylvania, where the 


THE FRONTIER 


II 


Susquehanna breaks through many of the ridges. Naturally 
this movement included many of the valley Germans; it 
included also adventurous or unsuccessful families from 
nearly all the other colonies; but the characteristic strain 
was furnished by that Scotch element which, attracted to 
northern Ireland in the early seventeenth century, now began 
to seek its fortunes in America. Allured by good hunting 
and fertile limestone bottoms, and impelled by the need of 
more room for their large families which clannishly clung to¬ 
gether, this population had by 1783 pushed to the southern 
extremities of the valleys. 

The individual settler, with his family, here met the wild 
single-handed, and lived a self-sustaining life; he must 
mend his gun, and raise his corn, and kill his meat. The com¬ 
munity was almost cut off by lack of facilities for transporta¬ 
tion from all the world besides, and most men within it began 
with the ax and plow, and sent their sons out again with the 
ax and plow to win a living. It was, therefore, a democratic 
community, and one apt to chafe under authority. It had 
resisted England, 1 its Revolutionary epic culminating in the 
battle of Kings Mountain; but it was equally ready to re¬ 
sist the authority of the states. A broad belt of wilderness 
separated this back country from the coast settlements, where 
government centered, and distrust was mutual. Free from 
the state patriotism so powerful in the older communities, 
the frontier possessed a strong national feeling, fostered by 
the Presbyterian church with which many of the Scotch- 
Irish settlers were connected, which was the oldest nation¬ 
wide institution in America and whose synods had for 
many years regularly drawn ministers and elders from the 
whole region to Philadelphia or New York. Life afforded no 
opportunity for formal education, and but a narrow range of 

1 In accordance with common usage the words England and English are often 
nised in this book to apply to the kingdom of Great Britain; in speaking of 
immigrants therefrom, however, the several racial stocks arc differentiated. 


Character¬ 

istics. 


12 


THE UNITED STATES IN 1783 


Area. 


Transporta¬ 

tion. 


Elements of 
union. 


experience, but it gave self-reliance, practical ability to cope 
with vital problems individually, or, if needs be, to organize 
to fight the Indians or resist interference, and it allowed only 
the courageous and physically fit to develop into manhood. 

This population in 1783 fairly well filled the mountain 
valleys, and was flowing out to the eastward into the piedmont, 
particularly in Virginia, where it was already mingling with the 
first waves advancing from the coast. The greater portion 
of the migration, however, was westward. In 1775 Daniel 
Boone moved his family into Kentucky, and by 1783 steadily 
increasing streams were flowing into the Mississippi valley, 
following the courses of the Tennessee, the Cumberland, the 
Kanawha, and the Ohio. The total population of this area 
amounted to about 550,000, and closely allied to it in char¬ 
acteristics were about 150,000 living in Vermont, New 
Hampshire, and Maine, who have been already counted as 
belonging to New England. 

The differences between the sections, and even those be¬ 
tween smaller localities within the greater sectional areas, were 
accentuated by the difficulties of transportation. The British 
government had discouraged trade between the several col¬ 
onies, desiring each to deal directly with the mother country. 
Roads were few and poor except in closely settled areas, as 
those around Boston and Philadelphia. To go by land from 
one state to another was in most cases an adventure taking 
time, strength, and often courage. Commercial intercourse was 
nearly all by water, and the coasts were by no means easy of 
navigation. Much time and money and skill wrould be required 
before the states could be knit together by a common life. 

The divergencies of the sections were offset by many 
bonds of union. Nearly the whole population spoke Eng¬ 
lish, which meant that their minds were fed by the same 
ideas, derived from the English literature of the time, par¬ 
ticularly on religious, legal, and political lines. The great 
bulk of the population, aside from the negro slaves, was of 


ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 


!3 


Teutonic stock; the Scotch, except a few living chiefly in 
North Carolina, being from the lowlands, where Anglo- 
Saxon blood predominated. In Maryland there were many 
Roman Catholics, but elsewhere Protestants were in over¬ 
whelming majority, and of them the greater number were 
Calvinists. There was a common political experience based 
upon the fact that all the states were confronted by much 
the same problems. The English common law was univer¬ 
sally accepted. Most important of all was the similarity of 
practice and principle with regard to methods of government 
other than local. The defense of these colonial political insti¬ 
tutions had been in large measure the object of the Revolution, 
and now they had been crystallized in the constitutions of 
the several states. 

Organic unity among the states was actually represented 
by the Articles of Confederation. These established not 
so much a form of government as a method of diplomatic 
intercourse, and the organization took the form of a body 
called a Congress, a term at that time denoting a meeting of 
diplomatic representatives. The delegates of each state 
jointly cast one vote, though Rhode Island had only about 
60,000 population, while Virginia had 700,000. Two or more 
members had to be present to cast the vote of a state, and 
they might, by dividing equally, nullify it. The assent of 
nine states was necessary to all important measures, and to 
amend the Articles the consent of the legislature of every 
state was necessary. The delegates were elected and paid 
by their state legislatures, and were liable to recall at any 
time. Their term was for one year, and they could be re¬ 
elected only twice in any series of six years. 

The powers of Congress were adapted particularly for 
war. It could not Collect customs, or regulate commerce, ex¬ 
cept by making treaties prohibiting discrimination against 
foreign goods and vessels. It could treat with those Indian 
tribes only which did not live wholly in any one state. Its 


Articles of 
Confedera' 
tion. 


Powers of 
Congress. 


14 


THE UNITED STATES IN 1783 


The judici¬ 
ary. 


The execu¬ 
tive. 


Weakness of 
the Confed¬ 
eration. 


revenue was to be obtained by dividing its expenses among 
the states in proportion to the value of land held by indi¬ 
viduals, but there was no method of forcing a state to pay, 
and during its existence the Confederation received only 
about $6,000,000 of the $16,000,000 for which it asked. 

There was no general judiciary, but Congress was given 
power to select certain state courts to try piracies and fel¬ 
onies on the high seas, and to establish courts of appeals in 
prize cases. One such court was established and was active, 
but was in 1784 discontinued, the war claims having been 
mostly adjudicated. Congress was authorized also to call 
special courts, made up according to a carefully detailed 
plan, to decide boundary disputes between states. 

No executive department was provided for, but Congress 
had power to appoint civil officers, and in 1783, as a result 
of hard experience during the war, executive business had 
been divided among three departments. The Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs was Robert Livingston of New York, suc¬ 
ceeded in 1784 by John Jay of the same state, who came to 
be the most influential man at the seat of government. 
Robert Morris was Superintendent of Finance until 1784, 
when he gave up in despair or disgust, and was succeeded 
by a board of three commissioners. General Knox in 1785 
followed General Lincoln as Secretary at War. A naval 
department was provided for, but remained unorganized. 
The post office was but a small affair and was not considered 
as a department. 

The government was weak because there was no head 
to unite and correlate the work of the departments, 
because these executive officers had no powers independent 
of Congress, and because Congress was so dependent 
upon the states. The intention of those who drew up the 
Articles seems to have been to divide the sovereignty between 
the states and the national government; to make each 
sovereign within its own sphere. Political theorists are not 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 


15 

in agreement as to whether such a division is possible, but 
however this may be, there can be little doubt that no divi¬ 
sion was accomplished by this agreement. The powers of 
the general government were so few that it became essen¬ 
tially a creature of the states, and they practically retained 
the whole sovereign power during the period. 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 

(As to the use of this material, see the last paragraph of the 
Preface, page viii.) 

This chapter is but a recapitulation of physiographic and sec¬ 
tional factors existing in 1783, the development of which was traced 
in volume one. As it is becoming increasingly common, however, 
to begin the basic college course in American history at about this 
period, a few references follow, which have been found useful in 
expanding the students’ knowledge of these subjects. 

Farrand, L., Basis of American History, 1-22. Powell, J. W., Physiog- 
Physiographic Regions of the United States. Shaler, N. S., Physiog- raphy- 
raphy (Winsor, J., Narrative and Critical History of America, vol. 

IV, pp. i-xxx). 

Channing, E., Town and County Government {Johns Hopkins New 
Historical Studies , II), 437-474. Eggleston, E., The Beginners of England ‘ 
a Nation, 98-188; 315-346. Fiske, J., The Beginnings of New 
England. Howard, G. E., Local Constitutional History, 51-99; 

319-351. Low, A. M., The American People, vol. I. Mathews, 

L. K., Expansion of New England, chs. 1,2. 

Bruce, P. A., Economic History of Virginia, vol. I, chs. I, VII; Plantation 
vol. II, ch. XX; Institutional History of Virginia, I, chs. I and III. area ' 
Channing, Town and County Government {Johns Hopkins Histori¬ 
cal Studies, II), 437-489. Commons, J. R., etc., A Documentary 
History of American Industrial Society, vol. I. Doyle, J. A., The 
English Colonies in America , Virginia, 101-184. Eggleston, E., The 
Beginners of a Nation, 1-98. Fiske, J., Old Virginia and Her 
Neighbors, II, 1-44. Jefferson, T., Notes on Virginia (published 
separately and in his Writings). 

Howard, Local Constitutional"'History, 102-117; 358-387. Middle 
Faust, A. B., The German Element in the United States, I, chs. 5, 6. States * 


i6 


THE UNITED STATES IN 1783 


The 

frontier. 


Elements of 
union. 


Articles of 
Confedera¬ 
tion. Sources. 

General 

accounts. 


Roosevelt, T., The Winning of the West, I, chs. I, V, VI. Tur¬ 
ner, F. J., The Significance of the Frontier in American History 
(Am. Hist. Assoc., Report, 1893, 197-227). Faust, A. B., German 
Element in the United States, I, chs. 10, n, 12. 

Frothingham, R., Rise of the Republic, chs. Ill, IV, VII. How¬ 
ard, G. E., Preliminaries of the Revolution, ch. I. Shaler, N. S., 
History of United States, ch. I. 

American History Leaflet, no. 20. The Federalist (any edi¬ 
tion), nos. 15, 16, 21, 22. 

Fiske, J., Critical Period of American History, chs. I and II. 
Frothingham, R., Rise of the Republic, 1-32, 101-157, and ch. XII. 
McLaughlin, A. C., The Confederation and the Constitution, 35-53. 
Small, A., Beginnings of American Nationality {Johns Hopkins 
Historical Studies, VIII), 1-89. 


CHAPTER II 


THE HISTORY OF THE CONFEDERATION 

* The chief claim of the national government under the 
Confederation to consideration lay in its ownership and con¬ 
trol of lands west of the mountains, and its permanent con¬ 
tribution to American development was the enactment of 
regulations for the survey and government of this area. 
The manner in which it became possessed of this immense 
territory was as follows. 

Seven of the colonies, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New 
York, Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia, had claimed, 
on the basis of charters and of Indian treaties, land stretch¬ 
ing westward to the Mississippi. The British government 
had wished to make the mountains the western boundary 
of the several colonies, and itself to direct the development 
of the Mississippi valley on imperial lines. The resulting 
dispute was a minor cause of the Revolution. The Con¬ 
tinental Congress took up this claim of the British govern¬ 
ment, and the first draft of the Articles gave Congress the 
right of fixing state boundaries. This power was cut out 
before the Articles were presented to the states for adoption. 
Maryland, thereupon, in behalf of the landless states, fearing 
the size and power that its neighbors might attain if their 
claims were granted, refused to accept the Articles unless 
the western lands were granted to the central government. 
In 1781 New York, whose claim was the most dubious, led 
the way with a cession. Maryland at once accepted the 
Articles, and negotiations began which ended in cessions 
by the other states. In 1784 Virginia ceded to the national 

17 


Land 

cessions. 


State bound¬ 
aries. 


Land survey 
and sale. 


18 THE HISTORY OF THE CONFEDERATION 

government the jurisdiction of all the land she claimed north 
of the Ohio, on certain conditions; but she retained the right 
to grant the ownership of land within a certain area, west of 
the Scioto, in payment of the land bounties promised her sol¬ 
diers during the Revolution. Massachusetts in 1785 ce< ^ed 
her claims west of the western boundary of New York. Con¬ 
necticut followed in 1786, reserving on the southern shore of 
Lake Erie a tract, about the size of the parent state, now 
known as the “Western Reserve.” In 1800, having sold all 
this land, Connecticut yielded her jurisdiction to the United 
States government. South Carolina ceded her claims in 
1787; and in 1790 North Carolina, having sold her land, 
handed over the jurisdiction. Georgia yielded nothing 
until 1802. 

In the meantime the power of Congress to arrange for 
the arbitration of state boundaries was several times resorted 
to. In 1782 Pennsylvania was awarded land claimed by 
Connecticut. In 1786 suits between Massachusetts and 
New York, and South Carolina and Georgia, were arranged 
by satisfactory compromises. Later Congress sold to Penn¬ 
sylvania the triangle between New York, Ohio, and Lake 
Erie, which was left in its hands by the cessions, and there¬ 
after state boundary disputes east of the Mississippi never 
became serious. 

One reason for the rapid settlement of these questions 
was the desire for securing titles on the part of many who 
wished to buy, some for the purpose of settlement and some 
for speculation. They were unwilling to invest money while 
titles were undetermined. Once title was clear, the demand 
for land became insistent, and Congress was eager to sell 
in the hope of increasing its revenue. It therefore became 
necessary to devise a system of land sale. There was no lack 
of experience on this subject, for the problem had existed from 
the beginning of colonization in America and had existed in 
every colony. In framing a national system practices were 


PUBLIC LAND SYSTEM 


!9 


brought together from all sections and incorporated in an act 
passed in 1785. The details were worked out by Williamson 
of North Carolina, with Jefferson as an adviser. So satis¬ 
factory has it proved, that under it, amended as it has been 
from time to time, two thirds of our territory has passed 
from public to private ownership. The basic idea was that 
no land should be sold until it had been surveyed. The unit 
of survey was the township, six miles square, and divided 
into thirty-six sections, each one mile square and numbered 
according to a uniform system. The townships were sur¬ 
veyed by running a base line east and west, from which per¬ 
pendiculars were drawn every six miles. The land between 
each two perpendiculars was called a range, and the ranges 
were numbered from east to west. The ranges were divided 
into townships by lines drawn every six miles, parallel to the 
base, and these townships were numbered from the base, 
south or north as the case might be. Section sixteen in 
every township was, in accordance with colonial practice, 
reserved for the support of education. 

A beginning was made by ordering the survey of seven 
ranges west from Pennsylvania and the Ohio. The terms 
on which this land was offered for sale were unwise, Con¬ 
gress overreaching itself in the desire for money. It would 
not sell land for less than a dollar an acre, plus the cost 
of the survey, nor less than 640 acres, and would not allow 
credit. Sales, moreover, were to be held, not on the spot, 
but in the several states, and were by auction. This ex¬ 
cluded the majority of those who wished actually to settle, 
for the bulk of the migratory population had little money 
or credit. States and private land companies were offer¬ 
ing land on better terms, and so Congress derived little 
revenue from this source. 

A satisfactory system of government was as necessary as 
a secure title. In 1784 a plan drawn up by Jefferson 
was adopted, but it was vague, and failed to satisfy a body 


North¬ 

western 

Ordinance. 


20 


THE HISTORY OF THE CONFEDERATION 


Settlement. 


of Revolutionary officers, chiefly from New England, who de¬ 
sired to settle on the north bank of the Ohio, west of the 
seven ranges. They organized as the “Ohio Company of 
Associates,” and in 1786 proposed to Congress to purchase 
a large tract in that region, using for the purchase money 
the certificates of indebtedness for five years’ pay which they 
had received from Congress at the close of the war in place 
of the half pay for life which had at first been promised them. 
Congress, glad to sink this debt, listened readily to their 
suggestions; and Nathan Dane, a delegate from Massachu¬ 
setts, after consultation with their agent, Dr. Manasseh 
Cutler, drew up an ordinance which passed July 13, 1787, 
and which ranks among the most important pieces of legis¬ 
lation ever adopted in the United States. It provided that 
the territory be ruled by a governor and judges, appointed 
by the national government, until the male population over 
twenty-one reached 5000. Then a legislature was to be 
added, and ultimately, in accordance with the repeated 
promises of Congress and the terms of the Virginia cession, 
the territory was to be admitted into the Union, divided into 
not less than three nor more than five states. These states 
were to be bound forever by certain conditions: freedom 
of person and of religion, security of contracts, encourage¬ 
ment of education, common use of rivers, and that “There 
shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . other¬ 
wise than in the punishment of crimes.” This ordinance 
applied only to the territory north of the Ohio. In 1790 
the first Congress under the Constitution organized the lands 
ceded by North and South Carolina as the Territory South 
of the River Ohio, upon the same plan as the Northwest 
Territory, except that slavery was not prohibited. Kentucky 
was never a territory, remaining a part of Virginia until ad¬ 
mitted as a state. 

The Ordinance of 1787 satisfied the Ohio Company, which 
promptly purchased 1,500,000 acres southwest of the seven 


DIPLOMATIC PROBLEMS 


21 


ranges and founded Marietta in 1788. Its members, com¬ 
bining with the Connecticut settlers that somewhat later 
occupied the Western Reserve, started a stream of New 
England and Middle States emigration, which balanced the 
Virginia veterans and the mountaineers who were occupying 
Kentucky and the military bounty lands of what is now 
southern and central Ohio. These two streams of popula¬ 
tion, representing differing traditions and political conceptions, 
were destined to divide the country west of the mountains, 
and their conflicts ultimately resulted in the great Civil 
War. 

In 1782 Jacob Yoder, a Pennsylvania German, started 
down the Monongahela with a boatload of flour. Running 
down the Ohio and the Mississippi, he bartered it at New Or¬ 
leans, sold his boat, and took ship for Philadelphia, trading 
at Havana on the way, and returned home across the moun¬ 
tains with his profits. This voyage shows the natural and, 
for the time, the only outlet for the crude bulky products 
of the frontier farms. Unfortunately Spain held its key. 
The United States did, indeed, claim to inherit from Eng¬ 
land the right to navigate the Mississippi, but there was 
also necessary a “place of deposit,” where goods could be 
transshipped and rafts broken up. Spain denied the one 
with the other. This was in part because of a dispute be¬ 
tween the two countries as to the southern boundary of the 
United States, this country claiming the parallel of 31 0 , 
and Spain that of 32 0 30'. A more important reason was 
the hope of the Spanish government to use the Mississippi 
as a bribe to induce the western settlers to desert the United 
States and declare themselves either independent or subject 
to Spain. If the bribe failed, a lash was ready, for Spain 
was on good terms with the powerful southwestern Indians, 
and could loose the curse of frontier war. When, year 
after year, Congress failed to open the river or to quiet the 
Indians, it was not unnatural that the people of the West 


The problem 
of the Mis¬ 
sissippi. 


22 


THE HISTORY OF THE CONFEDERATION 


Diplomatic 
problems of 
the north¬ 
west. 


Commercial 

problems. 


lost their attachment to the Union, and many entered more 
or less heartily into intrigues with the Spaniards. 

To the northwest the situation was similar. England 
continued to hold Niagara, Detroit, and other key points 
within the territory assigned the United States by the treaty 
of 1783, on the plea that we had not carried out certain 
terms of that treaty. Through these posts she controlled 
the fur trade, and through the fur trade, the Indians. The 
settlement of the lake region was prevented, and that of 
the north bank of the Ohio hindered. Moreover, by means 
of the St. Lawrence, the English controlled the prosperity 
of Vermont, as Spain did that of Kentucky, Tennessee, and 
western Pennsylvania. The Vermont legislature was treat¬ 
ing for a separate commercial arrangement, and English 
officials, many of whom had been Loyalists during the Revolu¬ 
tion, contemplated with pleasure the possibility of a dis¬ 
solution of the United States. The West, as Washington 
said, stood “upon a pivot, the touch of a feather would 
turn them any way.” 

Independence brought to the coast colonies freedom from 
the navigation acts, and all the nations of Europe sought 
the commerce which England could no longer monopolize. 
Treaties were made with Sweden, Prussia, France, Holland, 
and Morocco, and adventurous American seamen found 
their way into the Pacific, bartering on the northwest coast 
of America for furs and ginseng, which they exchanged at 
Canton for the teas and silks demanded in the United States. 
In 1788 it became necessary to appoint a commercial agent 
at Canton. Such new openings, however, scarcely made 
up for the loss of some old trade connections and the dis¬ 
turbance of others. British protection had previously 
enabled us to carry on a considerable trade in the Mediterra¬ 
nean, where the Barbary pirates preyed on the commerce of 
weaker nations. The new government was unable to make a 
treaty with any of these lawless little powers except Morocco, 



Michilimackinae 


hamp- 


;oston 


Detroit 


oA 

^Philadelphia 


oganes^-S. nj 

,ni®^LWisville 


K.viie'vW' 


-Nashviiili 

T Hf 


^ ^Charleston, 

Savannah ^ 

, Mar vs R. 


UNITED STATES 

1783-1790 


t. Augustine 


SCALE OF MILES 


American settleu territory and posts 
British settled territory and posts 
Spanish settled territory and posts 


y/yflyfly/, Disputed or unsettled boundaries 
Names of Indian Tribes are printed in blue. 

L LPOATES ENGR'G CO., N.Y. -- 'c u 




Greenwich 


Longitude 90 West from 80 












































































COMMERCIAL PROBLEMS 


2 3 


and consequently trade beyond Gibraltar vanished. More 
important was the fact that Great Britain cut off most of 
our trade with the West Indian islands belonging to her. 
Previously these colonies had received most of their pro¬ 
visions and lumber from New England and the Middle 
States, and had paid for it in molasses, rum, and money. 
Now England allowed them to import American goods only 
when the other English colonies could not possibly supply 
the demand, and even then ordered that the importation be 
made only in English vessels, whereas, before the Revolution, 
the trade had been carried on almost entirely in American 
shipping. These regulations distressed American merchants, 
farmers, fishermen, and shipowners, and they all asked for 
relief. John Adams was sent as minister to England, but 
proved powerless. Congress had no power to threaten 
England with retaliation; the several states pursued varying 
and contradictory commercial policies, and we had nothing 
to offer England, for the American people still preferred 
English goods, and she held as large a proportion of our import 
trade as before the war. The Spanish trade, also, demanded 
attention. Spain needed American fish and flour, but mer¬ 
chants engaged in this trade labored under a disadvantage, 
owing to the absence of a treaty. Spain refused to make 
such a treaty unless we would give up our claim to navigate 
the Mississippi. In 1786 Jay arranged a treaty whereby 
we Were to allow this claim to stand over without prejudice 
for twenty-five years. Congress divided on the subject; 
the Northeast, to which the commercial aspect appealed, 
favored it; the South opposed and defeated it. 

The net result was that the Confederation government proved 
incompetent to foster American commerce, and the commer¬ 
cial classes came to desire a stronger central government. 
Washington wrote Mr. McHenry, a delegate in Congress, 
August 22, 1785 : “We are either a united people under one 
head and for federal purposes, or we are thirteen independ- 


24 


THE HISTORY OF THE CONFEDERATION 


Financial 

disorder. 


ent sovereignties, eternally counteracting each other. . . . 
[The nations of the world] must see and feel, that the Union 
or the States individually are sovereigns, as best suits their 
purposes; in a word, that we are one nation to-day and thir¬ 
teen to-morrow. Who will treat with us on such terms? ” 
The paper money issued by the Continental Congress 
had been repudiated, but the national debt remained. This 
amounted to about $45,000,000, of which about $8,000,000 
was due to foreign nations and bankers. The states were 
annually asked for the sums of money required, but they 
seldom responded promptly, often paid in their own depre¬ 
ciated paper, and sometimes not at all. Altogether they 
scarcely supplied the modest running expenses of the govern¬ 
ment, about half a million a year. The interest on the 
domestic debt remained unpaid, and the notes and certifi¬ 
cates which represented it fell to about fifteen cents on the 
dollar; the interest on the foreign debt was met by addi¬ 
tional loans from Dutch bankers, obtained by John Adams. 
Jefferson outlined the scheme of metallic coinage with the 
dollar as the unit, which has ever since been used, but during 
the Confederation only copper cents were coined. In 1781 
Congress, on the advice of Robert Morris, established the 
Bank of North America, the first real bank in the country. 
The power of Congress to grant a bank charter was questioned, 
and to strengthen the bank’s position a Pennsylvania state 
charter was obtained in 1782. This was revoked in 1785 and 
the bank remained in a questionable position until 1787, when 
Pennsylvania granted a new charter under which the bank has 
since operated. During this period of uncertainty the bank 
was naturally of little assistance to the national government. 
Conditions grew steadily worse, the requisitions of 1786 were 
scarcely heeded by the states, delegates neglected to attend 
Congress, and those chosen were men of smaller caliber than 
in the first enthusiastic days of the Revolution. Lack of 
power to accomplish results brought about lack of interest. 


STATE GOVERNMENTS 


25 


The real political life and interest of the people centered 
in the state governments. Leaders like Patrick Henry, 
John Hancock, and George Clinton served as governors. 
The judiciary in nearly all the states ranked high. Under 
the new constitutions, established after the Declaration of 
Independence, it rested upon the authority of the people and 
not of an alien government as before the Revolution. So 
great was the respect for its personnel and the confidence in its 
honesty, that in some states it ventured to stand between 
the legislature and the state constitution, declaring laws 
unconstitutional and therefore void, thus paving the way 
for the high position subsequently taken by the national 
Supreme Court. Such cases during the Confederation were 
those of Holmes v. Walton in New Jersey in 1780, Caton v. 
Commonwealth of Virginia in 1782, Trevett v. Weeden in Rhode 
Island in 1786, and Bayard v. Singleton in North Carolina in 
1787. In 1791 the Supreme Court of New Hampshire came 
to a similar conclusion in the case of Gilman v. McClary. 
Some attempt was made to render judicial processes more 
simple and less expensive. In Virginia the laws of entail 
and primogeniture, by which great estates were kept intact 
and passed on from eldest son to eldest son, were abolished. 
In Virginia also, after a hard fight, Madison and Jefferson 
succeeded in disestablishing the state church, and in most of 
the states some steps were taken towards the separation of 
church and state, though it was to be many years before 
officeholding was made universally independent of religious 
belief, and taxes for the support of religion were abolished. 

Special interest attaches to the antislavery agitation of 
the period. The Quakers had always opposed slavery, and 
there had been a few other voices crying in the wilderness. 
The region north of the Carolinas had sufficient slaves, in 
fact, more than it wanted, and the colonies there had endeav¬ 
ored to get the consent of the English government to the 
prohibition of their importation. During the Revolution, 


State legis¬ 
lation, legal 
and religious. 


Antislavery 

movement. 


26 


THE HISTORY OF THE CONFEDERATION 


Economic 
problems and 
paper money. 


many states had prohibited the trade. Slavery had, in fact, 
ceased to pay except in the newly exploited districts of the 
extreme South. Under these circumstances the equality 
doctrines of the Revolution were readily extended to the ne¬ 
groes, at least to the extent of causing the majority of the 
leaders of thought to condemn slavery. There began an 
era of abolition. Vermont led the way in 1777. The Massa¬ 
chusetts constitution of 1780 was later interpreted as abol¬ 
ishing slavery, and New Hampshire followed in 1783. 
Pennsylvania in 1780 began gradual emancipation, and similar 
laws were adopted in 1784 by Connecticut and Rhode 
Island. New York and New Jersey followed in 1799 and 
1804. The number of slaves actually freed was small; some 
were sold south, and some continued to be held under the 
gradual emancipation acts, except in Massachusetts, Ver¬ 
mont, and New Hampshire, almost until the Civil War. In 
Virginia there was an equal disposition to free the slaves, 
but the property sacrifice would have been greater, and the 
future of the freed negroes was too uncertain. The move¬ 
ment, therefore, halted at the Mason-Dixon line, while the 
Northwest Ordinance, prohibiting slavery north of the Ohio, 
carried the division to the Mississippi, and a new sectional¬ 
ism, ominous for the future, but by no means sharp at this 
time, was thus foreshadowed. 

Even the state governments were not able to deal with all 
their problems successfully. The Revolution, like all wars, 
left behind it much economic distress. Not only was there 
destruction of wealth, but also much wealth changed hands. 
To a great degree the rich grew richer and the poor poorer. 
This was intensified during the Confederation, for the coast 
region and the merchants recovered from the effects of the 
war sooner than the farmers of the interior, who found taxes 
heavier, but no new means of making money. In 1783 and 
1784 there were large imports of long desired English goods, 
and many, particularly the farmers, thinking that independ- 


STATE GOVERNMENTS 


27 


ence would mean immediate good times, bought more than 
they could pay for. They became indebted to the merchants, 
who came to constitute a creditor class. Taxes, too, were 
heavier than before the Revolution, because of the state 
debts created to carry on the war, and they were levied 
chiefly upon landowners. The farmers came to hate those 
to whom they owed money, the lawyers who attempted to 
collect the debts, and the judges who insisted upon payment, 
or sent the debtor to prison in accordance with the law of 
that day. In the South, many of the merchants belonged 
to the debtor class. The chief political question that divided 
these classes was that of currency. Congress, as has been 
stated, had repudiated the paper money it had issued dur¬ 
ing the Revolution, and furnished only a small amount, 
which was speedily withdrawn, after the war. The ques¬ 
tion was, therefore, left to the states. There was undoubtedly 
too little money for the needs of the country. Gold and 
silver were sent abroad to pay for our imports, which 
were very heavy during the first years after the peace, really 
exceeding the capacity of the country to pay for them. The 
debtor class demanded the issuance of unlimited amounts 
of paper, which would make it easy to pay debts and taxes. 

This desire for cheap money was not the result of dishon¬ 
esty, but of lack of financial experience. The colonies gener¬ 
ally had been a debtor community, and before the Revolution 
had indulged in many dangerous financial experiments, and 
had been kept from others only by the restraining hand of 
England. Moreover, the Revolution had spread the idea 
that a legislature was omnipotent and could do anything 
the people desired; that it could make value where no value 
was before.. The paper-money party was the conservative 
American party; the sound-money party was a progressive 
element standing for ideas associated with England and 
composed of men interested in loaning money, a new business 
in America. In the Carolinas, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, 


28 


THE HISTORY OF THE CONFEDERATION 


Shays’s Re¬ 
bellion. 


Tendencies 
toward dis¬ 
solution. 


and New York, the paper-money party succeeded to a degree. 
In Rhode Island it gained full control. Currency was issued, 
for the redemption of which there was little hope, and it 
was voted that if the creditor refused it, the debt could 
be absolved by depositing the amount at court and adver¬ 
tising the fact in the newspapers, and that the creditor in 
such case be deprived of the franchise. Such notices began 
“Know ye,” and the papers were so filled with them that 
that phrase became the nickname of the party. Creditors 
fled their debtors, and were brought into court for refusing 
to accept payment. The state supreme court, in the case of 
Trevett v. Weeden, decided that the law was unconstitutional, 
whereupon the legislature began an attack upon the court. 

While the Rhode Island government ceased to be a pro¬ 
tection to property, that of Massachusetts was threatened 
with overthrow or dismemberment for protecting it. There, 
the debtors obtained in 1782 the right to tender, at prices 
to be fixed by arbitration, cattle or indeed almost any form 
of property as payment for debt, but paper money was re¬ 
fused. Taxes were high, state officers received what seemed 
to the farmer extravagant salaries, and lawyers, who were 
universally distrusted, grew rich. Under the lead of Captain 
Shays, the movement for relief assumed, during the fall and 
early winter of 1786-1787, an insurrectionary form in the 
western counties. Thanks to the energy of Governor 
Bowdoin the insurrection was put down, but the move¬ 
ment was not stamped out. Governor Bowdoin was 
defeated for reelection, and there was widespread sympathy 
for Shays. 

The states were not only torn by politics but were threatened 
with dissolution. In Maine and in the Berkshires there was 
talk of secession from the rest of Massachusetts; Pennsylvania 
and North Carolina were similarly threatened with disrup¬ 
tion; and Kentucky and Virginia were trying to agree to 
separate. Vermont, which was an unrecognized state, occu- 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 


2 9 


pying territory claimed by New Hampshire, New York, and 
Massachusetts, at one time seemed likely to annex the New 
Hampshire towns in the valley of the Connecticut River; at 
another, to be divided by the union of all the towns in 
that valley to form a new state. States seemed as liable to 
dissolution as the Confederation. John Marshall wrote, Jan¬ 
uary 5, 1787: “I fear . . . that they have truth on their 
side who say that man is incapable of governing himself. I 
fear we may live to see another revolution.” It seemed 
that the American people, instead of founding a nation, 
were destined to be resolved into an indefinite number of 
constantly changing political units, whose conflicting inter¬ 
ests would scarcely allow them to live forever at peace, the 
one with another, and that their separation from the British 
Empire was but a first step toward anarchy. 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 


American History Leaflets, nos. 22 and 23. Paine, Thomas, 
The Public Good. 

Adams, B. H., Maryland’s Influence in Founding a National 
Commonwealth {Johns Hopkins Historical Studies, III, no. 1). Ford, 
A. C., Colonial Precedents of Our National Land System. Hins¬ 
dale, B. A., Old Northwest, chs. XV, XVI. McLaughlin, The Con¬ 
federation, 108-138. McMaster, J. B., People of the United States, 

I, 147-167; 111,89-113. Roosevelt, T ., The Winning of the West , 

II, Treat, P. J., The National Land System. Turner, F. J., West- 
ern State Making {Am. Hist. Review, I, 70-87 ; 251-269). 

Adams, John, Works, III, 353-406. Coxe, Tench, A Brief 
Examination of Lord Sheffield’s Observations on the Commerce 
of the United States. 

Bancroft, G., United States (1883), VI, 136-153. Fisher, S., 
American Trade Regulations before 1784 (Am. Flist. Assoc., Papers, 

III, 467-496). Hill, W., First Stages of the Tariff Policy (Am. Econ. 
Assoc., Publications, VIII, no. 6). Lyman, T., Diplomacy of the 
United States, II, ch. IV. McLaughlin, The Confederation, 71-89. 
Sumner, W. G., The Financier and Finances of the American Revo¬ 
lution, chs. XIII-XV. 


Western 

problems. 

Sources. 

Historical 

accounts. 


Commerce 
and finance. 
Sources. 


Historical 

accounts. 


30 


THE HISTORY OF THE CONFEDERATION 


Reform legis- Hunt, G., Madison and Religious Liberty (Am. Hist. Assoc., 
lation. Report , 1901, 1 ,163-171). Jameson, J. F., Introduction to the Study 

of the Constitutional and Political History of the United States {Johns 
Hopkins Hist. Studies, IV, no. 5). Jameson, J. F., Essays on the 
Constitutional History of the United States, no. 5. Thorpe, F. W., 
Constitutional History of the American People, I, 60-132. Williams, 
G. W., History of the Negro Race, chs. XXVI-XXXI. 

Economic Bates, F. G., Rhode Island and the Formation of the Union (Co- 

conditions. lumbia University Studies in Political Science, etc., vol. X, no. 2). 

McLaughlin, The Confederation , 138-168. McMaster, United 
Stales, I, 299-354. Minot, G. R., The Shays’s Rebellion. Warren, 
J. W. P., The Confederation and the Shays's Rebellion {Am. Hist. 
Review, XI, 42-68). 


CHAPTER III 


THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 

Although on the surface all was disorder and dissolution, 
during the period of the Confederation, tendencies were at work 
in favor of a stronger union. An illustration of such nationaliz¬ 
ing influences was the action of various religious bodies. The 
Episcopalians and the Methodists adopted national constitu¬ 
tions. The Catholics received from the Pope a national 
organization, while the Presbyterians adapted their system, 
already national in character, to the conditions of independ¬ 
ence and formed a partial alliance with the Congregation- 
alists of New England. Far-sighted thinkers became more 
and more convinced that the only remedy for the exist¬ 
ing political evils also lay in creating a stronger central 
government. Franklin had, in fact, in a preliminary draft 
for the Articles of Confederation, sketched a much stronger 
government than that adopted; and even before the Articles 
were in force, Hamilton had begun an attack upon them, 
based on their insufficiency. The leader of the strong 
government party, however, was Washington, who, with 
the difficulties of waging war in the disorganized condition 
of the country fresh in his mind, continued to impress upon 
his wide circle of personal acquaintances the need of action, 
and who found in young James Madison a lieutenant that 
spared no labor in collecting and marshaling facts and argu¬ 
ments. Every year there were added to these leaders, 
supporters from among the business, property-holding, and 
professional classes. Some of these thought that only a 
monarchy could save the country, while the disorders in 

31 


Construc¬ 
tive tend¬ 
encies. 


3 2 


THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 


Attempts to 
amend the 
Articles. 


Calling of the 
convention. 


Characteris¬ 
tics of the 
convention. 


Rhode Island and Massachusetts convinced many, even 
decided Republicans, that the central government must be 
at least strong enough to preserve order. 

At first, in 1781, it was attempted to amend the Articles 
by giving Congress power to collect an import duty of five per 
cent to pay the debt. This was defeated by Rhode Island 
on the claim that “The power of the purse is the touchstone 
of freedom.” The real reason was that Rhode Island was 
attracting trade by underbidding its neighbors by means of 
a lower tariff. Then in 1783 Congress requested power to 
lay certain duties for twenty-five years. This was defeated 
by New York, where the state treasury was growing rich 
from duties on goods imported to be used in other states, 
and there was consequently jealousy of a federal impost. 
A third request, to allow Congress to pass navigation acts 
against countries refusing favorable commercial treaties, was 
discussed for three years without tangible result. 

The failure of these attempts at amendment strengthened 
the demand for more radical action. Hamilton, Thomas 
Paine, Pelatiah Webster, and others called for a constitu¬ 
tion to be drawn, as later state constitutions had been, by a 
convention summoned for that special purpose. The first 
step was taken in 1785 at Mount Vernon, where commis¬ 
sioners from Virginia and Maryland had met to settle a 
dispute as to the navigation of the Potomac River. As a 
result of discussion there, Virginia asked the states to send 
delegates to Annapolis to consider the condition of commerce 
generally. The meeting at Annapolis, held in 1786, was 
attended by delegates from only five states, and it recom¬ 
mended that a convention be held the next spring at Phila¬ 
delphia for the purpose of devising amendments to the 
Articles. This call was indorsed by Congress after some 
hesitation, and on May 25, 1787, the convention met. 

The Philadelphia convention was a very different body 
from any that had previously assembled in America. Fifty- 


THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 


33 


five members attended, and thirty-nine signed the Constitu¬ 
tion. Of the thirty-nine, only six had signed the Dec¬ 
laration of Independence, and only four the Articles of 
Confederation. The members represented not a younger 
generation, but another element in the same generation. 

They were less democratic, many distrusted the people, and 
nearly all cared less about political theory than about good 
government. The majority of the members were well edu¬ 
cated ; there were many graduates of American colleges, four 
had been students of law in the Temple in London, James 
Wilson of Pennsylvania had attended three Scotch uni¬ 
versities. There was much legal knowledge, and Blackstone, 
the expounder of the common law, was used more than Locke, 
the political philosopher and the guide of the Revolutionary 
statesmen. The great majority belonged to the rising strong 
government party; partly because the Revolutionary leaders, 
such as Clinton, Samuel Adams, and Patrick Henry, did 
not care to attend. The men who preached the Revolu¬ 
tion were not to be the leaders in raising up a new govern¬ 
ment. 

The constitution drawn up by this convention was not, Conflicting 
as is often claimed, an inspiration; rather it was a compro- mterests - 
mise. There is hardly an important clause which was not 
the result of mutual concession, and not a member was entirely 
satisfied. There was a conflict of interest between the large 
and the small states, between the states with a large slave 
population and those with few or no slaves, between the com¬ 
mercial and the agricultural districts, between those members 
who wanted the central government to be as strong as pos¬ 
sible and those who wished it to be only as strong as was 
necessary. Though the latter were outnumbered in the 
convention, they spoke with weight, for they represented 
those powerful leaders who were not present, and many voters 
whose acquiescence it would be necessary to secure before 
putting any plan into effect. 


34 


THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 


Leaders. 


Temper of 
convention. 


Madison, as the mouthpiece of Washington and the 
drafter of the Virginia plan which was presented as a sort of 
starting point for work, was the most active leader of the 
strong government party. Hamilton’s views were so extreme 
as to deprive him of some of the weight he might otherwise 
have possessed, and Franklin elected to play the part of 
peacemaker. Roger Sherman of Connecticut and James 
Wilson of Pennsylvania contributed much practical experi¬ 
ence and legal knowledge, while a number of younger men, 
as Charles Pinckney of South Carolina, who came with a 
well-developed plan of his own, and Rufus King of Massa¬ 
chusetts, were constantly on the floor. Mason of Virginia, 
Luther Martin of Maryland, and Paterson of New Jersey, 
who also presented a model of his own, were among the most 
consistent representatives of the weak government party. 
With Washington as presiding officer, and with closed doors, 
which allowed the discussion to become confidential, the 
convention went to work to harmonize the conflicting 
interests. 

No body of men ever worked more conscientiously or with 
a more sincere desire of coming to an agreement, but again 
and again it seemed as if their differences would prove abso¬ 
lutely irreconcilable ; time and again points were voted in 
committee of the whole only to be reconsidered and deter¬ 
mined differently in the regular session. On June 28 Frank¬ 
lin referred to “ the diversity of opinion that had prevailed 
throughout the deliberations of the convention. ... In 
this situation groping as we were in the dark, how has it 
happened that nobody has thought of applying for light to 
that powerful friend who alone can supply it ? ” His proposal 
for prayers, however, was rejected lest the public take alarm. 
By September the long four months’ debate had cleared the 
minds of the delegates as to many of the fundamental prob¬ 
lems of government, and when at length an instrument was 
framed the majority found more joy in its successful com- 


THE COMPROMISES 


35 


pletion than grief at the fact that they had been forced to 
compromise many of the convictions with which they had 
entered the convention. 

One of the most important of the compromises was with Compromises 
regard to representation. The small states were unwilling tation. resen " 
to forego the equal voice to which they had been accustomed; 
the large states were determined to have a change. While 
this discussion was progressing, it was decided that the 
legislature should consist of two houses, and Roger Sherman 
suggested the plan that was adopted: of having the states 
represented by two members each in the Senate, and accord¬ 
ing to some equitable ratio in the House. The Senate 
could check any legislation injurious to the small states, 
and the House, any unfavorably affecting the large. A 
similar compromise was made with regard to the election of 
the President, who was to be voted for in the first instance 
by an electoral college in which each state was to have as 
many members as it had senators and representatives. In 
case no person received a majority, which it was supposed 
might frequently occur, the election was to be made by the 
House, the delegation of each state having one vote. With 
these compromises the conflict of large and small states 
disappeared forever. It was, indeed, only a temporary and 
artificial alignment. 

There was much discussion as to what should be the 
equitable ratio upon which representation in the House was 
to rest. Ultimately it was decided to accept population, 
and this raised the question as to whether slaves should or 
should not be counted. They certainly contributed to the 
wealth of the country, but on the other hand they were not 
voters, and the vote of a free man in a state with slaves 
would count for much more than in a state with few or no 
slaves. This question was settled according to a compromise 
which had been almost unanimously recommended by Con¬ 
gress to the states in 1783, to the effect that direct taxes be 


Compromise 
on commer¬ 
cial powers. 


The question 
of sover¬ 
eignty. 


36 THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 

apportioned according to population, five slaves being 
counted as three free persons. Now it was agreed that both 
representation and direct taxes be apportioned according to 
this ratio. If the slave states received less representation, 
they also would pay smaller taxes. The fact that direct 
taxes were levied only three times before the freeing of the 
slaves removed, in practice, one of the compensating ele¬ 
ments of this compromise, but the compromise of three for 
five remained, and, although both parties to it subsequently 
complained, it was probably the fairest arrangement which 
could have been made at that time. 

Another compromise was between the northern commer¬ 
cial states that wanted Congress to have power to assist the 
merchant marine by passing navigation acts, and the extreme 
southern states. These latter feared that such legislation 
would increase freight rates, and particularly that the power 
of Congress might be used to prohibit the importation of 
slaves, and they, therefore, wished to forbid the passage of 
such acts except by a two-thirds vote; that is to say, practi¬ 
cally, except with their consent. It was agreed, finally, 
that navigation laws be allowed if passed by a simple major¬ 
ity, and that Congress should not prohibit the slave trade 
for twenty years. 

Throughout the convention there was continual conflict 
between those who wished the new national government 
to be supreme and those who wished it to be the agent of the 
states. In the end, the question was evaded rather than 
settled. As the majority of the members belonged to the 
national party, they inserted many clauses tending in that 
direction, particularly one to the effect that the Constitu¬ 
tion, treaties, and the laws of Congress be the “ supreme law 
of the land” and binding upon the judges of every court. 
Still they did not venture to be absolutely explicit, because 
their work had to be submitted to the people of the states, 
who they feared would reject a plan plainly and strongly 


THE COMPROMISES 


37 


nationalistic. The document that they drew up was, there¬ 
fore, ambiguous to the extent that it did not specifically vest 
the sovereignty either in state or nation. The convention 
probably leaned toward the latter position, but, as Madison 
points out, in interpreting the Constitution, the ultimate 
authority is not the opinion of the convention that drew it 
up, but the understanding of the people, particularly the 
members of the state conventions, who made it law. It is 
probable that a majority of these supposed that the Consti¬ 
tution divided the sovereignty between state and nation; 
some believed that all sovereignty remained in the states, 
and the central government was merely an agent to perform 
certain functions; few, if any, conceived that the states 
were giving up all their sovereignty to the new government. 

The majority in the Philadelphia convention hoped that 
they were giving enough power to the national government to 
make it self-dependent; and they sought to avoid friction 
between state and nation by reducing their relations to a 
minimum and allowing the nation to enforce its laws directly 
upon the individual, and not upon the states as had been 
the case in the Confederation. They laid upon the citizen 
a double duty and allegiance. Friction could not be alto¬ 
gether avoided, and ultimately the country divided in civil 
war over the question of sovereignty and its consequences. 
Yet this does not condemn the compromise arrived at. 
The country did not divide because the Constitution was 
ambiguous, but the Constitution was ambiguous because 
the country was already divided. In its elasticity lay its 
strength. Parties could differ as to its meaning and still be 
loyal and united in its support. If it had explicitly given the 
sovereignty to the nation, it would not have been accepted; 
if it had given sovereignty to the states, it could not have been 
adapted, as it has been, to the growing needs of national 
activity. 

Questions as to the form of government were more easily 


Elasticity of 
the Constitu¬ 
tion. 


38 THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 

Origin of the settled. The first formal resolution presented to the conven- 

Constitution. ^ Qn was . “That a national government ought to be estab¬ 
lished, consisting of a supreme legislature, executive, and 
judiciary.” This resolution was adopted and of itself re¬ 
moved many difficulties. The members knew how to form 
a government, and a government of three departments; 
they had but to look about them at the state constitutions 
framed within the last dozen years, and to recall the experi¬ 
ence of colonial times. It was the attempt to form a league 
of states, a confederation, which had proved unsuccessful 
because it was a novel task. Madison’s carefully analyzed 
plans of confederacies, ancient and modern, which he had 
brought to Philadelphia, became almost worthless. The 
provisions that survived debate were practically all based 
on American precedent, and in most cases upon prac¬ 
tices running back into colonial times. In discussion, 
indeed, the English constitution was often cited, but it was 
the English constitution as found in Blackstone, who de¬ 
scribed it as it had existed in the seventeenth century when 
its customs had been transplanted to America, and not the 
actual practice in 1789. Members saw in England three 
coequal departments, not the supreme legislature guided by 
a cabinet which actually existed, and so their attempt to 
follow English example but reenforced American tradition. 

The form The chief discussion arose from the fear, felt by some of 

men°t Vern ' the more democratic members, of intrusting the executive 
power to a single man. Defeated in the attempt to secure 
a multiple executive, these delegates endeavored to limit the 
President by an executive council. This also was voted 
down, but the Senate was given a check on his most impor¬ 
tant executive acts, its “advice and consent” being made 
necessary for the making of appointments and of treaties. 
The leading ideas that controlled the arrangement of details 
were those of the threefold separation of powers, and of 
checks and balances. The legislature was dependent upon 


THE CONSTITUTION BEFORE THE PEOPLE 


39 


the people alone; the House, whose members were elected for 
two years, stood for the masses; the Senate, whose members 
were to be chosen by the legislatures of the states and to 
serve six years, were expected to represent wealth and influ¬ 
ence, as well as the integrity of the states. The President 
was independent of the legislature, for its members could not 
serve as electors, and, even if he should be chosen by the 
House, it would be to serve a fixed term of four years unless 
he committed some misdemeanor so serious as to call for 
impeachment. The executive could raise no money or troops 
without the vote of the legislature; the legislature could 
pass a bill over the President’s veto only by two-thirds 
majority. The Supreme Court was to be appointed by the 
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; 
but as the justices were to serve for good behavior, they 
became practically independent on appointment. Thus, 
legislature, executive, and judiciary stood each uncontrolled 
by the others, but unable to take serious action without the 
others’ consent. Amendments to the Constitution could be 
formally proposed by a two-thirds vote of both houses of 
Congress, and become a part of the Constitution on their 
acceptance by three quarters of the states. On application 
by the legislatures of two thirds of the states, Congress was to 
call a convention to propose amendments. 

The Constitution, finally drawn up in the lucid English 
of Gouverneur Morris, was completed September 17, 1787, 
and it was submitted to Congress with the request that 
that body transmit the draft to the state legislatures. The 
Constitution itself, however, provided the method by which 
it was to receive its sanction, which was that it be 
submitted to conventions specially called in the several 
states, and go into effect on its ratification by nine 
states. This would give the Constitution a more direct 
sanction from the people than the Articles of Confederation 
had received, which had been simply adopted by the state 


The Consti¬ 
tution before 
the people. 


40 


THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 


Opposing 

forces. 


The Federal¬ 
ists. 


legislatures; it would give the federal Constitution in fact 
precisely the same sanction that the state constitutions had 
received, except in Massachusetts, where there had been a 
popular vote; but it would be in direct violation of the 
Articles of Confederation, which the convention had been 
called to amend, and which could be amended only by the 
consent of the legislature of every state. 

Congress, however, transmitted the draft, September 28, 
1787, to the state legislatures with its recommendation, 
and thereupon began the most momentous political conflict 
ever waged in this country. One clause of the Constitution 
forbade the states to issue “ bills of credit,” and this brought 
against it all the paper-money party. It was opposed by 
many of the established state authorities, partly because 
it would diminish the importance of the state and partly 
because those in power represented those favoring weak 
government. George Clinton and Patrick Henry fought 
it in their states, and they were aided by men like Gerry and 
Martin, who attended the convention but refused to sign. 
They characterized it as a “continental exertion of the well 
bom of America,” and scented danger of monarchy, aris¬ 
tocracy, and oppression. 

The advocates of adoption were in the awkward position 
that they must defend every provision. It was easier to 
compromise the interests of a state in the convention, where 
all states and interests were represented, than to defend 
that compromise at home, where people saw only one side 
of the question. Men returning from the convention, how¬ 
ever, had the advantage of thorough familiarity with all 
arguments pro and con, and they kept in touch with one 
another by correspondence. In the war of pamphlets which 
followed, the most efficacious were those entitled “ Federalist ” 
and written by Hamilton, Madison, and Jay. This title was 
adopted by the party of the Constitution, and so they forced 
their opponents to assume that of Anti-Federalists. 


ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION 


41 


The Constitution was, on the whole, favorable to the small 
states, and these were the first to accept it. First, Delaware; 
then Pennsylvania, which, though not small, was by its 
central position nationalistic; then New Jersey, Georgia, and 
Connecticut. In Massachusetts there was a struggle, but 
by clever management Samuel Adams and John Hancock 
were prevented from coming out against it, and on Febru¬ 
ary 6, 1788, the convention accepted it by a vote of 187 
to 167. Maryland, South Carolina, and New Hampshire 
followed, each after a hard contest. This brought the number 
up to nine, but the Constitution could hardly have gone into 
effect without Virginia and New York. In Virginia Patrick 
Henry led the opposition, and John Marshall, who was later 
to do so much toward interpreting the Constitution, was 
now one of its most effective supporters. The Federalists 
won, but it was with the understanding that they would do 
their best to secure certain amendments. In New York 
the country members still clung to the duties collected on 
goods imported for Connecticut and New Jersey. The city 
merchants thought that they would gain trade enough under 
the new system to more than make this up, and even pro¬ 
posed to secede from the state and join the new union. 
Hamilton, supporting the Constitution, conducted a legislative 
fight unequaled in American history, and forced it through 
a convention two thirds of whom had been opposed to it. 

With the assent of these eleven states the Constitution 
was assured a trial. Congress, on September 13, 1788, 
voted that it had been ratified, that elections should be held 
for the officers called for under the new government, and that 
they meet in New York on the first Wednesday of March, 1789. 
This done, the old Congress practically disappears from 
history, though it continued to meet until the next spring. 

North Carolina and Rhode Island were left in a peculiar 
position. Their associate states had repudiated the Arti¬ 
cles, and they themselves had agreed to no substitute. In 


Adoption o\ 
the Consti¬ 
tution. 


North Caro¬ 
lina and 
Rhode Island. 


42 


THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 


Amend¬ 

ments. 


North Carolina the influence of Patrick Henry was strong, 
and it was decided to stay out until certain amendments 
should be adopted. As Willie Jones, the Anti-Federal¬ 
ist leader, said: “ We run no risk of being excluded from the 
union when we think proper to come in. Virginia, our next 
neighbor, will not oppose our admission. We have a common 
cause with her. She wishes the same alterations.” Five 
states, in fact, when ratifying the Constitution, had proposed 
amendments. Many of these had to do with details, being 
devised to hedge about authority with limitations. The 
most important, however, were to supply what many felt 
to be a most serious omission, that is, a “bill of rights,” such 
as preceded nearly all the state constitutions, setting forth 
those rights reserved by the people, and, in this case, by the 
states also, to themselves inviolably forever. This matter 
was at once taken up by the new Congress when it met. 
On September 25, 1789, it proposed to the states, for their 
acceptance, ten amendments, constituting such a bill of 
rights, and on November 21 North Carolina ratified the 
Constitution. These amendments were accepted by the 
states, but even they did not satisfy Rhode Island. There 
the paper-money party was still supreme, and the legis¬ 
lature refused even to call a convention, in spite of threats 
by the commercial element to bring about the secession of 
Providence. Congress dealt with her vigorously. Mr. 
Maclay, a Pennsylvania senator, wrote in his diary: “They 
admitted on all hands that Rhode Island was independent, 
and did not deny that the measures now taken were meant 
to force her into the adoption of the Constitution.” These 
measures, consisting of tariff regulations, were successful, 
and on May 29, 1790, Rhode Island ratified the Constitution, 
and the union was complete. 

Thus was launched what has proved to be, up to the 
present time at least, the final and successful attempt at 
continental organization; a problem which for one hundred 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 


43 


years had been attracting increasingly the best minds, first 
of the British Empire and then of America; and the impor¬ 
tance of which merited, while the success of the solution 
justified, the attention devoted to it. The frame of govern¬ 
ment of no independent country, with the exception of Siam, 
has survived from 1789 to the present day with so few vital 
changes as has the Constitution of the United States. 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 

General source reading is probably more desirable and more 
easily possible than for any other period. The letters of Wash¬ 
ington and Madison, Madison’s Papers, Elliot’s Debates , and The 
Federalist are and will remain the best reading on the subject. 

Bancroft, G., History of the United States, VI, 207-370. Beard, 
C. A., An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United 
States. Curtis, G. T., Constitutional History of the United States, I, 
chs. XV-XXXII. Farrand, M., Framing of the Constitution of the 
United States. Jameson, J. F., Studies in the History of the Federal 
Convention of 1787 (Am. Hist. Assoc., Report, 1902, vol. I, 89-161), 
containing a bibliography. McLaughlin, A. C., The Confederation, 
221-277. Story, J., Commentaries, 1 ,470,627-643. Thorpe, F. W., 
Constitutional History of the United States, ch. V. 

B outell, L. H., Roger Sherman. B rown, W. G., Oliver Ellsworth. 
Gay, S. H., James Madison. Lodge, H. C., George Washington. 
Morse, J. T., Alexander Hamilton. Roosevelt, T., Gouverneur 
Morris. Rowland, K. M., George Mason. 

Davis, J., Confederate Government, 86-103. Harding, S. B., 
Ratification of the Federal Constitution by the State of Massachusetts. 
Federalist (edited byP. L. Ford), 632-651 (amendments proposed 
by the states). Henry, W. E., Patrick Henry, II, chs. XXXVI- 
XXXIX. Jameson, Essays on the Constitutional History of the 
United States, no. 2. Libby, O. G., Geographical Distribution of 
the Vote of the Thirteen States. McLaughlin, The Confederation , 
277-310. McMaster, United States, I, 454-502. Roper, C. L., 
Why North Carolina at first refused to ratify the Federal Constitution 
(Am. Hist. Assoc., Report, 1905, vol. I, 99-108). Story, J., Com¬ 
mentaries, 308-372: 


Sources. 


General 

accounts. 


Biographies. 


Adoption of 
the Consti¬ 
tution. 


CHAPTER IV 


“ Conven¬ 
tions of the 
Constitu¬ 
tion.” 


Organization 
of Congress. 


THE ORGANIZATION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE 
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 

The national Constitution, as compared with the usual 
state constitution of to-day, was brief. It but sketched 
the general outlines of the government, and left the filling 
in to those who should be elected under it. It was fortunate, 
therefore, that the first election brought into power those 
who had favored its adoption and who were consequently 
most interested in proving it a success. This work was 
done with as much care as the framing of the original pro¬ 
visions, and many of the practices and customs adopted in 
the first few years have come to have a force almost as bind¬ 
ing as that of the Constitution itself, and are known as “con¬ 
ventions of the Constitution.” 

Congress had been called for the first Wednesday of 
March, 1789, but it was not until April that a quorum as¬ 
sembled, and it was April 6 before both houses were organ¬ 
ized. Though it was a new government which was being 
founded, the majority of the members of Congress had had 
legislative experience. They were familiar with English parlia¬ 
mentary law, the ripe product of centuries of development, 
and they were accustomed to handling public affairs. Their 
methods they took, not so much from the practices of the 
contemporary British Parliament, though these were often 
quoted, as from those of the colonial and state legislatures 
and the Continental Congress, which were based on the older 
practice of the House of Commons during the Stuart period. 
From the first they made extensive use of committees, and 

44 


Committees. 


ORGANIZATION OF CONGRESS 


45 


in 1794 began the development of a system of appointing 
standing committees, to hold for the entire life of each 
Congress, and each to attend to some particular class of 
business. Gradually these committees became more impor¬ 
tant, until more work was done in the committee room 
than in the regular meetings of either the Senate or the 
House. 

The presiding officer of the House is called the “ Speaker,” The Speaker, 
and the first occupant of the position was Frederick A. C. 
Muhlenberg, who had held a similar post in Pennsylvania. 

In the legislature of that state the speaker had been un¬ 
usually powerful, and it was perhaps as a result of Mr. Muh¬ 
lenberg’s experience that the House voted, January 18, 1790, 
that committees be chosen by the Speaker “unless other¬ 
wise specially directed.” Later, the Speaker was allowed 
to appoint the chairman of the committee of the whole, the 
speaker pro tempore , and, at first by courtesy, and in 1804 
by rule, to name the chairmen of all committees. In the 
meanwhile, the rules of debate were developing in such a 
way as to increase his power. In 1789 he obtained the right 
to decide which of a number of members desiring to speak 
held the floor, and on February 27, 1811, the practice known 
as the “previous question” was introduced, which gives the 
Speaker, working with a majority of the House, power to limit 
debate. Thus there was a tendency from the first for the 
Speaker, the representative of the majority, to control the 
House, and he became in time the second most powerful officer 
of the government. 1 

The Senate pursued a different course. Its presiding Vicepresi- 
officer was not of its own choice, nor even a member, but was dency ' 
the Vice President; and there was some feeling of jealousy 

1 As is pointed out later this system reached its extreme development under 
Speaker Reed, 1889 to 1891, and Speaker Cannon, 1903 to 1911. In the latter 
year, however, the Speaker was deprived of the power to appoint standing com¬ 
mittees, and was required to give the floor to the member who first rises. 


46 ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 


Senate versus 
House. 


Choice of 
electors. 


President 

Washing¬ 

ton. 


toward him. In spite, therefore, of the efforts of John Adams, 
the first Vice President, the senators kept and have main¬ 
tained the right to choose their committees by ballot, and the 
Vice President quickly came to be one of the least powerful of 
national officers. 

The Senate considered itself the upper house, and en¬ 
deavored to have this claim recognized by the House of 
Representatives, particularly to secure for its members higher 
pay. They secured one dollar a day additional for one year, 
1795 to 1796. The political weight of the two branches 
has varied with the ability of their members. 

The President and Vice President were to be chosen by 
electors, each state having as many as it had senators and 
representatives. The method of selecting these electors 
was left to the state legislatures, and there was considerable 
diversity in the ways they adopted. In the first election 
three did so by a popular vote for a general state ticket, 
which later became the universal practice; two chose the 
several electors by districts; and in five the legislature 
elected them, a custom which continued in many states 
for forty years, and in South Carolina until the Civil 
War. In 1789 New York lost its vote because of a contest 
as to the method of selection; North Carolina and Rhode 
Island had not yet joined the Union. The electors cast their 
votes on the first Wednesday in February, and while they 
but confirmed popular opinion in voting unanimously for 
Washington, their selection of John Adams as Vice President 
was due to their own choice from among several available 
candidates. 

The choice of Washington as commander in chief of the 
Continental Army, in 1775, was due in large measure to the 
fact that he came from Virginia, the largest colony, and one 
whose cooperation was essential for the war. His choice 
as President, in 1789, was due to universal appreciation of 
his character. The Revolution had tested not only his 


THE PRESIDENCY 


47 


generalship but also his executive capacity. He had practi¬ 
cally been the continental executive through that dark period, 
maintaining national harmony and cooperation, not by 
authority, but by influence. At the close of the war he not 
only himself resigned from office, but he persuaded the 
military forces to subordinate themselves to Congress, al¬ 
though they were smarting under injustice, and Congress 
was so weak that many believed it could be brought to 
terms at the bayonet’s point. During the Confederation 
he had, as a private citizen, devoted himself to national 
undertakings, and all who had attended the constitutional 
convention recognized how great his influence had been in 
framing the Constitution and securing its adoption. Al¬ 
though he was not the peer of Franklin in intellectual ability, 
he had an active and original mind, but his distinguishing 
characteristic was the soundness of his judgment. He 
listened patiently to advice; he balanced it with his own ideas, 
and, in a greater proportion of instances than any other 
American statesman, he decided upon the course which the 
future proved to be the right one. He decided, moreover, 
in time; the crisis never passed while he hesitated. His 
judgment of men was as good as of policies, and he judged 
them for character as well as for ability. His own character 
was such as to give his judgments the weight that they de¬ 
served. Seemingly somewhat cold, and with a decided 
dignity of demeanor, he had, nevertheless, a restless and im¬ 
pulsive spirit. His calm was that of self-restraint, and meant 
force and not inertia. His sense of honesty was acute, and 
he had in the highest degree the feeling of honor and of pub¬ 
lic duty which were the best characteristics of the Virginia 
planter aristocracy to which he belonged. 

Such was the man who, on April 30, after a triumphal 
journey from Mount Vernon, was inaugurated at New York. 
Some members of Congress wished to give him a sounding 
title calculated to inspire respect abroad and awe at home. 


The 

presidency. 


48 ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 


Executive 
versus legisla¬ 
ture. 


The 

cabinet. 


John Adams called attention to the fact that cricket clubs 
had presidents. Nothing was agreed upon, however, and 
it proved that no title was needed to dignify an officer exer¬ 
cising such powers as the Constitution conferred upon him, 
especially when Washington occupied the office. Congress 
gave him a salary of $25,000, sufficient to enable him to sup¬ 
port an ample establishment; and Hamilton drew up a set 
of rules for social conduct, which protected him from in¬ 
trusion and yet satisfied the demands of hospitality. 

In his relations with Congress Washington was disposed 
to assert his authority to the full. On April 5, 1792, he sent 
in the first veto, and on March 30, 1796, he refused the 
request of the House to send to it certain executive papers 
that he thought should be kept secret. These points he 
successfully maintained, but his attempt to take part per¬ 
sonally when the Senate was giving its “advice and consent” 
to appointments and treaties was defeated, and the prec¬ 
edent finally became established that all communication be¬ 
tween the executive and the legislature be in writing. The 
President received compensation, however, in the decision 
of Congress that he should possess the full power of removing 
officials from office, although the Constitution might be in¬ 
terpreted to give the Senate the same right to advise and 
consent to their removal that it had in the case of their 
appointment. On the whole the executive and legislature 
proved, as the convention had intended, each to have suffi¬ 
cient power to maintain its independence, but not enough 
to control the other. Still, force of character or popular 
support has, from time to time, given now the one, now 
the other, the greater power. 

One of the first duties of Congress was to provide for 
the more extensive organization of the executive. Three de¬ 
partments— “Foreign affairs” (soon changed to “State”), 
“Treasury,” and “War”—were at once established, each 
headed by a secretary. Independent of these secretaries 


THE PRESIDENCY 


49 


were an Attorney-General to manage the legal business of 
the government, and a Postmaster-General to take charge 
of the post offices and post routes. The treasury depart¬ 
ment was modeled with peculiar care on a system largely 
the work of Robert Morris; several auditors, comptrollers, 
and registers mutually checked one another in such a way as 
to render misappropriation of funds practically impossible. 
The Constitution gave the President power to require the 
“Opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the 
executive Departments, upon any subject relating to the 
Duties of their respective Offices.” Washington from the first 
followed the practice of asking the advice of all the secre¬ 
taries upon matters of general interest, and soon oral con¬ 
sultations followed. In these conferences the Attorney- 
General took part, but not the Postmaster-General, as his 
office was regarded as purely administrative. Washington 
showed a disposition to include the Chief Justice, John 
Jay, and the Vice President, John Adams, among his inti¬ 
mate advisers; but Jay refused on the ground that it was 
improper for him to express his views on matters upon 
which he might subsequently be obliged to give a judicial 
opinion, and Adams, although he sometimes wrote an opinion, 
did not become a regular member of the group, perhaps 
fearing to compromise the dignity of his position by putting 
himself on a level with the heads of departments. By the end 
of the first administration these meetings, although not pro¬ 
vided for in the Constitution, had come to constitute an 
organization, to which the name “ Cabinet ” was applied. 
As its members served at the pleasure of the President and 
were consequently under his control, Congress resisted the 
attempt to allow them to appear in person before it, and so 
the cabinet in this country has always had less influence on 
the course of legislation than the cabinet in England. 

To the making of appointments to fill these and the nu¬ 
merous subordinate positions created by Congress, Washing- 


Appoint¬ 

ments. 


50 ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 


The 

judiciary. 


ton devoted the utmost care, for he knew that the quality of 
the personnel was vital to the success of the Constitution. He 
appointed no one whom he did not consider well fitted for the 
duties of the office. In addition he sought men of prominence 
who would bring prestige to the new government. He tried 
to avoid sectional and state jealousies, by apportioning the 
offices as equally as possible among the states and sections. 
Where he could, he tried to retain men in positions similar 
to those which they had occupied under the Confederation, 
or under the state governments where state services, like 
that of the customs, had been transferred to the Union. 
He refused, however, to appoint men notably opposed to 
the Constitution, even when they had held such positions. 
Particularly was this true in Rhode Island and North Carolina, 
where opposition had been keenest. For his cabinet, he 
secured Thomas Jefferson for Secretary of State, Alexander 
Hamilton for the Treasury, and Edmund Randolph for 
Attorney-General, while Henry Knox continued to serve as 
Secretary of War. 

With regard to the organization of the judiciary, the 
Constitution merely provided that there be a Supreme Court 
and such inferior courts as Congress might establish. Con¬ 
gress at once went to work upon the matter, and an act was 
drawn up, largely the work of Oliver Ellsworth of Connecti¬ 
cut, which was passed September 24, 1789. The Supreme 
Court was to consist of a chief justice and five associate 
justices. In each state, and also in Maine and Kentucky, 
which were not yet states, there was to be a district court, 
with a judge, an attorney, and a marshal. Intermediate 
circuit courts were provided by having two justices of the 
Supreme Court sit with the judge of the district. Wash¬ 
ington put forth redoubled efforts to supply the framework 
with men who would inspire public confidence. John Jay 
was made Chief Justice, and for the other positions many 
distinguished judges were drawn from the benches of the 


FINANCIAL MEASURES 


51 


states. Still, the national courts did not have much business 
at first, as the custom of appealing or transferring cases from 
state courts did not develop for some time. One of the 
Supreme Court decisions, that of Chisholm v. Georgia , in 1793, 
was to the effect that a state might be sued by a citizen 
of another state. The supporters of state sovereignty were 
so seriously alarmed at this, it being a principle of English 
law that the sovereign cannot be sued, that the Eleventh 
Amendment to the Constitution was adopted, definitely pro¬ 
hibiting a suit by an individual against a state. Gradually, 
however, the judiciary acquired respect, and, as cases arose, 
it blocked out some of the constitutional interpretations 
which later formed the basis of its power. It did not, during 
the Federalist period, declare any act of Congress uncon¬ 
stitutional, but in the case of Hylton v. the United States 
it discussed the constitutionality of such an act; while in 
Ware v. Hylton it declared a state law of Virginia void be¬ 
cause in conflict with a treaty. 

While the new government was thus working out its 
internal organization, it was devoting serious attention to 
the solution of those problems, the failure to solve which 
had wrecked the Confederation. First came that of revenue. 
Already on March 25, 1789, Fisher Ames was complaining 
that every day’s delay in framing a tariff bill meant the loss 
of a thousand pounds, and under the pressure of financial 
necessity the first tariff bill was rushed through and passed 
July 4. It was entitled “An act for the encouragement and 
protection of manufactures,” but was a haphazard affair 
in no true sense protective. The schedule of duties estab¬ 
lished was much lower than has ever been known since, the 
highest being fifteen per cent. The discussion was not politi¬ 
cal in the sense of dividing Congress into two parties, favor¬ 
ing high and low tariff, or any two opposing policies. It 
was, however, interesting in bringing out conflicting interests, 
as those between the Virginia producer of slaves and the 


The first 
tariff. 


52 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 


Financial 

conditions. 


The excise. 


Funding the 
debt. 


Georgia consumer, and between the farming, agricultural, 
and commercial sections. New England manufacturers of 
rum objected to duties on molasses, the raw material. Fisher 
Ames wrote, “Another molasses battle has been fought.” 
The question of the tariff was on the whole treated as one of 
administration and of local interests rather than as involving 
a conflict of principles. 

The tariff provided a revenue unexpectedly great, but the 
financial problem was still a delicate one. The amount 
appropriated during the first session for running expenses 
was only $629,000. This figure did not include salaries for 
customs, consular, and post-office officials, as they were 
remunerated by fees. The largest item of expense was 
for interest. The foreign debt now amounted to $11,710,378, 
and it was expected that something would be done for the 
domestic debt, of which the face value was $42,414,085. Ham¬ 
ilton, the new Secretary of the Treasury, speedily conceived a 
vast scheme for solving these difficulties and at the same time 
building new foundations of political strength for the govern¬ 
ment. This plan he presented to Congress in a series of reports. 

He first turned his attention to the revenue, and advised 
Congress to raise the tariff slightly in accordance with the 
principle of protection. Then he recommended the passage 
of an excise tax on distilled spirits, not a very productive 
measure, but one creating a new staff of officials and increas¬ 
ing the prestige of the government. 

These measures passed easily enough, but the next step 
brought a significant break between Hamilton and Madison, 
who was now serving as member of the House. Hamilton 
wished to fund the national domestic debt, giving the holders 
of the various forms of indebtedness a new uniform security of 
the same face value as that which they had held, and bearing a 
uniform rate of interest. Madison pointed out that much of 
the indebtedness was in the hands of speculators, many of 
whom had paid for it but fifteen cents on the dollar and who did 


FINANCIAL MEASURES 


53 


not deserve to receive full face value. Congress supported 
Hamilton, the debt was funded, and the interest paid. The 
financial element, seeing that the new government desired and 
was able to meet its obligations, were soon willing to lend 
money at a lower rate, and the credit of the United States was 
speedily established. 

Hamilton’s next step was to extend the newly created 
national credit to the assistance of the states, by assuming 
such portion of their debts as had been incurred in support 
of the Revolution. He had in mind not only finance, but 
also politics, for he believed that the firmest support the 
national establishment could have would be a large body 
of moneyed men looking to it for interest on their bonds. If 
he could transfer this great mass of debt from the states to 
the Union, he would weaken the former and add a bulwark 
to the latter. His plan was opposed by those who feared 
just this centralization, and by members from states which had 
small debts or none at all. The balance hung so close that 
both parties feared to bring it to the touch. In the meantime 
Congress was agitated by the rival claims of the Delaware, 
the Susquehanna, and the Potomac for the location of the 
federal district provided for by the Constitution as the site 
of the federal capital. This, too, hung in the balance. One 
session of Congress passed without action, the next brought 
in North Carolina, which was for the Potomac and against 
assumption, and Rhode Island, which was for assumption and 
against the Potomac. Innumerable attempts were made to 
bring about a bargain between the conflicting interests by 
combining the two questions. At length, at a little dinner 
given by Jefferson, who had just arrived from France to be 
Secretary of State, the matter was adjusted. State debts were 
assumed to the amount pf $21,500,000, and the federal district 
was located on the Potomac. Those interested in the Dela¬ 
ware were conciliated by making Philadelphia the seat of gov¬ 
ernment for ten years, while the new city was being prepared. 


The assump¬ 
tion of the 
state debts. 


54 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 


The national 
bank. 


Strict versus 
broad con¬ 
struction. 


The crown of Hamilton’s plan was the creation of a na¬ 
tional bank. It would facilitate the business of the govern¬ 
ment; it would strengthen the connection between the moneyed 
classes and the Union, and it could be made the means of 
establishing a stable national bank-note currency, — for which 
there was a real need. Growing business, moreover, needed 
banking facilities, for there were but three banks in the 
United States, one at each of the centers of capital: Boston, 
New York, and Philadelphia. The bank bill passed Congress 
practically as Hamilton drew it. It established the Bank 
of the United States, with $10,000,000 capital, four fifths to 
be invested in United States securities. It was to be under 
private management, but the government was to own one 
fifth of the stock. It could establish branches in the states, 
and could issue notes on the security of its capital. It had 
the privilege and duty of handling the financial business of 
the government and was bound to report its condition to 
the Secretary of the Treasury, if he asked it, as often as once 
a week. The charter ran for twenty years. 

When, in February, 1791, the bank bill was presented to 
Washington for his signature, he asked the members of the 
cabinet for their opinions as to its constitutionality, that 
point having been raised in Congress. Jefferson, who already 
had begun to fear the consequences of the centralizing policy, 
and to regret the part he had taken in aiding the assumption of 
state debts, wrote an elaborate opinion against it. He could 
find no authorization “among the powers specially enumer¬ 
ated,” nor “within either of the general phrases which are the 
two following: 1 to lay taxes for the purpose of providing for the 
general welfare,’ and ‘ to make all laws necessary and proper for 
carrying into execution the enumerated powers.’ ” “To take a 
single step beyond the boundaries thus specially drawn around 
the powers of Congress is to take possession of a boundless 
field of power, no longer susceptible of any definition.” Ham¬ 
ilton at length, and with wonderful acumen, argued that from 


HAMILTON 


55 


the powers granted to the Union other powers could be im¬ 
plied, that the Union was sovereign with respect to those 
powers granted to it, and that, in carrying them out, it could 
use any means that were “proper.” He was firmly per¬ 
suaded that if Jefferson’s strict view prevailed it would 
be “ fatal to the just and indispensable authority of the 
United States.” Washington signed the bill, and the ad¬ 
ministration was committed to a policy of broad construc¬ 
tion. 

These financial measures, upon which the success of the Hamilton, 
new establishment depended, were to an unusual degree the 
work of one man, Alexander Hamilton. Born in the West 
Indies, of a Scotch father and a French mother, he combined 
most happily the business sagacity of the one nationality with 
the vivacity and charm of the other. He came to New York 
just before the Revolution, and his precocity brought him, 
while still a boy in years, to the notice of the leading men 
of the time. He served on Washington’s staff, and he mar¬ 
ried a daughter of General Philip Schuyler, head of an old 
New York family of great political and social weight. Com¬ 
bining law and politics in the manner becoming common in 
America, he had by 1789 attained a position of such prom¬ 
inence that his appointment as Secretary of the Treasury, 
although he was only thirty-two, was received with con¬ 
fidence. His success in this position was due not only to 
the wisdom of his proposals, but also to his ability in secur¬ 
ing their adoption by Congress. His dominating personality 
soon converted the supporters of his measures into followers, 
and from about 1792 until his death in 1804 a great pro¬ 
portion of the strongest men in the country looked upon him 
as the surest support of rational government and held him 
in almost reverential affection. His qualities, however, were 
not such as to appeal to the mass of people who did not come 
into personal contact with him, and his West Indian training 
led him to place a reliance in the financial element as the 


Hamilton 
and Jefferson. 


The Whisky 
Rebellion. 


56 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 

touchstone of political strength which was unwarranted in 
the United States. 

An opposition to Hamilton’s party soon developed, 
centering itself about Jefferson, the Secretary of State, and 
Washington saw the fading of his dream of governing with¬ 
out parties, even before he had completed his first term. 
Nor was the Constitution at fault. The difference between 
Hamilton and Jefferson was more fundamental; they rep¬ 
resented two eternally opposed types of mind. Hamilton’s 
ideal was a strong government actively assisting in the prog¬ 
ress of the nation; Jefferson wished to see a government 
preserving order, but leaving to every individual the largest 
possible amount of freedom for personal development. They 
both read in the Constitution the expression of their views 
and so could cooperate in its support, while differing as to 
particular measures. This difference grew broader with 
almost every policy broached, and although Washington 
tried to stand between them, his judgment was so often 
with Hamilton that on December 31, 1793, Jefferson left the 
cabinet and became the head of a new party, professing 
especially loyalty to the Constitution strictly construed, 
and adopting the name Republican. 

The establishment of the financial system met with other 
opposition more violent but less important. In the moun¬ 
tain valleys of the frontier, the lack of transportation facili¬ 
ties compelled the farmer to transmute corn and wheat into 
commodities more easily handled. In later times much 
was fed to cattle, which were then driven to the coast, but 
even this was almost impossible in the eighteenth century. 
In the distillation of whisky most farmers found their es¬ 
cape from this dilemma. Whisky served as the currency 
of much of the mountain region, and upon its sale the in¬ 
habitants depended largely for what they had to buy from 
other sections. Upon them, therefore, the new excise tax 
fell with an especial rigor. Unaccustomed to oppression, 



Alexander Hamilton 


i 
























BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 


57 


they resisted at first by concealing their distilleries, and then, 
when United States officers attempted to enforce the law, 
by arms. In 1794 western Pennsylvania and neighboring 
regions of Virginia broke into revolt. Liberty poles were 
raised, and the “ whisky boys” rifled the mails and captured 
Pittsburgh. 

This was a situation demanding the utmost tact. Other 
portions of the mountain region were apt to join the in¬ 
surgents, and the Republicans, while disapproving their 
violence, sympathized with them in their opposition to the 
tax. Washington’s handling of this delicate situation was 
perfect. He assembled an army overwhelmingly large, 
which marched with much pomp and circumstance, but 
slowly, towards the disaffected district. This gave the in¬ 
surgents time to deliberate, and by the time the army reached 
Pittsburgh moderate leaders among them had gained the 
upper hand, and all organized forces had disappeared, with¬ 
out battle and without bloodshed. Some of the leaders 
were arrested, but they were treated with leniency, and 
Congress met some of the popular demands by rendering 
the enforcement of the law less onerous. The tax, however, 
was retained, and the government had shown its ability to 
cope with armed resistance. 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 

Of general importance are the Writings of Washington and Sources. 
Works of Hamilton, the Annals of Congress , or T. H. Benton’s 
Abridgment of the Debates of Congress , giving the debates in the 
House of Representatives, and Sketches of Debate by William 
Maclay, giving those in the Senate with many lively bits of local 
color. Callender, G. S., Selections from Economic History of the 
United States, 2 21-231, gives material of the financial system 
adopted. The following discuss the bank question: Hamilton, 

A., Works (edited by J. C. Hamilton), IV, 104-138; (edited by 
H. C. Lodge), II, 47-108, 294-348; III, 180-227. Jefferson, T., 
Writings (edited by H. A. Washington), VII, 555-561> (edited 


Historical 
accounts. 
Organization 
of the legisla¬ 
ture. 


The execu¬ 
tive. 


The judici¬ 
ary. 


The financial 
system. 


The frontier. 


58 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 

by P. L. Ford), V, 284-289; VI, 470-494. McCulloch v. Md., 
in United States Reports, 4 Wheaton, 316; Thayer, I. B., Cases, 
271-284. 

Follett, M. P., Speaker of the House , chs. I, XI. Jameson, J. F., 
Origin of the Standing Committee System in American Legislative 
Bodies {Political Science Quarterly, IX, no. 2). Lodge, H. C., The 
Senate {Scribner’s Magazine, vol. 34, 541-550). Lowell, A. L., 
Essays on Government, no. 1. McCall, W. S., The Power of the 
Senate {Atlantic Monthly, vol. 92, 433-442). McConachie, L. G., 
Congressional Committees. McMaster, United States, I, 525-568. 
Morse, J. T., John Adams, ch. X. Wilson, W., Congressional 
Government, chs. II, IV. 

Fish, C. R., Civil Service and the Patronage, ch. I. Jameson, 
.Essays, no. 3. Hinsdale, M. L., The Colonies and Congress (Am. 
Pol. Sci. Assoc., Proceedings, 1905), 126-149. Learned, FI. B., 
The President’s Cabinet. Lodge, H. C., Washington, 40-81. 
McMaster, United States, II, 267-275. Mason, E. C., The Veto 
Power, chs. Ill, VI. Salmon, L. P., History of the Appointing 
Power, 1-32. Stanwood, E., History of the Presidency, chs. I-IV. 

Baldwin, S. E., The American System of Supreme Courts {Inter¬ 
national, vol. IV, 540-557). Brown, W. G., Oliver Ellsworth, 180- 
200. Jameson, Essays, no. 1. McLaughlin, A. C., The Courts, 
the Constitution, and Parties, pages 4 and 5 giving a select bibliog¬ 
raphy of recent literature on the subject. Pellew, G., J. Jay. 
Willoughby, Supreme Court {Johns Hopkins Historical Studies, 
extra vol. VII). 

Bassett, J. S., The Federalist System, 27-42. Curtis, Constitu¬ 
tional History, II, 182-190, 589-600. Dewey, D. R., Financial 
History of the United States. Lodge, H. C., Hamilton, chs. V, VI. 
Macdonald, W., Select Documents, nos. 6, 8-12. Taussig, F. W., 
Tariff History, 8-17. 

Adams, H., Gallatin, 86-151. Bassett, Federalist System, 101- 
117. McMaster, United States, I, 593-604; II, 42-47, 67-72, 
189-206. 


CHAPTER V 

PROBLEMS OF THE FRONTIER AND OF COMMERCE 

Even while occupied with these fundamental tasks of 
organization and finance, the government could not neglect 
the problems of the West and of commerce. Failure to solve 
them had been one of the charges against the government 
of the Confederation, and continued failure would be fatal 
to that under the Constitution. 

Some satisfaction was given the western settlers by the The West, 
admission of Vermont in 1791, of Kentucky in 1792, and of Land. 
Tennessee in 1796, as states on an equality with the original 
thirteen. In 1799 the Northwest Territory passed into the 
second stage of development provided for by the Ordinance 
of 1787, which called for the organization of a legislature 
and the election of a delegate to Congress, who could speak 
but could not vote. In general, the western representatives 
counted for little in Congress, where their roughness and lack 
of oratorical ability caused them to be underrated. One 
exception was William Henry Harrison, the Northwestern 
delegate, who in 1800 secured a modification of the system 
of land sales, which had long been regarded as unsatisfactory, 
but which had not been changed, owing to conflicting views. 

By the new act, as little as 320 acres could be purchased, 
and credit was allowed for part of the purchase price. 

Thus for $160 a year for four years the settler could 
secure a title, an arrangement which was decidedly more 
advantageous to the actual pioneer than the legislation 
of 1785. 


59 


6 o 


PROBLEMS OF THE FRONTIER 


rransporta- To the solution of the vital problem of transportation the 
new government contributed nothing except the opening of 
the Mississippi River in 1795, and this contribution was re¬ 
garded with disfavor by many who feared that it would 
result in drawing western trade into independent channels, 
and so wean the affections of the people from the Union. 
The failure to improve and develop the routes over the 
mountains was certainly not due to oversight, for no one 
understood the problem, either politically or physically, better 
than Washington, who had given much time during the Con¬ 
federation to the attempt being made in Virginia to connect 
the Potomac and the James with tributaries of the Ohio. 
Nor is it likely that it was due to hesitation as to the power 
of Congress, considering the views of Hamilton and his as¬ 
sociates. It is more probable that it was due in part to 
lack of resources, and in part to the absorbing character of 
the problems pressing for immediate attention. While the 
national government did not act, some states were working 
at the subject, and some improvement was made by indi¬ 
viduals and by corporations acting under state charters, 
which built toll roads in Pennsylvania and made possible a 
heavy wagon traffic between Philadelphia and Pittsburgh. 
Indian The Indian question was dealt with more promptly and 

policy * effectively. In 1790 an act was passed providing that all 

land sales from the Indians must be made by public treaty 
with the United States, and that Indian trade be restricted 
to licensed traders, in order to prevent the friction resulting 
from the presence of irresponsible white men among them. 
In 1796 the government itself went into the business of 
trading with them in order to meet the competition of Span¬ 
iards and English, and to bind the Indians to the United 
States. None of these measures except the first were com¬ 
pletely successful, but they all tended to improve conditions. 
In addition to this general legislation negotiations were 
carried on with the several tribes to secure peace, territorial 


INCREASE OF TRADE 


6 l 


concessions, and definite boundaries. In 1790 McGillivray, 
the Creek chief, was invited to New York and flattered and 
bribed into promising to keep the peace, a promise partly 
fulfilled. Yet the greater part of Georgia remained in the 
hands of this and other tribes. The Iroquois of New York, 
weakened by the Revolution, were friendly; but the Indians 
of the Northwest continued warlike, instigated, so the 
frontiersmen believed, and probably at least not strongly 
discouraged, by the English. In 1790 General Harmar 
was sent against them and was defeated; in 1791 St. Clair, 
governor of the Northwest Territory, went against them, 
and his army was almost annihilated. In 1794, however, 
General Wayne won a victory at Fallen Timbers, near what 
is now Toledo, Ohio; wasted the Indian villages and fields, 
and in 1795 made with them the treaty of Greenville, which 
secured comparative peace for fifteen years. With peace, 
settlement in the Northwest began to increase rapidly, and 
the population grew from about 4000 in 1790 to 51,000 in 
1800. In the Southwest, Tennessee and Kentucky, whose 
Indian difficulties were less important or earlier composed, 
increased from 109,000 to 326,000. 

The commercial community of the East felt the advan¬ 
tages of the new government sooner than the West. The 
establishment of the Constitution was coincident with a 
natural revival of trade, and stimulated it by giving stability 
to credit and by putting a stop to tariff wars between the 
states. Before the Revolution, trade between the several 
colonies had been almost prevented by the restrictions of 
the navigation acts ; during the Confederation the people of 
different states began to trade with each other in spite of 
vexing differences between their commercial systems; now 
that a single system embraced the whole country, interstate 
trade at once assumed large and flourishing proportions. 

Commerce with the East Indies and other regions closed 
during colonial times began to flow smoothly. American 


Increase of 

trade. 

Domestic. 


Foreign. 


62 


PROBLEMS OF THE FRONTIER 


The policy 
of neutrality. 


The French 
Revolution. 


shipping was encouraged by the passage of a navigation act 
in 1789. By this act, ships built and owned by foreigners 
paid a duty of fifty cents per ton, American-built ships 
owned by foreigners paid thirty cents, and those wholly 
American, only six cents. The last class received also the 
additional advantage of a ten per cent reduction in the duty 
charged on the goods they brought in. The effect of this 
legislation was immediate. In 1787 only thirty per cent of 
our exports and seventeen and a half per cent of our 
imports were carried in American vessels. In 1795 the fig¬ 
ures were eighty-eight and ninety-two per cent respectively, 
and they remained approximately the same for many years. 
The classes which had most ardently favored the adoption 
of the Constitution were, therefore, confirmed in its support. 

Commercial treaties with Spain and England, however, 
were still wanting. Jefferson wished to bring those nations 
to terms by discriminating in favor of the goods and ships of 
countries with which we had treaties, but the commercial 
element doubted the efficiency of such measures and feared 
they would bring even more unfavorable treatment upon us. 
His policy was not adopted. 

The settlement of boundary and commercial questions 
rested, in fact, not upon ourselves alone, but depended on 
complex interrelationships among all the nations concerned. 
In 1790 our two neighbors, Spain and England, seemed to 
be on the point of war, and war might involve hostilities 
in our own western country. The cabinet, in considering 
this question, laid down the momentous principle, the basis 
of all our subsequent foreign policy, that it was to our in¬ 
terest to remain absolutely neutral, avoiding entanglements 
with either. 

This war cloud never burst, but there was already gather¬ 
ing a storm much more serious, which resulted in 1793 in war 
between England and France. Although France was not a 
neighboring power, populations of French descent lived in 


THE MISSION OF GENET 63 

Louisiana and in Canada, and French statesmen had never 
given up their dreams of colonial empire. Moreover, Amer¬ 
ican commerce used the seas on which the two nations con¬ 
tended, and sought the ports of both. Of most ominous 
significance, however, was the fact that this war became 
a struggle rather between parties and principles than be¬ 
tween nations; nations were divided within themselves, and 
particularly was this the case in the United States. The 
first movements of the French Revolution had been greeted 
in this country with almost universal approval, but when the 
Louis XVI who had supported our Revolution was beheaded, 
when Lafayette was forced to flee from France, when the 
Reign of Terror established anarchy in the place of govern¬ 
ment, Washington, Hamilton, and men of their stamp first 
cooled, and then became hostile. Jefferson, however, saw 
only the triumph of the rights of man, and looked on the 
“Terror” as a temporary phase, soon to be replaced by sane, 
democratic government. The dangers then were, that the 
seemingly frail union of the United States would be shat¬ 
tered, or that the predominant party would tear the nation 
from its neutrality and range it on the one side or the other. 

The first crisis came from the designs of the French. The 
treaties of 1778 and that of 1788 gave the French special 
privileges in our ports in time of war, and contained a clause 
guaranteeing the French possessions in the West Indies. 
Much of the money loaned by France to the United 
States, moreover, was still unpaid, and the French leaders 
hoped that the two republics thus intimately bound together 
might face together the “impious band of tyrants.” To 
bring this alliance to the point, they sent, as minister to the 
United States, “Citizen Genet,” a young enthusiast, who 
reached Charleston, April 8, 1793. There he issued com¬ 
missions to privateers to prey on English commerce, and he 
journeyed on to Philadelphia amid popular demonstrations 
of joy. On the day of his arrival in Charleston the news of 


The mission 
of Genet. 


PROBLEMS OF THE FRONTIER 


Western 

projects. 


64 

the king’s death had reached our government, and counsel 
was taken as to the policy to be adopted. Hamilton and 
Jefferson presented conflicting opinions, and Washington 
decided on a middle course. He would receive Genet as 
minister of the French republic; he would not take the stand 
urged by Hamilton that the treaties had lapsed because made 
with the former government of France which was now over¬ 
thrown, but he held that the guarantee of the French pos¬ 
sessions was not binding because intended to apply only 
in case France w r as fighting a defensive war, whereas he con¬ 
sidered that France was now the aggressor. He would in¬ 
terpret the clauses with regard to port privileges for French 
privateers and naval vessels as narrowly as possible in order 
not to anger England, and finally, on April 22, he issued a 
proclamation of neutrality. At his suggestion, too, a law 
was rushed through Congress, giving the government power 
strictly to enforce this neutral policy and especially to pre¬ 
vent the further launching of French privateers from our 
ports. Genet, therefore, on his arrival in Philadelphia, 
found justified the cynical prediction of his instructions, 
that the Americans no longer regarded “liberty as lovers, 
but as married persons: . . . reflection indeed guides them, 
but it cools them.” At least the government showed no 
disposition to enlist in a crusade for universal liberty. 

Genet was instructed, even if he failed to receive the active 
assistance of the government, to direct certain military opera¬ 
tions from the United States as a base. Not without the 
sympathy of Jefferson, he arranged expeditions of American 
frontiersmen against the Spanish settlements in Florida and 
Louisiana. The chief expedition was to be directed against 
New Orleans, and Genet’s agent for the purpose was Gen¬ 
eral George Rogers Clark, who during the Revolution^ had 
led the frontier soldiery against the British in Illinois. Love 
of adventure and the belief that this was a practical scheme 
for opening the navigation of the Mississippi, drew many to 


NEUTRAL COMMERCE 


65 


the French colors. Genet’s further project of separating the 
West from the Union and encouraging the establishment of 
a new republic in the Mississippi valley was not known to 
many of his American associates. It was, however, an es¬ 
sential part of the French program, as that nation was 
anxious to make the West Indies independent of this country 
for their food supply. These plans, so fraught with danger 
of war and disunion to the United States, did not succeed, 
partly through the vigilance of General Wayne in the West, 
and partly because Genet, elated by the popular enthusiasm 
for France, put himself in the wrong by defying the govern¬ 
ment, fitting out an illegally captured English vessel as a 
privateer, and dispatching it for a cruise from Philadelphia 
itself, under the very nose of the administration. His re¬ 
call was requested, and his party, the Girondists, having 
fallen in France, it was granted by the new French gov¬ 
ernment. 

While the allurements of Genet failed to entice us into a 
French alliance, the policy of England seemed likely to drive 
us perforce into hostilities against that country. Fisher 
Ames, an English sympathizer, wrote: “The English are 
absolutely madmen. Order in this country is endangered by 
their hostility no less than by French friendship. They act 
in almost every point against their interest and their true 
wishes.” The outbreak of the European war had at first 
seemed wholly beneficial to American commerce. Particu¬ 
larly important was the commerce of the French West Indies, 
which produced at that time immense quantities of 
sugar and coffee. The carrying of these products to France 
was now done almost wholly in American vessels, which re¬ 
ceived several millions yearly as freight. A great provision 
trade with the islands sprang up also, for the planters were 
too much interested in their staple crops to raise the food 
they needed, and the European wars left little in France to 
export to them. In fact, American foodstuffs were in de- 


Neutral 

commerce 


66 


PROBLEMS OF COMMERCE 


mand in Europe, while American vessels, having the ad¬ 
vantage of a neutral flag, found ready employment on many 
trade routes. In America farmers enjoyed high prices, 
shipbuilding increased, wages advanced, and successful 
merchants began to pile up fortunes. 

Disputed It became the policy of England to cut off, or at least to 

international regulate, this neutral trade. During the two centuries in 
law. which she had been the greatest naval power, she had devel¬ 

oped a system of international law giving belligerent nations 
great power over neutrals. In defense of their commerce, 
American statesmen resorted to the theories developed by the 
French and Dutch, which nations had found it to their ad¬ 
vantage to limit the rights of belligerents and to protect the 
neutral. For twenty years English and American diplomats 
clashed over these rival systems. 

England claimed the right to seize, as contraband of war, 
provisions destined for France, on the ground that without 
them the war could not be carried on. These provisions 
were, it is true, ultimately paid for, but England persisted 
in her right to take them, while the United States refused 
to grant the principle that foodstuffs were contraband. 
Moreover, England declared many French ports blockaded, 
and claimed the right to seize and condemn as prize any 
vessel whose papers showed it to be destined for them. The 
United States maintained that a blockade, to be legal, must 
be effective; that is, that a sufficient fleet must be kept off 
the port to render entrance practically impossible, and that 
seizures could be made only off the port. England also 
revived the “Rule of 1756,” declaring that any trade closed 
in time of peace should remain closed in time of war. The 
effect of this was to make American vessels sailing between 
the French West Indies and France liable to capture, as they 
had been forbidden the trade by France before the war, 
when she wished the monopoly. England claimed that 
France should not have the advantage of monopoly when 


HOSTILITY OF FRANCE AND OF ENGLAND 67 


there was no danger to her own vessels, and of the protection 
of a neutral flag during times of war. 

In executing these regulations, the English navy claimed “Right of 
the right of stopping and searching any vessel on the high impressment 
seas. If it appeared to be engaged in a legal voyage, it was 
released, but even in such a case the searching officer might 
force into the English naval service any member of the crew 
born in England. The United States acknowledged the 
right to visit a vessel and to examine its papers, but not to 
examine the cargo or to impress the crew. This matter 
of impressment was scarcely one of the leading questions at 
this time, but it proved to be one of the most obstinate. 

If a mistake were made and a native-born American were 
taken, he would be ultimately returned; though it was some¬ 
times after years of negotiation, and many died in the English 
service. If, however, he were an English-born, naturalized 
American, agreement was impossible; for England denied 
the right of any one to change his nationality, while the 
American government felt it its duty to protect all its citizens, 
naturalized as well as native. 

The attitude of the French government was actually not Hostility of 
much more friendly. It professed the most liberal views, SiSand. 
but claimed that if the United States could not defend its 
neutral rights against England, France was justified in re¬ 
taliating specifically for every English regulation which 
interfered with neutral commerce. This somewhat curious 
position, which was afterwards still further developed by 
Napoleon, rested on the idea that neutral nations were 
bound to defend their neutral rights, that because the 
United States was not strong enough to maintain her rights 
against Great Britain the latter nation received certain ad¬ 
vantages, that the United States to that extent ceased to be 
a neutral, and that France was justified in seeking redress 
by retaliation in kind. The naval predominance of Eng¬ 
land, however, enabled her to carry out her policy more 


68 


PROBLEMS OF COMMERCE 


Conflict of 
policies. 


The Jay 
treaty. 


fully, while the brusqueness of the English officers, and 
the high-handed methods of her admiralty courts in the 
West Indies gave to her action a greater offensiveness. 
Moreover, the French design of separating the West from the 
Union was known to but a selected few, while England 
openly kept the frontier posts, and was popularly supposed to 
encourage the Indians in their hostility. The result was that 
England received even more than her fair share of popular 
ill feeling. Indignation reached its climax when the news 
spread that eight Algerian corsairs had passed the straits of 
Gibraltar, it was believed by the connivance of England, 
and were raiding the trade routes of the Atlantic. 

The Republicans, or the party of Jefferson, proposed to 
meet this emergency by suspending all commercial inter¬ 
course with Great Britain until redress was given. The 
Federalists, the party of Hamilton, felt that this would be 
equivalent to a declaration of war with Great Britain, 
which they were most anxious to avoid. After a vigorous 
debate in Congress they were able to defeat the Republican 
proposals, and to carry out their own policy. They put a 
temporary embargo upon all commerce, thus avoiding dis¬ 
crimination ; they increased the army and began the crea¬ 
tion of a navy; and they sent a solemn final embassy 
to England to test the possibility of agreement. 

John Jay, the Chief Justice, who was appointed to under¬ 
take this delicate mission, had perhaps the best diplomatic 
training of all Americans, but he was naturally timid, and 
was so impressed with the critical character of his task that 
he failed to take full advantage of the perilous position in 
which England herself was at this time placed by the suc¬ 
cesses of the French. He had, moreover, a dangerous habit 
of breaking his instructions. 

The treaty which he obtained provided in the first place for 
a settlement of the difficulties growing out of the treaty of 
1783. The British agreed to give up the frontier posts, and 


THE JAY TREATY 


69 


commissions were arranged to settle disputed points regarding 
the boundary and the claims of British merchants for pre¬ 
revolutionary debts. Commissions were also to adjudicate 
on the claims of American merchants, resulting from illegal 
maritime seizures, and of British merchants for seizures by 
French privateers illegally equipped in United States ports 
before the neutrality law began to work effectively. Dis¬ 
puted questions of international law were not mentioned, or 
were settled in favor of England, except that more effective 
notice of blockade was to be given. The administration of 
English regulations was somewhat eased, partly by the terms 
of the treaty and partly by an understanding between Jay 
and Grenville, the English foreign minister. On these points 
no one could have done much, if any, better than did Jay, since 
nothing but total defeat could have brought England to 
curtail her belligerent practices upon the high seas, for she 
considered them rights and essential to her strength. In 
framing the long-desired commercial treaty, however, Jay 
probably obtained less than another might have done. It 
provided for trade on the basis of the “most favored nation’’ 
between the United States and Great Britain and Ireland. 
It gave Americans privileges in the British East Indies, and 
it unbottled western Vermont, whose natural outlet was down 
Lake Champlain and the Richelieu River to the St. 
Lawrence, by legalizing trade to Montreal and Quebec. In 
the case of the British West Indies, however, but small con¬ 
cessions were allowed, and these on conditions so onerous 
that the Senate rejected this article of the treaty. 

This treaty violated the instructions of the administration, 
particularly in yielding to some of the English contentions 
on international law. Washington, however, decided to 
present it to the Senate, and that body ratified it with the 
exception of the West Indies clause, an exception to which 
England consented. After much hesitation Washington 
signed it, and it became the law of the land. In the sum- 


The Jay 
treaty in 
politics. 


70 


PROBLEMS OF COMMERCE 


Results of the 
treaty. 


Washing¬ 
ton’s second 
term. 


mer of 1795 it was made public and was greeted by a storm 
of popular indignation. When Congress met in December, 
the Republicans attacked it and threatened to refuse the 
appropriations of money for which it called. The Federalist 
leaders exerted themselves to the uttermost, and by the 
first great outburst of congressional oratory Fisher Ames 
secured the passage of the appropriation. Thus peace with 
England was made secure, for the time at least. 

The treaty worked not unfavorably. The commissions 
awarded to American merchants damages much greater than 
to the British. Vermont could now send her products to 
Montreal, where they found a ready market. The evacua¬ 
tion of the posts, coming just after Wayne’s victory over the 
Indians, opened up the Northwest to settlement. Best of 
all, as a result of the treaty in conjunction with European 
events, Spain at length, in 1795, agreed to a treaty acknowl¬ 
edging the American claim to the parallel of 31 0 as a 
southern boundary, opening the navigation of the Missis¬ 
sippi, allowing New Orleans to be used as a place of deposit 
for three years, and promising to renew the privilege after 
that period or to assign some other place as a port of trans¬ 
shipment. 

In 1792, when the time of the second presidential election 
arrived, Washington had desired to retire, and had even 
gone so far as to begin the preparation of a farewell address. 
The situation still remained so critical, however, that he 
consented to serve another term, and was reelected unani¬ 
mously, while Adams was again chosen Vice President by 
a substantial majority. During his second administration, 
in fact by the year 1795, the new government was proved 
to be a success. It had established the finances, suppressed 
insurrection, regulated and protected commerce, cleared the 
boundaries recognized by the treaty of 1783 of European 
troops, conquered peace with the Indians, opened the Mis¬ 
sissippi, and maintained a dignified neutrality in spite of the 


WASHINGTON’S RETIREMENT 71 

all-absorbing European war. Nevertheless, Washington 
was saddened, because during this term it was equally proved 
that his hope of uniting the ablest men of the country, though 
of differing political views, in a joint effort to govern the 
country, was to be disappointed. The division which had 
appeared in the bank controversy was widened by the French 
Revolution. Jefferson and his associates sympathized with 
France, Hamilton and his supporters with England. The 
division spread through the country, and in Congress the 
great majority of the members came to be known as Federal¬ 
ists or as Republicans, only a small number holding them¬ 
selves independent of party. When Jefferson resigned as 
Secretary of State in 1793, he was succeeded by Edmund 
Randolph, a man of wavering views. In 1795 the latter was 
forced to resign, owing to improper communications with the 
French minister. Timothy Pickering, who succeeded him, 
was a thoroughgoing and partisan Federalist, and from this 
time the administration must be regarded as belonging to 
that party. Hamilton had left the cabinet in 1795 to engage 
in the more lucrative practice of law in New York, but he 
was replaced at the Treasury by a devoted follower, Oliver 
Wolcott, and his advice was still sought and generally taken 
on important questions. 

Washington was deeply sensitive to the attacks which 
the opposition press made upon the government and 
upoh even himself personally, and, practically all the dangers 
which had threatened the nation in 1784 having been 
averted at least for the time, he determined to carry 
out his plan and finally retire to Mount Vernon. In re¬ 
fusing a third term he established another “convention of 
the Constitution,” or unwritten law, which has not yet been 
broken. In his Farewell Address he sought, with some suc¬ 
cess, to fix upon the country certain fundamental policies, 
calculated to keep it from danger and guide its continuous 
advancement. He warned his countrymen of the danger 


Washing¬ 
ton’s retire- 
ment. 


72 


PROBLEMS OF COMMERCE 


of sectionalism, and of the necessity of actively developing 
a national feeling based on a really national life; he pointed 
out the evils of party and factional divisions; and, finally, 
he urged that the United States preserve that policy of 
neutrality with regard to European wars which he had in¬ 
augurated. On the 4th of March, 1797, he left office. If 
he had been younger, he would have been happy in what 
he had accomplished, but although only sixty-five years of 
age, he was broken in the service of his country, and his fears 
for the future overcast his joy in his accomplishments. No 
man has ever done more for his fellow-citizens. 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 


Sources. 


Historical 
accounts. 
Frontier. 
Genet affair. 


Jay treaty. 


Party align¬ 
ment. 


Political 

methods. 


Fisher Ames’s oration on the Jay treaty makes a valuable as¬ 
signment. For public sentiment with regard to the French Revolu' 
tion see Hart, A. B., History told by Contemporaries, nos. 93-95. 
Washington’s Farewell Address, Richardson’s Messages and Papers 
of the Presidents, I, 213-224, gives a good review of conditions. 

Hildreth, R., United States, IV, 498-538. Roosevelt, T., Win¬ 
ning of the West, IV, chs. I, II. 

Bassett, Federalist System, 84-101. Foster, J. T., American 
Diplomacy, chs. IV, V. Hazen, C. D., Contemporary American 
Opinion of the French Revolution {Johns Hopkins Historical Studies, 
XVI), ch. IV. McMaster, United States, II, 86-191. Turner, F. J., 
Genet's Attack on Louisiana and the Floridas {Am. Hist. Review, 
III, 650-671). 

Bassett, Federalist System, 117-136. Conway, M. D., Ed¬ 
mund Randolph. McMaster, United States, II, 165-170; 213— 
242. Moore, J. B., American Diplomacy, chs. II, III. Pellew, 
J. Jay, ch. X. 

Adams, H., Administrations of Jefferson and Madison, I, chs. 
Ill, V. Bassett, Federalist System, 42-56, 136-150. Fiske, J., 
Essays, Historical and Literary, I, 99-142. Lowell, A. L., Influence 
of Party on Legislation (Am. Hist. Assoc., Report, 1901, vol. I, 
319-542). Sumner, W. G., Hamilton, chs. X-XIII. Woodburn, 
J. A., Political Parties, 1-30. 

Becker, C. L., Parties in Colonial New York {Am. Hist. Review, 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 


73 


VI, 260-275 I VII, 56-76). Caheen, F. van A., Society of Saint Tam¬ 
many of Philadelphia {Pa. Mag. of Hist., January, 1903). Jernegan, 
N. W., The Tammany Societies of Rhode Island (Brown University 
Historical Seminary, Papers, no. 8). Luetscher, G. D., Early 
Political Machinery in the United States. Meyer, G., History of 
Tammany Hall. Walton, J. S., Nominating Conventions in Penn¬ 
sylvania {Am. Hist. Review, II, 262-279). 


The election 
of Adams. 


CHAPTER VI 

THE ADMINISTRATION OF JOHN ADAMS 

Although Washington had been unanimously elected in 
1792, the vote for Vice President had been on party lines. 
The electors of New York, Virginia, North Carolina, and 
Georgia had voted for George Clinton, a Republican; those 
of Kentucky for Jefferson; and Adams was reelected only by 
seventy-seven to fifty-five. In 1796 a still closer division 
of the electoral college was to be expected. In anticipation 
of the election, conferences or caucuses were held by the mem¬ 
bers of Congress belonging to the different parties. John 
Adams and Thomas Pinckney, popular as the negotiator of 
the Spanish treaty, were selected as the Federalist candidates, 
and Jefferson and Burr as the Republican. These nomina¬ 
tions were not regarded as absolutely binding upon the 
electors, who were still expected by many to use their own 
discretion. Hamilton, in fact, who distrusted the Federalism 
and the temper of Adams, hoped to reverse the order of the 
Federalist candidates. Each elector was to cast two votes, 
and the candidate receiving the highest number would 
be elected President, and the next highest, Vice Presi¬ 
dent. Hamilton tried to persuade all the Adams electors to 
vote for Pinckney, expecting that some scattering votes 
would also go to him, thus bringing him the largest vote and 
the presidency. The result was unexpected. The plan of 
Hamilton became known, and so alarmed the friends of Adams 
that twenty-one of them declined to vote for Pinckney, and 

74 


RELATIONS WITH FRANCE 


75 


although a majority of the electors were Federalists and 
Adams was elected President, Jefferson received the second 
largest vote and became Vice President. 

Adams thus became President after a contest which re¬ 
vealed not only that two parties divided the country, but 
also that the Federalists were divided among themselves. 
He must needs fight for the leadership of his own party. 
Under these circumstances, his decision to retain Washing¬ 
ton’s entire cabinet was unfortunate, as its members, being 
friends of Hamilton, looked to the latter for advice and failed 
to give the new President loyal support. 

The first problem that confronted the administration was 
a new phase of the foreign situation. France had been very 
much incensed by the Jay treaty. She held that the United 
States was bound, both by special treaties and by interna¬ 
tional obligation, to defend its rights as a neutral to the 
fullest extent; that in surrendering these rights to England 
it had become de facto the enemy of the French republic. 
James Monroe, a friend of Jefferson, had been sent on a 
mission of conciliation, but he so thoroughly sympathized 
with the French position that he became indiscreet and was 
recalled. On leaving, he intimated to the French govern¬ 
ment that there were two parties in America, that Jefferson 
would succeed Washington, and that, after the election, satis¬ 
faction would be given. 

The French government was prompt to throw its influence 
on Jefferson’s side. It refused to receive Monroe’s successor, 
the Federalist, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, and ordered 
Adet, its minister in the United States, to suspend his diplo¬ 
matic functions. Adet announced his withdrawal in a letter, 
written for the public eye, which was immediately printed 
and had some influence on the election. While thus work¬ 
ing for the success of the pro-French party, Adet secretly 
laid plans, in case of the election of Adams, to revive, 
on a large scale and somewhat different plan, those projects 


Adams’s 

cabinet. 


French in¬ 
trigues. 


76 THE ADMINISTRATION OF JOHN ADAMS 


The pro¬ 
posals of Tal 
ley rand. 


The X Y Z 
affair. 


with reference to the western country which Genet had 
endeavored to carry out. 

This was the situation with which Adams had to deal. 
He resolved to make an effort to reestablish diplomatic in¬ 
tercourse, and to that end sent John Marshall and Elbridge 
Gerry to join Pinckney, making a special commission con¬ 
sisting of two Federalists and one Republican. The French 
government remained, on the surface, obdurate, but Talley¬ 
rand, the French foreign minister, through authorized agents, 
offered to negotiate if bribes were given to him and to his 
associates, and a large sum of money to the French treasury. 
William Pitt, prime minister of England, was at the time 
toying with an offer precisely similar, but our commissioners, 
less accustomed to the devious methods of continental diplo¬ 
macy, emphatically refused to buy French friendship, and, 
finding no other way open, returned to America. 

The correspondence of the commissioners, known from 
the fictitious names given Talleyrand’s agents as the “XYZ 
correspondence,” was at once sent to Congress by Adams, 
with the assertion that he would “never send another minister 
to France without assurances that he will be received, re¬ 
spected, and honored as the representative of a great, free, 
powerful, and independent nation.” Congress, although the 
balance in the House of Representatives was held by a few 
independents, passed by large majorities the measures recom¬ 
mended by the administration (1798). A direct tax was voted, 
and a large volunteer army was provided for, of which Wash¬ 
ington consented to take command, with Hamilton as active 
head. The navy was largely increased, and a navy depart¬ 
ment organized. Commercial intercourse with France and 
the French possessions was ordered discontinued, the French 
treaties were declared abrogated, American warships were 
authorized to engage and capture French warships, and 
private vessels were permitted to arm both for defense and 
to attack any armed vessel, public or private, flying the 


THE FEDERALIST PROGRAM 


77 


French flag. Hostilities existed, naval encounters occurred, 
and several hundred merchant vessels changed hands, but 
no declarations were exchanged, and it was not war to the 
finish. 

Great popular excitement prevailed. The X Y Z cor- War feeling, 
respondence was published, and Pinckney’s “No, no, no, 
not a penny,” transmuted into the ringing phrase “Millions 
for defense, but not one cent for tribute,” raised him into a 
national hero; addresses of loyalty were showered upon the 
President, and the black cockade of Federalism was worn 
by many who up to this time had clung to French friend¬ 
ship and Republican doctrines. Joseph Hopkinson wrote 
Hail, Columbia , which became for a time the national 
anthem. 

The Federalist leaders considered that this outburst of The Federal- 
national feeling gave them an opportunity to put a bit in the lst program * 
mouth of democracy. The Constitution had done some¬ 
thing to check what they considered the license of the Rev¬ 
olutionary period, but the Whisky Rebellion, the scurrilous 
vituperation of the press, widespread and demonstrative 
sympathy with the doctrines of the French revolutionists, 
so much more radical than those of the most extreme leaders 
in America twenty years before, convinced them that some¬ 
thing more must be done to repress the demoralizing tend¬ 
encies of the times. They therefore speedily adopted a 
program of reaction, which the momentary popular anger 
against France enabled them to carry through Congress. 

Many of the Republican leaders were of foreign birth, par¬ 
ticularly Albert Gallatin, who had been concerned as a mod¬ 
erate in the Whisky Rebellion and was now leader of the op¬ 
position in Congress; and so in the spring of 1798 Congress 
increased the term of residence in the country required for 
naturalization from five to fourteen years, and passed the 
“Alien Law,” allowing the President to remove, at his dis¬ 
cretion, obnoxious foreigners residing in the country. No 


78 THE ADMINISTRATION OF JOHN ADAMS 


The elections 
of 1798-1799. 


War plans. 


prosecutions, however, were attempted under the law. The 
second step was an attack on the press. A “Sedition Act” 
was passed, making it a crime to libel Congress or the Presi¬ 
dent ; prosecutions under it promptly began, and con¬ 
victions were secured, the most noteworthy being that of 
Callender, a friend of Jefferson. Also, Adams removed from 
office some few of the more active of his opponents, and was 
urged to make a clean sweep. “The ingrates,” said the 
Columbian Sentinel , “ought not for a moment to be suf¬ 
fered to eat the bread of the public, when they wait only for 
a safe occasion to betray our country to France.” 

In the fall of 1798 and the spring of 1799 occurred elections 
for Congress, and the contest was hard fought. The Feder¬ 
alists appealed to the people to support the administration 
in a time of national peril against the “Jacobins,” who would 
sacrifice the country to France. The Republicans attacked 
the Alien and Sedition Laws. The Federalists were surpris¬ 
ingly successful; even south of the Potomac, where they had 
been least strong, they elected twenty-two members to fifteen 
Republicans. Encouraged by this popular approval, they 
planned to push forward their policy of increasing the power 
of the central government. They passed a national bank¬ 
ruptcy law, they adopted a more elaborate organization for 
the judiciary, increasing the number of judges; and Hamil¬ 
ton advised that a system of internal improvements be under¬ 
taken, that the people might become accustomed to look to 
the national government rather than to the states for bene¬ 
ficial legislation. 

Vital to the success of the Federalists was the continuance 
of hostilities with France. Hamilton even thought to extend 
the scope of the war. France was out of our reach, but Spain 
was the ally of France, and “France is not to be con¬ 
sidered as separated from her ally.” “Tempting objects will 
be within our grasp.” Largely ignoring Adams, he corre¬ 
sponded with Rufus King, minister to England, with Pitt, 


PEACE WITH FRANCE 


79 


and with Don Francisco de Miranda, a Spanish American 
who sought cooperation in the revolutionizing of Spain’s pos¬ 
sessions in America. A plan was in process of arrangement, 
according to which Hamilton was to lead the army, Great 
Britain was to furnish the navy, and the ultimate object was 
to be the establishment of well-ordered, constitutional inde¬ 
pendence for Spanish America, the addition of Florida and 
New Orleans to the United States, and the sharing of the 
commercial advantages to come from the overthrow of 
Spain’s monopolistic system by the United States and Eng¬ 
land. To this scheme the opposition of Adams proved fatal. 
He refused to countenance the Miranda negotiation, and 
he allowed trade with the French ports in the island now 
called Haiti, thereby preventing Hamilton’s plan of starv¬ 
ing that island until it declared its independence and threw 
in its fortunes with England and the United States. Finally, 
on receiving assurances that a minister would be properly 
received by France, he at once, without even consulting his 
cabinet, which he knew would be hostile, nominated William 
Vans Murray for the post. 

The popular desire for peace was so great that the Senate 
dared not reject the opportunity, but Adams was induced 
to send three commissioners, Oliver Ellsworth, Governor 
Davie of North Carolina, and Murray, instead of a minister. 
The offer on the part of France did not indicate a change 
of heart, but a conviction that a mistake had been made. 
Talleyrand had not intended actual war; our merchant 
marine was too useful to French commerce, and our food¬ 
stuffs too vital to the French West Indies. He had hoped to 
frighten the United States, and had failed. On September 30, 
1800, a convention was concluded at Paris which was mutually 
satisfactory. France renounced her claims under the treaties 
of 1778 and of 1788, and the United States forbore to press 
the claim of Americans for certain classes of illegal seizures. 
With the French peace, plans for an English alliance fell, and 


Peace with 
France. 


8o 


THE ADMINISTRATION OF JOHN ADAMS 


The effect 
of the peace. 


Federalist 

factions. 


Adams’s action restored to the nation that neutrality and 
isolation from European politics which Washington had 
believed to be so essential to our progress. 

Hamilton and his friends were not able to oppose in public 
the restoration of peace, as they had not been able to reveal 
to the public all their plans, because an overwhelming major¬ 
ity of the people either sympathized with France or believed 
in the policy of peace, if there could be peace with honor. 
Among themselves, however, they execrated Adams. Theo¬ 
dore Sedgwick, Speaker of the House, wrote: “Had the 
foulest heart and the ablest head in the world been per¬ 
mitted to select the most embarrassing and ruinous measure, 
perhaps it would have been precisely the one which has 
been adopted.” Mutual quarrels led Adams to dismiss 
Pickering, the Secretary of State; others of the cabinet 
resigned; and he appointed in their stead men whose views 
harmonized with his own, John Marshall becoming Secretary 
of State. 

This breach was partly the result of a rivalry and mutual 
distrust between Adams and Hamilton, which was of very 
long standing and which was accentuated by Hamilton’s 
attempt, in 1796, to deprive Adams of the succession, and by 
the reluctance with which Adams acceded in 1798 to Wash¬ 
ington’s request to make Hamilton second in command in the 
new army. The difference was, however, far more than 
personal. About Hamilton gathered a group of able, self- 
sufficient men who distrusted popular government more and 
more with every passing year. George Cabot, leading 
member of the “Essex Junto,” as the Massachusetts group 
of “high-toned” Federalists was called, wrote in 1801: 
“There is no security for a good government without some 
popular mixture in it; but there will be neither justice nor 
stability in any system if some material parts of it are not 
independent of popular control.” In 1804 he wrote: “I 
hold democracy in its natural operation to be the government 


FEDERALIST FACTIONS 81 

of the worst.” These men believed, as had John Cotton, 
in a government neither “meerly democratical,” nor “ meerly 
aristocratical”; and with Winthrop, that “The best part of 
a community is always the least, and of that least part, the 
wiser is still less.” They deprecated the peace with France 
for domestic reasons, for without war, said George Cabot, 
“The people will not support the army; the navy will not 
be increased; neither taxes nor loans will be permitted be¬ 
yond what may be necessary to discharge existing engage- 
1 ments.” They felt, moreover, that the United States could 
not forever stand as a spectator of the world contest which 
was going on between the untrammeled forces of democracy 
represented by France, and England, the defender of au¬ 
thority, of law and order. They believed that if we waited 
until that contest was decided, we should fall a victim to 
whichever side was victorious. George Cabot wrote, June 9, 
1798: “It is pretty certain that, if Great Britain yields, we 
shall have the weight of the whole European world to oppress 
us.” 

Although these leaders practically controlled the party, 
they realized that they could not control the country without 
the addition of the more moderate Federalists of the Adams 
type, who had somewhat more of confidence in the people 
and in the ability of the United States to stand alone and 
aloof. Consequently, Hamilton advised that in the forth¬ 
coming campaign all should loyally support Adams for the 
presidency, although he set forth in a pamphlet, designed 
for private circulation, that the latter was totally unfitted 
for that office by reason of his views and his temperament. 
The candidate agreed upon for Vice President was C. C. 
Pinckney, whose name would recall the intrigues and the in¬ 
sults of the French, With the war issue removed, divided 
in counsel and deprived by Washington’s death in 1799 of 
the great prestige of his support, the Federalists realized 
that the campaign of 1800 would prove very much more 


Federalist 
candidates 
for 1800. 


Republi¬ 
can program. 


82 THE ADMINISTRATION OF JOHN ADAMS 

difficult than that of 1798-1799. Yet they fully expected 
a victory, confident in their record of usefulness. 

This record, however, was precisely the basis of the Re¬ 
publican campaign. The leaders of that party attacked the 
whole centralizing tendencies of the last twelve years, the 
increase of taxes, the failure to reduce the debt, the multipli¬ 
cation of public officers. They attacked the administration 
as tyrannical because of its prosecutions under the Sedition 
Law and its removals from office; they attacked the judiciary 
for partial conduct in the trial of one Fries, accused of 
treason for inciting armed resistance in Pennsylvania to the 
collection of the direct tax. But, under the skillful leadership 
of Jefferson, they emphasized most of all the lurking danger to 
liberty and popular government involved in the stretching of 
the Constitution by the doctrine of “implied powers.” As 
an antidote to the policy of centralization and as a platform 
about which to rally the party, Jefferson’s friends secured in 
1798 the passage by the legislatures of Kentucky and Vir¬ 
ginia, of resolutions condemning the Alien and Sedition Acts. 
Those of Kentucky, adopted almost verbatim as drawn up by 
Jefferson, stated that the Constitution was a compact, “that 
the government created by this compact was not made the 
exclusive or final judge of the extent of the powers delegated to 
itself . . . but that . . . each party [state] has an equal right 
to judge for itself, as well as of infractions, as of the mode 
and measure of redress.” The Virginia resolutions, drafted 
by Madison, gave a similar interpretation to the Constitution, 
and added: “That in case of a deliberate, palpable, and 
dangerous exercise of other powers not granted by the said 
compact, the States who are the parties thereto, have 
the right, and are in duty bound, to interpose for arresting 
the progress of the evil, and for maintaining within the 
respective limits, the authorities, rights, and liberties apper¬ 
taining to them.” The Alien and Sedition Laws were de¬ 
clared to be instances of such violation. When nine of 


1 


THE ELECTIONS OF 1800 AND 1801 


83 


the ten states lying to the north replied unfavorably to the 
constitutional interpretation presented by Virginia and Ken¬ 
tucky, the latter state, November 22, 1799, passed a new 
resolution setting forth the theory that in case of an infrac¬ 
tion of the federal compact by the national government: 
“ Nullification by those sovereignties [the states], of all un¬ 
authorized acts done under color of that instrument, is the 
rightful remedy.” In Virginia John Randolph of Roanoke, 
John Taylor of Caroline, and others contemplated the possi¬ 
bility of separation from the Union, and urged that the state 
prepare herself for self-defense. Jefferson did not give coun¬ 
tenance to violent action, however. Solemnly to voice a 
protest was all that he desired, at any rate for the present; 
he had confidence that under the normal conditions of peace 
his principles were those of a majority of the people, and he 
confidently expected that the election would establish his 
principles. 

While Jefferson directed party policy, the Republican 
candidate for the vice presidency, Aaron Burr of New York, 
applied himself with equal skill to the manipulation of poli¬ 
tics in that pivotal state. He secured and published 
Hamilton’s letter condemning Adams; he organized and 
combined all the elements in any way dissatisfied with the 
Federalist administration, and finally succeeded in carrying 
the new state legislature which would choose the presidential 
electors. 

The election throughout the country resulted in the choice 
of seventy-three Republican electors to sixty-five Federalist. 
This assured the defeat of the Federalists, but it did not de¬ 
termine who would be the next President. Jefferson and 
Burr received an equal vote, and the election was therefore 
thrown into the House of Representatives, — the House 
which was elected in 1798-99 and in which the Federalists 
retained the majority. It therefore fell to them to choose 
between their two opponents. The majority preferred Burr; 


Aaron Butr, 


The elections 
of 1800 and 
1801. 


84 THE ADMINISTRATION OF JOHN ADAMS 


The achieve¬ 
ments of the 
Federalists. 


Causes of 
Federalist 
defeat. 


young, brilliant, fascinating, an opportunist devoid of politi¬ 
cal principle, he might, they felt, by care and skill be made 
in effect a Federalist President. Burr, however, refused to 
commit himself by promises, and Hamilton, long the rival 
of Burr in law as of Jefferson in politics, urged that it would 
be safer to choose Jefferson, who would, though an enemy, 
be timid and conciliatory, rather than Burr, whom he be¬ 
lieved to be entirely untrustworthy. Hamilton’s advice 
was finally taken, and on February 17, 1801, by the thirty- 
sixth ballot, Jefferson was elected President. 

The Federalists, in their twelve years of power, had given 
the country so good a government that the Constitution was 
universally accepted as a success, and there was contest only 
over its interpretation. They had established many supple¬ 
mentary practices or conventions so well devised as to last 
until our own day. They had preserved the neutrality of the 
country in the great struggles that were desolating Europe, 
in spite of threats and lures and internal divisions, and in so 
doing had laid the foundations of our foreign policy. Finally, 
one of the last acts of Adams was to appoint to the position 
of Chief Justice, John Marshall, who, in a series of decisions 
extending through thirty-five years, was to embody per¬ 
manently in the law of the land the constitutional principles 
of moderate Federalism. 

The Federalists lost power because they were out of sym¬ 
pathy with a majority of the people. The leadership of the 
party came from the financial and commercial classes, whereas 
agriculture was the predominant interest of the country. 
They stood for national centralization, whereas the spirit of 
local independence was still more vital than that of nation¬ 
ality. The country had not yet grown together into a real 
economic unit, nor had it been fused into one by an endur¬ 
ing national patriotism. The Federalists, moreover, were 
firm believers in the subordination of the masses, while the 
spirit of democracy and the confidence of the people in 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 85 

themselves were growing daily stronger. The work of the 
Federalists in organizing and establishing the central gov¬ 
ernment proved of permanent value, but the people now 
preferred to give the administration of it to men more in 
sympathy with their interests and ideals. 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 

For the Kentucky and Virginia resolutions, etc., American His¬ 
tory Leaflets, no. 15. Ames, H. V., State Documents on Federal 
Relations , 15-26. Johnston, A., Readings on American Constitu¬ 
tional History, 228-236. Macdonald, W., Select Documents, 148. 

Adams, C. F., John Adams, II, ch. X. Allen, G. W., Our 
Naval War with France. Bassett, Federalist System, 204-252. 
Schouler, J., United States, I, ch. IV. 

Adams, H., A. Gallatin, 189-266. Adams, H., John Randolph , 
ch. II. Anderson, F. M., Contemporary Opinion of Kentucky and 
Virginia Resolutions {Am. Hist. Review, V, 45-63, 225-244). 
Bassett, Federalist System, 252-276. Holst, H. von, United States, 
I, ch. IV. Hunt, G., J. Madison, 259-271. Story, J., Commen¬ 
taries, secs. 158, 1288, 1289, 1885, 1886. 


Sources. 


Historical 
accounts. 
French war. 


Political 

contest. 


CHAPTER VII 


The inaugu¬ 
ration. 


The return to 
the men and 
principles of 
the Revolu¬ 
tion. 


JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY 

On March 4,1801, Thomas Jefferson was inaugurated. It 
was the first occasion on which a President took office at 
Washington, although the government had moved there the 
year before. The city had but a small population, scattered 
here and there over the great area laid out by l’Enfant, the 
French engineer, and the public buildings were unfinished. 
The occasion was stripped of the pomp and dignity with 
which the Federalists had surrounded such functions, and 
Jefferson walked from his boarding house to the Capitol, 
instead of riding in a coach. Natural as such an act was 
to him, it was probably not without the design of typify¬ 
ing the overthrow of what he considered the aristocratic 
party and the incoming of democracy. Significant as is 
the triumph of Jefferson, however, his election did not 
mark so much the incoming of new principles as a return 
of those of the Revolution. The strong government reaction 
of the Federalist period had accomplished its task of reestab¬ 
lishing order, but had grown irksome to the majority of the 
people, who now turned to the men who had held their con¬ 
fidence during the Revolutionary struggle, and to younger 
men of like mind. Jefferson himself had held office almost 
continuously, but is remembered chiefly for his work during 
the Revolution and as President. Many states, like the 
nation, sought veterans. In the state elections of 1799 and 
1800, Thomas McKean became governor of Pennsylvania, 
and George Clinton of New York; and later Republican 
victories made John Langdon governor of New Hampshire, 

86 





Thomas Jefferson 


i 


\ 













































































































































































* 







THOMAS JEFFERSON 


87 


and Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts. In both houses of the 
new Congress, the supporters of Jefferson were in the majority. 

The leadership of the new party in thought and personnel The Virginia 
was Virginian. The Virginia stock was now at its prime. element - 
The hardships of the early years had weeded out the physi¬ 
cally weak, and the cavalier immigration had infused an ele¬ 
ment of high refinement, which served to excite the emula¬ 
tion of the rest. At this period the plantation system had 
reached its highest possible development in Virginia. As it 
had stretched westward into the piedmont, the plantations 
had become larger, and the need of administrative talent on 
the part of the owners greater. The next generation 
would be deflected by the mountains southward and into 
cotton culture, but now founders and administrators of the 
greatest plantations in the country were still living in 
Virginia, and were moved to public service by a desire for 
distinction and a sense of noblesse oblige . Finally, at this 
period the Virginia or kindred North Carolina stock con¬ 
trolled Kentucky, and also Ohio, which was to become a 
state in 1803 ; and so Virginia was brought into close contact 
with the expanding life of the West. 

Typically Virginian was Thomas Jefferson. He was Thomas 
democratic in his unwillingness to dictate or be dictated to, J efferson * 
rather than in an unquestioned acceptance of the will of the 
majority. He hated form, abolished many of the social 
conventions of the Federalist period, and risked a war with 
England by taking the wrong lady in to dinner. Yet he built 
the most exquisite mansion in America, and ruined himself 
financially to maintain a lavish hospitality. He would brook 
no superior. Both his simplicity and his extravagance 
aroused the grave distrust of the more formal and exact men 
of the North, and he was thrice anathema because of his 
freedom of expression on religious matters, in a generation 
which was not indeed very religious, but which regarded 
orthodox religion as essential to the support of authority. 


88 


JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY 


Republican 

conserva¬ 

tives. 


Northern Re¬ 
publicans. 


His dislike of form, perhaps, prevented his becoming an ora¬ 
tor, but in conversation he was convincing, and he possessed 
one of the most persuasive pens in all America. He was 
not a good judge of men and was often found in association 
with those of questionable conduct, but he did not cherish 
that jealousy of men of talent which is often an accompanying 
trait. He combined better than any other American states¬ 
man the strength that comes from the possession of a few 
ineradicable convictions, such as confidence in the wisdom of 
mankind and the consequent supremacy of reason, with an 
aptitude for shifting his views on nonessential questions; 
and so he preserved the magnetism of the idealist while 
he adapted himself with ease to the changing conditions of 
a growing country. While he was President, this change was 
chiefly in the direction of an enlarging view of the functions 
that the national government might beneficently exercise; 
and in this development he was followed by his faithful col¬ 
laborators: Madison, the new Secretary of State, and Albert 
Gallatin, the Secretary of the Treasury. 

Another group, enthusiastic Jeffersonians in 1800, clung 
to the views of that date: John Taylor of Caroline, the 
closet statesman, author of Construction Construed and the 
Constitution Vindicated; John Randolph, in 1801 chairman 
of the committee on ways and means, administration leader 
in the House, and keenest master of sarcasm among Ameri¬ 
can statesmen; Nathaniel Macon, Speaker of the House 
from 1801 to 1807, and guardian of pure government and 
economy; and James Monroe, the favorite though uninspired 
foreign agent of the administration. These men all held 
strictly to the principles with which the government had 
come into power, while the administration drifted away. 
In Jefferson’s second administration they came to form a 
third party known as the “Quids,” which, however, was 
but short-lived. 

The northern section of the Republican party played at 


THE REPUBLICAN PARTY 


89 


first a decidedly minor part in determining party policy. In 
New York it was composed of a union between the factions 
of the Clintons, the followers of Burr, and the old manorial 
family of the Livingstons. Interest was mainly centered in 
the rivalries of these groups, and national politics were sub¬ 
ordinated to those of the state. DeWitt Clinton resigned 
a United States senatorship to become mayor of New York. 
Pennsylvania seemed to be represented by Gallatin, who, with 
Madison and Jefferson, formed the inner council of the party, 
but his views were rather cosmopolitan than local, and he was 
in no sense characteristically Pennsylvanian. Leaving him 
aside, the Pennsylvanian democracy was not only torn by 
internal divisions, like that of New York, but failed to produce 
leaders even of any great local influence. In New England 
a democratic element existed, and after a few years of agi¬ 
tation and organization became numerically powerful, but 
the bulk of the ability and education remained with the Feder¬ 
alists, and it was many years before any New Englanders dis¬ 
puted with the Virginians the guidance of the Republican party. 

The distinguishing feature of the northern democracy was Party organi 
party organization. Tammany Hall had been founded in zatlon * 
1789. In 1793 and 1794 this club type of party organization 
received great impetus from the success of the Jacobin clubs 
in France, and Democratic societies were formed from Maine 
to Charleston and Kentucky. These societies were believed 
to have been concerned with the Whisky Rebellion, and Wash¬ 
ington so sternly discountenanced them that, except in New 
York, they lost their influence and passed away. Even Tam¬ 
many Hall formed separate political and social organizations. 

In the meantime there had been developing the type of organi¬ 
zation that was ultimately established. In New York, in colo¬ 
nial times, men had put themselves forward for office or had 
been brought to public notice by a few friends. About the time 
of the Revolution nominations were made by mass meet¬ 
ings of those interested. Later, these mass meetings had 


9 o 


JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY 


The spoils 
system. 


degenerated into caucuses, where a few politicians met, 
often secretly, and made up a “ slate ” of nominations, which 
was then presented to the public as the choice of large 
and enthusiastic assemblies of voters. In the meantime, 
there had been developing in Pennsylvania a system which 
applied to candidates for more general offices, where those 
interested could not be expected to come together. County 
officials were nominated by conventions of representatives, 
and in 1788 the first state party convention -was held. Such 
conventions for the sole purpose of selecting party candidates 
were too expensive in time and money to be held regularly, 
and their place was generally supplied by a legislative caucus 
of the members of the party. Sometimes there was a 
“ reenforced caucus,” delegates being specially sent to speak 
for those districts which were represented in the assembly 
by members of the opposing party. By controlling the local 
“caucuses” or “primaries,” politicians were able to select the 
members of the legislature and the delegates, and through 
them to control the party policy and the selection of its general 
candidates. 

The management of such party machinery had not yet 
become a profession upon which any considerable number of 
persons depended for a living, but not all these politicians 
were disinterested, and most of them wanted some payment 
for their services. The newspaper editor wanted the state 
printing; the wealthy man wanted, perhaps, a bank charter; 
others looked to some public-salaried position as their reward. 
It was already felt, as Josiah Quincy said, that party cohesion 
was strengthened by “interchange of good offices.” In 1799 
McKean of Pennsylvania, and in 1800 Clinton of New York, 
marked their entry into power by the removal of many 
Federalists and the appointment of Republicans in their 
places, and many of the most active workers for Jefferson’s 
election looked to the distribution of the spoils as the most 
important result to come from their success. 


THE SPOILS SYSTEM 


91 


Jefferson was not opposed in principle to making political 
appointments or removals, but he hesitated to adopt a policy 
of proscription, as he hoped to win to his support the bulk 
of the Federalist voters, leaving their leaders helpless. His 
inaugural breathed a spirit of universal good will. “But 
every difference of opinion,” he said, “is not a difference of 
principle. We have called by different names brethren of 
the same principle. We are all Republicans, we are all 
Federalists.” To satisfy his supporters and win his oppo¬ 
nents was a difficult task, but one exactly suited to his 
ability and temperament. He proceeded, tentatively, a 
talons as he expressed it, beginning with cases where removal 
might be defended on some special ground without an appeal 
to general principles. He reinstated all who had been removed 
by Adams; he declared void certain so-called “midnight” ap¬ 
pointments made in the last moments of the Adams adminis¬ 
tration, the commissions for which had not been delivered; 
he removed officers appointed by Adams after it was known 
that the latter was defeated for reelection and that these 
appointees would serve a hostile administration. In defense 
of this action, he wrote an ingenious letter to the merchants 
of New Haven who had protested against the removal of 
their collector, — and then he waited. No reaction followed; 
the Federalist press raged, but the elections went Republican, 
and Jefferson proceeded to make removals generally upon 
the principle that more offices should be held by Republi¬ 
cans. As the Republicans gained one state after another, 
similar state proscriptions marked their victories as in 
Rhode Island in 1810, and Massachusetts in 1811. Appoint¬ 
ments were, on the whole, good, being by no means given 
purely because of party usefulness, and those appointed 
kept office while their party was in power. The principle 
of rotation in office was not yet established. Moreover, the 
practice of removal was in large measure confined to the 
North. “Some states,” said Jefferson, “require a different 


Jefferson’s 
removals and 
appoint¬ 
ments. 


92 


JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY 


Democratic 

innovations. 


The repeal 
of the judi¬ 
ciary act of 
1801. 


regimen from others.” The adoption of a proscriptive policy 
did not, therefore, mean the introduction of a complete 
spoils system into national politics. Moreover, as Wash¬ 
ington had been occupied as capital for only a year, there 
was no firmly rooted official class whose distresses could 
stir the popular imagination, as when Jackson took similar 
action at a later time. The proscription of Jefferson, there¬ 
fore, effected no great change in the character of the civil 
service, and was soon forgotten. 

While the personnel of the government was being changed, 
the general aspect of official life was assuming a simpler and 
more democratic tone. Jefferson discarded the official rules 
of etiquette which Hamilton had drawn up. He lived simply, 
though somewhat lavishly, as he did at home. The Feder¬ 
alist practice of having the two houses of Congress send the 
President formal addresses at their coming together, and of 
his replying, — a practice drawn from the custom of the 
British Parliament,—was done away with. On the other 
hand Congress sought to draw closer to the people. The 
House of Representatives granted better opportunities for 
reporters, and the Senate, against the unanimous vote of 
its Federalist members, provided itself with a stenographer 
to take down its debates. 

The regular program of the party was destructive, and 
few administrations have so thoroughly carried out the work 
they were elected to accomplish. One of the earliest meas¬ 
ures was the repeal of the judiciary act of 1801, which was 
regarded as creating an unnecessarily expensive system. 
Additional venom was given to the attack upon this law 
because Adams had made it a means of providing positions 
for Federalist congressmen who had been defeated for 
reelection. John Randolph wished “to give a death-blow 
to the pretension of rendering the judiciary a hospital 
for decayed politicians.” The repeal was made, in spite of 
the question raised as to the constitutional power of Congress 


REPUBLICAN REACTIONARY PROGRAM 


93 


thus to deprive of their offices men appointed to hold office 
during good behavior. 

The repeal of this act was one move in a general attack on 
the judiciary, the only department of government in which 
the Federalists remained intrenched. It availed, however, 
comparatively little to reduce the number of judges if those 
that remained were still Federalists; and partly with the 
object of gaining control of the bench by displacing Feder¬ 
alist judges and putting Republicans in their places, a 
number of impeachments were brought. The first, against 
Mr. Pickering, a district judge, was successful; but in the 
next case, that of Samuel Chase, a justice of the Supreme 
Court, accused of undue political activity, the Senate failed 
to find him guilty, taking the position that impeachment was 
judicial in its nature as well as in its processes, and convic¬ 
tion should be based on some definite judicial offense and 
not on general grounds. This failure led to the abandonment 
of the attempt to weed out the judiciary. It was a plan 
discountenanced by the more moderate of the Republicans. 
In Pennsylvania, a similar effort to control the judiciary 
met with a similar result. Stung by these defeats, Ran¬ 
dolph and others of the more radical among the Repub¬ 
licans proposed that judges be removable by a joint 
resolution of the houses of Congress, and that state 
legislatures have the right to recall their senators. These 
proposals, however, met with small response, and although 
an additional judge was added to the Supreme Court 
in 1807, it was not until 1811 that a majority owed their 
selection to a Republican President, and even then Marshall 
continued to dominate the court by his reasoning and his 
powerful personality. 

In the field of legislation there were no obstacles, and 
progress was rapid. The excise law fell at once, as Gallatin 
sympathized with the frontier whisky makers, of whom he 
had been in 1794 a leader, and Jefferson disliked the for- 


The attack 
on the judi¬ 
ciary. 


Repeal of 
Federalist 
laws. 


94 


JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY 


The pursuit 
of simplicity. 


Financial ad¬ 
ministration. 


midable corps of officials which its enforcement required. 
The bankruptcy act was easily repealed. The residence 
requirement for naturalization was again reduced to five 
years, while the Alien and Sedition Acts expired by limi¬ 
tation. The Bank, having a charter for twenty years, could 
not be overthrown during Jefferson’s administration, but 
when in 1811 its charter expired, it was forced to go out of 
existence. 

Still in the pursuit of simplicity, the diplomatic service 
was curtailed, and the standing army reduced. “For defense 
against invasion,” said Jefferson of the Litter, “their number 
is as nothing. . . . Uncertain as we must ever be of the 
particular point in our circumference where an enemy may 
choose to invade us, the only force which can be ready at 
every point and competent to oppose them is the body of 
neighboring citizens as formed into a militia.” In the same 
way, the regular navy was reduced by laying up many of 
the frigates, while a multitude of small gunboats were 
built, which might be manned by naval militia and act as 
a coast guard in time of war. 

Upon Gallatin, the Secretary of the Treasury, lay the 
burden of proving that a simple government could be also 
efficient, and it was hoped that he might do something to 
remove that last remaining instrument of Hamiltonian 
consolidation, the national debt. In pursuit of these aims 
Gallatin showed great skill and was assisted by great good 
luck. In the first place, he brought the finances more closely 
under the control of Congress, by securing the adoption of 
the system of specific appropriation, in the place of the 
general appropriation of lump sums for civil service, war, 
and so forth, that it had previously been customary to make. 
Expenses he pared down, with almost too severe an economy. 
At the same time the increase of the customs revenue was 
unparalleled. Sir William Scott, the English admiralty 
judge, decided in 1799, in the cases of the Emmanuel and the 


RELATIONS WITH FRANCE 


95 


Polly , that American vessels might carry on the trade be¬ 
tween France and her colonies, if the goods were first brought 
to the United States and paid duty. The result was that in 
some years during the Napoleonic wars sixty million dollars’ 
worth of products of the West Indies paid duty in American 
ports. The revenue advanced, surpluses piled up, and when 
Jefferson retired in 1809, $33,000,000 of debt, all that had 
matured and was payable, had been wiped out. 

When Jefferson became President, the war in Europe was New dangers 
drawing to a close, but the peace bid fair to be more danger- from France - 
ous than the war. Napoleon, now in control of France, 
found in the colonial policies of his predecessors an outlet for 
his tremendous energies. His foreign minister and leading 
supporter, Talleyrand, was well acquainted with American 
affairs and urged them upon his attention. On Septem¬ 
ber 30, 1800, the peace with the United States removed one 
obstacle to the enterprise; the next day the secret treaty of 
San Ildefonso, by which Spain ceded Louisiana to France, 
gave the field for exploitation; October 1, 1801, prelimi¬ 
nary articles with Great Britain were signed, and in March, 

1802, the treaty of Amiens established peace with that 
country and opened the ocean to French exploits. Before 
France actually took possession of New Orleans, and while 
the treaty of cession was still in fact a secret, the right of 
deposit at that place accorded Americans by the treaty of 
1795 was withdrawn. Nor was another place of deposit 
designated as the treaty required. Thus, when the French 
should occupy Louisiana, they would have all the strings of 
western intrigue in their hands, and the future of the Missis¬ 
sippi valley might be at their disposition. 

The news of the withdrawal of the right of deposit, coupled Jefferson’s 
with well-authenticated information regarding the secret policy.* 
treaty of cession, created a panic in public circles at Washing¬ 
ton. Every one realized what it would mean to have France 
as a neighbor, instead of decrepit Spain, one of whose heirs 


9 6 


JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY 


we had intended to become. Just what Napoleon’s next 
step would be was unknown at the time, and cannot be 
stated with certainty even to-day. It was sufficiently evi¬ 
dent, however, that he would strive to reestablish the French 
colonial empire in America on the broadest scale, and that 
his plans would necessarily conflict with the aspirations of 
far-seeing Americans. The struggle for the Mississippi valley, 
which had seemed won by the peace of 1763, appeared now 
to be on the point of reopening, under very different condi¬ 
tions: in the earlier period the conflict was for the oppor¬ 
tunity to expand over an unoccupied territory, but now the 
territory was occupied by tens of thousands of Americans 
whose livelihood would be dependent upon the French, 
since the latter might, by keeping the Mississippi closed, 
cut them off from all commercial intercourse with the 
outside world. The Federalists lamented the peace with 
France, and again urged war. Jefferson saw clearly 
the peril of the times, but he had confidence in the reason¬ 
ableness of the French government. He wrote on April 
18, 1802: “The day that France takes possession of New 
Orleans fixes the sentence which is to restrain her forever 
within her low-water mark. It seals the union of two 
nations, which in conjunction can maintain exclusive posses¬ 
sion of the ocean. From that moment we must marry our¬ 
selves to the British fleet and nation.” He talked peace, 
and he sent Monroe, as special commissioner to France, 
instructed to buy New Orleans. If France would not sell, 
or grant us full navigation rights on the Mississippi, we 
would delay until the next war between France and England, 
and then ally ourselves with the latter. Meantime he 
extended courtesies to the English minister. 

Jefferson’s policy would have been perfect if, in addition 
to what he did and did not do, he had also prepared for the 
emergency of war ; but it was neither to his skill nor to the 
efforts of Monroe that success was due. The key to the 


PURCHASE OF LOUISIANA 


97 


French plan was the island of Santo Domingo, perhaps at 
that time the richest colony in the world. The negroes on 
the island had revolted, and Napoleon’s first work was to 
reduce them. On January 7, 1803, news reached Paris that 
the expedition intended to accomplish the reduction had 
been virtually destroyed. At once Napoleon dropped his 
whole project and devoted himself to European affairs. He 
threw over Talleyrand; he prepared for war with England 
and Austria; and he decided to sell, not New Orleans alone, 
but all Louisiana, to the United States in order to prevent 
its falling into the hands of England, to replenish his 
coffers, and to secure the effective gratitude of this country. 
The offer was made to Robert R. Livingston, our regular 
minister, before Monroe arrived, and the bargain was con¬ 
cluded April 30, 1803, for $15,000,000, $3,750,000 of which 
was to be paid our own citizens for claims against the French 
government. 

The treaty was received in America with astonishment, 
and not with unmingled pleasure. Jefferson realized its 
value, perhaps more clearly than any one else, but it conflicted 
with his idea of strict construction, as the Constitution 
nowhere explicitly gave the right to annex territory. It 
was, however, so easy to imply such a right from the treaty¬ 
making power, that his followers swept aside even his sugges¬ 
tion of a constitutional amendment to legalize the treaty, 
and thus they started on the broad path that was to lead 
them to stretch the Constitution almost as much as the 
Federalists had done. 

The Federalists could not object to the treaty on this 
ground, but based their opposition on the clause providing 
that “The inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incor¬ 
porated in the Union of the United States, and admitted 
as soon as possible, according to the principles of the Fed¬ 
eral Constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advan¬ 
tages, and immunities of citizens of the United States.” 


Purchase oi 
Louisiana. 


Constitu¬ 
tional con¬ 
troversies. 


Territorial 
organization 
of Louisiana. 


98 JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY 

This clause obviously implied the admission of the new 
territory into the Union as a state or states. Foreseeing the 
diminished consequence of the eastern states, if this great 
addition were made to the southern and western sections, 
many Federalists contended that we could acquire territory to 
govern as a colony, but that to enlarge the Union, to admit 
new states, was to change the character of the government, 
and required the consent of all or at least three quarters of 
the states. Defeated in Congress, some Federalists, such 
as Pickering, discussed the advisability of secession by the 
New England states. George Cabot urged patience: 
“We shall go the way of all governments wholly popular, 
from bad to worse, until the evils, no longer tolerable, shall 
generate their own remedies.” The Republicans were 
forced to maintain the implied power to add to the Union 
as well as to annex territory. 

The question of the government of the newly acquired 
territory was not without difficulties, as the population was 
very largely alien in law and language. It was found in¬ 
convenient to apply to it at once all the rights and privi¬ 
leges customary in the other territories, and the first terri¬ 
torial act was, therefore, based on the idea that Congress has 
absolute power over the territories, unrestricted by the guar¬ 
antees of individual rights contained in the amendments to 
the Constitution. George W. Campbell said: “It really 
establishes a complete despotism ; it does not evince a single 
trait of liberty.” This act, passed in 1804, divided the 
region by the parallel of 33 0 ; the Territory of Orleans lying 
to the south, the District of Louisiana to the north. In 
1805 the latter division was made a territory, and both sec¬ 
tions were given governments modeled on that laid down in the 
Northwestern Ordinance. The constitutional importance of the 
Louisiana purchase controversies, in committing the Repub¬ 
licans, the party of strict construction, to such decided 
principles of broad construction, cannot be overestimated. 


JEFFERSON’S INTERNAL POLICY 


99 


The annexation of Louisiana settled at once and finally 
the allegiance of the West to the Union. The government 
which could secure an outlet for their products deserved and 
received the full support of the western settlers. The work 
partly accomplished by the Spanish treaty of 1795 was now 
complete. Jefferson aimed also, though less successfully, Indian policy 
at the solution of the Indian problem. He hoped by civi¬ 
lizing them to attach them to the whites, abolish war, and 
do away with the need of extensive hunting grounds. He 
continually extended the purchases of Indian land in Georgia, 
in Tennessee, and all along the northern bank of the Ohio, 
and up the Mississippi and the Wabash. 

At the same time, Jefferson’s insatiate scientific curiosity Exploration, 
made it a pleasant public duty for him to direct the ex¬ 
ploration of the new territory to the west. In 1785, when 
minister to France, he had conversed with and encouraged 
John Ledyard, who was endeavoring to establish American 
possession and trade on the northwest coast of the continent. 

He never lost interest in the project, and he firmly believed 
that American civilization would reach across to the Pacific. 

The most important of Jefferson’s exploring expeditions was, 
in fact, organized before the purchase. Led by the Presi¬ 
dent’s private secretary, Meriwether Lewis, and by William 
Clark, it ascended the Missouri in 1804, and wintered in 
what is now North Dakota ; the next summer it crossed the 
Rocky Mountains and wintered near the Pacific coast. 

Returning in 1806, it brought back masses of invaluable 
information, which, popularized by Nicholas Biddle, made 
Louisiana known to the people. Other expeditions under 
Zebulon Pike during 1805-1807 explored the upper Mississippi, 
and also the region as far westward as Pikes Peak, and far 
enough to the southward to get into trouble with the Spaniards. 

The reelection of Jefferson caused scarcely a ripple of Thereelec- 
excitement, so content and prosperous was the country. ^° n n o[ J effer - 
The Twelfth Amendment had now been adopted, requiring 


IOO 


JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY 


The Hamil¬ 
ton-!} un- 
duel, and 
Burr’s fall. 


Jefferson’s 
plans for an 
extension of 
national ac¬ 
tivities. 


each elector to cast one vote for President and one for Vice 
President, preventing such a deadlock as that of 1800. The 
growth of democratic feeling was evinced by the fact that 
ten states out of seventeen chose their electors by popular 
vote. The Republican caucus dropped Burr, and nomi¬ 
nated George Clinton for Vice President. The Federalists j 
supported C. C. Pinckney and Rufus King, but secured for j 
them only 14 electoral votes to 162 for Jefferson, carrying 
only Connecticut, Delaware, and two districts in Maryland. 

Jefferson had almost succeeded in his object of winning 
the Federalist voters from their leaders, and the same year 
saw the disappearance of his two most conspicuous rivals. 
Burr, his ambition thwarted in the Republican party, ran 
for governor of New York, counting on Federalist support. 
Hamilton opposed him, and he was defeated; whereupon he 
challenged Hamilton, shot, and killed him. The profound 
and generous grief for the loss of Hamilton, whose high ability 
and character were now almost universally admitted, and the 
circumstances of the duel, ended Burr’s hope of political 
advancement through the ordinary channels. He turned to 
the West, thinking, with his address and skill, to weave some 
great project from the maze of frontier intrigue, but he was 
too late. The securing of the Mississippi valley had con¬ 
tented the frontiersmen, and Burr’s plans, whatever they 
may have been, fell flat. He was arrested and tried for 
treason, and while acquitted, found public sentiment so 
strongly turned against him that he left the country for 
many years. 

Secure in his power, Jefferson began to take a more genial 
view of government. His fertile mind saw so many ways in 
which he could benefit the country that he began to chafe 
under the restrictions which his strict view of the Constitu¬ 
tion put upon him. In his second inaugural he looked for¬ 
ward to the time when the debt should be paid, “and that 
redemption once effected, the revenue thereby liberated 


REPUBLICAN FACTIONS 


IOI 


may, by a just repartition of it among the states and a 
corresponding amendment of the Constitution, be applied 
in time of peace to rivers, canals, roads, arts, manufactures, 
education, and other great objects within each of the states.” 
By the time he wrote his sixth annual message he was sure 
that the people would find no advantage in a reduction of 
the tariff, but would prefer the application of the surplus 
“to the great purposes of the public education, roads, rivers, 
canals, and such other objects of public improvement as it 
may be thought proper to add to the constitutional enumera¬ 
tion of Federal powers. By their operations new channels 
of communication will be opened between the states, the 
lines of separation will disappear, their interests will be 
identified, and their union cemented by new and indissoluble 
ties.” Gallatin made a careful report on practicable internal 
improvements, and Congress appropriated money for a 
survey of the coast, and of a national road to run from Cum¬ 
berland, Maryland, westward, connecting Washington with 
the Ohio; but it preferred to find its power by implication, 
rather than by amendment to the Constitution as Jefferson 
proposed. 

This movement of the administration toward centraliza¬ 
tion led to a breach in the Republican party. The main 
issue was as to whether Jefferson’s successor should be the 
ever faithful Madison, or Monroe, whose views were less 
elastic. John Randolph, however, at the head of the “ Quids,” 
carried the campaign into many matters and harassed 
the administration on every side. Particularly bitter was his 
attack on Gallatin who had proposed — as part of the 
agreement by which Georgia in 1802 ceded'to the national 
government her claims to all territory west of what is now 
her western boundary — to reimburse the Yazoo claim¬ 
ants for their losses caused by the revocation of grants 
they had corruptly obtained from the Georgia legislature. 
This plan he defeated, although the proposition was re- 


Republican 

factions. 


102 


JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY 


The Barbary 
wars. 


England’s 
policy to¬ 
ward neu¬ 
tral trade. 


peatedly renewed, and although in 1811 the Supreme Court, 
in the case of Fletcher v. Peck , declared that the original 
contract was binding. An appropriation to pay the claim 
was secured only in 1814, when Randolph was not in Congress. 
On the whole, however, the honors of war were with the 
administration, for Randolph’s friend Macon was defeated 
for the speakership in 1807, and as a consequence Randolph 
lost the chairmanship of the committee on ways and means. 

It was in the field of foreign affairs that Jefferson en¬ 
countered his chief difficulties. Peace was his passion, but 
in one instance he overcame his repugnance to war. The 
utter barbarity and unreasonableness of the Barbary pirate 
states had always disgusted him, and even during the Con¬ 
federation he had opposed the policy of placating them with 
bribes in order to open up the Mediterranean to our trade. 
Now, as President, he made war on Tripoli, and in 1805 
secured a peace without payment, meanwhile saving the 
navy from the extinction to which the policy of economy 
seemed destined to condemn it. An American squadron re¬ 
mained in the Mediterranean, and that sea continued open 
to American merchant vessels until the war of 1812. 

The foreign questions of greatest difficulty, however, 
arose from the renewal of the war in Europe, and the neces¬ 
sity of protecting our trade as a neutral nation. The battle 
of Trafalgar in 1805 gave England a naval supremacy that 
she had not had in the previous war, and with this renewed 
power to enforce her demands, she revived the practices to 
which we had then objected. The British mercantile interests, 
jealous of the prosperity of the American marine, called for 
action, and in 1805, in the case of the Essex, Sir William 
Scott reversed his previous decision in the case of the Polly , 
and declared liable to seizure French colonial products, even 
though landed and paying duty in American ports, unless it 
could be shown that they had actually become the property 
of American merchants, and that the intention was to keep 


RELATIONS WITH ENGLAND 


103 

them in America. In 1807 the protective clauses of the Jay 
treaty expired, and the substitute treaty which William 
Pinkney, as special commissioner, and Monroe, the regular 
minister in England, secured, was so unsatisfactory that 
Jefferson refused to present it to the Senate. England was, 
therefore, left free to adopt such policy as pleased her, and 
her program for the regulation and control of the trade of 
neutrals was made continuously more complete. In May, 
1806, the coast of Europe from Ostend to Brest was declared 
blockaded by England, and the British Orders in Council 
of January 7, 1807, and November n, 1807, had the effect 
of extending, this blockade to every port of Europe from 
which the British flag was excluded. England declared that 
this policy was retaliatory, her Orders being in answer to 
Napoleon’s Decrees, which will be subsequently mentioned. 
Napoleon stated that his first Decree was in answer to 
the Brest blockade. To neutrals the question of which bel¬ 
ligerent was primarily at fault was of small moment compared 
with the practical fact that neutral trade was hampered and 
vexed. 

The manner in which the officers of the British navy 
actually exercised these so-called belligerent rights was not 
less obnoxious than the claims themselves. It was found 
more convenient to blockade the American coast than 
that of Europe; and two frigates were therefore stationed 
off New York to examine the papers of vessels leaving port, 
and if their destination or cargoes appeared contrary to the 
Orders, they were sent to Halifax for judgment by the 
admiralty court there. In performing this police duty, in 
1806, the English accidentally shot and killed an American 
sailor, John Pierce. 

Still more troublesome was the matter of impressment. 
The increase of American trade, which, adjusting itself to 
conditions, continued to grow until 1808, called every year 
for four thousand new sailors, and high wages and good 


Blockade of 
New York. 


Impress¬ 

ments. 


104 


JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY 


treatment induced many to desert the English service, both 
public and private, for the American. This whetted the 
zeal of English naval officers in making impressments. It 
was estimated that 2500 sailors deserted the British marine, 
public and private, every year, and that impressments 
amounted to 1000 a year. This difficulty culminated when, 
on June 22, 1807, the Leopard fired on, stopped, and 
took men from the United States frigate Chesapeake. Such 
an insult was even more distressing than the impress¬ 
ment of men from private merchant vessels. England, 
indeed, did not venture to defend the act, but made diffi¬ 
culties about the form of apology, and a call to war swept 
over the country as it had in 1794, when England was 
reported to have unleashed the Algerian pirates. 

French poi- The policy of France was as disastrous to neutrals as that 
neutra! ard England. After Trafalgar, Napoleon despaired of reach- 
trade. j n g England directly, and saw that he could conquer her only 

by cutting off her trade, the source of her wealth. He planned 
to close the continent to English goods, and until his fall 
this was the predominant idea in his wars and alliances. He 
professed to be the champion of the freedom of the seas, but 
his policy took the form of declaring England beyond the range 
of law, and of stamping as English allies all neutrals who 
did not maintain their rights against her. On November 21, 
1806, he issued the Berlin Decree, declaring the British Isles 
in a state of blockade. As the French had no men-of-war, 
but only privateers at sea, this decree would not materially 
affect neutral vessels on their way to England, but any vessel 
coming from the ports of England could be seized on enter¬ 
ing a French port. On December 7, 1807, he followed this 
with the Milan Decree, which declared any vessel that should 
submit to be searched by an English vessel, or should enter 
a port of England or her colonies, denationalized and liable 
to capture. 

With the two belligerents equally maltreating us, it was 


THE EMBARGO 105 

difficult indeed to formulate a policy for the United States. 
One party, after the Chesapeake affair, clamored for war with 
England. The majority of the Federalists would have pre¬ 
ferred war with France. Jefferson would war with neither, 
but would bring both to reason by arguments addressed to 
their self-interest. In his youth he had been much impressed 
with the efficacy of the nonimportation agreements directed 
against England. As Secretary of State he had submitted 
a report to Congress, advising that we coerce foreign nations 
into a liberal policy toward us by commercial discrimination. 
He argued that we exported things absolutely necessary to 
foreign nations, such as food and raw materials; that we 
received luxuries and things that we could do without; 
and that, therefore, our trade was more important to them 
than theirs to us. 

He first directed this policy against England, and had 
introduced into Congress a nonimportation bill, excluding 
such British goods as could be replaced by goods from other 
nations or could be produced at home. This was passed 
in March, 1806, to go into effect on November 15, if England 
did not come to terms before that date. It was subsequently 
suspended and went into operation only on December 14, 
1807. It was intended as a threat only, not to be enforced. 
“What is it?” said Randolph, “a milk and water Bill! A 
dose of chicken broth to be taken nine months hence.” 
Eight days after the nonimportation act went into effect, 
it was replaced by the more vigorous measure of an embargo, 
utterly prohibiting all foreign intercourse and requiring 
coasting vessels to give bond to go only to domestic ports. 
While the embargo was nominally directed equally against 
France and England, it was really upon the latter country 
that it fell hardest. It was, in fact, an extension of Napo¬ 
leon's continental system of exhausting England by depriv¬ 
ing her of her markets. So true was this, that one of the 
French ministers said, “The Emperor applauds the em- 


Jefferson’s 
policy of 
commercial 
coercion. 


Nonimpor¬ 
tation and 
embargo. 


The effects 
of the em¬ 
bargo. 


Repeal of 
the em¬ 
bargo. 


106 JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY 

bargo,” and many Federalists believed that it was dictated 
by Jefferson’s French sympathies. This charge was unjust, 
for the embargo was, in fact, a particular hobby of Jefferson’s, 
who believed that he had discovered in it a substitute for 
war. 

Like war, the embargo was not one-sided. It substi¬ 
tuted a test of passive endurance for one of active conflict. 
England, indeed, suffered severely, but the government 
remained firm, its aristocratic structure enabling it to resist 
popular discontent. In the United States the embargo was 
a greater blow to the mercantile interests than any measure 
yet taken by the belligerents, or than war itself would have 
been. Some of the Federalist leaders again talked of a seces¬ 
sion of the states of New England, and in practice the act 
was very generally evaded by smuggling. Smuggling led to 
the passage of various enforcement acts of great rigor. 
These, the legislature of Massachusetts declared, February 
15, 1809, “in many respects unjust, oppressive, and uncon¬ 
stitutional, and not legally binding on the citizens of this 
state.” It, however, counseled obedience and remonstrance 
to Congress. 

In the meantime, the embargo was proving even more 
disastrous to the agricultural interests and particularly to 
the planters, who could not dispose of their crops, although 
they had to continue to support their slaves. The Federal¬ 
ists, led in the House of Representatives by Josiah Quincy 
of Massachusetts, were joined by dissatisfied Republicans 
like Joseph Story and John Randolph, and the embargo was 
brought to an end March 1, 1809. Thus, three days before 
his retirement, Jefferson was forced to see the failure of his 
favorite experiment in international relations, and to sub¬ 
mit to almost his only defeat from Congress, which, most 
largely through the democratic weapon of argument, he 
had ruled more completely than any President before or 
after. 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 107 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 

Every student should read Jefferson’s inaugural, Richardson’s 
Messages, I, 321-324. The Writings of Jefferson and the Works 
of Gallatin are generally interesting and useful. If available, 
An Inquiry into the Principles and Policy of Government in the 
United States, by John Taylor (of Caroline), 530-571, gives a clear 
view of Virginia constitutional theories. 

Adams, H., Administrations of Jefferson and Madison, I, chs. 
V-VII, is the best account of the intellectual condition of the 
country for the period. In general, however, and particularly for 
narrative, this invaluable work is not usable for class work, 
as it is long and is too well knit to break up easily into selec¬ 
tions. Channing, E., The Jeffersonian System, is distinctly 
workable. See also Trent, Southern Statesmen of the Old Regime. 

Fish, C. R., Civil Service, chs. II and III. 

Allen, G. W., The Barbary Wars. 

Adams, H., Randolph, ch. IV. Cox, I. J., Exploration of 
Louisiana Purchase, 1803-1806 (Am. Hist. Assoc., Report, 1904, 
vol. I, 149-174). Ogg, F. A., The Opening of the Mississippi. 
Story, J., Commentaries, §§ 1277-1288,1317-1321. Sparks, J., John 
Ledyard (Library of American Biography, vol. XIV). Turner, 
F. J., Diplomatic Contest for the Mississippi Valley {Atlantic, 
vol. 93, 676-691). 

Callender, G. S., Economic History, 239-260. Foster, J. W., 
Century of American Diplomacy. Moore, J. B., American Di¬ 
plomacy, chs. Ill and V. Schouler, J., United States, II, ch. VI, 
secs. 1, 2. See also Adams as noted above. 

Other valuable biographies are: Adams, H., Gallatin; 
Dodd, W. E., Statesmen of the Old South, and Macon; Roosevelt, 
T., Morris; Quincy, E., Quincy. 


Sources. 


Historical 

accounts. 

General. 


Civil service. 
Barbary 
policy. 
Louisiana. 


Diplomacy. 


Biography. 


CHAPTER VIII 


THE WAR OF 1812 


The election 
of 1808. 


The domestic 
policy of the 
new adminis¬ 
tration. 


The election of 1808 occurred during the stress of the 
debate over the embargo. It was understood that Madison 
represented the administration policy, although Jefferson 
professed to stand neutral between the Republican candi¬ 
dates. Monroe was the candidate of Randolph and the 
“ Quids,” who attacked the growing consolidation of the 
government, and would have limited the embargo to American 
vessels, a measure which would have relieved the southern 
planter by allowing him to export his crops, but would 
not have benefited the maritime interests. The Vice Presi¬ 
dent, George Clinton, felt that he deserved promotion, and 
that the northern democracy should be recognized. The 
contest was practically settled by the first public congres¬ 
sional caucus, which selected Madison and Clinton as the 
candidates; but in spite of this selection, Monroe was run 
for President in Virginia and Clinton in New York. The 
Federalists at first thought of supporting Monroe or Clinton, 
but in a secret meeting of the leaders in New York decided 
to repeat the ticket of 1804, presenting C. C. Pinckney and 
Rufus King. The Federalist candidates received the votes 
of all New England except Vermont, and, in addition, those 
of Delaware, and 5 in Maryland and North Carolina, 47 
in all. Madison received 122, and Clinton 6 for President. 
The vote for Vice President was a little more scattering, 
but Clinton was reelected. 

Madison had been a most efficient assistant. He had 
proved invaluable to Washington during the movement for the 


THE NONINTERCOURSE POLICY 


109 

formation of the Union, and to Jefferson during the struggle 
for religious liberty in Virginia, and afterwards during the 
conflict with the Federalists and the establishment of the 
Republican regime. He was, however, a weak leader, and 
at once encountered congressional opposition. Fear of his op¬ 
ponents deterred him from promoting Gallatin from the 
treasury to the state department, and caused him to appoint 
to the latter Robert Smith, the weakest man who ever filled 
the office. Gallatin remained at the treasury, and Madison 
made up for Smith’s incompetence by writing many of his 
dispatches. Probably no administration ever came into 
office with so few intentions; in fact, absence of intent was 
naturally its policy. The destruction of Federalist legis¬ 
lation had been almost completed under Jefferson; the party 
policy now demanded an administration without a history. 

There was a growing demand for internal improvements, 
such as Jefferson had favored, and this movement was 
fostered by Gallatin, but the majority were as yet so true to 
the principles of 1800 that the only thing accomplished was 
the granting of various small appropriations for the Cum¬ 
berland Road. In 1811, though by a close vote, the National 
Bank was discontinued. 

Foreign affairs, therefore, absorbed the main attention, Noninter- 
and here Madison seemed at first to score a victory. The couree ' 
embargo had been succeeded by a nonintercourse act, prohib¬ 
iting all trade with England and with France, but allowing 
it with the rest of the world. If, however, England would 
withdraw her “Orders,” or Napoleon revoke his “Decrees,” 
the prohibition would cease against the compliant power. 

Canning, the British minister of foreign affairs, proposed to 
take advantage of this offer, if he could at the same time 
secure other advantages, and so instructed Erskine, the 
English minister in the United States. The latter was a young 
man, with an American wife and American sympathies, and 
he consented to a treaty more favorable to America than 


no 


THE WAR OF 1812 


Prosperity of 

American 

trade. 


Macon Bill 
number two. 


Madison and 
Florida. 


Canning had intended. Madison promptly withdrew the 
prohibition of intercourse with England, and 1200 ships 
sailed for that country. Canning, however, promptly re¬ 
jected the treaty, claiming that Erskine had exceeded his 
authority; nonintercourse was revived, and Madison’s 
seeming victory was turned into defeat. Erskine was suc¬ 
ceeded by Francis James Jackson, a disagreeable man, whom 
Madison was easily able to worst diplomatically, but whose 
year in America meant practically a cessation of negotiations. 

In the meantime, American trade was rapidly reviving; 
the mercantile marine of Massachusetts in 1809 was larger 
than ever before. Losses from seizures were guarded against 
by high freight rates and insurance. Neutral ports were uti¬ 
lized, as is shown by the growth of exports to Russia, from 
about $12,000 in 1806 to about $4,000,000 in 1810. More¬ 
over, the laws of the United States were disobeyed, and 
many vessels sailed for England and France, while those 
countries issued many special licenses permitting the viola¬ 
tion of their own regulations. This prosperity, however, 
was in spite of the restrictive commercial system of the Re¬ 
publicans and not because of it. This system had no vic¬ 
tory to its credit, and it became steadily more unpopular. 
The result of this growing dissatisfaction was the pas¬ 
sage in April, 1810, of Macon Bill number two,—the 
first and more stringent bill proposed by Macon having 
failed to pass the Senate,—which applied the system in 
its mildest form. This bill threw open all trade, but 
offered, in case either of the belligerents should change its 
obnoxious policy and the other should not follow this 
example within three months, to revive the nonimporta¬ 
tion act against the country that remained obdurate. 

This act brought Madison into collision with Napoleon. 
It was not the first time. The Louisiana treaty had pre¬ 
sented an ambiguity with regard to the eastern boundary. 
Madison claimed the territory up to the Perdido River, the 


RELATIONS WITH FRANCE 


III 


present western boundary of the state of Florida, whereas 
the boundary intended was the Iberville River, just north of 
New Orleans. The dispute was between the United States 
and Spain, for France had ceded all she owned, whatever it 
might be, but Napoleon was master of Spain, and negotiations 
were actually with him. Napoleon cared nothing for the bit 
of territory, but it was important to the United States because 
it contained the mouths of many rivers whose upper waters 
were beginning to attract settlers. Ever since 1803 Napoleon 
had used this situation to influence American policy, offering 
to secure title when the United States might be of use to him, 
and withdrawing when the need had passed. On the whole 
Madison got the best of the game; for in 1810, as the result 
of a revolution by some American settlers in the region, he 
took possession of Baton Rouge and about half of the dis¬ 
puted area. The United States, however, had as yet no 
good international title. 

Up to this time, however, Napoleon had reason to think Napoleon 
of the United States as a friendly and almost docile power, tercourse! 
for the commercial policy of restrictions, although not adopted 
to please him, was actually what he wanted, as it cut off an 
important branch of English trade. He had, to be sure, dis¬ 
approved of the nonintercourse act, as it had allowed trade 
with the allies of France, which it had forbidden with her. 

As long as there was a possibility that England and the 
United States might come to terms, however, he had re¬ 
mained quiescent, in fact friendly, fearing an alliance be¬ 
tween the two countries. When the disavowal of the Erskine 
treaty had made certain a period of ill feeling between them, 
he actively expressed his disapproval. He first ordered all 
American vessels within the range of his influence to be se¬ 
questered, that is, held for official examination, on the ground 
that those in French ports were violating United States law, 
and that those in the ports of French allies should not be al¬ 
lowed to trade while trade with France was prohibited. On 


11 2 


THE WAR OF 1812 


The Cadore 
letter. 


Madison 
accepts the 
Cadore 
letter. 


March 23, 1810, the Rambouillet Decree ordered the sale 
of this property, amounting to $8,400,000, and consisting 
of 51 vessels in France, 44 in Spain, 28 in Naples, and n in 
Holland. Napoleon was in hopes that this order might cause 
a reestablishment of the embargo, which he would be glad 
to see, and the property which he held might be used to 
secure concessions from the United States, and to prevent 
retaliation. The main purpose of his policy, the cutting off 
of England’s trade with the United States, was still secure. 

Very different was the situation created by the Macon 
Bill number two, which threw the restrictive system to the 
winds and unsealed one of England’s best markets. Napoleon 
promptly, but secretly, ordered the absolute confiscation of all 
the American property sequestered and sold, to clear up ac¬ 
counts for the past, and on the same day, August 5, 1810, 
dictated a letter which his foreign minister, Cadore, communi¬ 
cated to the United States. This announced that the Decrees 
of Berlin and Milan “are revoked, and after November 1, 
they will cease to have effect, ... it being well understood 
that in consequence of this declaration the English are to 
revoke their Orders in Council and renounce the new principle 
of blockade which they have wished to establish,” or that the 
United States “cause their rights to be respected by the 
English.” “His majesty loves the Americans. Their pros¬ 
perity and their commerce are within the scope of his policy.” 

Madison received this letter with delight, and requested 
England to revoke her Orders. The Marquis of Wellesley, 
who had now succeeded Canning in the management of Eng¬ 
lish foreign affairs, replied that Cadore’s letter made the re¬ 
peal conditional on the action of England, and that the De¬ 
crees were actually being enforced. Napoleon did not hasten 
to explain the ambiguity. In fact he had no intention of 
abandoning his continental system, but proposed, even if 
England withdrew her Orders, to secure his ends by internal 
regulations. Madison, however, was not aware of this 


RELATIONS WITH FRANCE AND ENGLAND 113 

intention, and as England still refused to recall her Orders, he 
issued a proclamation under the authority of Macon Bill 
number two, reviving nonintercourse with that country on 
February 2, 1811. Congress sustained him by an act of 
March 2, but word soon reached America that Napoleon still 
seized all vessels violating the Decrees, and during the spring 
the balance hung between peace and war. Monroe, who had 
become Secretary of State, was in favor of breaking nego¬ 
tiations with France; Madison still clung to his belief in 
Napoleon. The latter, at the critical moment, released the 
American vessels he held. The administration decided in 
his favor; a new minister, Joel Barlow, the poet, was sent to 
France, and Napoleon had the satisfaction of closing the 
American market to England once more. It was already 
beginning to be evident that he might look to the United 
States for still more active assistance. 

The situation was changing in the United States. A new 
generation was coming to the front, composed of young men 
born during or after the Revolution, whose boyhood had been 
filled with tales of that war. They felt a greater confidence 
in the future of the country, a more unreasoning patriotism 
than the older men who had been so long at the helm, and 
their pride was stung by the bickering, ineffectual neutrality 
which we had for twenty years been practicing. One group 
of such young leaders came from South Carolina. That 
state was now ready to play a leading part in the national 
life. A long struggle between the planters of the coast and 
the frontier farmer element descending from the mountains, 
had been brought to a close in 1808 by a constitutional ar¬ 
rangement between the sections, by which each controlled one 
house of the legislature. The spread of the plantation system 
resulting from the expanding cultivation of cotton was soon 
to make the state a political unit. The South Carolina lead¬ 
ers, some sprung from the cultivated English and Huguenot 
stock about Charleston, some from the sturdy Scotch-Irish 


A new 
generation. 


THE WAR OF 1812 


The influence 
of the 
frontier. 


114 

element of the piedmont, were freed from state contests, and 
prepared to turn their united attention to national affairs. 
In the new Congress William Lowndes and John C. Calhoun 
appeared for the first time, while Langdon Cheves had been a 
member for but a part of the previous session. These were 
all for war, but, except for their inherited antipathy to Eng¬ 
land, were impartial as between France and England. Cal¬ 
houn would fight both. 

The direction in which this energy would turn was deter¬ 
mined by the young men of another section. The frontier 
had been expanding with great rapidity. Population had 
stretched along both banks of the Ohio and parts of the Mis¬ 
sissippi, the Tennessee, and the Cumberland. This advance 
had not been with regular, closed front, as Washington had 
advised, but along the lines of most attraction or least resist¬ 
ance. The government under the Republicans had rapidly 
extended the purchase of Indian lands, with the general idea 
of obtaining the possession of river banks rather than of 
steady progressive occupation. In 1804 the minimum 
amount of public land sold, was reduced to one hundred and 
sixty acres, the minimum price remaining at two dollars an 
acre, and the method being that none was sold by private sale 
until after it was offered at public auction. New land offices 
were opened at convenient points in the West, and, under the 
credit system established in 1800, the settler could buy land 
that was on the market for eighty dollars down, eighty more 
at the end of two years, and similar payments at the end of 
the third and fourth years. This did not satisfy the restless 
frontiersmen, who pressed on, seeking the most attractive 
spots or impelled by a desire for change, regardless of govern¬ 
ment regulations. They settled in land not yet placed on sale, 
or even in regions not yet purchased from the Indians, and 
asked that, when these locations were actually surveyed, the 
settler be given the right to purchase at the minimum price 
by private sale before the public auction took place. At first 












































































INDIAN WAR IN THE WEST 


115 

the government endeavored to drive out such unauthorized 
squatters, but government authority was not sufficiently 
strong to keep them out of the wilderness. As western in¬ 
fluence grew in politics the demand for legal recognition of the 
right of the squatter to preemption in the purchase of his 
holding became more insistent. In several special cases it 
was granted, and this encouraged others to settle where they 
wished, in the hope that they would subsequently be granted 
rights. The result was that the frontier was irregular and far 
flung. Great and powerful Indian tribes interposed between 
the settlements of eastern Georgia and those of Louisiana, on 
the one hand, and of Tennessee, on the other. Back of the 
thread of river farms in Indiana and Illinois were other 
tribes still unbroken. Hence the people of Georgia, Ten¬ 
nessee, Kentucky, Ohio, Louisiana, and even Vermont may 
be said to have been living under frontier conditions; one fifth 
of the whole population of the United States and represented, 
after the admission of Louisiana as a state in April, 1812, by 
12 senators out of 36; and, under the census of 1810, by 
35 out of 182 representatives. 

This section was even more powerful from its unanimity Indian war in 
than from its size. Every new purchase of land aroused the West ' 
greater hostility among the Indians. Two great Indians, 
brothers,—Tecumseh, the statesman, and Olliwochica, the 
prophet, — were organizing the tribes to resist further en¬ 
croachments ; and they were universally believed to receive 
support from the British in Canada. The crisis came when 
the Indians denied the legality of the last great purchase along 
the Wabash. Hostilities broke out, and on November 5,1811, 

William Henry Harrison, governor of Indiana Territory, won 
the important victory of Tippecanoe. An Indian war was 
thus begun, and the frontiersmen believed that they must ^ 
fight the British, at any rate, secretly. They thought that it 
would be better to do it openly, and that the conquest of 
Canada was possible and was the soundest solution of the 


THE WAR OF 1812 


116 

Indian question. Representatives of such ideas were Felix 
Grundy and John Sevier of Tennessee, and R. M. Johnson 
and Henry Clay of Kentucky. 

Preparations These young leaders, known as the “War Hawks,” con- 

Enghmd Wlth trolled the Congress that came together in the fall of 1811. 

Clay was elected Speaker, and he gave the important com¬ 
mittee chairmanships to men of like views. A war program 
was rushed through Congress. Republican repugnance to a 
navy was still, indeed, strong enough to thwart Cheves and 
Lowndes in their endeavors to prepare for ocean warfare, 
but land forces were abundantly provided for. The regular 
army was to be increased by 25,000 men, the President was 
authorized to employ 50,000 volunteers, new regulations for 
the militia were adopted, and half a million was appropriated 
for coast defense. Madison, though looking upon war rather 
with apprehension than with enthusiasm, followed the new 
leaders and put their policy into effect. Already he had with¬ 
drawn our minister, William Pinkney, from England, as a 
result of the misunderstanding over the Cadore letter. The 
English government, now somewhat alarmed at the pros¬ 
pect of war, sent over A. J. Foster, who at length arranged the 
Chesapeake affair and some minor matters. Public opinion, 
however, was not appeased, and Madison inflamed the hos¬ 
tility toward England by making public the papers of a 
British spy, John Henry, who had been sent in 1809 to report 
on public sentiment in New England. These papers, which 
Madison had secured in a somewhat romantic manner, con¬ 
tained no startling disclosures, but they evinced an unfriendly 
and suspicious attitude on the part of England. On April 1, 
1812, Madison recommended an embargo of sixty days, which 
was considered as preparatory to war. On June 1 he sent in a 
long message reviewing our negotiations with England, and 
suggesting that Congress consider the question of war. On 
June 18 Congress passed the crucial measure, and the war 
was begun. On June 23, before news of the war reached 


REELECTION OF MADISON 117 

England, the ministry, after a hard struggle in Parliament, 
had yielded to the accumulated complaints of English manu¬ 
facturers who were impoverished and laborers who were starv¬ 
ing because of the cutting off of American trade, and withdrew 
its Orders. The war party in the United States, however, was 
really more influenced by ill feeling caused by twenty years of 
rude treatment, and by the Indian question, than by a desire 
to win commercial privileges. The impressment question, 
moreover, remained unsettled, and so this action of England 
did not affect their determination to persist in the war. 

This war policy was not adopted without opposition. 
John Randolph and a few other Republicans joined with the 
Federalists, led by Josiah Quincy, in fighting it, step by step, 
through Congress. Even now that war had been declared, 
it was still hoped by these leaders that the election in the fall 
would reverse the decision. The Republicans in congres¬ 
sional caucus renominated Madison, and selected Elbridge 
Gerry for the vice presidency. Monroe, now Secretary of 
State, supported the administration. George Clinton was 
dead, but his more talented nephew, DeWitt Clinton, decided 
to run as a northern and peace candidate. He was nomi¬ 
nated by the Republican members of the New York legis¬ 
lature, and his nomination was indorsed by a convention 
of Federalists which met at New York. The election was 
fought out strictly on the war issue, and the result showed 
the important position, as arbiter between the sections, 
which the frontier had come to occupy. The old thirteen 
coast states gave 90 electoral votes to Madison and 89 to 
Clinton; the five new western states gave their 38 votes 
solidly for war. Of the coast states, New England gave its 
43 votes for peace; the 59 votes south of the Potomac 
were for war; the Middle States divided 31 for war and 46 
for peace. Madison’s majority was unexpectedly narrow; 
the change of the single state of Pennsylvania situated in the 
closely divided region would have elected Clinton. 


The election 
of 1812. 


The interna¬ 
tional situa¬ 
tion. 


Conditions in 
the United 
States. 


Il8 THE WAR OF 1812 

The War of 1812 was no more a single-handed conflict 
between the United States and England than was the Revo¬ 
lution. In 1776 the conflict began in America and spread 
to Europe; in 1812 the United States was at length drawn into 
the great struggle from which all her elder statesmen had been 
for nineteen years endeavoring to keep her free. It is notice¬ 
able that the one great country whose interests were very 
similar to our own, Russia, had just taken the other side in 
the conflict. We felt most keenly the violation of neutral 
rights by England; Russia, the exactions of Napoleon’s con¬ 
tinental system. At the very time that Russia accepted war 
with France for the express purpose of protecting her growing 
commerce with the United States, the latter went to war with 
England, and the weight of the neutral powers was thus 
balanced. Russia allied herself with England, but we did 
not correspondingly join Napoleon. We had suffered almost 
equally from both parties; since the beginning of hostilities in 
Europe, according to a report made to Congress July 6,1812, 
Great Britain had made 917 seizures, of which more than 
half had been returned as illegal; France 558, of which about 
one quarter had been similarly returned. In spite of tradi¬ 
tional sympathy, even Madison shared in the feeling of Cal¬ 
houn that the logical thing, however impractical, was to 
make war upon both. The administration, therefore, re¬ 
frained from an alliance with France, but French success 
meant the success of the United States, and the war press 
followed with exultation the invasion of Russia, and with 
growing affright Napoleon’s desperate struggle of 1813 and 
1814. 

The United States was ill prepared for war. During the 
long period of Jefferson’s economy the means of defense had 
been cut down to the slenderest. The great reduction of the 
debt might have been expected to improve credit, but this 
was offset by the hostility of the merchant class, which 
possessed the greater part of the ready money, and by the 


CONDITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 119 

disappearance of the United States Bank, which would have 
managed the necessary loans. There was, moreover, a great 
reduction in the revenue. Nearly all sources of income had 
been discarded except the tariff, and during the war the 
blockade of the coast by the overwhelming navy of Great 
Britain rendered the income from that source small and pre¬ 
carious. Trade did not indeed cease. The English needed 
American foodstuffs for their armies in Spain, and by special 
license Baltimore merchants drove a thriving trade thither; 
sending in 1813, $15,500,000 worth, chiefly flour, to the 
peninsula. The English, too, did not extend their blockade 
to the New England coast until April 25, 1814, and Boston 
merchants supplied, at least to some extent, the English at 
Halifax; but between December 10, 1813, and April 4, 1814, 
this trade was partly interrupted by a domestic embargo. 
The import trade, upon which alone duties could be collected, 
was still more interrupted, being confined almost entirely to 
New England ports. As the duties were doubled, the collec¬ 
tions at Boston actually increased until that port was block¬ 
aded, but were not sufficient to offset their almost entire 
cessation elsewhere. In 1813, Congress imposed for the sec¬ 
ond time a direct tax, and revived the Federalist expedient 
of an excise. All these resources together produced only a 
little over $10,000,000 a year; and to meet the excess 
expense of about $20,000,000 a year Gallatin resorted to 
treasury notes and permanent loans. These loans amounted 
during the war to $98,000,000, and the government found 
great difficulty in marketing them; they brought in much 
less than their face value and paid high interest, the first 
seven and one half per cent. The government, moreover, 
was not a strong one on the administrative side. Gallatin 
was not popular and left the country in 1813 as peace commis¬ 
sioner. His office was filled, after an interval, by Alexander 
Dallas, also of Pennsylvania, and a strong man, though not 
the equal of Gallatin. In the other departments Monroe was 


120 


THE WAR OF 1812 


Naval duels. 


the only really able official, and he cannot be considered as 
first class. Madison, himself, was not a vigorous chief execu¬ 
tive, and inefficiency permeated the administration. 

The American navy at the opening of the war — aside 
from Jefferson’s gunboats, one hundred and seventy in num¬ 
ber, intended only for coast defense and of very little use 
even for that purpose — consisted of frigates and sloops built 
during the Federalist regime. All together there were about 
twenty vessels, and not one able to oppose an English line- 
of-battle ship. Eleven British ships of the line and about 
ninety other vessels were on American stations at the out¬ 
break of hostilities. The administration proposed to keep 
the American vessels in harbor for coast defense, but Rogers 
with a small squadron put forth to sea without waiting for 
orders, and the remonstrances of naval officers backed by 
the early successes of the navy succeeded in bringing about 
a change of plan. The American commanders’ object was 
to cruise on well-known British trade routes and destroy 
commerce. While they were forced to flee when they encoun¬ 
tered a ship of the line, they were anxious to meet British 
frigates singly, for the American naval department had 
hit upon the clever device of building frigates somewhat su¬ 
perior to those of corresponding rank in the British navy. 
On August 19, 1812, the Constitution, Captain Hull, encoun¬ 
tered the Guerriere. After a sharp fight the Guerriere struck 
and soon after sank. This was the first of a series of 
naval duels: the Wasp fought the Frolic; the United States, 
the Macedonian; the Constitution, the Java; the Chesapeake, 
the Shannon; and in all of these contests except the last 
the American vessel won. These encounters attracted an 
attention far beyond their intrinsic importance. The Eng¬ 
lish had looked upon themselves as invincible upon the sea 
against almost any odds. Brougham had said in Parliament: 
“The assembled navies of America could not lay siege to 
an English sloop of war.” The fact that in nearly all these 


THE WAR ON LAND 


121 


cases the American vessels were slightly superior in size 
and weight of metal, was less important than the fact that 
they showed in each encounter superior speed and maneuver¬ 
ing qualities and better marksmanship. The American crews 
were better treated, and proved to be more efficient. 

In America these successes aroused much enthusiasm, 
Congress became much more liberal towards the navy, and 
several battleships were laid down. These were not, how¬ 
ever, finished before the war ended; the existing vessels were 
picked off one after another by the British, or blockaded in 
port, and by 1814 the navy was almost driven from the sea. 
Five hundred and twenty-six privateers from time to time 
assisted the navy in the work of commerce destroying, taking 
over thirteen hundred prizes, but most of these too were 
finally captured or blockaded. The naval record of the War 
of 1812 was brilliant, considering American resources. In 
captures, the two countries were about equal; the Ameri¬ 
cans claimed all together about 1750, the British navy cap¬ 
tured 1683, and British privateers a small number. The 
effect upon the ocean, however, was totally different in the 
case of the two countries. Although English insurance rates 
rose decidedly, and the commercial interests became, to 
some degree, hostile to the war, English commerce was not 
demoralized, while that of the United States was, by the 
end of the war, arrested. Moreover, none of the English 
military operations on the seacoast were impeded. Great 
Britain remained mistress of the ocean. Naval warfare on 
the Lakes, however, told a different story. 

The war party had put its hopes chiefly on the land war, 
hoping to coerce England by the conquest of Canada. It was 
thought by many that the Canadians would welcome the 
American armies as liberators from a hated yoke. This view 
overlooked the fact that the seat of war, upper Canada or 
Ontario, had been settled very largely by American Loyalists, 
whose devotion to the Crown was strengthened by their 


The first year 
of the war on 
land. 


122 


THE WAR OF 1812 


The over¬ 
throw of the 
Indians. 


English proj¬ 
ects in 1814. 


bitterness toward those who had driven them from their 
homes and deprived them of their estates. The incompetence 
of many of the generals first selected, and the difficulty of 
mobilizing armies composed chiefly of militia, added to the 
difficulties, but perhaps still more important was the wild 
nature of the country, rendering an extensive campaign 
of conquest almost impossible. The first invasion, directed 
from Detroit by General Hull, recoiled upon American soil. 
Hull and his army were captured, and the peninsula of Michi¬ 
gan fell under British control, while British expeditions pene¬ 
trated the wilderness of Wisconsin to the Mississippi, and 
occupied Fort Dearborn on the site of what is now Chicago. 
Meanwhile, the fighting on the Niagara frontier was indeci¬ 
sive, — in effect an American defeat, as the Americans had 
taken the initiative. An advance northward along the line of 
Lake Champlain also proved abortive. 

The navy of the Lakes came to the assistance of the army. 
On September 10, 1813, Oliver Hazard Perry, having con¬ 
structed a fleet, largely out of green timber, defeated the 
English and won control of Lake Erie. With his assistance, 
William Henry Harrison invaded Canada, and on October 5 
defeated the English in the battle of the Thames. This 
battle was particularly pleasing to the frontiersmen, for 
Tecumseh was killed and the confederation of northwestern 
Indians broken up. The same fall saw the last uprising of 
the Creek Indians. They had been roused by the eloquence 
of Tecumseh, who had visited them in 1811, and, knowing of 
the English war, on August 30, 1813, surprised and massacred 
about four hundred whites gathered in Fort Mimms on the 
Alabama. Tennessee was promptly aroused, and General 
Andrew Jackson, with an army of frontiersmen, descended 
upon the Indians and on March 27, 1814, at the Great 
Horseshoe Bend, administered a severe and lasting defeat. 

In spite of these successes the year 1814 opened inaus- 
piciously. Napoleon abdicated April 11, and England could 


DOMESTIC DISAFFECTION 


123 


direct her entire energies to the American war. A vigorous 
campaign was planned; an expedition on Burgoyne’s old 
route down Lake Champlain, a harrying of the coast, par¬ 
ticularly of the Chesapeake, by mixed naval and military 
forces, with attacks on Washington and Baltimore, and, most 
important of all, a great expedition against New Orleans. 

The coast expedition had a fair share of success during 
the summer. It made several descents on New England, and 
in August temporarily occupied Washington and burned the 
Capitol. In September, however, it received a severe check on 
its attack on Baltimore, where Fort McHenry successfully re¬ 
sisted the fleet, making a defense which inspired Francis Scott 
Key to write The Star Spangled Banner , which immediately 
became the most popular of the national anthems. The 
Champlain project was thwarted by a naval battle near 
Plattsburg, New York, where, on September n, Commodore 
Macdonough defeated an English flotilla, and maintained 
control of the lake, thus making an advance by the English 
army impracticable. The greatest and the most ominous of 
the undertakings, that against New Orleans, was still im¬ 
pending during the fall. The fate of the Mississippi valley 
seemed again uncertain. The Louisiana region contained 
only about 150,000 inhabitants; it was isolated from the 
rest of the United States; the loyalty of its Creole popula¬ 
tion to the United States had never been proved and was 
strongly suspected. In the hands of a foreign power, it 
would become a menace to the Union, as it had been before 
the purchase. Timothy Pickering wrote that he did not ex¬ 
pect any western members to attend the opening of Congress. 
Just at this time domestic affairs reached a crisis more acute 
than any since 1798; if, indeed, they were then as full of 
peril. 

The administration, following Jefferson’s plans, had hoped 
to rely to a very great extent on the militia for its military 
operations. This reliance proved delusive, for the state 


Depression 
in 1814. 


Domestic 

disaffection. 


124 


THE WAR OF 1812 


The Hartford 
Convention. 


authorities made many difficulties about the appointment ot 
militia officers, and about the employment of the militia in 
Canada or even outside the state to which it belonged. While 
General Van Rensselaer and his troops were fighting against 
superior numbers on the Canada side of the Niagara River, 
New York militia, eyewitnesses of the conflict, refused to cross 
to their assistance. This attitude was most marked in New 
England, where opposition to the war was very strong. The 
general dissatisfaction which had been felt for twelve years at 
New England’s constantly decreasing influence, naturally cul¬ 
minated when she was drawn into a war against England, 
which country she believed to be defending the cause of just 
and sound government. George Cabot had predicted, in 1804, 
that in case of “a war with Great Britain, manifestly provoked 
by our rulers, . . . separation will then be unavoidable, 
when our loyalty to the Union is generally perceived to be 
the instrument of debasement and impoverishment.” The 
Federalists secured control of all the New England state gov¬ 
ernments, and on October 17, 1814, Massachusetts called a 
convention to meet at Hartford to discuss the situation. 

Twenty-three delegates met at Hartford on December 15, 
1814. George Cabot presided but, either from constitutional 
dislike of action, or because his wisdom grew with the impor¬ 
tance of the event and he realized that the majority still fa¬ 
vored the Union, he took a fairly conservative stand. In 
secret session the convention formulated its demands: that 
the power of Congress to make war, to make new states, and 
to lay embargoes or restrict commerce be limited by consti¬ 
tutional amendment; that amendments be adopted provid¬ 
ing that the President serve only one term, and that succes¬ 
sive Presidents should not come from the same state; and 
that the representation of the southern states based on 
slave population be abolished. The states were also advised 
to demand a portion of the national taxes raised within their 
limits to be used for purposes of local defense; and, while 


BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS 


125 


awaiting the answer to these ultimata, to make certain 
antidemocratic changes in their laws, and to protect their 
citizens from the draft for military service which the admin¬ 
istration was at that very time, though unsuccessfully, urging 
Congress to order. If the national government should not. 
grant these demands within six months, it was recommended 
that another convention be held. While it is very doubtful 
whether a majority in any New England state would have 
supported an actual proposition to secede, even if these de¬ 
mands had been refused, the state of the Union seemed very 
dubious when the Massachusetts and Connecticut commis¬ 
sioners appointed to present the conclusions of the con¬ 
vention approached Washington in the middle of January, 
1815. 

Two events occurred before they reached there, however, 
that rendered their mission so obviously useless that they 
returned home without presenting their demands. The 
first of these was the defeat of the New Orleans expedition 
by General Jackson, in a battle on January 8, which aroused 
to enthusiasm the patriotic pride of the Americans. Frontiers¬ 
men from Tennessee and Kentucky had descended to the 
assistance of the local levies, and had defeated a superior 
force of the enemy, consisting of picked troops who had 
served with Wellington, and who were supported by a large 
fleet. The battle enheartened those who were discouraged, 
and renewed the war spirit. Both the spirit and the battle, 
however, were unnecessary, for, before the battle had been 
fought, peace had been signed, although news of it did not 
reach America until later. 

Negotiations had been begun almost as soon as hostilities. 
Russia, desirous of concentrating all England’s strength 
against France, and friendly to the United States, had offered 
mediation. This offer was accepted by the United States in 
the spring of 1813. Napoleon’s fortunes were waning rapidly, 
and it was to be feared that the whole weight of England’s 


Battle of 
New Orleans 


Peace nego¬ 
tiations. 


126 


THE WAR OF 1812 


power might be directed against us. John Quincy Adams, 
Gallatin, and James A. Bayard, a Federalist senator from Dela¬ 
ware, were appointed commissioners. England refused the 
mediation, but the commissioners remained abroad, and 
in 1814 direct negotiations were begun. Henry Clay and 
Jonathan Russell were added to the commission, and Ghent 
was arranged as the place of meeting with the English com¬ 
missioners. The latter were instructed to demand a “ recti¬ 
fication ” of the boundary line, the establishment of an in¬ 
dependent buffer Indian state between the Ohio and the Lakes, 
and other concessions. The American commissioners re¬ 
fused to treat on this basis. The Duke of Wellington told 
the British government that the military situation did not 
justify such demands and would not while the Americans 
had control of the Lakes. The English industrial and com¬ 
mercial classes were eager for peace and a renewal of trade, and 
brought such pressure to bear upon the government that it 
receded, first from one point, and then from another, until 
at length a treaty was agreed to on Christmas eve, 1814, 
upon the basis of the status quo ante helium , or a return to 
the conditions before the war. As we had gone to war for 
the redress of grievances this was, strictly speaking, a defeat, 
but the change of circumstances resulting from the defeat of 
Napoleon made it seem a distinct victory. It was not a 
return to the condition before the war, because with the ces¬ 
sation of war in Europe, the violation of our neutral rights 
actually ceased; moreover, the Indians of the southwest and 
northwest, although they still remained on their lands, had 
been decisively defeated and ceased to be a factor in war or 
diplomacy. The news of the treaty, coming in close con¬ 
junction with Jackson’s great victory, turned the country 
from depression to rejoicing; the commissioners of Massa¬ 
chusetts and Connecticut returned without even proceeding 
to Washington, and all fear of disunion vanished with the 
announcement of the peace. 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 


127 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 

For war speeches: Colton, C., The Life, etc., of Henry Clay, I, 
159-185 ; and Calhoun, J. C., Works, II, 1-13. For peace speeches: 
see Harding, S. B., Select Orations, 175-190 (John Randolph); 
and Quincy, E., Josiah Quincy, 281-300. These speeches are also 
to be found in the Annals of Congress. For the peace negotia¬ 
tions: Adams, J. Q., Memoirs, III, 1-144, perhaps the best op¬ 
portunity for the general student to become acquainted with this 
diary, owing to the concentration of interest. Ames, H. V., State 
Documents, 54-88, and Macdonald, W., Select Documents, No. 32, 
give material on the Hartford Convention. 

Babcock, K. C., The Rise of American Nationality, is particu¬ 
larly good on the western aspects of the war movement. Into 
the more intricate complications of the diplomatic web the author 
has not found it expedient to lead the students in a general course. 
McMaster, United States, III, 529-540, and Schouler, United 
States, vol. II, ch. VIII, sec. 1, give most students more than 
Henry Adams. On the Hartford Convention, H. C. Lodge’s 
George Cabot, chs. X-XIII, throws more light than anything else. 
Hildreth, R., United States, VI, 464-477, 544-554, is useful where 
available. On the war itself, Mahan, A. T., Sea Power in its Rela¬ 
tion to the War of 1812, especially chs. V, IX, XI, and XVII, 
makes good and valuable reading. His chapter XVIII is also the 
most comprehensible account of the peace negotiations. Schouler, 
United States, II, 417-491, has a lively account of the war. 


Sources. 


Historical 

accounts. 


CHAPTER IX 


The period 
transition. 


The disap¬ 
pearance of 
the Federal¬ 
ists. 


THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION — NEW SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, 
AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS 

The close of the War of 1812 marks the beginning of a 
new epoch in the history of the United States. From 1760 
to 1815 two great problems, our relations with Europe and 
the organization of government, absorbed the energies of 
the nation. The tendencies of national development and 
the characteristics and interests of the several sections re¬ 
mained fairly constant. Now, new problems, new tendencies, 
and changing characteristics are discernible. For about 
fifteen years, however, representatives of the passing genera¬ 
tion remained in partial control, and we have a period of 
transition. During this transitional period the old conflict 
between Federalists and Republicans quieted down, the 
party in power utilized what was more permanent in the 
policies of both, and the period is called the “Era of Good 
Feeling.” At the same time new sections were working out 
their principles, new leaders were endeavoring to find nat¬ 
ural bonds of union and points of difference, and politically 
it might be called w T ith equal truth the “Era of Factional Con¬ 
flict.” Party politics almost ceased, but personal, sectional, 
and economic differences were more pronounced than ever 
before. 

The Federalists never recovered from the ill repute 
brought upon them by the Hartford Convention and the 
rumors circulated as to its secret purposes. They continued 
to be a factor in some states and to send to Congress a mi¬ 
nority distinguished by such men as Rufus King and Daniel 

128 


ACTIVITY OF THE SUPREME COURT 


129 


Webster, but their influence was merely as a makeweight 
between factions of their opponents. The democratic spirit 
of Jefferson had definitely triumphed over the aristocratic 
leanings of the Essex Junto. 

On the other hand the war had caused the administration 
to depart still farther from the path of strict construction 
from which Jefferson himself had begun to stray. The new 
war leaders were inspired by a love of the Union, and favored 
an active policy which required liberal national powers. 
Therefore Congress adopted more and more, in spite of 
occasional protests and checks, the Hamiltonian policy of 
broad construction. It is not altogether fantastic to say that 
Hamiltonian policies, carried out in the Jeffersonian spirit, 
formed the political code of the new period. 

With these favoring conditions, the Supreme Court, 
under the leadership of John Marshall, began a series of 
great decisions which crystallized this constitutional theory 
and gave it permanence. In 1803 the Court, in the case of 
Marbury v. Madison , declared that a law of Congress, 
when repugnant to the Constitution, was void. In 1810, 
in the case of Fletcher v. Peck , it decided that the national 
Constitution forbade a state to violate a contract made with 
a private person. In 1819, in the famous case of Dartmouth 
College v. Woodward , the Court accepted the argument of 
Daniel Webster, the counsel for the college, that a charter 
of a private corporation is a contract within the meaning of 
the Constitution and cannot be impaired by state law. In 
the case of the United States v. Judge Peters , in 1809, the 
Court asserted the supremacy of the national courts over 
the state authorities. In the case of Martin v. Hunter’s 
Lessee , in 1816, the Supreme Court accepted an appeal from 
the decision of a Virginia court, on the ground that the inter¬ 
pretation of the national Constitution was involved; and 
in 1821, in the case of Cohens v. Virginia , it was decided 
that a case might, if the interpretation of the national Con- 


Acceptance 
of broad 
construction. 


Activity of 
the Supreme 
Court. 


i3° 


THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION 


Marshall’s 

influence. 


stitution were involved, be transferred from the state to the 
national courts, even before the former had given a decision. 
These last two rulings brought an immense amount of busi¬ 
ness to the national courts, and therefore increased their 
prestige. The strict constructionists of Virginia were seri¬ 
ously alarmed. Official protests were made, and John Tay¬ 
lor, in vigorous pamphlets, defended the state courts, but no 
successful method of checking the activity of the national 
court was devised. In the cases of McCulloch v. Mary¬ 
land , 1819, and Osborn et al. v. The Bank of the United 
States, 1824, the doctrine of “implied powers” was broadly 
affirmed, Marshall using much the same line of argument 
that Hamilton had employed in 1791 when the question of 
the first United States Bank came up. Of very great and 
increasing importance is the case of Gibbons v. Ogden , de¬ 
cided in 1824, which held that the monopoly of steam navi¬ 
gation in the waters of the state, which the New York legis¬ 
lature had given Fulton and his patron Livingston, was un¬ 
constitutional and void because it conflicted with the power 
given by the Constitution to Congress to regulate interstate 
commerce. This decision at once threw open all the navigable 
waters of the country to competition, and it became the start¬ 
ing point for the interpretation of this clause, upon which 
so much of the subsequent legislation of Congress has rested. 

The Court, under Marshall, was careful to guard what 
it held to be the rights of the states, as in the case of Ogden 
v. Saunders , 1827, in which it upheld the right of New 
York to pass a bankruptcy act, if fairly drawn and adminis¬ 
tered, and thus give a debtor a discharge from his debts. 
Marshall, indeed, held that the states were as strictly sover¬ 
eign within the range of their powers as was the United States 
government. Yet the general trend of his decisions was in 
the direction of nationalization and extension of the functions 
of the general government. 

No series of judicial decisions ever exerted so much 


PROVINCIALISM 


131 

political influence as these. Framed largely by one mind 
and upon a consistent theory, they formed a starting point 
from which the Supreme Court has developed the great 
structure of constitutional law as it stands to-day. Judge 
Marshall, moreover, wrote unhampered by the necessity of 
constant reference to preceding cases which renders judicial 
decisions at present so technical and difficult of understand¬ 
ing for the average man. His style was simple and con¬ 
vincing, his personality venerable and sympathetic, and, far 
from merely reflecting the trend of thought, he was a de¬ 
cided factor among the many that were leading the nation 
to think nationally. 

A less attractive manifestation of the nationalistic feeling is 
noticed by travelers writing of the United States after 1815, 
who speak of a certain blatant patriotism, not mentioned by 
those before the war. The typical American was boastful 
of himself, of everything connected with him, and par¬ 
ticularly of his country. This patriotism was in part a real 
sentiment of devotion to the country and pride aroused by 
the war. It was in part, also, the result of provincialism. 
No other generation of Americans has ever been so isolated 
from the European world as that which flourished between 
1815 and 1845. The close of the Napoleonic wars brought a 
period of comparative international quiet, and the United 
States was allowed to disassociate itself from the course of 
European politics in which it had been involved from the 
beginning. Foreign affairs ceased to be a leading subject 
of party division, and became to a very large extent an 
administrative question. 

This provincialism was intensified by the condition of 
the United States trade. The European peace not only 
put an end to the difficulties of neutral trade, it put an end 
to the trade itself. It was now possible for the French to 
carry their cargoes in their own vessels. The business of 
importing goods into the United States to reexport them to 


Provincial” 

ism. 


Decline of 
trade. 


I 3 2 


THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION 


Decline of 
New Eng¬ 
land com¬ 
merce. 


other countries continued to decline, slowly in amount, rapidly 
in comparison with our total trade. In carrying foreign goods 
from one foreign port to another, our vessels encountered 
many restrictions intended to protect the merchant marines 
of the various countries involved, and the carrying trade 
diminished. The direct trade between the United States 
and foreign countries grew during the first part of this period 
at a much smaller rate than the wealth of the country. The 
consequence was that even the commercial bonds with the 
outside world were considerably weakened. The United 
States was as much isolated as it is possible for a nation to be 
under the conditions of modern civilization. 

This diminished importance of trade particularly affected 
New England, which had always profited largely by handling 
the goods of other sections and countries. Some merchants 
fought against the new tendencies. With the renewal of 
peace they expected trade to revive, and in the interests of 
trade they called for a reduction of the doubled war duties, 
for stricter navigation acts, and for treaties providing for 
reciprocal privileges to level the barriers being raised against 
them in Europe. In Congress their demands were pressed 
by Daniel Webster, who had succeeded Josiah Quincy as 
the representative of solid New England business interests. 

The really ample protection that was obtained from 
the navigation acts, combined with the natural advantages 
which New England possessed in building w r ooden ships, 
caused a revival of the shipbuilding and shipowning in¬ 
dustry, especially after 1830. These vessels, however, were 
chiefly employed in exporting cotton and western prod¬ 
ucts, and New York, Baltimore, and other ports in contact 
with those regions profited by the reviving trade more than 
did New England. Relatively her commerce entered upon 
a slow decline, and many of the old seaports, as Portsmouth, 
Newburyport, Salem, and Newport, passed from the bustle 
of life into a dignified old age. 


NEW ENGLAND 


T 33 


New England no longer spoke with a single voice. The Rise of New 
embargo, the nonintercourse, and finally the war had acted Jj^^es man ' 
as a heavy protective tariff, at times prohibitive, in favor of 
American manufacturers. Many New England merchants 
had turned their capital from shipping into manufacture. 

They found that New England possessed an almost unex¬ 
ploited source of wealth in the abundant and perpetual water 
power furnished by its swift rivers. The population was 
naturally adapted to manufacturing, for the spinning wheel 
was to be found in every farmhouse, and the bulk of the 
population had for over a hundred years been clothed mainly 
with the products of domestic industry. With capital, 
water power, and skilled labor, the factory system, which had 
been developing in England, was rapidly and successfully 
transplanted to New England; and about the river falls and 
rapids arose new towns, as Lowell, Pawtucket, Central Falls, 

Valley Falls, and many others. To the English inventions, 
brought over to America by such men as Samuel Slater, were 
added those of American inventors, as the wool card of Whit- 
timore and the power loom of Lowell. By 1812 there were 
within 30 miles of Providence 53 mills with 48,000 spindles. 

In 1815, 500,000 spindles and 76,000 persons were em¬ 
ployed in the manufacture of cotton, chiefly in New Eng¬ 
land, and the annual output of woolens was estimated to be 
worth $19,000,000. 

These newly rising New England factory centers did not Factory con 
reproduce the unfortunate conditions which accompanied dltlons - 
the industrial revolution in England. The factories were, 
until after the Civil War, widely scattered through many 
towns, and the employees came, to a large extent, from the 
country adjacent. They were mostly self-respecting farmers’ 
daughters, who looked upon the experience as temporary, 
many hoping to gain money for education, or at least to es¬ 
cape the narrow horizon of farm life. As one of their number 
subsequently wrote: “Just such girls as now knock at the 


I 34 


THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION 


Reasons for 
emigration 
from New 
England. 


“Inclo- 

sures.” 


Improve¬ 
ment of in¬ 
ternal trans¬ 
portation. 


doors of the Harvard Annex and the various women’s col¬ 
leges, then knocked at the doors of the Lowell cotton mills.” 
In some of the towns, particularly in Lowell, the mill owners 
took especial care to guard and regulate the life of these 
working girls. 

Neither did the replacement of domestic industry by 
the factory system lead to the social disorders found in Eng¬ 
land. It was, of course, a less important movement, for 
home labor had not been so highly developed as in that 
country. It was, moreover, gradual, and during many years 
some of the manufacturing processes were performed in con¬ 
nection with farm labor. As manufacturing became more 
and more concentrated, and spinning and other auxiliary 
occupations disappeared, many of the smaller and less fertile 
farms did indeed become unprofitable, but it was so easy for 
the farmer to move westward that instead of distress at 
home we find an increasing stream of westward emigra¬ 
tion. 

The growth of manufacturing was reflected on the out¬ 
skirts of New England, in western Massachusetts, Vermont, 
New Hampshire, and Maine, by the increase of sheep raising 
to supply the necessary raw wool. In 1810 there were re¬ 
ported in New England 638,326 sheep; in 1840, 3,617,305. 
This replacement of crop growing by sheep raising meant en¬ 
largement of farms, and the employment of fewer laborers 
in proportion to the area. Here again a movement which 
had caused untold distress in England during the fifteenth 
and seventeenth centuries was accomplished in America so 
quietly as to be almost unobserved, owing to the ease with 
which those crowded out found homes in the West. 

The new factories produced so much more than had the 
old domestic processes that markets for the disposal of the 
product were needed beyond the borders of New England. 
During the embargo and the war such a market was found in 
the South and West, but the difficulties of the trade were 


NEW ENGLAND 


135 


immense, owing to the lack of means of transportation. As 
early as 1790 many turnpike companies had been organized, 
and the roads were steadily improved. Soon after there 
followed many canal schemes, largely devised by the mer¬ 
chants to bring in the country products to some port from 
which they could be shipped in coasting vessels. With such 
purpose, connection was made between the Merrimac and 
Boston, between Worcester and Providence, and the Con¬ 
necticut and the Merrimac were made navigable for long 
distances. After the war, the problem of the western trade 
became more and more important. This problem was more 
difficult. It was necessary to drive the roads and canals 
over the mountains. Portland and Portsmouth discussed 
and began elaborate undertakings to cross the Green Moun¬ 
tains and utilize Lake Champlain; Boston considered the 
possibility of piercing the Berkshires and linking itself with 
Albany. These undertakings were too extensive for the 
private purses of the merchants, and it would be futile to 
build canals in New England unless there were connections 
farther west. Many, therefore, began to look upon them as 
national undertakings, and to believe it to be the duty of the 
national government to build them. Foremost in this move¬ 
ment was John Quincy Adams, son of President John Adams. 
Having served as a Federalist senator, in 1808 he broke with 
the Federalists, and was now high in the councils of the 
Republican party. 

As the means of transportation improved, not only did 
the products of New England find their way westward, but 
western foodstuffs came east and entered into competition 
with those of the New England farms. Against this com¬ 
petition the farmer could find no protection, as interstate 
trade was free by the Constitution. Many sold or deserted 
their farms and used the roads which had ruined them to 
journey to new opportunities in the West. 

The manufacturers had to meet in the southern and 


Other 
reasons for 
emigration ‘ 


New Eng-, 
land policies. 


i 3 6 


THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION 


Protection in 
the Middle 
States. 


western markets the competition of the English. From this 
competition, however, they believed that their still “infant, 
industries” could and should be protected by the national 
government; and accordingly they petitioned for a high 
tariff so arranged as to offset the advantages which the 
English still possessed because of a low cost of production. 

In making this request they came into direct conflict with the 
declining commercial interests, which were opposed to all 
limitations put on foreign trade. This conflict lasted from 
1815 to about 1830, and resulted in the triumph of the party 
of protection. By 1828 Webster had become an acknowl¬ 
edged champion of the movement; manufacture, rather 
than commerce or agriculture, was understood to be the 
great New England interest, and protection and internal im¬ 
provements its policies. 

The Middle States — New York, New Jersey, Pennsyl¬ 
vania, and Maryland — were at the beginning of this period 
more solidly in favor of protection than was New England. 
Pennsylvania had been the first state in which manufactures 
became important, and made a strong demand for protec¬ 
tion of industry, in this case chiefly of iron instead of tex¬ 
tiles as in New England. There were more than three times 
as many persons engaged in agriculture as in manufactures s 
in these states, but the agricultural element also favored 
protection. Peace in Europe had turned thousands of Euro¬ 
peans from soldiers into farmers, and the demand for Ameri¬ 
can foodstuffs almost ceased. Under these circumstances 
the American farmers w r ere much impressed by the argu¬ 
ment that it was advantageous for them to encourage manu¬ 
factures in order to build up a home market for their prod¬ 
ucts. Such a home market would not only consume their 
surplus food, but also make profitable the raising of raw 
materials, such as wool. The development of grazing was 
particularly noticeable in western New York, which in 
1840 had over 5,000,000 sheep, and, as in New England, re- 


THE MIDDLE STATES 


137 





\QN 7 U 


'itoon* 


. South JBend 


V 4“" S W' York - 
in ^ 

TMadelEkia e 


'itisfiurg^ 

.^Bedford 


lombsi 


1 teouJ 


iware 


*lAndj~ ' 
TtSashville 


•lesion 


iavannah 


Mobile' 


Pensacola 


St. Augustine 


Roads and Trunk Canals in 1825 

It will be observed how closely this road map resembles a present-day rail¬ 
road map. Both followed natural geographic routes. At this period the 
greater proportion of bulky articles still went by water. 


Canals 

Roads 




SCALE OF MILES 


.. nr- 

0 50 100 200 

***.. 

■'-‘“^Bahama 


.♦ ^ISLANDS 

A- •« v 


LU PCATIS, ENfi'll, N.Y 
















THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION 


The contest 
for western 
trade. 


138 

suited in the crowding out of many individuals and fami¬ 
lies, who swelled the westward flowing stream. 

The Middle States were all interested in the improve¬ 
ment of transportation. The growing trade of the West, the 
. manufactured goods which it imported, whether from Eng¬ 
land or from New England, and the agricultural. products 1 
with which it paid for them, might be made to pass through 
their territory if the mountain barrier could be pierced. 
This great prize of the western trade was the object of vig¬ 
orous rivalry between the ports of Baltimore, Philadelphia, 
and New York. The last mentioned was the first to under¬ 
take a radical solution of this truly gigantic task, the other 
two being better served by roads which brought in a drib¬ 
bling trade from the Ohio valley and deadened greater enter¬ 
prises. Here, as in New England, such an undertaking was 
too great for individuals, and corporate organization was 
not sufficiently developed in America to attempt it; but un¬ 
like the New England schemes, this project fell within the 
limits of a single state. DeWitt Clinton urged that New 
York state could do nothing so greatly to its advantage as 
to construct a canal up the Mohawk valley to connect with 
Lake Erie. He overcame the opposition of those who 
doubted the feasibility of the plan and of those sections of 
the state which it would not directly benefit. The project 
was definitely accepted in 1817, and in 1825 the canal was 
completed. The canal cut freight rates in some cases to a 
thirtieth of what they had been, and yet paid for itself in 
nine years. It was to the Lake region what the Mississippi 
was to its valley, and soon canals connecting the Lakes with 
the Ohio drew much of the trade of that region to New 
York. The ties binding the Northwest to the South weak¬ 
ened, while those attaching it to the East grew stronger with 
every passing year. 

Pennsylvania was stirred by this success into activity, 
and in 1824 appointed a canal commission; but the work- 


THE SOUTHERN STATES 


I 39 


ing out of the plan involved much greater physical difficul¬ 
ties and more violent local jealousies. Although a route 
consisting of canals, supplemented by an inclined plane over 
the highest ridge, was completed some ten years later, con¬ 
necting Pittsburgh and the Susquehanna, Philadelphia did 
not regain its lost ground until the railroad era. Baltimore 
was still more active, and had hopes of national assistance, 
for any national transportation route would be apt to fol¬ 
low the Potomac, through the western part of Virginia, to 
the Ohio. In 1823, a canal convention was held at Wash¬ 
ington to promote such a design. Ultimately, however, 
Baltimore capitalists became fearful that such a scheme 
would benefit Washington too exclusively, and as early as 
1827 they planned the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, which 
was intended to, and for a time did, give Baltimore a very 
large share of the Ohio valley trade. The hopes of Wash¬ 
ington rested entirely upon Congress; and those of Rich¬ 
mond, — based on the routes by way of the Potomac, the 
James, and the Kanawha, — although they antedated all the 
others and did not cease to be of moment in state politics un¬ 
til the Civil War, continued unfulfilled. 

Internal improvements and the tariff were, therefore, the 
leading political issues in the Middle States, and while a de¬ 
cided majority favored the tariff, the transportation schemes 
tended to develop state rivalries and factions within the 
states based on special and local interests. 

The great problem of transportation and the great prize 
of the western trade were not without interest to the South¬ 
ern States. Charleston and Savannah were almost as near 
Cincinnati and Louisville as were Philadelphia and Balti¬ 
more, but the mountain ranges between were recognized by 
the most daring engineers as impossible for canals, and no 
serious efforts at competition were made until the develop¬ 
ment of railroads. Such projects as were seriously devised 
and executed were of a local nature to bring the country 


Policies of 
the Middle 
States. 


The South 
and western 
trade. 


140 


THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION 


Increase of 
the cotton 
crop. 


Revival of 
slave labor. 


produce to some seaport, as were the canals about Boston 
and Providence. Charleston in particular was served by a 
mesh of canals making most of the Carolina rivers tributary 
to her harbor. 

The attention of the South was increasingly absorbed by 
the development of cotton culture. The invention of Eli 
Whitney’s cotton gin in 1792 made cotton growing profitable. 
Cotton rapidly displaced indigo in the tidewater region of 
South Carolina and Georgia, and arrested the development 
of rice growing. It was soon found that the short staple 
cotton, which could be grown on the uplands, was almost as 
valuable as the long staple of the coast, and the farmers of 
the piedmont region abandoned in large measure the culture 
of cereals for the new crop. In 1800 the total product was 
about 35,000,000 pounds, of which 17,790,000 were exported, 
worth, at New York prices, about $9,000,000. In 1820 
the product was 160,000,000 pounds, of which 127,860,000 
pounds, worth, at Liverpool prices, $27,000,000, were 
exported. 

The culture of cotton was peculiarly well adapted to 
the employment of slave labor. Its simple requirements, 
not involving the use of expensive machinery, gave system¬ 
atic employment for three quarters of the year. Hence 
there was no call for the diversification of industry for which 
slave labor is usually inadequate. The low cotton plants, 
moreover, allowed the overseer to superintend a large gang 
of workers in a manner impossible, for instance, in a corn 
field late in the year. The price of slaves, which had dropped 
very low when the mountains checked the western spread of 
tobacco growing, now rose. In 1808 the international slave 
trade had been forbidden, in spite of some opposition. This 
limitation of the supply of slaves, at the same time that the 
demand was increasing, made this rise unusually sharp. The 
average value of a good field hand about the time of the 
introduction of cotton culture was $200; in 1815, $250; 


THE SOUTHERN STATES 


I41 


in 1836, $600. This rise benefited Virginia and Maryland, 
where slave property had become somewhat of a drug on 
the market. Now, some of the surplus was sold to the 
cotton states. The improvement in slave values checked 
the rise of antislavery feeling. This had never been strong 
in South Carolina and Georgia, and now even in North 
Carolina, Virginia, and Maryland there developed the feel¬ 
ing that though slavery was evil, it was necessary. The 
spread of slaveholding into the upland region diminished 
the friction between those districts and the coast, and tended 
to produce a solidarity of interest, especially in South Caro¬ 
lina, where the agreement of 1808 marked the close of sec¬ 
tional conflicts between the coast and the piedmont, and 
gave the state a political unity that very much contrib¬ 
uted to its political weight. 

As in the case of tobacco, the spread of cotton culture 
went hand in hand with the spread of the plantation system. 
The increase in production meant a progressive decline in 
price, and the cultivators felt the constant desire to increase 
their landholdings and the number of their slaves, in order 
to maintain their incomes. The successful planters came 
to hold constantly larger investments, and the unsuccessful, 
to sell out and depart for other regions. As plantations 
spread into the uplands, many of the non-slaveholding farm¬ 
ers of those districts, some galled by their inferior social and 
economic position, and some, such as the Quakers of North 
Carolina, by their dislike of slavery, moved to the north¬ 
west, across the Ohio. Consequently the advance of the 
cotton plantation pushed before it into the West a consider¬ 
able proportion of the white population. 

The absorption of the population in one industry led to 
a growing dependence of the Cotton South upon the rest of 
the world. While the bulk of its foodstuffs was always 
produced at home, it came to depend for a larger and larger 
proportion of them upon the states to the northwest. In the 


Spread of the 

plantation 

system. 


Economic de¬ 
pendence of 
the South. 


142 


THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION 


Protection in 
the South. 


Fall in the 
price of 
cotton. 


latter part of the twenties a million dollars’ worth of live stock, 
chiefly sheep, cattle, and hogs, came annually through the 
Cumberland and Saluda gaps into South Carolina, and with 
the building of railroads came corn and also wheat. At the 
same time the factory system failed to develop and the pop¬ 
ulation relied for cloth and tools and luxuries upon England, 
France, and New England. 

In 1816 the great political leaders of the cotton belt, 
Lowndes and Calhoun, were strongly in favor of a protective 
tariff. They felt the nationalistic impulse of the war and 
washed to make the United States self-sufficing; they were not 
yet convinced that the South might not share in the develop¬ 
ment of manufactures. The South had been on a par with 
the rest of the country in the production of cloth by house¬ 
hold spinning and weaving. North Carolina in 1810 pro¬ 
duced more than all New England. Southern dealers did 
not yet realize that factory-made cloth would drive domestic 
manufacturers from the market, or that the factory system 
would not develop in the South. Moreover, the “home 
market” argument appealed to them. England levied an 
import duty on cotton, which New England could not do. 
Again, a large portion of the cotton goods imported into the 
United States was made of cotton grown in India. To 
keep out such goods and build up American manufactures 
would mean a larger and steadier market. 

This opinion changed decisively and with great rapidity 
as the result of changing circumstances. The increasing 
production of cotton brought down the price. The aver¬ 
age price of “ middling uplands,” the standard American 
cotton, in Liverpool fell from 36.50 cents a pound in 1816, to 
23 cents in 1820; in 1821, it was 16.46, in 1822, 13.9c, and 
only once again before the Civil War did it reach as high as 
20 cents. Indian cotton was driven out of competition, and 
the cotton belt assumed at once a commanding position as 
holding a world monopoly. At the same time, the processes 


THE SOUTHERN STATES 


I 43 


of manufacture were cheapened, and, with the lower cost, the 
demand for cotton goods and, therefore, for raw cotton con¬ 
tinually expanded. It became no longer an object to the 
southern planter to secure a home market; it was as profitable 
to sell to Europe as to New England. A United States duty 
on raw cotton could not enhance its price here, as the com¬ 
petition was among American producers. Nor did the pro¬ 
tective tariff on cotton cloth cause manufacturing to develop 
in the cotton district. On the contrary, the factory-made 
cloths of England and the North drove the spinning wheel 
from farm and plantation. At the same time, the planter 
did not obtain the full benefit of the cheapening processes 
of manufacture, because of the tariff, which enabled the 
American manufacturers to keep up prices in spite of the 
declining cost of production. McDuffie of South Carolina, 
the leading exponent of the anti-tariff sentiment, said of the 
bill proposed in 1824 : “ Whatever may be its effect upon the 
domestic manufactures, I speak advisedly when I say, it will 
operate as a tax upon the people, to the extent of at least 
four million of dollars, and whether the proceeds of this tax 
shall go into the national treasury, or into the pockets of in¬ 
dividuals, the thing about which there can be no doubt is, 
that the tax will be paid by the people.” 

The very decrease in the price of cotton, which gave the 
South its undisputed monopoly, made its opposition to 
the tariff more bitter. Part of this decrease was due to a 
lower cost of production resulting from better agricultural 
methods, better means of internal transportation, lower 
freight rates across the ocean, resulting from the increasing 
competition of English vessels, and declining cost of manu¬ 
factured foods. Much of the decrease of price, however, was 
taken from the profits of the planter. That this was so all 
could feel, but how it happened few could satisfactorily ex¬ 
plain. There could be no doubt that it was a serious blow 
to the rising prosperity of South Carolina and the settled 


Cotton and 
the tariff. 


144 


THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION 


Spread of 

cotton 

culture. 


portion of Georgia. Some planters could keep up their net 
incomes by increasing their plantations, but it was impossible 
greatly to increase the area of cotton cultivation within the 
state, and the total income of the state was therefore dimin¬ 
ished. Moreover, the soil was beginning to be exhausted in 
the oldest regions; for under the crude methods employed, 
twenty-five years of continuous cotton crops left it almost 
worthless. This depression in the prosperity of the South 
was attributed in very large measure to the tariff, and 
through that, to those sections of the country which upheld 
it. McDuffie said in 1828: “Individuals are always open 
to impressions of generosity. But classes of the community, 
and sections of country, when united and stimulated by 
the hope of gain, being destitute, like corporations, of indi¬ 
vidual responsibility, are, like them, destitute of hearts and 
souls to feel for the wrongs and sufferings they inflict upon 
others.” 

The most potent cause of the lower price of cotton, how¬ 
ever, was the opening up of new cotton areas in other states— 
Alabama, Tennessee, and Mississippi; and the more the de¬ 
pression was felt in the older region, the more rapidly the ex¬ 
pansion went on. While one stream of population was flow¬ 
ing out to the free states of the northwest to win small farms 
by manual labor, another, composed largely of men with 
capital in money and slaves, was directed southward and 
westward in the hope of opening new plantations under 
more favorable conditions. It was significant of the differ¬ 
ence in the character of these two streams that in 1818 land 
offered for sale by the government in Alabama for agricultural 
purposes sold, in some cases, for as much as $107 per acre, 
while the average price in Missouri, where most of the pur¬ 
chasers were of the individual pioneer type, was a little over 
$2, the highest being $10. Between 1824 and 1841 the average 
annual cotton production of the South Atlantic States in¬ 
creased only from 433,000 bales to 529,000, while that of the 


THE SOUTHERN STATES 


145 


Gulf States grew from 253,000 to 1,030,000. While this 
spread of the cotton area led to the economic distress of the 
coast by continually lowering the price of cotton, it added to 
the political weight of the “ Cotton ” or “ Lower ” South. 
Ultimately the cotton interests gained control in all the 
seaboard and Gulf states from South Carolina to Mexico, 
and all became conscious of a common interest and united for 
a single purpose. 

The process by which this political unity was obtained 
was a very gradual one. The young planter, flush with the 
rich crops of a new section, saw matters with a very different 
eye from one in South Carolina struggling to keep up ap¬ 
pearances. Moreover, while cotton stretched out over the 
best land and that most accessible to transportation, — over 
the “Black Belt,” — the poorer and more remote regions of the 
South were occupied by the small farms of non-slaveholding 
whites. The gradual processes by which the plantation 
system spread over the lower South, and by which all classes 
became united in the support of slavery and what came to 
be known as “ Southern Rights,” are the leading features of 
southern history from the War of 1812 to that of i860, and 
are illustrated particularly by the career of Calhoun, who 
came to be the national spokesman of the section. 

Somewhat distinct from the rest was the newly admitted 
state of Louisiana. New Orleans was in large measure the 
port of the Mississippi valley, and a larger proportion of the 
population of the state was engaged in commerce than in any 
other state of the Union. Every improvement in the navi¬ 
gation of the river or its tributaries increased trade, every 
improvement in means of transit across the mountains 
might diminish it. Moreover, Louisiana’s leading native 
product was sugar, and as it was impossible to produce 
enough to supply the United States, the tariff might be 
arranged to raise the price and increase the incomes of 
the producers. Thus Louisiana was vitally interested in 


The “ Cotton 
South.” 


Sugar 

culture. 


146 


THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION 


the two problems of internal improvements and the tariff, 
and was on the tariff question divided from the Cotton 
South. Both sections, however, employed the plantation 
system, and in the end this proved a bond stronger than 
that binding Louisiana to the North. 

Most conservative of all the sections was the Appalachian 
Mountain region, the old frontier of the Confederation; but 
beyond the mountains there was growing up a new frontier, 
the center of the bustling activity of the period. Into it 
were flowing streams of population from all the other sections, 
the predominating tone being given by the people from the 
old frontier. Around the southern end of the mountains, 
and down the long valleys from Virginia and thence through 
the passes into Georgia, Alabama, and Tennessee, came 
picturesque caravans of planters with their slaves, in search 
of new fields. Northward through Cumberland Gap and 
down the Kanawha valley and over the Cumberland Road, 
when it was completed, poured a constant stream of emigrants, 
seeking better opportunities, and freedom from the galling 
competition of slave-owning capitalists. The roads of Penn¬ 
sylvania were, at seasons, literally thick with emigrants from 
the eastern states. After 1825 the Erie Canal began to be the 
great avenue for New Englanders and emigrants from central 
New York, directing them into the Lake region, which until 
then, for lack of means of access, had lagged behind the Ohio 
valley. The peopling of the Mississippi valley and the Lake 
region in this transition period was one of the greatest move¬ 
ments of population the world has ever seen. Five terri¬ 
tories there — Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, Mississippi, and 
Alabama — quickly became so populous that they were 
admitted as states between 1816 and 1821. In 1810 the 
frontier districts contained about 1,200,000 inhabitants; in 
1830, 4,200,000. The great bulk of this population con¬ 
sisted of men and women, in the prime of life, who had them¬ 
selves moved into their new homes. 


THE FRONTIER 


147 


The major problem of this region was transportation. 
Much had already been done. The acquisition of Louisiana 
had cleared the mouth of the Mississippi, and in 1807 Fulton 
produced the first practicable steamboat. These two events 
worked together. The rapid current of the Mississippi had 
made it almost useless as an inlet for merchandise, although 
goods could be easily enough floated down on rafts, which 
were afterwards broken up and sold for lumber. With the 
aid of steam, boats could go up as well as down. In 1811 
there was launched at Pittsburgh the first of the river fleet 
of steamers, the New Orleans, with a ship-shaped hull and 
side wheels. Soon a new type was evolved, more suited to 
the western waters: a raft-like hull, drawing very little water, 
on which was raised a superstructure of one, two, three, or 
four decks or stories, and with a great driving wheel at the 
stern. Such vessels could cross shallows and run rapids, 
and they multiplied marvelously. In 1820 there were 60 in 
the Mississippi basin; in 1830, as many as 230. This natural 
navigation, however, by no means answered the needs of the 
West. Every farmer could appreciate the advantage of 
direct connection over the mountains with the eastern mar¬ 
kets, and the limits of navigation could be greatly extended 
by a few judiciously planned improvements such as canals 
about rapids or cutting off detours, and the building of sup¬ 
plementary roads. 

The attempts at solving the problems of internal im¬ 
provement in the valley were all affected by the absence of 
capital. Few of the settlers brought much with them, and 
in the few years of settlement little had accumulated. There 
was, therefore, a large party in favor of securing national 
assistance for the accomplishment of these undertakings. 
Others, opposed to the interference of a governing body so 
far away and not under their control, favored some scheme for 
increasing the resources of the several states, such as the 
grant of unsold land within their borders. Still another 


Transporta¬ 
tion in the 
Mississippi 
valley. 


148 


THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION 


State banks 
of issue. 


The “ Ameri¬ 
can system.” 


proposition was for the states to provide capital by generous 
emissions of paper money. As the states were forbidden by 
the Constitution to issue bills of credit, this end was obtained 
by the creation of banks, some owned in part by the state gov¬ 
ernments, some entirely private, and all having practically 
unrestricted power of issue. The extinction of the National 
Bank in 1811 withdrew a regulative influence, and between 
1811 and 1816 the number of banks in the country trebled, 
and their issues of bank notes grew from $45,000,000 to 
$100,000,000. The majority of these banks were poorly 
managed, particularly in the West. In 1814 all those out¬ 
side of Massachusetts suspended specie payment, and the 
value of the paper currency varied widely. In 1813 and 1814 
forty banks of issue had been chartered in Kentucky; other 
states were equally lavish, and loose supervision, combined 
with the lack of necessary business experience, brought wide¬ 
spread ruin. 

On the subject of the tariff also the frontier was divided. 
Owing to the great expense of transportation, a small amount 
of manufacturing had sprung up in Kentucky early in the 
century, and this gave a temporary support to the protective 
movement. Although this development was checked when 
the importation of such products from Europe and the east¬ 
ern states, where more abundant capital and denser popula¬ 
tion made manufacturing thrive more naturally, became prac¬ 
ticable, the protective sentiment was fostered by the fact that 
a tariff might help the farmer indirectly by the building up 
of a home market, and, in the case of certain raw materials, 
directly by protective duties. Kentucky planters became in¬ 
terested in the production of hemp, and farmers north of the 
Ohio in that of sheep and hides. Their interests conflicted 
somewhat with those of the eastern manufacturers, who wished 
these raw materials to be as cheap as possible; but here were 
the elements of a bargain, such as has marked almost all 
tariff bills. The tariff could be so framed as to be of ad van- 


ACTUAL DEMOCRACY 


149 


tage to both western farmer and eastern manufacturer. More¬ 
over, a high tariff, as conceived at that time, meant increased 
revenue, and hence was favored by those who wished the 
national government to aid in internal improvements. These 
two ideas were combined by one of the two great representa¬ 
tives of the frontier, Henry Clay, with that of having the 
national government distribute among the states the pro¬ 
ceeds of the sales of public lands, and the combination was 
labeled the “ American system.” In general, apart from the 
particular interests which varied from locality to locality, 
the people of the frontier divided on these subjects according 
to fundamental political principles. Those who believed in 
exerting the powers of the government to aid the individual 
favored the American system; those who preferred to be let 
alone opposed it; but in 1815 this division was by no means 
clearly marked. 

In all sections there was growth, activity, and change. 
For the first time travelers were impressed with the nervous 
energy of Americans. The “quick lunch” was at once a 
symptom of the new spirit and a cause of the sallow, un¬ 
healthy complexion which was equally a subject of comment. 
A new impulse had taken hold of the nation; it had awakened 
to a realization of the tremendous economic possibilities 
which lay before it. Other nations have had similar out¬ 
bursts of activity when vistas of progress have been opened 
before them; but it is safe to say that never before has a 
whole nation been so thrilled, because never before has so 
great a prospect been offered so freely to every individual 
citizen. The possibility that any boy might aspire to be¬ 
come president or to make a fortune was undoubtedly a great 
stimulating motive that spurred the entire population to un¬ 
precedented exertions. The advanced doctrines of the Rev¬ 
olution were just coming to be true in actual life; and, 
unquestioned, unqualified by the limitations of experience, 
they were the real inspiration of the people. 


/ 


Actual 

democracy# 


THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION 


150 


Democracy 
in politics. 


Party or¬ 
ganization. 


This democratic spirit naturally extended to politics. In 
the old states constitutions were altered, particularly in 
Connecticut in 1818, and in New York and Massachu¬ 
setts in 1821, in the direction of universal suffrage and popular 
election of all officers. In Pennsylvania and Ohio the term 
of judges was limited. In the new states, the constitutions 
were framed on even more popular lines. Where no changes 
were made, as in Rhode Island, there was popular dissatis¬ 
faction. The growth of democratic feeling is also indicated 
by the change in the method of choosing presidential electors. 
In 1824 six states continued to leave their appointment to 
the legislature; in 1828, there were only two; in 1832 and 
thereafter, South Carolina stood alone. 

In New England and the other eastern states the more 
democratic elements were bound somewhat closely together 
in party organization. In each state there were well-rec¬ 
ognized leaders or groups of leaders, such as the Albany 
Regency which gained control of New York during the twen¬ 
ties. These leaders generally arose to power by the clever 
manipulation of politics in their particular localities, and were 
in touch with local leaders in every township or county, 
whom they held by the gift of public offices. The spoils 
system was now fully recognized in New York and Penn¬ 
sylvania, and by this type of politician in New England and 
elsewhere. The local leaders often gained their power by 
combining all elements dissatisfied with the existing authori¬ 
ties, and when once in power they sought to retain it rather 
by organization and avoidance of issues upon which people 
were divided than by the active advocacy of a positive pro¬ 
gram. At this period few men could rise to the position of 
state “boss” unless personally honest and possessing some 
of the qualities of statesmanship; but many of their lieu¬ 
tenants, particularly those controlling the cities, were without 
principle and were in politics simply for what they could get 
out of it. Throughout this period these leaders were con- 


FRONTIER DEMOCRACV 


151 

tinuously endeavoring to get control of the national govern¬ 
ment that they might divide the national spoils. As the 
progress of democratic sentiment is illustrated by the choice 
of presidential electors by popular vote instead of by the 
legislature, the development of party organization is to a 
slight degree shown by the spread of the general ticket at 
the expense of the district system of election. Party leaders 
felt keenly the difference in the political weight of a state 
that was sure to cast its entire electoral vote in one scale or 
the other, as compared with one which habitually divided it, 
as did Maryland. When the change of a few hundred popu¬ 
lar votes might mean the gain or loss of many electoral votes, 
every inducement would be offered to influence those who 
held the balance. In 1824 five states used the district sys¬ 
tem; in 1828, four; in 1832, only Maryland; in 1836, none. 

In the plantation area, both the old tobacco region and 
the new cotton belt, the structure of society and political 
methods were very little affected by the new growth of de¬ 
mocracy. The governing class readily admitted to itself all 
who won economic success, and the laws were democratic in 
appearance, but the actual practice was aristocratic. Such 
democracy as existed in these states was in those districts 
into which the plantation system did not extend. Neverthe¬ 
less, a democratic sentiment is indicated by the fact that the 
constitutions of the newer states in the South gave repre¬ 
sentation in the legislatures according to white population, 
which favored the poorer sections; whereas the older states 
counted some proportion of slaves, thus increasing the power 
of the planters who owned them. 

In the Mississippi valley political democracy was the nat¬ 
ural result of a real equality. It took its form largely from 
the habits acquired in the old mountain frontier. It was a 
democracy without organization, depending on personal 
leadership. It was an equality without specialization. The 
man most successful as an Indian fighter was expected to 


Plantation 

democracy. 


Frontier 

democracy. 


State rights 
versus strict 
construction, 


Religious de¬ 
velopment. 


152 THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION 

make the best judge or the best congressman. While a leader 
was trustworthy and represented the interests of his followers 
he could count on their support. If he were victorious, he 
was expected to punish his enemies by turning them out of 
office, and to reward his friends with the vacated positions. 
On simple political questions the people were intelligent 
and independent, well trained through the necessity of self- 
government in their own communities. They were unwilling 
to accept the authority of experts even on such matters as 
diplomacy and finance, and were suspicious of what they 
could not see and understand. Administrative red tape, 
such as had been evolved at Washington, seemed to them but 
a veil to hide peculation and fraud. They chafed under a 
government managed decorously by middle-aged gentlemen 
from Virginia and New England. 

This frontier democracy cared little for the fine-spun 
constitutional controversies which had divided parties in the 
past. Its members revered the Constitution as the emblem of 
the Union which had done and was to do much for them; 
they appealed to it when Congress seemed likely to interfere 
with their own freedom of action or that of their state; but 
the majority of them would readily brush it aside if it stood 
in the way of any measure they wished the government to 
undertake. They were generally in favor of state rights, 
but they were not strict constructionists. 

Unlike the Revolutionary generation, that which was now 
arising was religious and emotional. Religion took on the 
prevailing democratic spirit. In Massachusetts the Unita¬ 
rian element ceased to lay stress on the negation of points of 
doctrine, and, under the leadership of Buckminster and Chan- 
ning, began to lay emphasis on the positive side of their be¬ 
lief, the nobility of man. In 1820 the Unitarians definitely 
separated themselves from the Congregationalists, and their 
societies spread rapidly through and beyond New England. 
In the theology of Emerson the democratic spirit reached 


RELIGIOUS DEVELOPMENT 153 

its supreme point. He put into the mouth of Jesus the words: 
“I am divine. Through me God acts; through me, speaks. 
Would you see God, see me: or, see thee, when thou also 
thinkest as I now think! ” The spread of Unitarianism in 
this region was checked only by the work of men like Horace 
Bushnell of Connecticut, who harmonized the Calvinistic 
theology with the new spirit of democracy. Still more rapid 
was the growth of the Methodists, Baptists, Universalists, 
Disciples of Christ, and similar denominations whose systems 
were equally democratic and whose methods were more 
emotional. In the West, this spirit showed itself rather by 
methods of work than by theological adjustment. The 
itinerant preacher, in his house-to-house rounds, found more 
fruitful ground for his religious teaching because his visits 
made one of the few breaks in the monotony of the isolated 
frontier life. The revivalist sought to stir his hearers, not 
only to spiritual emotion, but to physical manifestations of 
it in shouts and lamentations and even to such outward 
and visible signs of a changed life as “treeing the devil” with 
the ever ready firearm. The camp meeting, with its pro¬ 
longed picnic features, combined needed social relaxation 
with the odor of sanctity. The sects that succeeded were 
those that adapted themselves to the needs of a people re¬ 
ligious at heart, but unable to grasp theological distinctions, 
and unwilling to be bound by what seemed to them the cold 
conventions of ordered religious observances. 

The religious spirit was also deeply humanitarian, and, 
now and again, took form in crusades for the betterment of 
mankind, for the heathen, the insane, the drunkard, the 
negro, women, children, the ignorant, and the poor. Natu¬ 
rally such a period found expression in literature. In the 
excitement just preceding the War of 1812, William Cullen 
Bryant and Washington Irving began to write. In 1815 the 
North American Review was founded. In the transitional 
period, Emerson, Hawthorne, Holmes, Poe, Whitman, and 


Humanita- 
rianism and 
literature. 


154 


THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION 


Sources. 


Historical 
accounts. 
General con¬ 
ditions. 

Constitu¬ 

tional 

questions. 


many others of the greatest American writers and thinkers 
passed their boyhood, to attain man’s estate and take up 
their life work during the thirties. 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 

For a general course the opinions of Judge Marshall afford 
satisfactory constitutional assignments, disregarding the opinions 
of other judges. See Constitutional Decisions (ed. by J. P. 
Cotton, Jr.) or the following references: Chisholm v. Georgia 
(1793): 2 Dallas, 419. Marbury v. Madison (1803): 1 Cranch, 
137; Thayer, J. B., Cases, 107-114. United States v. Judge Peters 
(1809): 5 Cranch, 115; Marshall, Writings, 119-125. Fletcher 
v. Peck (1810): 6 Cranch, 87; Thayer, Cases, 114-123. Gib¬ 
bons v. Ogden (1824): 9 Wheaton, 184. Martin v. Hunter's 
Lessee (1816): 1 Wheaton, 304; Marshall, Writings, 525-555. 
Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819): 4 Wheaton, 518; Mar¬ 
shall, Writings, 188-210. McCulloch v. Maryland (1819): 4 
Wheaton, 316; Marshall, Writings, 160-187. Cohens v. Virginia 
(1821): 6 Wheaton, 264; Marshall, Writings, 221-261. Osborn 
et al. v. The Bank of the United States (1824): 9 Wheaton, 738; 
Marshall, Writings, 315-342. Travelers’ impressions of the 
United States are perhaps more valuable for this period than any 
other. Early Western Travels, edited by R. G. Thwaites, contains 
a mine of supplementary reading. Paulding, J. K., Letters from 
the South, and Tudor, W., Letters from the Eastern States, are among 
the best on those sections. Callender, G. S., Economic History , 
359~373 (Transportation), and 487-561 (Tariff), contains usable 
selections. The Works of H. Clay, V, 461-480, and D. Webster, 
III, 94-149, contain important speeches on the tariff. Where 
the Annals of Congress are available, the debates of the 14th Con¬ 
gress are suitable, especially 1 sess., 684-688 (Speech of John 
Randolph on the tariff). See also Taussig, F. W., State Papers 
and Speeches on the Tariff, 252-385. 

Adams, H., Administrations of Jefferson and Madison, IX, 
175-242. Schouler, J., United States, II, 505-516. Turner, F. J., 
Rise of the New West, 10-67. 

Babcock, American Nationality, 290-309. Cooley, Judge T. M., 
and others, Constitutional History of the United States as seen 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 


155 


in the Development of American Law. Farrand, The First Hay- 
hum Case {Am. Hist. Review, XIII, 281-285). Thayer, J. B., 

Marshall. Story, J., Commentaries, secs. 1033-1044; 1259-1281; 

1374-1397 ; 1685-1688. Turner, F. J., New West, 299-306. 

Bretz, J. P., Postal Extension into the West (Am. Hist. Assoc., Transporta- 
Report, 1909, 143). Hulbert, A. B., Historic Highways of America tlon - 
(especfally, Cumberland Road, Great American Canals, Portage Paths, 

Waterways of Westward Expansion). McMaster, United States, 

IV, 381-429. Monette, J. W., Progress of Navigation (Miss. Hist. 

Soc., Publications, VII, 479). Richardson, Messages, II, 142-183 
(veto message of Monroe). Turner, New West, 96-111. 

Boggess, A. C., Settlement of Illinois. Brigham, A. P., Geographic Migration. 
Influences, ch. V. Callender, G. S., Economic History, 313-320, 

597-610. Faust, A. B., German Element, I, chs. XIII, XIV. Hins¬ 
dale, B. A., Old Northwest, 295-328, 368-392. Matthews, L. H., 

Expansion of New England, 178-224. 

Stanwood, E., American Tariff Controversies, I, m-157. The tariff. 
Stevens, W. P., Foreign Trade of the United States, 1820-1840 
{Journal of Pol. Econ., VIII, 348-452). Turner, New West, 224- 
245 - 

Commons, J. C., Documentary History of American Industrial Cotton. 
Society, II (U. B. Phillips), 165-299. Hammond, M. B., The 
Cotton Industry (Am. Econ. Assoc., Publications, new series, no. 1). 

Fish, C. R., Civil Service, 79-104. Murdock, J. S., First Na- Politics. 
tional Nominating Convention {Am. Hist. Review, II, 680-682). 

Walton, J. S., Nominating Conventions in Pennsylvania {Am. 

Hist. Review, II, 262-278). 


CHAPTER X 


POLITICS DURING THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION, 
1815 TO 1829 


The Four¬ 
teenth Con¬ 
gress. 


The cur¬ 
rency. 


The Fourteenth Congress, which met in December, 1815, 
was one of the most talented ever elected. Only about 
the year 1850, when as at this time the leaders of a passing 
generation served side by side with those rising into power, has 
there been another such aggregation of talent. As the elections 
in most states had been held in the dark days of the fall of 
1814, a large number of Federalists had been chosen; they 
numbered 65 out of 182 in the House and 14 out of 36 in the 
Senate. With Jeremiah Mason, Rufus King, and Robert 
Goodloe Harper in the Senate, and Webster and Pickering in 
the House, they could match their representation in any 
Congress for ability. Among the Republicans were Macon, 
Randolph, and William Pinkney of the older generation; and, 
of the younger generation, Calhoun, Lowndes, R. M. John¬ 
son, McLean of Ohio, and Henry Clay, the Speaker. The 
youthful element were in control, and they went blithely to 
work to heal the wounds of the war, and to solve the newly 
arising problems. 

The most pressing question was that of the currency. 
Specie was extremely rare; in Boston only New England 
bank notes were at par; those of New York -were at 
fourteen per cent discount; those of Baltimore and Phila¬ 
delphia, at sixteen per cent, and those of the western banks 
at a still lower rate. These rates varied from time to 
time and from place to place; notes valuable at home 
declined as they were taken away, for their value depended 

156 


MADISON’S ADMINISTRATION 


157 


on personal knowledge of the banks and their directors. The 
government found itself embarrassed even more seriously 
than were the private interests, for it collected money in one 
place that must be spent at another, and these inequalities 
caused it the utmost inconvenience. The Secretary of the 
Treasury, Dallas, had recommended in 1814 a new national 
bank, and it was even then evident that a majority could be 
secured in its favor, in spite of Republican repugnance to a 
measure so distinctly Hamiltonian. 

Its establishment, however, was delayed by a difference of 
opinion as to its form. Calhoun wished a distinctly govern¬ 
ment bank, chartered in the District of Columbia, and so 
free from any question as to its constitutionality. Webster 
wished a bank entirely private in ownership and manage¬ 
ment. Dallas’s plan, as he finally presented it, was for a 
bank modeled very closely on that of Hamilton. In such 
form it passed the Fourteenth Congress. The capital was to 
be $35,000,000, one fifth in cash, the remainder payable in 
United States securities. One fifth was to be subscribed by 
the United States, which was to have the appointment of 
five of the twenty-five directors. It was hoped to have the 
shares widely held, and therefore their par value was fixed at 
$100 instead of $400 as in the case of the first National Bank. 
The Bank was to establish branches in the several states 
under certain conditions, was to receive government deposits 
unless the Secretary of the Treasury could show Congress 
satisfactory reasons why this should not be done, and was to 
transfer government money from place to place without 
charge. It could issue notes, convertible into specie, to the 
full amount of its capital. The charter was to run until 
March 3, 1836, and the corporation was to pay a bonus of 
$1,500,000 to the government. Webster secured the passage 
of a joint resolution requiring that, after February 20, 1817, 
all government dues be collected in gold and silver, “the 
legal currency of the United States, or in treasury notes, 


The second 
Bank of the 
United 
States. 


Opposition 
to Bank. 


The tariff 
of 1816. 




158 POLITICS OF THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION 

notes of the Bank of the United States,” or “in notes of banks 
payable and paid on demand” in specie. 

These measures and other favoring circumstances relieved 
the government, which on February 1, 1817, resumed the 
payment of its obligations in specie. Business, however, 
did not at once recover. The National Bank was at first 
badly managed, recklessly extending credit until, in 1819, 
it was on the verge of ruin. Langdon Cheves was then 
made president, and by dint of rigid economy and contrac¬ 
tion of loans saved it, after a stormy period, during which the 
whole country was racked by a financial crisis. Its safety, 
however, was gained at the expense of unpopularity, due to 
the belief that Cheves sacrificed private interests to the 
Bank and so precipitated the crisis of 1819. Maryland, 
Ohio, and other states attempted to subject its branches to 
heavy taxes, and were prevented only by the decisions of the 
Supreme Court declaring such action unconstitutional. This 
exemption, giving the Bank’s branches a decided advantage 
over the state banks, added to the local opposition to this 
great national financial institution. 

In the meantime Congress was considering the question 
of the revenue. The doubled war duties would soon expire, 
and the manufacturers petitioned Congress to save them 
from the overwhelming competition of English goods that 
they expected when this took place. Madison recommended 
a limited and temporary protection, and Dallas proposed a 
definite scheme. In spite of opposition from the Federalists 
representing the commercial interests, and of numbers of the 
old-school Republicans headed by Randolph, the bill passed 
much as Dallas proposed it. Upon products of certain well- 
established industries, such as carriages, hats, firearms, shoes, 
and paper, the duty was made practically prohibitive, on the 
ground that domestic competition would keep prices down, 
and the market could thus be preserved for Americans with¬ 
out distressing the consumer. On cottons, woolens, and iroiv 


MADISON’S ADMINISTRATION 


159 


of which we should be obliged to import some proportion, the 
duty was placed high enough to enable the domestic manufac¬ 
turers to compete easily. As the American mills produced 
most extensively the cheaper grades of cottons, the system of 
minimum valuation was adopted. That is, all cotton cloth 
costing less than 25 cents a yard was valued and taxed as if it 
cost that price. As the price of cotton cloth rapidly declined, 
this afforded the New England mills an unexpected amount of 
protection. In the case of iron a specific rate of $1.50 per 
hundredweight was levied on rolled iron, and corresponding 
amounts on other grades, thus again giving the manufac¬ 
turers the advantage of any diminished cost of production. 

Upon goods not successfully produced in this country, it 
was proposed to levy such duties as the revenue demanded. 

In general in the tariff of 1816, these latter revenue duties 
ranged much lower than those levied for protection. Numer¬ 
ous local battles were fought on particular duties, as between 
the rum distillers of New England, who wanted molasses to 
be free, and the sugar growers of Louisiana, who wanted it 
protected. Louisiana won, the duty being placed at five 
cents per gallon. The tariff of 1816 was the first framed by 
Congress on distinctly protective lines, and it was afterwards 
contended by Calhoun that even this tariff was but a tem¬ 
porary expedient and did not commit its supporters to the 
policy of protection. 

The tariff of 1816 seemed at first successful both as a The crisis of 
protective and as a revenue measure. The debt was reduced, l8lQ ' 
and the direct taxes and the excise were repealed in 1816 
and 1817, respectively. The crisis of 1819, however, changed 
this situation. The revenue fell, the majority were unwilling 
to restore the direct taxes and the excise, and the result was 
a demand for an increased tariff. This demand came still 
more loudly from those who felt the economic pinch of hard 
times and looked to a tariff for relief from their personal ills. 

The movement spread and became organized. Hezekiah 


160 POLITICS OF THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION 


Internal im¬ 
provements. 


Niles, who published at Baltimore the powerful weekly, 
Niles' Register , pushed the issue in every number; societies 
were organized, conventions held for the promotion of Amer¬ 
ican industry, and petitions urged Congress to act. In 1820 
a vigorous effort was made for the adoption of a new bill with 
a higher range of duties. This bill passed the House, but was 
defeated by a very close vote in the Senate. The cotton¬ 
growing interests had become thoroughly hostile to protec¬ 
tion in the four years between 1816 and 1820, and voted 
solidly against it. On the other hand, New England was still 
divided. Thirty-eight New England members voted for 
the bill, fifteen against it, and thirteen w T ere absent. The 
movement needed to become still more popular in the North 
and West to overcome the united opposition of the South. 

The Fourteenth Congress applied to other matters the 
same bold, nationalistic policy which it adopted in the case 
of the tariff and the currency. An enlarged navy was pro¬ 
vided for, pensions were increased, and public buildings 
ordered. Particularly noticeable was the policy with regard 
to internal improvements. Three hundred and fifty thousand 
dollars was voted for the completion of the Cumberland 
Road to Wheeling, and at its second session the bonus from 
the National Bank, and the dividends on its stock, were as¬ 
signed as a fund for general internal improvements. The 
changed attitude of Congress is well illustrated by a letter 
written by Gallatin in May, 1816: “The war has been produc¬ 
tive of evil and of good, but I think the good preponderates. 
Independent of the loss of lives and of the property of in¬ 
dividuals, the war has laid the foundation of permanent taxes 
and military establishments, which the Republicans had 
deemed unfavorable to the happiness and free institutions 
of the country. But under our former system we were be¬ 
coming too selfish, too much attached exclusively to the 
acquisition of wealth; above all, too much confined in our 
political feelings to local and state objects. The war has 


THE ELECTION OF 1816 l6l 

renewed and reinstated the national feelings and character 
which the Revolution had given, and which were daily les¬ 
sening. The people have now more general objects of at¬ 
tachment, with which their pride and political opinions are 
connected. They are more Americans: they feel and act 
more as a nation; and I hope that the permanency of the 
Union is thereby better secured.” 

Congress, however, had advanced along this path more 
rapidly than the country, and was destined to receive two 
important checks. Madison, representing the old Republican 
spirit, on the last day of his term vetoed the “Bonus Bill” 
for internal improvements, on constitutional grounds. The 
second check came from the people. Congress had voted to 
raise the pay of its members from $6 a day to $1500 a 
year. Against this the democratic sentiment of the country 
revolted, the press was filled with denunciations, very many 
members were defeated for reelection, and so popular a man 
as Henry Clay barely escaped defeat. The new Congress 
was somewhat more democratic than its predecessor. It 
reduced the pay of its members, and it failed to pass a 
national bankruptcy bill strongly desired by the older mon¬ 
eyed sections, but it still inclined to take a broad nation¬ 
alistic position on questions of general policy. 

The absorption of the Federalist policies by the Re¬ 
publicans resulted in the absorption of most of the Federalist 
voters; and Republican success in the presidential election 
of 1816 was a foregone conclusion. Interest, therefore, cen¬ 
tered in the nominations. The administration candidate 
was James Monroe, Secretary of State. Opposition was made 
to him on the ground that it was dangerous and unfair to 
perpetuate the Virginia dynasty. New York, always eager 
to obtain the presidency, presented Governor Tompkins, a 
man of little national reputation, and a hopeless candidate. 
The most formidable opposition candidate was William H. 
Crawford of Georgia, now Secretary of War, soon afterwards 


Congress 

checked. 


The election 
of 1816. 


162 politics of the period of transition 


Monroe’s ad¬ 
ministration. 


Secretary of the Treasury, and the particular friend of 
Gallatin. A caucus attended by 119 of the 141 Republican 
members of Congress, nominated Monroe by a small 
majority for the presidency and Tompkins for the vice presi¬ 
dency. This action was acquiesced in, though not without 
a murmur as to the dangerous character of such a caucus. 
The Federalists simply nominated electors, leaving them free 
to vote for whomever they desired. They carried only 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Delaware; and Monroe 
received 183 electoral votes to 34 for Rufus King, upon 
whom the Federalist electors united. 

James Monroe seems to have resembled Washington in 
character, being less remarkable for particular talents than 
for his general balance and sanity. He certainly impressed 
contemporaries who knew him intimately more favorably 
than he does modern students of his career. As a diplomat, 
in spite of an obvious liking for the occupation, he was a 
most dismal failure, but as an administrator, as governor 
of Virginia, and as Secretary of War in 1814 and 1815, 
during which years he continued to serve as Secretary of 
State also, he was decidedly successful. In fact his may be 
said to have been the only civic reputation enhanced by the 
war. As President he fully lived up to what was expected 
of him, and came to be venerated by the people. He sur¬ 
rounded himself with a cabinet of unusual ability. John 
Quincy Adams brought to the state department an expe¬ 
rience unparalleled in our history, and an ability fully equal 
to his experience. With an outlook more cosmopolitan 
than that of most of the leaders of his generation, he 
was one of the firmest in his assertion of American 
rights, and retained the unbending conscience and strict 
moral code of New England. He was painfully eager to 
succeed Monroe, and he constantly suspected the motives and 
methods of his opponents. Crawford continued at the 
treasury and was regarded as the leading candidate for the 


THE SLAVERY QUESTION 


163 


succession. The probability of his success gave him a large 
body of supporters in Congress, and he contended tenaciously 
for full control of the patronage of his department, to aid in 
the accomplishment of his ambition. John C. Calhoun, Sec¬ 
retary of War, had also, in the latter part of the administra¬ 
tion, presidential aspirations and seems, for a time, to have 
been Monroe’s favorite candidate. The Attorney-General, 
William Wirt, was an able, conscientious public servant, who 
might have acceptably filled the presidency, but was not 
now a candidate. With men of such capacity and political 
position, the cabinet overshadowed both the President and 
Congress, and exercised a greater power than ever before or 
since. Yet Henry Clay, Speaker of the House, and repre¬ 
sentative of the growing West, had his own ambitions, and 
harassed the administration by a dashing opposition. 

The great crisis of Monroe’s first administration came, 
as Jefferson said, “ like a fire bell in the night,” and yet it 
had for a long time been preparing. The great slavery 
compromises of the Constitution had thus far served to 
keep that question in the background. Nevertheless, there 
were occasional controversies, and general dissatisfaction 
with the institution was slowly growing. In 1808 the slave 
trade was closed by act of Congress, and in 1820 it 
was declared to be piracy. Sentiment was not, however, 
strong enough to secure its absolute repression. Still the 
South felt that now it had secured all its share of benefit 
from that particular compromise, while the commercial states 
continued to enjoy the advantages of the navigation acts. 
In the North there was a growing feeling that the slave popu¬ 
lation should not be represented at all in the national legisla¬ 
ture, while the South felt keenly the fact that it was being 
outdistanced by the North. In 1790 the states south of the 
Mason and Dixon line had a total population of 1,925,000 
to 1,968,000 north of it, which gave them 48 representatives 
to 57 in the House; the new census of 1820 would show 


Balance of 
the sections. 


Attitude to¬ 
ward slavery. 


164 POLITICS OF THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION 

4,372,000 to 5,144,000 inhabitants, which according to the 
Federal ratio would give 89 representatives to 123. Much 
of this change was due to the migration of southern whites 
to the Northwest. While the slavery interest was thus los¬ 
ing in the House, accident and agreement had managed to 
keep the two sections equal in the Senate. Five of the 
original thirteen states had by 1789 adopted the policy of 
emancipation, either immediate or gradual. Vermont, free 
since 1777, was admitted in 1791; New York and New Jersey 
in 1799 and 1804, respectively, changed from slavery to eman¬ 
cipation, and Ohio in 1803 was admitted as a free state, mak¬ 
ing nine in all by 1804. Kentucky and Tennessee, admitted 
in 1792 and 1796, made good the loss of New York and New 
Jersey to the list of slave states, and Louisiana, in 1812, 
brought their number up to nine. Thereafter the balance 
was preserved by admitting Indiana, free, in 1816, Mississippi, 
slave, in 1817, Illinois, free, in 1818, and Alabama, slave, in 
1819. 

Interest in the question of slavery from the ethical 
standpoint seemed to have declined. After the abolition of 
the slave trade in 1808 the antislavery societies, which had 
at one time been quite numerous in both North and South, 
and had since 1793 held an annual convention, ceased to be 
active; and they were succeeded in 1816 by the Colonization 
Society, many of whose members were more interested in 
freeing the South from the incubus of the free negro than in 
freeing the slaves. This society began a settlement called 
Liberia, on the coast of Africa, as a refuge for transported 
blacks, but its efforts are said to have relieved the country 
in nineteen years of the natural increase of only nine and a half 
days. While the moral issue slumbered, an important eco¬ 
nomic question was arising. The renewed interest of the 
South in slave labor, and the rapid expansion westward of the 
plantation system, made southern statesmen anxious to save 
as much as possible of the national domain for slavery. 


THE MISSOURI QUESTION 165 

New laws were fortifying this institution at home, and capi¬ 
talists of southern birth were endeavoring to overthrow the 
prohibition in Indiana and Illinois. On the other hand the 
moneyless pioneer, whether from a free or a slave state, was 
anxious not to encounter the competition of the plantation 
and the social obloquy of working at labor shared by negro 
slaves. This struggle between the systems of free and slave 
labor approached a climax when the frontier of population 
touched territory the status of which with respect to slavery 
had not been determined. 

In December, 1818, Missouri petitioned to be allowed to 
form a state constitution. An enabling bill was introduced 
into the House, and on February 13, 1819, Mr. Tallmadge of 
New York moved to amend it in such a way as to prohibit the 
further introduction of slaves into Missouri and to provide that 
the children of slaves already there, born after the admission 
of the state, become free at the age of twenty-five. Thus 
amended the bill passed the House, but Tallmadge’s amend¬ 
ments were struck out in the Senate. The House insisted on 
its amendments by a vote of 78 to 76, and consequently 
there was no action during that session of Congress. The 
dispute, once started, blazed throughout the country. Cobb 
of Georgia told Tallmadge: “You have kindled a fire which 
the waters of the oceans cannot put out, and seas of blood 
can only extinguish.” The fact that it was the Senate only 
that prevented the passage of the amendments aroused the 
South to the necessity of preserving its political balance and 
the equality in the number of states. The North was stirred 
to defend the interests of its settlers, and to prevent any in¬ 
crease in the slave representation. The long dominance of 
the South in national politics strengthened the popular feel¬ 
ing in the North, and it became evident that, in spite of the 
absence of agitation, antislavery feeling was developing. 

The debate in Congress brought out little argument in 
favor of slavery except as a necessary evil. The argument of 


The Missouri 
question* 


The Missouri 
debate. 


l66 POLITICS OF THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION 


The Missouri 
Compromise. 


Clay that the diffusion of slavery would weaken and amelio¬ 
rate it was a popular one. The main contention of the op¬ 
ponents of restriction was that Congress had no right to 
bind a state. This doctrine, most effectively set forth in the 
next session by William Pinkney of Maryland, appealed 
strongly to the state rights’ advocates of the South and West. 
It was no new or theoretical argument. From 1805 to 1824 
the central point of Illinois and Indiana politics was the 
question whether they should remain bound by the prohibi¬ 
tions of the Northwest Ordinance. Ultimately the majority 
decided that they did not want slavery. If they had decided 
differently, it is difficult to see how slavery there would have 
been prevented, although the national courts might have 
been able to do it. The leading spokesman of the restriction- 
ists was Rufus King of New York, who presented many in¬ 
stances of such conditions applied by Congress to states, in 
particular those which had been applied to the Northwest 
Territory, and a number contained in the Louisiana Purchase 
treaty. The popular discussion was fully as keen as that in 
Congress. Legislatures petitioned Congress on the one side 
and the other. John Quincy Adams and Calhoun conversed 
on the possibility of a separation of the sections. Adams 
believed that the North would forcibly prevent such action 
if attempted by the South. 

When Congress came together again, in December, 1819, 
the situation was complicated by the request of Maine for 
admission. If Congress did not consent before March 4, 
1820, the permission of Massachusetts for such a division of 
her territory would be withdrawn and the opportunity to 
form an additional free state would be lost. Under this pres¬ 
sure, a compromise was brought about. Maine was to be 
admitted as a free state, and Missouri as a slave state, and 
in the remainder of the Louisiana territory north of 36° 30' 
(the southern boundary line of Missouri) slavery was to be 
prohibited forever. In the House, the vote for this latter 


MONROE’S REELECTION 


167 


clause was 134 to 42, of whom 37 were from the South. 
On the admission of Missouri as a slave state, the South 
was solid for'it, the Northwest solid against; from New Eng¬ 
land seven voted for it and from the Middle States eight, 
three purposely absented themselves, and it passed. The 
compromise thus effected Randolph characterized as a dirty 
bargain of eighteen northern “dough-faces,” an epithet 
which clung for years to northerners voting for proslavery 
measures. Monroe, after much consultation, signed the bill, 
probably understanding that “forever” meant until the ter¬ 
ritory was created into states, thus supporting Pinkney in 
the view that Congress could not bind a state. 

The Missouri question broke out afresh at the next session, 
for Missouri had adopted and asked approval for a constitu¬ 
tion forbidding free colored persons to settle in the state, thus 
abridging, it was claimed, the rights of citizens of other states. 
Debate again raged. It was argued that Missouri was violat¬ 
ing the Constitution, and on the other hand that Missouri was 
already a sovereign state and could not be disciplined. In 
this crisis, Henry Clay succeeded in bringing about a com¬ 
promise, admitting Missouri on condition that the obnoxious 
clause should never be construed to abridge the rights to 
which any citizen is entitled under the Federal Constitu¬ 
tion; a vague and imperfect agreement, which neverthe¬ 
less served its purpose. Good feeling was in large measure 
restored, and the struggle over slavery was postponed for 
many years. 

In the interval between the two Missouri compromises 
Monroe was quietly reelected. Only one electoral vote was 
cast against him, although the Federalists elected a fair 
number of congressmen and might have cast some electoral 
votes had they decided to do so. Most of the northern 
representatives favoring the compromise were defeated, but 
the subsidence of the slavery issue deprived this fact of 
much of its significance. 


Second Mis¬ 
souri Com¬ 
promise. 


Election of 
1820. 


168 POLITICS OF THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION 


Spanish- 

American 

Revolution. 


Duties of 
neutrals. 


The second administration of Monroe saw the settle¬ 
ment of a question that had long been troubling the govern¬ 
ment. During the Napoleonic wars the American colonies 
of Spain had been relieved from her active control, revolu¬ 
tionary movements had been started, and trade relations had 
sprung up which the inhabitants were loath to relinquish. 
These relations were for the most part with England, and 
the amount of trade was so great that Napoleon, when at 
Elba, stated that it was the opening of this new outlet for 
English commerce that had prevented the success of his 
continental system. From 1810 on, Buenos Aires main¬ 
tained a practical independence, although it was not declared 
until 1816. Her great leader, General San Martin, in 1817 
crossed the Andes, and in 1818 won the independence of 
Chile. In 1821 he drove the Spaniards out of Peru. In 
1817 a successful revolution was begun in Venezuela under 
the inspiration of Simon Bolivar, who had succeeded to 
the position and plans of Miranda after the latter’s death in 
1812. Victorious at home, he pushed the Spaniards from 
what is now Colombia and Ecuador, finally defeating their 
last South American forces, in 1824, on the plateaus of 
Upper Peru, which was renamed Bolivia. Somewhat sim¬ 
ilar and simultaneous movements freed Mexico and Central 
America from Spain, and Brazil from Portugal. 

These movements excited intense interest in the United 
States. The breaking down of the Spanish colonial empire 
seemed to open broad avenues to American commerce, and 
the democratic sentiment of the country thrilled with sym¬ 
pathy for a movement so like our own struggle with England. 
While there was substantial agreement that Spain could not 
recover her American possessions and that no other country 
should be allowed to take them, there was divergence as to 
method. Henry Clay represented the enthusiastic public 
sentiment, particularly of the West, and urged immediate 
action. The administration saw a position so complex and 


MONROE’S SECOND ADMINISTRATION 169 


difficult that it dared move but slowly, and secured in 1817 
the passage of a neutrality law more strict than that of 1794, 
to prevent Americans from compromising the government 
by equipping vessels or expeditions in United States ports to 
assist the revolutionists. 

John Quincy Adams was particularly anxious to preserve 
the fairest appearance of neutrality in order that no excuse 
might be given for European intervention, and that his 
negotiations for the purchase of Florida might proceed 
smoothly. At the same time he pressed to the utmost all 
advantages against Spain, to hasten the latter negotiation. 
In 1812 Mobile had been seized as a part of the Louisiana 
Purchase, and was still held. In 1817 Florida was invaded 
by American troops to suppress a nest of pirates, posing as 
South American patriots, at Amelia Island, and in 1818 a 
more formidable invasion was made to the westward to punish 
certain Indians who had been raiding the southern part of 
Georgia. General Jackson, who commanded this expedi¬ 
tion, conceiving that he had received tacit instructions from 
Monroe to seize Florida, took possession of all the western 
portion of that province. This latter action was disavowed 
by the United States, but it so forcibly illustrated the help¬ 
lessness of the Spanish authorities, and Adams so firmly in¬ 
sisted that we would not stand annoyances arising from her 
weak government, that Spain finally consented to sell what 
she could not hold. In 1819 a treaty was made which, in 
addition to ceding Florida, defined a line of demarcation 
between the United States and Mexico, which Spain still 
held. This line ran irregularly from the mouth of the Sabine 
River to the parallel of 42 0 north latitude, and along that 
parallel to the Pacific. This line was unsatisfactory to some, 
particularly to Clay and to Adams himself, because it left 
what is now Texas, to which we had a somewhat shad¬ 
owy claim as part of the Louisiana Purchase, in the pos¬ 
session of Spain; it w r as, however, an important step in terri- 


The Florida 
treaty. 


170 POLITICS OF THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION 


torial expansion, because it gave the first international rec¬ 
ognition to our claim to extend to the Pacific. The treaty 
was not ratified until February, 1821. This matter settled, 
in March, 1822, recognition was given to certain of the new 
Spanish-American republics, though neutrality was still main¬ 
tained between them and Spain. 

In the meantime this American difficulty was attracting 
the attention of Europe. The leading continental powers, 
Russia, Austria, Prussia, and France, were united in the Holy 
Alliance, for the purpose of maintaining peace and monar¬ 
chical government. Rebellion after rebellion was put down in 
Europe, and American statesmen had well-grounded fears 
that the establishment of peace there would be followed by 
intervention in America. The crisis came in 1823, when 
France, as agent of the Alliance suppressed a republican rev¬ 
olution in Spain, and order seemed to be established through¬ 
out the territories of the Holy Alliance and dependent states 
except the American colonies of Spain. Fortunately Eng¬ 
land was as unwilling as the United States to see the new 
republics restored to their former condition or given to a for¬ 
eign power. There was much sympathy in England for 
liberal government, many English took part as volunteers 
in the struggle for South American independence, and the 
English merchants did not wish to surrender the markets 
they had found in the newly opened ports. Canning, the 
English minister of foreign affairs, suggested that as their 
interests were alike, the United States and England join in 
protesting against the threatened intervention by the allied 
European powers. President Monroe and others considered 
the situation so critical that this offer by Canning ought to 
be accepted. Adams, however, succeeded in convincing 
them that England, because of her interests, would oppose 
the movement whether her offer was accepted or not, and 
that we should avoid such an entangling alliance. He be¬ 
lieved that the United States was the leading American 


THE MONROE DOCTRINE 


171 

power, and should not admit England to equal coopera¬ 
tion. 

In December, 1823, this policy was announced to the 
world in the President’s annual message. It was stated that 
Europe had a set of primary interests with which the United 
States would not interfere; that, in return, it was expected 
that Europe would not interfere with the primary inter¬ 
ests and particularly the governmental system of the Ameri¬ 
can continents. “With the existing colonies or depend¬ 
encies of any European power, we have not interfered, and 
shall not interfere. But with the governments who have 
declared their independence, and maintained it, and whose 
independence we have, on great consideration, and on just 
principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition 
for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling, in any 
other manner, their destiny, by any European power, in any 
other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposi¬ 
tion towards the United States. ...” Special intimation 
was given, because of the encroachments of Russia on the 
northwest coast, that the era of colonization was over, there 
being no longer any unclaimed land on the two American 
continents. 

The success of the Monroe Doctrine was immediate and 
lasting. It had been for many years before the American 
Revolution the desire of the people of the American colonies 
to break away from all European interference. The Revolu¬ 
tion had only partly accomplished this separation, the close 
of the Napoleonic wars made it actual, and the Monroe 
Doctrine applied the principle to both American continents 
and, by preventing European powers from obtaining a foot¬ 
hold, reduced the danger of future complications. In Europe 
the plan of intervention was abandoned, Spain ultimately 
acknowledged the independence of her American colonies, and 
Russia in 1824 consented to a satisfactory boundary on the 
northwest coast. Since 1823 no European country has at- 


The Monroe 
Doctrine. 


172 POLITICS OF THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION 


Rivalry, of 
England and 
the United 
States. 


tempted to establish new colonies in America, and there 
has been only one dangerous attempt by a European power 
to overthrow the government of an American republic. 

The immunity of Spanish America from European attack 
was at this time due more to the British fleet than to Monroe’s 
message; but the political wisdom of Adams in refusing to co¬ 
operate with England was at once shown. The designs of 
England in America w r ere less obnoxious than those of the 
other European countries, but her power was greater. Eng¬ 
land was, after all, the great rival of the United States, and the 
ideas of the two countries were essentially divergent. Can¬ 
ning highly resented the claim that no European power should 
interfere in America and the attitude of leadership assumed 
by the United States in thus laying down the law for the 
American continents. There at once arose a contest between 
Adams and Canning, which continued after Adams ceased 
to be Secretary of State and became President, for the 
actual primacy in Spanish America. Adams urged upon 
the new governments the advantages of the Monroe Doctrine; 
he negotiated for commercial treaties, and in 1825 accepted 
an invitation to send delegates to attend a Pan-American 
Congress to be held at Panama. Canning claimed that 
Spanish America owed its independence chiefly to English 
aid and the protection of the English navy. He was able to 
offer better terms and so secured more commercial treaties. 
Moreover, in an open market American manufacturers could 
not compete with the English. The result was that England 
obtained the main commercial advantages and was brought 
into more intimate relationship with Spanish America than 
was the United States. While the Monroe Doctrine, sup¬ 
ported by the growing power of the United States, limited the 
range of England’s activity by causing her to refrain from a 
policy of territorial acquisition, the rivalry of the two nations 
was constant throughout the nineteenth century, and England 
was the dominant power in the Caribbean Sea almost to 1900. 


THE LAND QUESTION 


173 


In domestic policies, the direction still seemed to be 
toward a broad use of national power. Congress voted to 
make the Cumberland Road a turnpike supported by tolls, 
but this was prevented by a veto of Monroe in 1822 based on 
constitutional grounds. Nevertheless he favored an amend¬ 
ment to make such action possible. Congress took up the 
problem of harbor improvements, and in 1824 passed a bill 
providing for a general survey, looking toward a compre¬ 
hensive system. In 1824 a new tariff was passed, more de¬ 
cidedly protectionist in character than that of 1816. 

The most important legislation was with regard to public 
lands. The existing system, as reorganized in 1800 and in 
1804, provided that land be put up at auction and sold at or 
above the minimum price of $2 an acre. Land not sold 
at auction might be bought at private sale for $2. In 
either case at least one hundred and sixty acres had to be 
purchased, and a limited credit was given for three quarters 
of the purchase price. This system encouraged speculation; 
men put all their money into the first cash payment, buying 
as large an area as possible, and trusted to the future for the 
rest. Many became insolvent, and their distress was re¬ 
doubled by the crisis of 1819. It was estimated that in 1820 
half the heads of families in the Northwest owed the 
government for land. Gerson Flagg wrote from Edwards- 
ville, Illinois, December 10, 1820: /‘The price of land has 
fallen more than half — a bad time for speculators — there 
are many here who paid out all the money they had in first 
installments on land and depended on selling it before the 
other payments became due. And as the price of land is now 
reduced nobody will buy it at the former price. It will of 
course revert to the United States unless Congress does some¬ 
thing for their relief.” Various measures were taken in 
1820 and 1821 to relieve this situation. The minimum price 
of land was reduced to $1.25; the minimum amount to be sold 
was reduced to eighty acres, and the credit system was 


Nationalistic 

legislation. 


The land 
question. 


174 POLITICS OF THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION 


The cam¬ 
paign of 
1824. 
Crawford. 


abolished. Those holding land unpaid for were allowed to 
pay at this new rate, and to turn over to the government a 
portion of their land as payment, keeping such amount as 
their payments already made would cover. These changes 
relieved the acute distress. By the end of the next adminis¬ 
tration the public land system was on a businesslike basis. 
There was a demand that the system be still further changed, 
that the idea of making a revenue be abandoned, and the 
land opened on easier terms to the actual settler, but while 
this proposition was continually agitated, the policy was not 
adopted. 

As the election of 1824 approached, the contest for the 
succession became more bitter. The friends of Crawford, 
believing him to have the strongest support in Congress, 
called a caucus, as had been the custom. It was held, and 
recommended Crawford to the people for the presidency and 
Gallatin for the vice presidency. The friends of the other 
candidates refused to attend the caucus, denounced it as a 
corrupting and undemocratic method of selecting a candidate, 
and made it one of the issues of the campaign. It. was said 
to be but an evasion of the wise provision of the Constitution 
forbidding congressmen to be presidential electors. It made 
the President dependent on Congress. This attack injured 
Crawford, particularly in Pennsylvania, a state which he had 
hoped to win by the selection of Gallatin as running mate. 
The legislative caucus had long been a local issue there, 
and was growing increasingly unpopular. Crawford received 
less than one tenth of the vote of that state. Crawford’s 
campaign was further hampered by his physical breakdown 
resulting from a stroke of paralysis. His political strength 
lay in Virginia, where he was considered the soundest exponent 
of the old Republican principles, to support which, against 
the attacks of Marshall, many of the best minds of that state 
were now rallying. In Georgia, where he lived, he repre¬ 
sented a similar interest, and he was supported in New 


ELECTION OF 1824 


175 

York by Martin Van Buren and other politicians. He 
received 41 electoral votes. 

John Quincy Adams was put in nomination by the legis- John Quincy 
latures of Massachusetts and other states, but it was claimed Adams ' 
that actually his nomination involved a more dangerous 
precedent than that of Crawford. Madison had been Secre¬ 
tary of State under Jefferson, Monroe under Madison, now 
Adams was serving under Monroe. Practically, it was 
argued, the President chose his own successor. Adams was 
in favor of a broad nationalistic policy at home, and his con¬ 
duct of foreign affairs had been admirable, but his strength 
lay in the fact that he was the only northern candidate. He 
received 84 electoral votes, including all those of New Eng¬ 
land, 26 out of 36 in New York, and 7 others scattered through 
Delaware, Maryland, Illinois, and Louisiana. 

The policies which Adams represented in the North, Clay Clay and 
represented in the West. He had expected to receive the J ackson * 
full support of his section now clamorous for recognition. 

This hope was defeated by the sudden appearance of a new 
candidate, — Andrew Jackson, the victor of New Orleans. 

The conflict between these rivals began in 1819, when Clay 
endeavored to have Congress censure Jackson for his conduct 
in Florida. Jackson betook himself to Washington to defend 
his reputation. He gathered friends by his simplicity, his 
dignified bearing, and his sterling common sense. He de¬ 
feated the attack of Clay, and through his friendships laid the 
foundation for a political machine. Carefully advised by a 
group of able friends, he grew in strength. Clay attacked him 
as a military chieftain, a new Alexander or Caesar, threaten¬ 
ing the liberties of the republic; but his quiet demeanor in his 
public progresses reassured the people. His appeal was not 
so much on particular policies as on the general ground of 
democracy and opposition to the bureaucratic tendencies 
ol the established administration. Many felt that a change 
was needed, a man of the people, fresh from among 


176 POLITICS OF THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION 


Election in 
the House. 


“Bargain 
and corrup¬ 
tion.” 


them, untainted by long residence at Washington and 
abroad. 

Clay and Jackson divided the electoral votes of the 
West, 33 to 29. Elsewhere, however, Clay received only 4, 
while Jackson proved to be the only candidate with national 
support. He divided the seaboard South with Crawford, 
receiving 33 votes to the latter’s 36, and the Middle States 
with Adams, 37 to 26. In all he received 99 votes, New 
England being the only section not to contribute to the 
number. 

Calhoun was elected Vice President by a very large ma¬ 
jority, but no candidate received a clear majority for the pres¬ 
idency. The election was thus thrown into the House of 
Representatives, which had to choose between the three re¬ 
ceiving the highest numbers of electoral votes, — Jackson, 
Adams, and Crawford. In this election, according to the Con¬ 
stitution, each state cast one vote, decided by a majority vote 
of its representatives. Clay, excluded from the competition, 
became to a certain extent king maker, for the candidate 
he favored would be apt to receive the vote of the Clay 
states. His preferences and vote were naturally for Adams, 
whose general views were the same as his own, rather than 
for Crawford, supposed to be a strict constructionist, or for 
Jackson, whom he had so violently opposed. The vote 
was taken on February 9, and Adams was the choice of 
thirteen states, Jackson of seven, and Crawford of four. 
Adams was therefore declared elected. 

Before the election in the House took place, a Washington 
newspaper published a letter, the authorship of which a Mr. 
George Kramer, a member of Congress from Pennsylvania, 
afterward acknowledged, to the effect that Clay w r as negotiat¬ 
ing to sell his support for the position of Secretary of State. 
On February 14 it was announced that Adams had decided 
to offer this position to Clay. This was at once hailed by 
their enemies as proof of the charge. The administration was 


ELECTION OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 


177 


attacked as founded on bargain and corruption. John Ran¬ 
dolph, referring to the personal habits of the two men, — the 
strictness of Adams’s and the somewhat loose life of Clay, — 
characterized it as a combination of Blifil and Black George, 
the Puritan and the Blackleg. He spoke of Clay as “this 
being so brilliant and so corrupt that like a rotten mackerel 
in the moonlight shined and stunk.” Clay fought a duel 
with Randolph, and produced evidence, convincing to the 
historian, of his purity of motive in supporting Adams. 
Nevertheless the charge was widely believed, and seemed 
to confirm in the public mind, particularly in the cruder por¬ 
tions of the country, the vague suspicions long entertained of 
public immorality at Washington. 

Another charge of much greater significance was made Popular 
against the administration. It was urged that the election sovereignty - 
of Adams was a violation of the will of the people. Kramer 
wrote : “The nation having delivered Jackson into the hands 
of Congress backed by a large majority of their votes, there 
was in my mind no doubt that Congress would respond to 
the will of the nation by electing the individual they had de¬ 
clared to be their choice.” The election was perfectly 
constitutional; there was in fact no ground for saying that 
Jackson was the choice of the majority. No candidate re¬ 
ceived a majority of either electoral or popular votes, and 
it was impossible to say how the people would have voted 
had the issue been a simple one between Adams and Jackson. 

Senator Benton of Missouri, one of the Jackson leaders, 
wrote to Scott, the Missouri representative: “The vote which 
you intend thus to give is not your own. It belongs to the 
people of the state of Missouri.” In Missouri the vote 
had been, 1401 for Clay, 987 for Jackson, and 311 for 
Adams. With Clay no longer a candidate and now support¬ 
ing Adams, it was certainly difficult to say how the people 
of Missouri wished their representative to vote. Benton 
claimed that the vote should be for Jackson; Scott 


178 POLITICS OF THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION' 


Party con¬ 
flict. 


Adams and 
the dvil 
service. 


Internal im¬ 
provements. 


voted for Adams. Difficult as it was to tell who “the 
people” were and what they wished, this assertion that 
the government did not rest on their will very much 
weakened the administration. It made a direct appeal to 
the growing democratic spirit of the time. 

The inauguration, therefore, found two parties existing 
in place of the four factions of the previous November. The 
administration, combining in its support the followers of its 
two leaders, embarked upon an active progressive nationalistic 
policy. It found itself confronted by an opposition, ably 
led, composed of most of those who had favored Crawford 
and Calhoun as well as Jackson. This opposition endeavored 
to avoid committing itself on subjects of national policy, and 
contented itself with attacking the administration as corrupt, 
and with upholding the rights of the people: a program which 
could unite all elements of opposition without exciting 
discord. 

Adams wished to ignore these political divisions and 
continue the “era of good feeling.” In spite of the fact 
that many of those in office were his violent opponents, he 
would make no removals. In fact, he proceeded upon a still 
broader basis than Monroe, for he gave, in pursuance of an 
anteelection promise, recognition to the Federalists, by 
naming Rufus King minister to England. Probably no 
administration before or after has been so nonpartisan. 
Adams lost more support than he won by this policy. He 
was not the man to love his enemies, even though he kept 
them in office, and they loved him no better; the good fellow¬ 
ship of rewarding one’s friends was more popular than the 
correct virtue of impartiality. 

The public policy which most interested Adams was that 
of internal improvements, and great impetus was given to this 
movement in 1825 by the completion and immediate success 
of the Erie Canal. During this administration more than 
twice as much was given for roads and harbors as in the whole 


ADMINISTRATION OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 179 

previous history of the country. The total amount, however, 
was only something over two millions, and with the progress 
of surveys, it was becoming evident that this was but a drop 
in the bucket compared with the great sums needed for the 
development of transportation, and with the sums actually 
spent by states and companies in the wealthy coast region. 
Government aid was still rather a promise for the future 
than an accomplishment, and less popular support was 
gained than Adams anticipated. 

In his own peculiar field of foreign affairs, also, Adams was 
unfortunate. When invited to send delegates to a Congress 
of American Republics called to meet at Panama, Adams and 
Clay gladly accepted. They foresaw a great future of con¬ 
tinental cooperation, and hoped to secure the leadership for 
the United States. The plan, however, was made the 
subject of violent attack. Southern orators breathed on 
the smoldering coals of slavery feeling, by pointing out 
that the black republics of Haiti and Santo Domingo 
would also attend. The administration won its point, and 
Congress provided for delegates, but the delay made them 
late at the Congress, nothing was accomplished, and this 
advertised failure overshadowed the quieter routine successes 
of the period. 

Meantime there was forced upon the government a 
question on which Adams was totally out of sympathy with 
a majority of his countrymen. Since the War of 1812 the 
government had been rapidly pushing its purchases of Indian 
land. Indian title had been extinguished in Ohio and almost 
completely in Indiana, Illinois, the lower peninsula of Mich¬ 
igan, Louisiana, and Arkansas. The Indians, however, still 
retained possession of rich tracts in Georgia, Alabama, and 
Mississippi, which were strongly desired by the westward- 
moving cotton planters. The treaty of Indian Springs in 
1825 ceded a large portion of this land held by the Creeks in 
Georgia and Alabama. Intimations were brought to Adams 


Foreign 

affairs. 


The Georgia 
Indians. 


l 80 POLITICS OF THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION 


that this treaty had been secured without the due consent 
of the Creek nation. He ordered an investigation, and 
decided that the treaty had been illegally negotiated. The 
matter was a complicated one. By a treaty of 1791 the 
United States had guaranteed to the Creeks the boundary 
agreed upon in that treaty. By Gallatin’s agreement with 
Georgia in 1802 the United States had promised to remove 
the Indians as soon as possible. In the dilemma created 
by these conflicting promises, Adams decided to regard 
the treaty of Indian Springs as void, and ordered negotiations 
to be reopened. This seemed to the people of the frontier 
misplaced conscientiousness. Georgia was particularly in¬ 
censed, deeming it part of her sovereign rights to control the 
Indians within her borders, and resenting any interference 
by the national government beyond the strict letter of the 
Constitution. Governor Troup proceeded to act according 
to the treaty of Indian Springs; the President notified him that 
he would cause the authority of the national government 
to be respected. Troup replied: “You are sufficiently 
explicit as to the means by which you propose to carry your 
resolution into effect. Thus the military character of the 
menace is established, and I am at liberty to give it the 
defiance which it merits.” 

This controversy was particularly unfortunate for Adams 
because it placed him in the doubly obnoxious position 
of supporting the Indians and of opposing state rights. 
The frontier, essentially devoted to the Union, and careless 
of strict construction though it was, nevertheless opposed 
the central government when it appeared as a monitor 
instead of a beneficent purveyor of roads and canals. This 
Georgia question served to weld together the frontier and 
the old Jeffersonian democracy. The fact that Adams ulti¬ 
mately succeeded in extinguishing the claim of the Creeks to 
territory in Georgia did not offset in the public mind his 
punctiliousness as to the methods employed. 


ADMINISTRATION OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 181 


The tariff question bid fair to be as disturbing for the oppo¬ 
sition as Georgia was for the administration. Whereas Adams 
and Clay and the districts supporting them were avowedly 
in favor of a protective tariff, the Jackson leaders were con¬ 
fronted with the fact that their allies in Pennsylvania and 
some other states wanted protection, while South Carolina 
and Georgia were becoming every day more violently op¬ 
posed to it. The protectionist sentiment was persistent, and 
in 1827 a convention was held at Harrisburg to recommend 
new legislation to Congress. At the next session it was 
necessary to take up the subject. 

Under these circumstances certain Jackson leaders de¬ 
vised a clever scheme by which to secure credit for pro¬ 
tectionist sentiment without passing a bill, and to divide 
their opponents. A bill was reported from a committee 
controlled by Jackson men, which provided for high duties 
on the iron of Pennsylvania and the raw products of the 
West, but which gave inadequate protection to the tex¬ 
tile manufacturers of New England. This might cause dis¬ 
sension between the two classes of protectionists, and it was 
expected that the bill would be defeated by the combination 
of New Englanders opposed to its details, and southerners 
opposed to protection altogether. Thus legislation would 
be prevented, the Jackson leaders would secure credit for 
introducing a bill satisfactory to those regions in which their 
strength lay, and the burden of the defeat would lie at the 
door of Adams’s home section, New England. This plan was 
upset; for enough New England members, headed by 
Webster, voted for the bill to carry it. This act, passed in 
1828, framed with the intention of being defeated, based 
upon no scientific principle, and relating, as John Randolph 
said, “to manufactures of no sort or kind but the manu¬ 
facture of a President of these United States,” quite properly 
acquired the title of the “Tariff of Abominations.” Politi¬ 
cally the tariff question had become so involved and compli- 


The tariff 
question. 


The tariff of 
1828. 


182 politics of the period of transition 


The civil 
service. 


Campaign 
of 1828. 


Election of 
1828. 


cated that the attitude of the Jackson party on the subject 
was an enigma, which, after all, was one of the objects at 
which its leaders aimed. 

While they stood thus uncommitted on the subject of 
the tariff, the Jackson leaders endeavored to strengthen 
themselves by attacking the administration. In 1826 
Benton brought in a report on the patronage. He was un¬ 
able to show that corruption existed, but he magnified the 
size and influence of the civil service, and pointed out the 
danger to the republic if it should fall into the hands of 
unscrupulous politicians. To those who believed that the 
administration was founded on bargain and corruption, this 
seemed an added reason for overthrowing it and giving the 
control to Jackson, the true representative of the people. 
This attack was the more effective because of the unpopu¬ 
larity of the civil service. Owing to the failure to remove 
officials, many officeholders were old, while appointments 
were made, on the whole, from the more aristocratic classes. 
The red tape of administration generally seems unnecessary 
to those on the outside, and to the frontiersman it seemed 
devised but to cover up the theft of public money. The 
demand for “Reform” became one of the most effective of 
the issues made by the opposition. 

The campaign of 1828, therefore, was fought rather on 
the issue of who should run the government than what 
that government should do. The administration had not 
succeeded in defining any issue with its opponents on 
public policy, and it was not able to defend itself success¬ 
fully against the charges and innuendoes continually directed 
against it. 

The electorate was thoroughly aroused by the busy four 
years’ campaign, and several times as many votes were cast as 
in any previous election. The election resulted in the choice 
of Jackson, who received 647,276 popular votes to 508,064 
for Adams, and 178 electoral votes to 8> 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 


183 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 


For general politics, Adams, J. Q., Memoirs , and Benton, T. H., 
Thirty Years ’ View, are satisfactory. For the tariff the references 
given at the close of the last chapter continue sufficient. For 
internal improvements, Calhoun, J. C., Works, II, 186-196; and 
Richardson, Messages, II, 144-183 (Views of James Monroe, 
May 4, 1822). For the Missouri question: Adams, J. Q., Memoirs, 
V and VI. Jefferson, T., Writings (edited by H. A. Washington), 
VII. King, C. R., Life, Correspondence, and Speeches of R. King, 
VI, 690-803. For the Monroe Doctrine: American History Leaf¬ 
lets, no. 4. Hill, M., Liberty Documents, ch. XX. 

In addition to the references on special subjects given at the 
close of the last chapter, the following may be used: Basset, J. S., 
Jackson, vol. I. Holst, H. von, United States, I, 421-458. Hunt, 
C. H., Livingston, ch. XIV. Lodge, H. C., Webster, 129-171. 
Parton, J., Jackson, III, 94-120. Phillips, U. B., Georgia 
and State Rights (Am. Hist. Assoc., Report, 1901, II), ch. II. 
Quincy, J., Adams, chs. VI, VII. Roosevelt, T., Benton, ch. III. 
Schurz, C., Clay, ch. X. Sumner, G. W., Jackson, chs. IV, V. 
Taussig, F. W., Tariff History, 68-108. 

Moore, J. B., American Diplomacy, ch. VI. Turner, F. J., 
New West, 119-124. Gilman, D. C., Monroe, appendix, contains 
a bibliography. 

Catterall, R. C. H., Second Bank of the United States, 1-21. 
Dewey, D. R., State Banking before the Civil War {Senate Doc., no. 
581, 61st Cong., 2d sess. Publication of the United States Mone¬ 
tary Commission). 

Burgess, Middle Period, 61-108. Hammond, The Cotton Indus¬ 
try, chs. I, II, and III. Harris, Slavery in Illinois, 6-16, 27-50. 
Hinsdale, B. A., Old Northwest, 345-367. Holst, H. von, United 
States, I, 324-381. McMaster, United States, III, 514-529. 
Schafer, W. A., Sectionalism and Representation in South Carolina 
(Am. Hist. Assoc., Report, 1900, I), 184-400. Turner, New West , 
149-172. 


Sources. 


Historical 

accounts. 

General 

politics. 


Monroe 

Doctrine. 


Banking and 
currency. 


Missouri 

Compromise. 


CHAPTER XI 


End of the 

transition 

period. 


Jacksonian 

democracy. 


The inaugu¬ 
ration. 


FRONTIER POLICIES 

The inauguration of Andrew Jackson, on March 4, 1829, 
brings to a close the period of transition beginning in 1815. 
The new tendencies, struggling during this period for ex¬ 
pression, became established. The change from the second 
Adams to Jackson was much more important than that from 
the first Adams to Jefferson. The election of Jefferson had 
caused a temporary halt in the centralization of the govern¬ 
ment. The Jeffersonian democracy wished government to 
do as little as possible, because it was afraid of being op¬ 
pressed. In practice the Jeffersonian Democrats were almost 
as aristocratic as the Federalists had been; control was still 
in the hands of a class. The Jacksonian democracy, on 
the other hand, had a robust belief in its power; it was 
unafraid; it wished the government to be active. The 
Jackson victory, moreover, meant the actual transfer of 
power to the majority. The people at large were brought 
into more direct contact with the government, by the ex¬ 
tension of political organization, by the growth of the press 
and by the appointment of men of all classes to office. So 
complete was this transfer of power, that politics in the 
North became unfashionable, and for a period of fifty years 
men of wealth and refinement, to a large extent, kept out of 
political life. It was not only that the Jackson party 
triumphed, but in this fundamental point of appealing 
directly to the plain people their opponents were obliged 
to copy them. The basis of political power in the United 
States was permanently broadened. 

This change was dramatically represented by the charac- 
184 






Andrew Jackson 


i 






























COMPOSITION OF JACKSON’S PARTY 


185 

ter of the inaugural exercises. In the place of the trimly 
dressed gentlemen of the old regime, who gravely bore their 
part in the imposing ceremony of the inauguration, and the 
crowds of female relatives who came to visit Washington and 
attend the dignified social functions of the season, came 
thousands of unselected Democrats, editors from the fron¬ 
tier, ward heelers from New York, and Pennsylvania farmers. 

The chief social function was a vast reception at the White 
House, which ended in a drunken revelry. Justice Story 
wrote: “ King Mob seemed triumphant.” The breakdown 
of social barriers illustrated the leveling of those of politics. 

While it was clear to most intelligent on-lookers that Composition 
the victory of Jackson meant a closer relationship between pi/ty Cks ° n s 
government and people, it was not clear what form this 
relationship would take, or what public policies would be 
adopted by the new administration; for the victory had been 
won by a combination of elements differing widely in their 
view of what was meant by democracy and what policy 
was advantageous for the government. 

First was the democracy of the frontier, represented by The frontier. 
Jackson himself, self-reliant, based on actual equality among 
the people. Politically, it was kept together by personal 
leadership. It expected from the new government a renova¬ 
tion of the civil service, a solution of the land problem, the 
elimination of the Indian, relief from currency troubles. On 
the tariff and internal improvements it was divided. This 
frontier element was the most powerful. Influential in de¬ 
ciding issues between the other sections since 1812, it was 
from now on for fifteen years the dominant section, but it 
could not rule alone. The ten frontier states, including 
Georgia, which can at this time be considered as frontier, 
cast, in 1828, 74 electoral votes to 187 cast by the rest of 
the country; the census of 1830 would make the proportion 
96 to 190. Jackson received the total electoral vote of this 
section and almost two thirds of the popular vote. 


186 


FRONTIER POLICIES 


Virginian 

democracy. 


The Cotton 
South. 


Northern 

democracy. 


Allied with the frontier was the Jeffersonian democ¬ 
racy of Virginia, North Carolina, and Maryland; democratic 
in theory rather than in practice, controlled by an upper 
class of intelligent planters, sensitive on constitutional 
questions, opposed to centralization, and hoping for a reversal 
of the active policy pursued by the Adams administration. 
The planters, however, favored a government decorously 
conducted by gentlemen, and they looked at currency ques¬ 
tions from the point of view of men with large vested in¬ 
terests.’ This section contributed 44 electoral votes to 
Jackson and only 6 to Adams. 

The eleven votes of South Carolina, which was as yet the 
only state thoroughly controlled by the cotton interest, 
were given to Jackson with the firm conviction that he was, 
or could be made, an advocate of tariff reduction if not an 
opponent of protection altogether. South Carolina furnished 
the Vice President, Calhoun, and it was expected that after 
a single term, Jackson would retire and leave him the succes¬ 
sion. In character the democracy of South Carolina resem¬ 
bled more that of Virginia than that of the frontier, the 
control being in the hands of a capitalistic upper class. 
It differed from that of Virginia in that the industry upon 
which it was based was steadily growing, encroaching con¬ 
stantly upon the frontier region, as cotton plantations were 
established in western states. 

With the votes received from the West and South, 
Jackson would have just failed of election ; his great 
victory was due to the democracy of the North. The 
northern democracy differed from that of the other sections 
in that it was a democracy opposed to an aristocracy. It 
consisted in the main of the poorer and less fortunate classes 
who lived in the same communities with the richer and more 
powerful. It had, therefore, somewhat of the bitterness of 
European democracies, and it felt the need of close organiza¬ 
tion for self-protection. The minor leaders of this section 


JACKSON'S FIRST ADMINISTRATION 


187 


were of a lower character than those elsewhere, and the most 
important figure, Martin Van Buren, governor of New York, 
was regarded very generally as a man whose talents were 
confined to the successful manipulation of the party ma¬ 
chinery. This northern faction of the party was strongly inter¬ 
ested in maintaining the tariff. It cast 49 electoral votes for 
Jackson, only one of which came from New England. 

The organization of the administration gave little clew Theadminis- 
as to which would be the ruling faction, but it did serve to tratlon - 
emphasize the fact that the character of the government had 
completely changed. None of the new cabinet officers were 
men of previous experience in national administration. 

Martin Van Buren was made Secretary of State; of the 
remaining members, three were more or less closely allied to 
Calhoun, two were personal friends of Jackson. Virginia, for 
the first time in the history of the country, was without a 
representative at the council table of the cabinet. The 
influence of Calhoun was strengthened by the patronage 
given the Telegraph , a Washington paper, which was edited 
by his friend Duff Green, and which became the official organ 
of the administration. It was soon evident, however, that 
the personnel of the cabinet meant comparatively little, for 
Jackson gave no more weight to the advice of his con¬ 
stitutional advisers than to that of outsiders. He grad¬ 
ually drew about him a group of personal friends whose 
advice he often took, and whose pens he often employed to 
make up for his own want of literary skill. Most important 
of these were Amos Kendall of Kentucky, Isaac Hill of New 
Hampshire, Major Lewis of Tennessee, and F. P. Blair of 
Missouri, who occupied inferior positions, but who were 
dubbed, because of their influence, the “ Kitchen Cabinet.’’ 

The attention of the administration was first given to the Removals, 
civil service. In fact it was forced to act by the crowd which 
had flocked to Washington, not only to witness the triumph 
of the people, but also to divide the spoils. After a campaign 


i88 


FRONTIER POLICIES 


Appoint¬ 

ments. 


waged largely on the plea that the government was corrupt, 
it was natural that the first result of victory should be to 
remove from office those supposed to be unfaithful. More¬ 
over, the frontier believed in the capacity of any man 
for any kind of work, a belief based on the frontier necessity 
for one man to do many things. It distrusted experts. As 
Jackson said in one of his messages: “The duties of all 
public offices are, or at least admit of being made, so plain and 
simple that men of intelligence may readily qualify them¬ 
selves for their performance; and I cannot but believe that 
more is lost by the long continuance of men in office than is 
generally to be gained by their experience.” It was held 
that the offices should be manned by friends of the admin¬ 
istration, and, at least in theory, that even these friends 
should “rotate” every so often. Office was regarded rather 
as a sinecure than as a duty. Although these doctrines were 
popular, the adoption of a general policy of removal cre¬ 
ated great popular excitement. For thirty years an ap¬ 
pointment in the civil service had meant almost certainly 
a life position, and officeholders were not prepared to fall 
back on other occupations. The population of Washington 
depended almost wholly upon public employment. More¬ 
over, the Jackson administration did not make removals 
slowly and for special reasons as did Jefferson, but upon the 
broad grounds that public offices should not be held long by 
any one person, and that it was right to punish one’s enemies. 

More important was the difference in the character of 
the men who got places “out of the general scramble for 
plunder,” as Samuel Swartwout describes the struggle for 
appointments. The decisive qualification for office was 
service to the party. The motto of the administration was, 
“To the victors belong the spoils.” Nor was it past service 
only that was considered, but also the possibility of future 
usefulness. A great many appointments were given to edi¬ 
tors who had spread broadcast the charges of corruption 


THE SPOILS SYSTEM 


189 

against the previous administration. Few newspapers paid 
at that time, and many had been maintained with a view 
to reward when the victory came. These editors planned to 
combine their new official duties with their editorial labors. 

Very soon there developed also the policy of assessing the 
officeholders for the purpose of paying party expenses. Thus 
the spoils system was fully established. 

Closely connected with the establishment of the spoils Party organi- 
system was the development of party organization. Such s^i^system? 
organization was expensive, and the civil service was thus 
made to bear this expense. In New York and Pennsyl¬ 
vania this process was already complete in 1829; now it 
spread rapidly. After 1831 national conventions were held for 
the selection of presidential candidates, and these became the 
centers of party organization. They soon began to provide 
for a permanent national committee which became the exec¬ 
utive of the party. The convention system having been 
adopted for national purposes, it rapidly spread into those 
states where it had not previously been established. The 
old custom of individual nominations and of legislative cau¬ 
cuses gradually disappeared, and the convention system be¬ 
came, in the course of time, practically universal. 

These innovations were not brought about without Opposition, 
opposition. The spoils system was popular on the frontier 
and with the northern democracy; it was unpopular with the 
southern democracy. In fact the Atlantic coast states of 
the South were generally exempted from political proscrip¬ 
tion until after the Civil War. The spoils system was bit¬ 
terly attacked by the opponents of the administration. They 
claimed that it would lead to maladministration, and that it 
gave the President too great power by making all officers 
dependent upon him for their livelihood. The convention 
system was perhaps even more disliked, particularly in the 
South, on the ground that it gave the majority a tyrannical 
power in dictating party policy. Calhoun and many other 


IQO 


FRONTIER POLICIES 


Significance 
of the new 
system. 


Indian 

policy. 


southern leaders never gave up the fight for local party 
independence. In fact the formation of efficient national 
party organizations was a long step in the consolidation of 
the government, against which the South was always con¬ 
tending. 

In spite of opposition, both the spoils system and party 
organization became definitely fixed upon the country. 
When the opposition came into power in 1841, they pursued 
the Jacksonian policy with regard to the civil service, and 
they found themselves forced to adopt also the convention 
system. Circumstances compelled them to resort to na¬ 
tional conventions in 1831 and 1832, and gradually the 
practice was taken up by one state after another. The 
change of attitude is illustrated by the experience of a 
young Illinois lawyer and Whig politician, Abraham Lincoln. 
In 1840 he wrote a pamphlet denouncing the Democrats 
because of the convention system; in 1843 he vigorously 
defended it on the ground that its conveniences offset its 
evils. In fact these were necessary features of the Democratic 
victory. The people desired to control the ordinary every¬ 
day course of the government; to do this organization was 
necessary, and to support this organization the spoils system 
was the simplest method. As party organization became 
highly developed it was often used to thwart the will of the 
people, and often the national conventions agreed to com¬ 
promises acceptable to the people of no one section of the 
country; but in a crude way it brought government nearer 
the people, and by harmonizing sectional differences strength¬ 
ened the government. It was fifty years before these rough- 
and-ready methods of democratic government were outgrown. 

As a frontiersman and an Indian fighter, it was natural 
that Jackson should take a vigorous attitude on the Indian 
question. In his first annual message he attacked Jeffer¬ 
son’s policy of civilizing them and “reclaiming them from a 
wandering life.” This policy seemed to be succeeding too 


JACKSON’S INDIAN POLICY 


IQI 


well in Georgia, where the Cherokees had become sedentary, 
had adopted a tribal constitution, and had claimed immunity 
from the jurisdiction of the state. Georgia and Alabama 
had passed laws for the government of their Indian territories, 
and the Indians had appealed to the President for protec¬ 
tion. He informed them that they must recognize state 
authority, and he recommended that Congress set apart an 
Indian territory beyond the Mississippi, and gather there all 
the tribes then living to the east of it. 

In carrying out this policy Jackson encountered the 
same opponent who had prevented the complete triumph 
of Jefferson thirty years before, — John Marshall. The In¬ 
dians appealed their cause to the Supreme Court, which, in 
the cases of the Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 1831, Worcester v. 
Georgia , 1832, and Graves v. Georgia, 1834, decided that the 
Cherokees constituted a “domestic dependent nation that 
the laws of Georgia were void within their territory, and 
that treaties between them and the United States were 
valid. As there existed a treaty guaranteeing their terri¬ 
tory, the United States seemed bound to defend them. 
President Jackson, however, ignored these decisions. He 
would not admit that the Supreme Court could dictate the 
policy of the executive. “John Marshall has made his de¬ 
cision,” he is reported to have said ; “now let him enforce 
it.” 

Throughout the administration the constructive portion 
of Jackson’s Indian policy was consistently carried out, 
with skill and success. In 1834 an Indian territory w r as 
roughly defined. Already in 1830 arrangements had been 
made for the removal of the Choctaws from Mississippi. In 
1836 the great majority of the Creeks and Cherokees were at 
length removed from Georgia and Alabama. The same policy 
cleared northern Illinois and Wisconsin of the Winnebago 
and Sac and Fox tribes, though not until after a short 
period of hostilities in 1832, known as the Black Hawk War. 


Jackson and 
Marshall. 


Indian 

removals. 


192 


FRONTIER POLICIES 


Opposition to 
internal im¬ 
provements. 


As a result of these removals the population of Illinois 
bounded, in the decade, from 157,445 to 476,183; that of 
Alabama from 309,527 to 590,756; that of Mississippi from 
136,621 to 375,651. Only the Seminoles in the swamps of 
Florida successfully resisted removal. The power of the 
Indians east of the great river had been broken by Jackson 
and Harrison in the victories of 1814; the credit for actually 
clearing the territory belonged to Jackson, and in perform¬ 
ing this task he did one of the things which the frontier 
had elected him to do. 

On the subject of internal improvements Jackson’s 
course was less clearly marked out. While Adams and Clay 
had relied upon this policy for popularity, the Jackson leaders 
had not committed themselves against it, and the frontier 
was divided. Every one saw the overwhelming need of im¬ 
proving transportation; differences existed as to whether 
it was the proper function of the national government to 
carry on such works. Jackson discussed the matter in his 
first annual message, and on May 30, 1830, decidedly revealed 
his policy by vetoing the “Maysville Road Bill.” Unlike 
Madison and Monroe, he based his veto on the inexpediency 
as well as the unconstitutionality of such appropriations. 
This was an act of political courage, for the road proposed was 
intended to benefit that portion of Kentucky in which Jack¬ 
son’s support lay. Kentucky did not go Democratic again 
until 1856. A struggle now ensued between a majority in 
Congress and the President. Congress passed several appro¬ 
priations for such purposes by including them in general 
appropriation bills which the President dared not veto; 
items thus passed being known as “riders.” Jackson killed 
several bills that might have been passed over his veto by a 
two-thirds majority, by “pocket vetoes.” If the President 
does not desire a bill passed by Congress to become a law, 
he must return it within ten days, otherwise it becomes ef¬ 
fective without his signature, “unless the Congress by their 


PUBLIC LANDS 


193 


adjournment prevent its return.” The great majority of 
bills are passed in the last few days of the session, and a num¬ 
ber of these Jackson simply “pocketed,” neither signing nor 
vetoing them, and as Congress adjourned before the ten days 
expired, they simply lapsed. Within his party, Jackson won 
a decisive victory on this subject. Opposition to national 
grants for local purposes became one of the cardinal principles 
of the Democrats. On national legislation his attitude was 
influential for the time being; in 1838 the Cumberland Road 
was turned over to the states in which it lay, and no impor¬ 
tant new projects were undertaken; but many years later 
appropriations for rivers and harbors, and land grants to 
railroads, revived the practice. 

Jackson’s policy on this subject was not entirely nega¬ 
tive. He realized the need of the frontier for capital with 
which to construct roads and canals, and proposed that, 
in case the national government had a surplus revenue, 
this money be divided among the states according to 
their representation in the electoral college. That is, he 
advocated leaving the work of improvement to the states, 
but supplying them with money. It seemed probable that 
there would soon be a surplus available, for the revenue far 
exceeded expenditures, and the public debt was being rapidly 
paid off. Jackson could look forward to action while still 
President, and he advised the adoption of a constitutional 
amendment to remove all doubt as to the legality of such ac¬ 
tion. In this he showed himself more in favor of practical 
state rights than Jefferson, who, in 1806, under similar 
circumstances, recommended an amendment giving the na¬ 
tional government power to undertake such work. Jackson 
subsequently changed his mind, but his plan was in part car¬ 
ried out. 

Closely connected with the question of internal improve¬ 
ments was another question deeply interesting to the fron¬ 
tier: that of the public land. By the time Jackson became 


Distribution 
of the surplus 


Public lands. 


194 


FRONTIER POLICIES 


President the business difficulties resulting from the credit 
system and the crisis of 1819 had been almost settled and the 
passage of some additional relief acts completed the work. 
A large question of policy remained. The demand of the 
settlers for a reduction in price, if not the sale of land at the 
actual cost of survey, was growing continually stronger. 
Benton, Jackson’s great western champion, advocated it, and 
in 1832 Jackson himself said: “It seems to me to be our true 
policy that the public lands shall cease as soon as practi¬ 
cable to be a source of revenue.” This policy was exceed¬ 
ingly distasteful to the older states, which, even as things were 
already, saw too many of their strong young men enticed 
away by the desire to become landowners. Particularly 
the manufacturing states feared the depletion of the ranks 
of their workers and felt the very present necessity, in 
order to keep the laboring population at home, of paying 
wages so high as to make competition with England increas¬ 
ingly difficult. On December 29, 1829, Senator Foote of 
Connecticut introduced a resolution that the committee on 
public lands inquire into the expediency of restricting sales 
at the minimum price to land already surveyed. This 
resolution became the excuse for one of the greatest debates 
that Congress ever heard, to which it will be necessary to 
recur in another connection, but it was not passed. On the 
other hand, the price of land was not reduced. Something, 
however, was done for the home seeker by the passage of a 
number of preemption laws, which gave actual settlers the 
right to preempt or occupy land before it was put upon the 
market, and buy it at private sale at the minimum price 
before the public auction was held. These laws were passed 
for one year only, and applied only to those who had already 
taken such holdings. They were renewed almost every 
year. Finally, in 1841, a permanent general law was passed. 
The “squatter,” instead of being driven from the public land, 
— a plan the government had tried in the eighteenth century, 


PUBLIC LANDS 


195 


— became the recognized forerunner of civilization, with a 
prior claim to the land he selected. More might have been 
accomplished had the land question not been closely involved 
with the general question of revenue and the tariff, and later 
with that of slavery. 

As land was still to be sold at a profit the question arose Land 
as to what should be done with the revenue derived from it. revenui; 
Benton had the rather fantastic idea that it could best be 
employed in constructing fortifications which would forever 
render the United States secure against attack. Jackson 
proposed that the United States turn the lands within each 
state over to that state. His idea was that the states could 
use the proceeds of their lands for the purposes of internal 
improvement. Opposition to this plan was overwhelming. 

Either the states would sell cheaply and thus draw population 
more quickly from the East, or the first settlers would receive 
for their own purposes large sums from land secured by na¬ 
tional effort, and which the landless states felt should be ad¬ 
ministered for the general benefit. The opposition, however, 
could not let matters rest without action. If the proceeds 
of land sales, after the payment of the debt, simply went to 
swell the general revenue, a large surplus would result. With 
a surplus revenue, the demand for a lower tariff would become 
compelling. Henry Clay, therefore, in 1833 presented a 
plan whereby the lands were to be administered by the 
national government, ten per cent of the proceeds of sale in 
each state was to be given to that state, the remainder was 
to be divided among all the states. This would dispose of 
the revenue, give special recognition to the state in which 
the land lay, recognize also the common claim of all the 
states, and furnish all states with a fund for internal im¬ 
provements. The bill passed Congress, but Jackson “pock¬ 
eted” it, and the question remained open. At length in 
1836 a bill was passed which disposed of the whole surplus 
revenue, and which avoided any appearance of unconsti- 


196 


FRONTIER POLICIES 


Sources. 


Historical 

accounts. 


Party organi- 
ration. 


Indian 

questions. 

Land and in¬ 
ternal im¬ 
provements. 


tutionality by providing that the money be loaned to the 
states instead of given to them. The special grant to the 
state in which the lands lay was also omitted. In this 
form Jackson accepted the measure, although somewhat 
unwillingly, and the question of land revenue was thus 
temporarily settled. 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 

On the composition of the Jackson party: Adams, J. Q., 
Memoirs, VI, 5-104. Benton, T. H., Thirty Years’ View. Che¬ 
valier, M., Society, etc., in the United States. [Cooper, J. F.], 
Notions of the Americans. Kendall, A., Autobiography. Quincy, 
J., Figures of the Past. Tocqueville, Alexis de, Democracy in 
America (translated by Bowen), 1-72. Mrs. Trollope, Domestic 
Manners of the Americans. Jackson’s messages in Richardson’s 
Messages and Papers, vol. I, 265, and vol. II, 308, are useful. 

The best general accounts are: Macdonald, W., Jacksonian 
Democracy; and McMaster, J. B., United States, vol. V. Of 
biographies, those of Jackson, by W. G. Sumner and J. S. Bassett; 
of T. H. Benton, by W. M. Meigs and by T. Roosevelt; and of 
M. Van Buren, by E. M. Shepard, are useful. Woodburn, J. A., 
Political Parties, ch. IV. 

Fish, C. R., Civil Service and the Patronage, chs. Ill, IV, V, VI. 
Macy, J., Political Parties, ch. IV. Ostrogorski, M., Democracy 
and the Organization of Political Parties, II, 1-75; also published 
in one volume. Parton, Jackson, III, 164-255. 

Phillips, U. B., Georgia and State Rights (Am. Hist. Assoc., 
Report, 1901, vol. II), ch. III. 

Hart, A. B., Practical Essays, IX, X. Johnson, E. R., River and 
Harbor Bills (Am. Acad, of Polit. and Soc. Sci., Annals, n), 782 ff. 
Mason, Veto Power, secs. 83-94. Schouler, United States, ch. XIV, 
sec. II. Shosuke Sato, Land Question {Johns Hopkins Historical 
Studies, IV), nos. 7-9. Sioussat, S. L., Tennessee Politics {Am. 
Hist. Review, vol. 14, 50-69). Wellington, R. G., Political and 
Sectional Influence of the Public Lands. 


CHAPTER XII 


JACKSON AND SOUTH CAROLINA 

While the problems of the frontier were thus receiving 
attention and the voice of the northern politician was grow¬ 
ing powerful, another section of the Jackson party demanded 
attention. No state had such high ambitions, none was so 
united in its desires, as South Carolina. The boon that 
it expected as a result of Jackson’s triumph was the reduction, 
radical and prompt, of the tariff. All the distress caused by 
exhaustion of the soil, and the decline in the price of cotton 
due to the opening of new cotton areas, was attributed to the 
high tariff. Seldom has an entire population been so united 
in its understanding of an economic question, and it was 
equally insistent on relief. 

It was the general belief in South Carolina that a pro¬ 
tective tariff was unconstitutional. The Constitution gives 
Congress power “ to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, 
and Excises to pay the Debts and provide for the common 
Defense and general Welfare of the United States; but all 
Duties, Imposts, and Excises shall be uniform throughout the 
United States.” It was argued that there was no power to 
lay duties to protect domestic industry, and that such 
duties, so far from being uniform and providing for the 
general welfare, were ruining the cotton planter and en¬ 
riching the cotton manufacturer. McDuffie also argued 
that an import duty on goods necessary in the production 
of cotton, by making it more costly, amounted to an 
export duty on cotton, and the Constitution specifically for¬ 
bids export duties. Whether these arguments were or were 

197 


Demands of 

South 

Carolina. 


Constitution¬ 
ality of a pro¬ 
tective tariff. 


198 


JACKSON AND SOUTH CAROLINA 


Talk of 
secession. 


Calhoun’s 

position. 


not valid, they at any rate secured no relief from the courts. 
No tariff bill except that of 1789 contained any formal ex¬ 
pression of its object, and it was impossible to prove that 
any particular duty was levied only for the purpose of 
protection. The constitutional argument was equally with¬ 
out effect in Congress. McDuffie claimed that the cotton 
interests were practically unrepresented, because they had a 
minority representation; subject as they were to the tyran¬ 
nical rule of the majority, it would be as well to withdraw 
their representatives from Washington altogether. 

The tariff of 1824 had caused men to formulate these 
views; the tariff of 1828 intensified their belief in them. Some 
leaders began to “calculate the value of the Union.” In¬ 
cendiary toasts were drunk at public dinners; a congress of 
the states opposed to the tariff was proposed; some suggested 
state laws to tax or prevent the importation of “tariffied” 
articles. Secession was discussed. “Fear nothing,” said a 
correspondent in the Charleston Courier; “foreign nations 
will protect us. We have commerce and products to tempt 
them, and they have men and ships to defend us. Congress 
can do nothing but blockade us, and this may soon be ob¬ 
viated.” 

To this situation it behooved Calhoun, the political 
leader of South Carolina, to set his mind. A cotton planter 
among cotton planters, he naturally sympathized with their 
views. At the same time he was deeply devoted to the Union. 
He had entered Congress as one of the enthusiastic young 
leaders who brought about the War of 1812; he had been 
active in the Fourteenth Congress, taking part in its discussion 
on the nationalistic side; for sixteen years he had been in 
Washington as congressman, cabinet officer, and vice presi¬ 
dent. In 1829 his prospects for a national career seemed 
high; he was strong in the cabinet, and had friends and sup¬ 
porters all over the North and West; he was the logical can¬ 
didate for the succession. He therefore devoted all the 


CALHOUN’S POSITION 


199 


powers of his great mind to make possible the prosperity of 
his section and the preservation of the Union. 

The metaphysical bent of his Scotch ancestry was plainly 
apparent in his views. As he studied the situation in the 
light of past history he became convinced that all govern¬ 
ments tend to become tyrannical. The problem is to create 
a government having sufficient power to be efficient, and yet 
so limited as to be unable to oppress any portion of the 
governed. The right to vote is not sufficient, for the tyranny 
of the majority is far worse than that of a single man. The 
only remedy is to allow each body of citizens of a particular 
section or special interest to vote separately, and require, 
to make a law valid, a “concurrent majority” in every section 
and interest. In this way all legislation for the general wel¬ 
fare could be passed, but nothing offensive to any section; 
the minority would be absolutely protected. “The concur¬ 
rent majority . . . tends to unite the most opposite and con¬ 
flicting interests, and to blend the whole in one common 
attachment to the country.” “Instead of factions, strife, 
and struggle for party ascendency, there would be patriotism, 
nationality, harmony, and a struggle only for supremacy 
in promoting the common good of the whole.” This view 
of the true structure of government Calhoun set forth later 
in an essay entitled: A Disquisition on Government; and it 
formed the basis of his political thought throughout the 
last twenty years of his life. 

Applying these views to the United States, he argued 
that the government had been founded by thirteen inde¬ 
pendent states. These states had united and formed a com¬ 
pact or bargain, the terms of which were set forth in the Con¬ 
stitution. They had not surrendered their independence, 
they had not divided the sovereignty; because, according 
to his belief, sovereignty is indivisible, they had merely as¬ 
signed certain specified functions to the central government. 
The national government must confine itself to the powers 


The doctrine 
of “con¬ 
current ma¬ 
jorities.” 


The doctrine 
of nullifica¬ 
tion. 


200 


JACKSON AND SOUTH CAROLINA 


Calhoun’s 

purpose. 


Webster- 

Hayne 

debate. 


specified. If it exercised other powers, it was acting without 
authority. In such case a decision of the national Su¬ 
preme Court could not be considered final, for it was a part 
of the national government. Back of the Court stood the 
states. In case of a “deliberate, palpable, and dangerous 
exercise of other powers not granted by the said compact,” 
each state was at liberty to “nullify” the law. Thus the 
government would be prevented from oppressing any one 
state, and the principle of the concurrent majority would be 
maintained. 

This doctrine of nullification recalled the Virginia and 
Kentucky Resolutions of Madison and Jefferson, in the asser¬ 
tion of the right of a state to declare an act unconstitutional. 
Calhoun, however, went so far beyond them in drawing con¬ 
clusions as to what action should be taken by the state, that 
Madison indignantly refused to be held responsible. Accord¬ 
ing to this new view, if a state legislature were fully convinced 
that the Constitution was being violated and Congress refused 
to change its action, then a convention should be called, 
representing the people of the state as a whole, for the express 
purpose of discussing the question. The sovereign people 
acting thus in their collective capacity could declare such law 
null and void within the limits of the state. Thus the state 
would be relieved of oppression without resorting to the vio¬ 
lent remedy of secession. This was undoubtedly the purpose 
of Calhoun. While he believed in secession as a right, he 
was, until just before the close of his life, opposed to it in 
practice. He was not even a strict constructionist in the 
sense that John Randolph was, for he was willing to see 
the range of national activity widen, so long as it was in ac¬ 
cordance with the will of a concurrent majority and thus 
oppressed no one section or interest. 

In 1828 Calhoun prepared an elaborate account of his 
views for the use of the South Carolina legislature, which 
adopted and published it under the title of the South Carolina 


WEBSTER-HAYNE DEBATE 


201 


Exposition. In 1830, in the debate on the Foote resolution 
with regard to public lands, Robert Y. Hayne, a senator from 
South Carolina, speaking under the eye of Calhoun, the Vice 
President, elaborately explained and defended these views, 
and sought to win for them the support of the West by recall¬ 
ing the long alliance between that section and the South. 
Daniel Webster responded, and there followed the most famous 
debate in American legislative history. Webster asserted that 
the Union was older than the states. He maintained that the 
Convention of 1787 effectually framed, not a compact, but a 
government, which was sovereign within the range of powers 
specified in the Constitution; that the United States Supreme 
Court was the only proper arbiter as to the extent of these pow- 
ers. He attacked Hayne’s idea as bad history, bad law, and 
as utterly impracticable. Webster’s speech was far more 
than a constitutional argument. It was a defense of the Union 
against the spirit of sectionism. It was filled with praise of 
the Union and what it had done and was to do for the country. 
It appealed to all to sink their differences in the struggle for 
the common good, and not only did it thrill the audience 
which he held spellbound in the Senate chamber, but its 
glowing periods carried conviction and enthusiasm to tens 
of thousands throughout the country. Oratorically the 
triumph rested with Webster, but in most respects it was a 
drawn battle. Historically neither view was wholly sound. 
There can be little doubt that the framers of the Constitution 
intended, as John Marshall’s decisions indicated, to divide 
the sovereignty. There was nothing in the political think¬ 
ing of the eighteenth century to cause that to be considered 
impossible. Here Webster clung nearer to the past than 
Hayne, for he recognized that the states were sovereign as 
well as the Union, while the latter utterly denied any sover¬ 
eignty to Union. Probably, however, as his opponents 
asserted, Webster’s views tended, if carried to their logical 
conclusion, to exalt the Union almost as much as Hayne’s 


202 


JACKSON AND SOUTH CAROLINA 


exalted the states. Webster carried with him the greater part 
of the country. The northeastern states, profiting as they 
did by the western and southern markets for their products, 
and by the navigation and tariff acts, were becoming every 
year more devoted to the Union. Hayne spoke to the grow¬ 
ing cotton interest, whose feeling for the Union was so rudely 
shaken by the oppression of the tariff, that many were coming 
to believe that independence and an alliance with England 
might best promote its prosperity. The impression which the 
two senators made on the West, to which they were both appeal¬ 
ing, was a divided one. The northern hostility to a liberal land 
policy was the very cause of the debate, and its opposition to 
expansion had not been forgotten. The West, moreover, was 
thoroughly in favor of local self-government, or state rights. 
On the other hand, it had been strongly unionist in sentiment 
ever since the Louisiana Purchase, and could not afford to lose 
the navigation of the Mississippi, the markets for its prod¬ 
ucts in the South and in the East, and national protection 
for its sugar, hemp, and wool. Moreover, in the West, Web¬ 
ster’s argument that the Union was older than the states was 
literally true, and the new states there lacked the historic 
traditions that endeared the older states to their inhabitants. 

Jackson and Upon the West, as represented by Jackson, Calhoun re- 
a oun ' lied to obtain a reduction of the tariff; if that failed, he hoped 
that Jackson’s state rights principles would cause him to tol¬ 
erate peaceful nullification. Calhoun and Jackson, however, 
did not get on well together, and Van Buren steadily under¬ 
mined Calhoun’s influence. Van Buren had the advantage 
of being more congenial socially and more willing to be an 
instrument, for it was becoming evident that Jackson was 
to be the real head of his administration and desired assist¬ 
ants rather than mentors. The first breach came on April 13, 
1830, when Jackson was invited to a banquet given by cer¬ 
tain southern congressmen on Jefferson’s birthday. After 
much state sovereignty oratory, he was asked to give a toast, 


CABINET REORGANIZATION 


203 


and proposed: “Our Federal Union, it must be preserved,” 
a phrase which rallied the Union sentiment of the country 
even more than Webster’s oratory. Just after this, a power¬ 
ful weapon fell into the hands of Calhoun’s foes. William 
H. Crawford wrote a letter in which he asserted that in 1818, 
when both he and Calhoun had been members of the cabinet, 
the latter had been in favor of censuring Jackson for his 
action in Florida. This letter, produced at the proper time, 
made Jackson intensely angry. He could not realize that 
Calhoun might be his friend and still have proposed such 
action, and he wrote, demanding an explanation. Calhoun 
made every effort to present the matter in the most favorable 
light, but no impression was made on Jackson, who on May 
30, 1831, broke off all communication with the Vice Presi¬ 
dent. 

The break between Calhoun and the President was followed 
by a reformation of the cabinet. All but one of Jackson’s 
own supporters resigned to accept other positions, and Cal¬ 
houn’s friends were forced to retire. The new cabinet was 
much more representative of the party than was the old. 
The Secretary of State, Edward Livingston, was a very able 
man and a great friend of Jackson’s. Lewis Cass, Secretary 
of War, and Levi Woodbury, Secretary of the Navy, were 
democratic leaders in the Northwest and in New England, 
respectively; Louis McLane of Delaware, Secretary of the 
Treasury, and Roger B. Taney of Maryland, the Attorney- 
General, continued to be prominent for many years. At 
the same time, the patronage of the administration was with¬ 
drawn from Calhoun’s organ, the Telegraph , and was given to 
a new paper, the Globe , founded by Blair and Rives in the 
interests of Jackson. The summer of 1831 saw, therefore, 
the total reorganization of the administration, and the com¬ 
plete cutting off of one powerful faction of the Jackson party. 

Meantime, Congress was giving as little consideration 
to the economic views of the cotton planters as Jackson was 


The new 
cabinet. 


Tariff legis¬ 
lation, 1830- 
1832. 


204 


JACKSON AND SOUTH CAROLINA 


to Calhoun’s constitutional theories. In his first message 
Jackson had commented on the fact that the approaching 
payment of the debt made it necessary to plan for a reduc¬ 
tion of the tariff, and that “the duties on those articles which 
cannot come in competition with our own productions are 
the first which should engage the attention of Congress.’’ 
This distinctly protectionist idea was actually carried out by 
a reduction of duties on tea and coffee. The next Congress 
took up the matter more seriously. Clay, who was now in the 
Senate, moved a resolution to the effect “ that the existing 
duties upon articles imported from foreign countries, and 
not coming in competition with similar articles made or pro¬ 
duced in the United States, ought to be forthwith abolished. 
. . .” This represented the protectionist ideal of a re¬ 
duction of the revenue without a reduction of protection. 
Hayne proposed “ that the existing duties upon articles 
imported from foreign countries should be so reduced that 
the amount of the public revenue shall be sufficient to defray 
the expenses of the government according to their present 
scale after the payment of the public debt; and that, allow¬ 
ing a reasonable time for a gradual reduction of the present 
high duties on the articles coming into competition with 
similar articles made or produced in the United States, the 
duties be ultimately equalized so that the duty on no article 
shall, as compared with the value of that article, vary mate¬ 
rially from the general average.” The bill, as finally passed, 
was largely the work of John Quincy Adams, who was now a 
member of the House and chairman of the committee on 
manufactures. It was largely in accordance with Clay’s 
resolution. The chief “abominations” of the tariff of 1828 
were done away with, but reduction was accomplished mainly 
by putting noncompetitive articles on the free list. The 
protectionists claimed that by redressing the worst grievances 
this new tariff of 1832 would render the protective system 
more popular than ever, and mean its permanent adoption. 


NULLIFICATION APPLIED 


205 


The time had now come when, if ever, South Carolina 
should try the efficiency of its newly forged weapon of nulli¬ 
fication. At this critical moment there was a sharp division 
within the state, and the party of action won by a vote of 
only 23,ocx) to 17,000. The decision made, the legislature 
called a convention, and the convention on November 24, 

1832, declared the tariff act null and void after February 1, 

1833. No appeals were to be allowed to United States courts, 
and if force were used, the state would be driven to the more 
extreme remedy of secession. On December 18 South Caro¬ 
lina suggested a convention of states to discuss the questions 
involved. If the South Carolina leaders expected that Jack¬ 
son’s respect for the rights of the states would paralyze the 
action of the central government, they were speedily un¬ 
deceived. On December 10 he issued a proclamation drawn 
up by the new secretary of state, Edward Livingston, which 
denied in emphatic language and with cogent arguments 
both the right of nullification and that of secession, and was 
as strongly nationalistic as Webster’s reply to Hayne. His 
determination to preserve the Union and enforce the laws 
was expressed firmly in the proclamation, with the accom¬ 
paniment of profanity in private conversation, and in action 
by giving General Scott the necessary orders to collect the 
revenues in Charleston harbor. 

South Carolina expected support from other states, par¬ 
ticularly those in which the cotton interest was important. 
Calhoun firmly believed that if he could but rally these states 
to a unity of action, they could dominate the country. Here 
he and his supporters met a decided disappointment. Al¬ 
though some states expressed opposition to the tariff, and 
Georgia and Alabama proposed conventions, — the one, of the 
southern states, and the other, of all the states, — no state 
supported the constitutional position of South Carolina, and 
several officially condemned nullification, and expressed their 
confidence in the general government. The Gulf States, with 


Nullificatioi 

applied. 


Unpopular¬ 
ity of nullifi¬ 
cation. 


206 


JACKSON AND SOUTH CAROLINA 


their fresh fields, did not feel the pinch of the tariff as did 
South Carolina. Moreover, the national government was 
at this very moment performing the inestimable service of 
driving out the Indians and opening wide new areas to culti¬ 
vation. Men could not seriously fear the consolidating 
tendencies of an administration which was standing between 
them and the Supreme Court. South Carolina was thus 
left to stand alone. 

Compromise While the state did not secure any support for its con¬ 
stitutional views, it did cause a reconsideration of the tariff. 
Jackson led the way by advising a change: “In effecting 
this adjustment, it is due, in justice to the interests of the 
different states, and even to the preservation of the Union 
itself, that the protection afforded by existing laws to any 
branches of the national industry should not exceed what 
may be necessary to counteract the regulations of foreign na¬ 
tions and to secure a supply of those articles of manufacture 
essential to the national independence and safety in time of 
war.” Calhoun resigned from the vice presidency in order 
to be on the floor of the Senate during this vital discussion, 
and South Carolina suspended the date of nullification to 
give Congress a fair chance to repent, and to repeal the bill 
it had just passed. 

Compromise The debate in Congress showed a decided weakening in 
the protectionist forces. This was partly due to natural 
causes, and partly to a general dislike to force to a crisis the 
issue presented by South Carolina. The matter dragged, 
however, and it seemed quite possible that Congress would 
adjourn without action. In the middle of February, urged 
by the seriousness of the situation, Clay conferred with Cal¬ 
houn, and with his approval introduced a bill. With the 
leader of the protectionists and the leader of the opposition 
united in its support this bill was rapidly passed through 
Congress and became a law March 2, 1833. It was essen¬ 
tially the act of 1832 with a slight increase in the duty on 


COMPROMISE TARIFF OF 1833 


207 


woolens. In all cases where the duty exceeded twenty per 
cent, however, one tenth of this excess was to be removed 
every two years until 1840; on January 1, 1842, one half of 
the remaining excess was to be taken off, and on July 1, the 
other half. The result would be, on July 1, 1842, a uniform 
horizontal tariff of twenty per cent as Hayne proposed in 
his resolution. 

While Congress thus offered an olive branch with one The force 
hand, it at the same time condemned nullification by passing, act ‘ 
on March 1, a force bill giving the President powers adequate 
for dealing with the situation. In South Carolina the con¬ 
vention came together again and, declaring itself satisfied 
with the new tariff, withdrew its nullifying resolution, March 
15, 1833. On March 18 it nullified the force bill, a pro¬ 
ceeding quite harmless, as the President now had no occasion 
for acting under it. 

As regards protection, the tariff of 1833 was distinctly Effect of the 
a compromise. Clay claimed that he had really proved him- com P ronus? * 
self the savior of protection, for the new Congress, elected 
in the fall of 1832, would have reduced the tariff very con¬ 
siderably; now, bound by the compromise measure, the 
tariff would remain fairly protective until 1842, and then a 
new bill could be drawn up. Calhoun claimed that by adopt¬ 
ing the compromise measure Congress had bound itself to the 
view that protection was justifiable only as a temporary 
measure; that the time for its abandonment was fixed in 
the bill, and that in the future the tariff would be levied on 
the horizontal basis. The question of the right of nulli¬ 
fication also remained technically open. Calhoun claimed 
that it had proved entirely successful; that by it South Caro¬ 
lina had obtained redress that it could have found in no other 
way. The general impression in the country at large was 
decidedly different. The repudiation of the doctrine by all 
the states that expressed themselves on the subject, and 
particularly the emphatic tone of the President’s proclama- 


208 


JACKSON AND SOUTH CAROLINA 


Sources. 


Historical 

accounts. 


tion, backed up as it was by acts, and supported by the pas¬ 
sage of the force bill, 32 to i in the Senate and no to 40 
in the House, impressed upon all the fact that the Union 
could and would enforce its laws. As a matter of fact 
nullification was not again tried. Politically the nullifica¬ 
tion controversy cleared the situation in many ways, par¬ 
ticularly by showing the difference between the state rights 
views of Jackson, who believed in leaving much public 
business to the control of the states, but who, nevertheless, 
looked upon the Union as permanent; and the position of 
those who by state rights meant that the Union had no 
sovereign powers. The unqualified Union doctrine, set forth 
in Jackson’s proclamation, alarmed many who disapproved 
of South Carolina’s action, but were fearful of a consolidated 
general government. Many conservative southern thinkers 
began to act independently of the Democratic party, which 
its leaders had made so emphatically the party of the Union. 
The crisis caused by the tariff system was thus passed, but 
not without a decided shock to the nation, and permanent 
political results. 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 

American History Leaflets, no. 30. Calhoun, J. C., Works, I, 
1-107 (Disquisition on Government); IV, 164-212 (Speech on the 
Tariff); VI, 1-208 (Papers on Nullification). Congressional De¬ 
bates, 20th Cong., 1 sess., 2382-2406 (Speech of McDuffie on the 
tariff, perhaps the best exposition of South Carolina’s views); 
21st Cong., 1 sess., 43-92 (Speeches of Webster and Hayne, which 
are also to be found in Macdonald, W., Select Documents, nos. 
47-49, S3, 55, and 56; and many other places). For Jackson’s 
Proclamation, see Richardson, Messages, II, 640-666. For doc¬ 
uments see H. V. Ames, State Documents. 

In addition to the general accounts mentioned at the close of 
the last chapter: Holst, von, Calhoun, ch. IV. Houston, D. F., 
Nullification in South Carolina. Lodge, H. C., Webster, chs. VI, 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 


209 


VII. McLaughlin, A. C., Lewis Cass, 139-149. Schafer, W. A., 
Sectionalism and Representation in South Carolina (Am. Hist. 
Assoc., Report, 1900, vol. I), 384-400. Stanwood, E., American 
Tariff Controversies , chs. VIII, IX. Sumner, W. G., A. Jackson, 
ch. VII, ch. VIII, sec. 7. Taussig, F. W., Tariff History, 74- 
112. Turner, F. J., New West, 314-333* 


CHAPTER XIII 


The bam> 
question. 


The currency. 


JACKSON AND THE BANK 

While Jackson and his party emerged from the nulli¬ 
fication struggle distinctly pledged to support the Union, 
they were not committed either for or against a protective 
tariff. In fact the compromise took the tariff out of politics 
for ten years, and political issues had to be sought elsewhere. 
The main issue had already been formulated before the tariff 
compromise had been arranged. Few persons in the older 
states imagined in 1828 that the existence of the National 
Bank would by 1832 become the leading question of party 
division, but it was a question that the frontier was deter¬ 
mined to press, and with the will the frontier had the power. 

A frontier community is always in search of capital, for 
opportunities to expend it are innumerable and accumula¬ 
tion has not yet begun. It was to answer this demand that 
Adams and Clay proposed to have the national government 
undertake internal improvements, and that Jackson wished 
to give to the western states the public land. These plans 
had little practical result until the distribution bill of 1836, 
and western states and individuals were supplying themselves 
as they could by borrowing. Throughout the frontier the 
bulk of the inhabitants were debtors, and the most enter¬ 
prising owed the largest sums; there was a general com¬ 
munity of interest, and a tendency to look at all questions 
from the debtor rather than the creditor point of view. This 
showed itself particularly with regard to the currency. There 
was a demand for an abundant supply of money; there was 
less interest in its stability. The people wanted to get money 

210 


OBJECTIONS TO THE BANK 


211 


easily to pay their debts; they did not feel keenly the neces¬ 
sity of paying in money worth one hundred cents on the 
dollar. The states were forbidden by the Constitution to 
emit bills of credit, and thus the financial expedients resorted 
to differed from those of the Shays’s Rebellion period, though 
the situation was in many respects similar. It was dis¬ 
covered that the states could charter banks, and that these 
banks could emit bills of credit and thus partly satisfy the 
demand. As creditors refused to accept such bills at their 
face value, it was thought desirable to make them legal tender, 
and thus compel their acceptance somewhat as Rhode Is¬ 
land had done in 1786. Kentucky took such action, where¬ 
upon the state supreme court declared the act void on the 
ground that it violated the United States Constitution, which 
prohibits a state from making “anything but gold and silver 
Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts.” This decision was 
at once attacked by the “Relief” party, and in 1825, by a 
vote of 38,000 to 22,000, a legislature was elected pledged 
to erect a new supreme court. The next year saw a reaction, 
and the matter was not forced, but the strength of the de¬ 
mand for an easy currency was made evident. The sup¬ 
porters of state banks, which were thus refused the indorse¬ 
ment which their states were anxious to give them, were 
naturally opposed to the United States Bank, whose notes 
were freely accepted by creditors both public and private. 

They believed that if this giant, privileged corporation, 
were once removed, they would be able to furnish a cur¬ 
rency satisfactory to creditor and debtor alike. They 
disliked the strict and inflexible rules by which its branches 
regulated their relations with the state banks, thus keep¬ 
ing business up to a standard which public opinion believed 
too high. The frontier wished to set its own business 
standards. 

To those who opposed the National Bank as a competitor Tte Bank 
of the state banks were added those who feared it as a great nopoly. 


212 


JACKSON AND THE BANK 


Objections 
banks in 
general. 


corporation and representative of the money power. At first 
it had been as liberal in making loans and in encouraging 
speculation as the better state banks; it extended its credit 
so far, in fact, that it was on the verge of bankruptcy. At 
this time Langdon Cheves had become president and adopted 
a rigorous conservative policy which brought the Bank out 
of its difficulties and enabled it to weather the crisis of 1819; 
but the Bank was saved at the expense of foreclosures that 
ruined hundreds of those who owed it money, and brought 
into its hands immense amounts of general property. Ben¬ 
ton said: “I know towns, yea cities, where this bank already 
appears as an engrossing proprietor.” “All the flourishing 
cities of the West are mortgaged to this money power. They 
may be devoured by it at any moment. They are in the 
jaws of the monster! A lump of butter in the mouth of a 
dog ! One gulp, one swallow, and all is gone.” 
to Jackson, Benton, and others of the western leaders had 
still another ground of opposition. They had seen the evil 
effects of the overissues of paper money during the War of 
1812 and of the contraction by the National Bank in 1819. 
They became doubtful of the value of banks at all, and sus¬ 
picious of all money except hard cash. Jackson in 1829 
wrote to Nicholas Biddle, the new president of the United 
States Bank: “I do not dislike your bank any more than all 
banks, but ever since I read the history of the South Sea 
Bubble I have been afraid of banks.” They feared also 
the influence of banks in politics, and with some reason. 
Up to this time all banks were chartered by special act of a 
state legislature or of Congress, and no legislature would 
think of granting a charter to a bank whose board of directors 
belonged to the party in opposition to the legislative majority. 
Banks were often as closely connected with some party or 
faction as were the newspapers, using their credit to further 
the schemes of their partisans. Jefferson had written to 
Gallatin that it would be advisable to make all banks Re- 


THE BANK AND THE GOVERNMENT 


213 


publican by sharing the national deposits among them. It 
was, therefore, not unnatural to suspect the greatest of all 
banks of being concerned in politics. 

The constitutional question seemed to have been settled 
by the decisions of John Marshall, but, as has been seen in 
the case of the Indians, Jackson did not consider the judg¬ 
ments of the Supreme Court binding on the executive. In 
the letter to Biddle just referred to, Jackson states his con¬ 
stitutional doubts and inclinations. His preferences were 
for a bank belonging entirely to the government and with its 
home in the District of Columbia. He disliked the mingling 
of public and private business as he did of state and national 
functions. He wished all government affairs to be so simple 
that the humblest citizen could understand them; all com¬ 
plexities were obnoxious to his temperament and to the men 
whom he represented. 

Even before Jackson’s election, hostility to the Bank was 
a political asset. In 1827 one Illinois politician wrote to 
another with respect to a third: “The Bank is suing every¬ 
body — several thousand dollars are now in judgment, and 
there is not money to meet the emergency. Many appeals 
are taken, and McLean is the defendant’s lawyer in all the 
bank cases. He takes none for the Bank, nor ever has.” 
“Such are the distresses of the people and his usefulness to 
them as a lawyer that it is difficult to say whether he can be 
excluded from the legislature.” This opposition had found 
its way into national politics, and bills had been introduced 
into Congress for the sale of the government bank stock and 
for reducing the amount of government deposits held by 
the Bank. 

This agitation over the bank question was almost entirely 
confined to the frontier; in the older sections of the country 
the Bank was looked upon as a sound institution, doing its 
work well, and as a satisfactory financial agent of the govern¬ 
ment. There was, therefore, general surprise in the East 


The Bank 
and the 
government. 


Opening of 
the question. 


214 


JACKSON AND THE BANK 


Jackson’s when Jackson referred to the matter in his first annual mes- 

o^the Bank, sage, but there would have been disappointment in the West 
if he had not done so. He called attention to the fact that 
the charter expired in 1836, and that the question of a rechar¬ 
ter would come up. “In order to avoid the evils resulting 
from precipitancy in a measure involving such important 
principles and such deep pecuniary interests, I feel that I 
cannot, in justice to the parties interested, too soon present 
it to a deliberate consideration of the legislature and the 
people. Both the constitutionality and the expediency of 
the law creating this bank are well questioned by a large 
portion of our fellow-citizens; and it must be admitted by 
all that it has failed in the great end of establishing a uniform 
and sound currency.” 

Nichole This message was a great disappointment to Biddle, 

who was on good terms with many of the Jackson leaders, 
particularly with Major Lewis of the “kitchen cabinet,” and 
who had tried to conciliate Jackson by placing many of his 
supporters on the directorates of the branch banks. It 
placed him in an embarrassing position, for he could not tell 
whether to cling to Jackson and rely on overcoming his op¬ 
position by allowing a few changes in the new charter, or 
to fight him and help select a new President who would gen¬ 
uinely support the Bank. The alternative of doing nothing 
and simply awaiting events was impossible for Biddle, who 
was temperamentally a man of action. His dilemma con¬ 
tinued even after the break between Jackson and South 
Carolina, for McDuffie was the leader of the Bank interest 
in the House, while the new Secretary of the Treasury, Mc- 
Lane, was also friendly to the Bank. 

The crisis. The crisis came in the session of 1831-1832. Jackson 

referred to the subject in his message and left it to the judg¬ 
ment of “an enlightened people.” If nothing were done, 
and Jackson were reelected, the Bank would be entirely at his 
mercy. If an appeal were to be taken to the people, the issue 


THE CRISIS 


215 


must be framed in this session of Congress for presentation 
in the fall elections. Many of the leaders of the opposition 
urged Biddle to force the issue, and some insinuated that he 
must take sides if he expected their support. On January 
9, 1832, he applied for a recharter. Certain modifications 
were made in the law with the hope of making it, even now, 
acceptable to Jackson. Before the bill was passed an in¬ 
vestigation was ordered, which proved satisfactory to the 
Bank’s friends, and the bill was passed in the Senate, 28 to 20, 
and in the House 109 to 79. 

It now rested with Jackson to sign the bill or take issue 
with a decided majority in Congress. It required no small 
political courage, on the eve of a presidential election, to 
take a position on a question on which his own party was 
divided, and which he might easily avoid by accepting the 
vote in Congress as the decision of the “enlightened people,” 
to whose judgment he had left the question in December. 
He, however, accepted the issue squarely, vetoing the bill 
in a message which was intended to be the leading political 
document in the next campaign. He was not satisfied with 
the modifications made in the charter. He contended that 
the charter created a monopoly: “The powers, privileges, 
and favors bestowed upon it in the original charter, by in¬ 
creasing the value of the stock above its par value, operated 
as a gratuity of many millions to the stockholders.” The re¬ 
charter would raise the value twenty to thirty per cent more 
and be practically an additional gratuity of at least $7,000,000. 
The whole monopoly he estimated to be worth $17,000,000, 
and it was being sold for an annual payment of $200,000 for 
fifteen years, or $3,000,000 in all. In other respects he 
found that the charter created distinction between the “high 
and the low, the rich and the poor.” He pointed out that 
the bank stock was held almost entirely in the East, the 
South, and in Europe, while nearly half its profits were 
derived from its western business; thus making its divi- 


The new 

charter 

vetoed. 


2 l6 


JACKSON AND THE BANK 


The Anti¬ 
masons. 


The National 
Republicans. 


dends a tax upon western industry. He threw doubt on 
its constitutionality, and hinted at the dangerous political 
influence it might wield. The message skillfully combined 
arguments against a national bank in general with those 
against this bank in particular, and appealed to American 
prejudice against foreigners, western prejudice against the 
East, the distrust of the poor for the rich, and the hatred of 
democracy for privilege. 

Attention was now concentrated on the approaching 
election. The first nomination was made by a new party 
formed upon a special issue. In 1826 a certain William 
Morgan, who had printed a book purporting to reveal the 
secrets of Freemasonry, disappeared, and the rumor grew 
that he had been abducted by the Masons. The Masonic 
order was powerful at this time, not only in America, but in 
other countries, and the Masons belonged generally to the 
wealthier classes of society. It was claimed that they used 
their influence in juries and in legislatures to advance the 
interests of their fellows. Suspicion spread like wildfire through 
the rural districts of New York, Pennsylvania, and New 
England. All secret societies were attacked, and men so 
sane and experienced as John Quincy Adams and Edward 
Everett spent days in discussing whether the Phi Beta Kappa 
should reveal its secrets to the world. This movement was 
taken hold of by a number of very able young political 
leaders, such as Thurlow Weed and William Seward in 
New York, and Thaddeus Stevens in Pennsylvania. They 
made it bulk large in local politics, and with a view to 
improving their position at home, they caused to be held, in 
1830, the first genuine national party convention in Ameri¬ 
can history, and in September, 1831, they met again at 
Baltimore, and selected William Wirt as candidate for the 
presidency. 

In naming a candidate so early, the Antimasons had 
hoped to combine all the opposition to Jackson, but in this 


CAMPAIGN OF 1832 


217 


they were unsuccessful. The great bulk of the opposition 
wished to vote for Henry Clay. He was a natural leader of 
men; he could not move about the country on private busi¬ 
ness without an accompaniment of public dinners and an 
atmosphere of triumph, and in the session of Congress just 
finished he had led the opposition in the Senate. His name 
was formally presented by a National Republican conven¬ 
tion at Baltimore in December, 1831, and also by a national 
assembly of young men at Washington in May, 1832, which 
adopted the first national party platform. 

After the break with Calhoun, it was inevitable that 
Jackson should be the Democratic candidate. To be sure, 
he had declared himself opposed to the reelection of a Presi¬ 
dent, but he believed it should be prevented by constitutional 
amendment; while the people allowed it, he had no scruples 
in accepting it. The Democratic convention was held in 
Baltimore in May, 1832. The only question was with re¬ 
gard to the vice presidency. Jackson desired Van Buren, 
but there was strong opposition to him, on the ground that 
he was a time-serving politician. It was largely with the 
idea of strengthening Van Buren that a national convention 
was held at all. As a result of skillful manipulation, Van 
Buren was chosen, though probably in opposition to the wish 
of the majority of the Democrats of the country. The Demo¬ 
crats of Pennsylvania voted in the election for a candidate of 
their own. 

In the campaign which followed these nominations, the 
main issues were the existence of the National Bank, and 
the defense of the administration. The National Republi¬ 
cans placed first in their program the protective system, but 
that could not be made an issue because so many of the Demo¬ 
crats were protectionists also, and Jackson had just signed 
the tariff of 1832, which was reasonably satisfactory to that 
element. On internal improvements the situation was clearer, 
and the result of the election seems to show that Jackson 


The Demo¬ 
crats. 


The cam¬ 
paign of 1832. 


2 l8 


JACKSON AND THE BANK 


The election. 


lost some few votes because of his opposition to expending 
national money for such purposes. The attitude of the 
administration toward the civil service was much discussed 
but exerted little influence. 

The result of the election was surprising in showing that 
in spite of the new issues before the country, and of the active 
record of the administration, the people voted almost pre¬ 
cisely as they had four years before. Jackson gained about 
40,000 votes; Clay and Wirt, together, about 20,000 as 
compared with Adams in 1828. The changes in the elec¬ 
toral vote were greater, but are easily accounted for. Clay 
naturally gained Kentucky, where his popularity as a favorite 
son was enhanced by his advocacy of internal improvements. 
Jackson gained Maine and New Hampshire rather because 
the Democrats in those states were brought to the polls by 
better organization than because they were more numerous 
than before. He gained in New York because that state 
now chose its electors upon a general ticket rather than by 
districts as it had in 1828, when its vote was divided 20 
to 16. New Jersey had voted for Adams and now voted 
for Jackson, but this was brought about by the change of only 
a few hundred votes. The only significant change was in 
South Carolina. Actual nullification did not take place until 
the election was over, but the break between Calhoun and 
Jackson, and the passage of the tariff of 1832, had effectually 
alienated that state, which cast its vote for John Floyd of 
Virginia. In spite of this opening breach Jackson held all the 
rest of the Cotton South. Gratitude for his Indian policy and 
confidence in the state rights views of a man who ignored John 
Marshall, and who had not yet issued the proclamation in reply 
to nullification, caused Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi 
to vote for Jackson as before. In fact the election showed 
that the people still regarded it as fundamentally important 
to have at Washington a true representative of their ideas, 
and that they regarded Jackson as such a representative. 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 


219 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 

Callender, Economic History, 564-592. Richardson, Messages, 
II, 576-591. Macdonald, Select Documents, nos. 46, 50-52, 
57-68. 

In addition to those given at the close of ch. XI: Catterall, 
R. C. H., Second Bank of the United States, 186-314. Dewey, 
D. R., State Banking before the Civil War, and First and Second 
Banks of the United States. Sumner, E. G., Jackson, ch. VT, 
sec. 9. McCarthy, C., The Antimasonic Party (Am. Hist. Assoc., 
Report, 1902, I, pp. 371-464). 


Sources. 


Historical 

accounts. 


CHAPTER XIV 


JACKSON’S SECOND TERM 

The war on Although Jackson’s reelection was primarily a personal 

the Bank. triumph, he interpreted it as a popular indorsement of all 
his views; from that time he considered himself as the 
true representative of the people and distrusted all their 
other representatives. His first duty was to deal with 
nullification, and his strong and successful handling of 
that question has been already described. With the settle¬ 
ment of that crisis in March, 1833, he resumed with vigor the 
fight with the money power as personified in “Nick” Biddle, 
president of the Bank. It was not to be supposed that so 
powerful an institution would give up the fight for its life as a 
result of the election. It still had four years in which to 
effect its salvation. Jackson genuinely feared that it would 
use in its defense the immense resources at its disposal, and 
he had little confidence in the ability of Congress to re¬ 
sist its arguments. The report of 1832 brought out the fact 
that the question of its loans to members of Congress had 
been dropped, because so many members had been its debtors. 
How far such loans might influence their public action was 
a question which probably not even the members involved 
could have answered, but the practice was obviously danger¬ 
ous. Moreover, the willingness of the Bank to spend money 
in its own behalf was indicated by its distribution of literature 
for use in the campaign of 1832. It was also true that the 
Bank had indulged from time to time in business methods of 
doubtful wisdom. These, however, were not on a scale 
really to endanger its solvency, and while the administra- 


220 


JACKSON AND THE BANK 


221 


tion cited them to strengthen its case and prove that govern¬ 
ment deposits were unsafe, the real motive for its subsequent 
policy seems to have been the political one. 

In this situation Jackson and his advisers were not con¬ 
tent to remain quietly on the defensive. It was decided 
to take the initiative and attack the Bank by removing the 
government deposits. As business was handled, a balance 
of between eight and nine million always remained in the 
Bank. This large sum, upon which the Bank had no interest 
to pay, constituted a most valuable resource. These deposits 
were in the charge of the Secretary of the Treasury, who was, 
in regard to them, so far independent of the President that he 
was required by law to report to the House of Representatives. 
The first necessary step was to secure a Secretary of the 
Treasury favorable to the plan of removal. McLane was 
transferred to the state department, and William J. Duane 
appointed to succeed him at the treasury. On September 
18, 1833, Jackson read to the cabinet a paper stating his in¬ 
tentions and assuming entire responsibility for their execu¬ 
tion. Duane, however, refused to act in accordance with 
Jackson’s desire, or to resign, and was, therefore, removed 
September 23. He was succeeded by Roger B. Taney, 
the Attorney-General, who was an ardent supporter of the 
plan, and at once carried it into execution. Government 
expenses were paid from the deposits already in the Bank, 
but no more government money was deposited there. A 
financial panic followed, which the supporters of the Bank 
attributed to the removal, and the administration to the 
manner in which the Bank contracted its business. 

When the new Congress came together, the bank question at 
once became the leading topic of discussion. The House sus¬ 
tained Taney’s action by a vote of 118 to 103. The Senate, how¬ 
ever, had a strong antiadministration majority, and, powerless 
to take active measures, adopted resolutions condemning the 
removal and accusing the President of having violated the 


Removal of 
the deposits. 


Censure of 
the Senate. 


222 


JACKSON’S SECOND TERM 


The “expung¬ 
ing resolu¬ 
tion.” 


End of the 
second 
Bank of the 
United States. 


Constitution. This vote of censure, Jackson considered to be 
an unwarranted attack on the people’s representative. He 
replied by a “Protest,” in which he defended his action. He 
pointed out that the censure was a judicial act, and that the 
Senate had no right judicially to condemn the President 
unless he were impeached by the House of Representatives; 
he asserted the independence of the executive, and depre¬ 
cated the growing power of the Senate, whose members held 
their offices for a long term, were not elected by the people, 
and were not directly responsible to them. To his mind the 
structure of the government was simple: the legislature made 
laws, the courts decided cases, the President executed the 
Constitution and the laws; each was independent of the others 
and should leave the others entirely alone. Of the three 
branches of government he had come to think that the execu¬ 
tive stood closest to the people, and should, therefore, enjoy 
a certain precedence. 

The Senate refused to place the “Protest” upon its 
minutes, while Benton, the Jackson leader in that body, 
endeavored to have the “Censure” stricken from its records. 
This purely personal aftermath of the bank struggle became 
one of the leading issues in politics for the next two years. 
At length on January 16, 1837, the administration having 
secured a majority in the Senate, Benton succeeded in passing 
his “ expunging resolution ” by a vote of 24 to 16 — at a time 
when Jackson was suffering from the removal of a bullet fired 
at him by Benton’s brother in one of the shooting affrays of 
their youth. 

Though its national charter expired in 1836 and its 
connection with the national government was at an end, the 
United States Bank secured a local charter in Pennsylvania, 
and strove to maintain its leading financial position. Its 
new charter, however, cost much money; its business methods 
grew more unsound; and finally, in 1841, it failed, and Jack¬ 
son’s victory was complete. 


PET BANKS 


223 


With the withdrawal of the deposits from the Bank of 
the United States, it was necessary for the government to 
devise some other method of handling public moneys. It 
was not attempted to do the government business on a smaller 
margin of deposits; in fact the public debt was fully paid, 
January 1, 1835, and from that time the deposits grew 
constantly greater. On January 1, 1836, they amounted to 
$25,000,000 ; on June 1, of the same year, to $41,500,000. 
These deposits were divided among certain banks selected 
by the Secretary of the Treasury. In making this division 
the attempt was to distribute the money equally throughout 
the country rather than concentrate it in the financial 
centers; population rather than business necessity was con¬ 
sidered. In deciding among the banks of any locality, the 
considerations were very largely political; in fact in many 
places adherents of Jackson were encouraged to found banks 
for the express purpose of receiving such deposits. The 
administration had it in mind to use its influence as a check 
upon these banks, but its attempts in this direction were 
ineffective; and the overthrow of the National Bank meant 
really the turning over of the great question of banking and 
currency to the states. The different sections of the country 
were so far apart in their ideas on these subjects that a 
national policy could not be other than unpopular. 

State control meant practically no control throughout the 
frontier region. The banks receiving government deposits 
looked upon them as a permanent loan without interest, and 
increased their business accordingly. They enlarged their 
issues of currency far beyond the limits of safety, and loaned 
it on easy terms. 

At length the frontier business community had obtained 
what it had long desired, easy credit; any merchant could 
secure money on almost any security. Men undertook enter¬ 
prises far beyond their resources or the demands of the com¬ 
munity. Particularly speculation in land was carried to an 


“Pet 

banks.” 


Speculation. 


224 


JACKSON’S SECOND TERM 


Distribution 
of the sur¬ 
plus. 


extreme. Town sites were purchased; elaborate plats were 
prepared, showing streets and public buildings, where in fact 
the muskrat was the only inhabitant; swampy creeks were 
magnified into streams which would furnish water power 
for factories yet unthought of; and steamboats were pictured 
as sailing through channels which a hunter’s canoe could 
not have navigated. Seven such cities were projected within 
ten miles of Madison, Wisconsin, and town lots sold before 
there was a single hut in any one of them. The average 
annual sales of public lands for the ten years before 1835 
amounted to $2,363,004; for the ten years after 1836, to 
$3,534 , i 7 i ; these figures would seem to represent the normal 
amount of land needed by the increasing population. In 
1835 the sales amounted to $11,990,515.75, and in 1836 to 
$24,877,179.86. Such purchases were almost purely specu¬ 
lative; they discounted the advance in land values for many 
years to come. 

The immediate effect of these land sales was to increase the 
income of the government to an unprecedented amount; 
in 1834 it was $21,800,000, in 1836 it was $50,800,000. This 
increase of revenue coming just after the payment of the public 
debt, and at a time when the compromise of 1833 prevented a 
reduction of the tariff, caused both parties to unite in the 
passage of the bill for the distribution of the surplus, already 
noted. It was expected that this surplus available for 
distribution would amount to $40,000,000, and in the three 
quarters of a year during which the act was in force, $28,000,- 
000 was actually given over to the states. This distribution 
of the surplus stimulated in many ways the era of specu¬ 
lation begun by the distribution of deposits and overthrow 
of the Bank. The states counted upon the surplus as 
permanent, and some, hoping to increase their share, founded 
state banks, for which the money they received served as 
capital, and which issued more paper currency, thereby 
increasing the plethora of money, the ease of securing credit, 


THE SPECIE CIRCULAR 


225 


and the temptation to speculate. The states themselves set 
the example, for while some of them used their new resources 
as a school fund, the greater number planned internal im¬ 
provements on such a scale that their share of the surplus 
would hardly pay the annual interest charge. Ohio, Indiana, 
and Illinois began an elaborate system of canals, and the 
country seemed at length destined to be provided with trans¬ 
portation facilities at public expense. 

While land speculation in the West was the controlling 
factor in the situation, the fever spread everywhere and to 
everything. All kinds of new undertakings were entered 
upon, real estate rose to figures which in some places it did 
not touch again for over sixty years, fortunes were made, and 
extravagance of living increased with every year. The 
nouveaux riches , with their European silks, wines, and carriages, 
began to set the tone of society, and the dignified aristocracy 
of the colonial type began to lose its control of the world of 
fashion, as it had, in 1829, of politics. European imports 
increased, and, paper money supplying domestic needs, great 
quantities of gold and silver were shipped out of the country. 

The country was rapidly increasing in real wealth, popula¬ 
tion was pushing westward and creating land values with 
unprecedented rapidity; but the people were attempting to 
realize on them more rapidly than they were created by 
means of credit currency. The danger of the situation was 
very generally recognized, but there were differences as to the 
remedy. Few statesmen venture to put a check upon pros¬ 
perity. Jackson, however, saw a simple remedy for the 
evil, and he applied it with the same courage he had pre¬ 
viously shown. In 1835 and 1836 Benton tried to have 
Congress adopt a bullionist policy, and vote to accept nothing 
but gold and silver in payment for public lands. This 
policy he pressed with such characteristic energy that he ac¬ 
quired the nickname of “Old Bullion.” Congress, however, 
refused to accept the principle, and finally, on July 11, 1836, 


Extrava¬ 

gance. 


The Specie 
Circular. 


226 


JACKSON’S SECOND TERM 


Jackson took action on his own authority. His experience 
with paper money had made him, like Benton, suspicious of 
it; he was anxious to get rid of it altogether, at least in the 
transaction of government business. Consequently he is¬ 
sued what is known as the “Specie Circular,” ordering that 
only gold and silver be received for the public land. Congress, 
by a majority of 41 to 5 in the Senate and 143 to 59 in 
the House, voted to reverse this policy, but a pocket veto 
maintained it. 

Before the tide of prosperity had begun to ebb, the elec¬ 
tion of 1836 approached, and Jackson looked once more for 
vindication of his policy; not in his own reelection, but in 
that of his chosen successor Van Buren. In every direction 
Diplomacy, he had been victorious. Even in diplomacy, the particular 
field of his rival John Quincy Adams, he had won victories of 
moment. Diplomatic questions were not so vital to the 
national existence as they had been before 1815. It was 
only now and then that some episode attracted the public 
attention. The first of these was the question of the trade 
with the British West Indies. Under Adams that trade 
had been brought to an end by the unwillingness of either 
the United States or England to make necessary concessions. 
Van Buren, in 1829, notified the British government that a 
new administration had come into power, which would nego¬ 
tiate on a new basis. Thus to refer to politics in a diplomatic 
dispatch was unusual, and gave his opponents in the Sen¬ 
ate an excuse for rejecting his nomination as minister to 
England in 1831. Yet, improper though his method may 
have been, it was successful. England reopened negoti¬ 
ation, a compromise was agreed upon, and this valuable 
trade was reestablished. The policy of mutual concession 
which marked the settlement of this dispute was characteris¬ 
tic of the commercial policy of the Jackson administration 
throughout, and that of Van Buren which succeeded. Treaties 
were made with some of the South American powers, on 


FOREIGN RELATIONS 


227 


terms more liberal than those offered by Adams. In 1831 a 
reciprocity treaty was made with France which benefited Reciprocity, 
the cotton trade. Moreover, throughout this period the 
greatest international publicist that America has produced, 

Henry Wheaton, was working for reciprocity of customs dues 
and legal regulations with the countries of the Baltic. The 
taxes on emigration levied by the German states were 
abolished, and a number of treaties of commercial reciprocity 
were made, culminating in that with the Zollverein in 1844, 
which was rejected by the Whigs. Treaties with Siam and 
Muscat for the first time put the country into direct rela¬ 
tions with the nations of the East. While an extensive trade 
had been carried on with China and India, the only previous 
treaty protection had been that afforded for a time by the 
Jay treaty with England. 

A more sensational incident resulted from the purpose Indemnities, 
of the government to collect, from various foreign nations, 
damages for injuries sustained by our merchants during 
the Napoleonic wars. In 1831 a very satisfactory treaty 
was framed with France, but difficulty soon arose, as the 
French Assembly was unwilling to pay the obligations the 
French government had assumed. Jackson referred to the 
matter in his regular message to Congress in language that 
the French press regarded as insulting; and a demand for 
war rang through France. The French Assembly finally 
voted to pay the money if a proper explanation or apology 
was made for the language contained in the President’s 
message, while the American government stated that a presi¬ 
dential message was a purely domestic document which 
could not form a proper subject of diplomatic negotiations. 

Ministers were withdrawn from the respective capitals, and 
the situation became extremely acute. This question during 
1835 attracted the attention of the country. Jackson in¬ 
sisted on the payment of the indemnity, and was supported 
by the House of Representatives under the lead of John 


228 


JACKSON’S SECOND TERM 


Texas. 


Quincy Adams, now chairman of the committee on foreign 
affairs. In the Senate Clay brought in a more conciliatory 
report and prevented any action hostile to France. Before 
Congress met again France had yielded, accepting, as suffi¬ 
cient explanation of the President’s language, a later message 
of Jackson, in which he stated that he had never intended 
to threaten her. The success of the United States in this 
episode was felt to strengthen its position abroad. At home 
the credit for the solution was claimed alike by the friends 
of Adams, Clay, and Jackson, but the majority of the people, 
as in the case of nullification, gave it to Jackson. While 
this was the most important of the treaties securing damages, 
several others were made, and practically all American claims 
against foreign countries were liquidated. 

The most important question of diplomacy, and the one 
which might be expected chiefly to interest the administra¬ 
tion, was that concerning Texas. The treaty of 1819, by 
which our western boundary was fixed at the Sabine River, 
was not regarded as final by many persons in the United 
States. No sooner had Adams become President than he 
began to negotiate for the purchase of the territory beyond, 
if possible as far as the Rio Grande. He pointed out to 
the Mexican government that this region, in which there 
were only a few thousand Mexicans, was rapidly being 
occupied by settlers from the United States, alien to the 
Mexicans in language and customs and apt to prove a dis¬ 
turbing factor. The Mexicans refused to sell, and adopted 
active but ineffectual measures to prevent the Americaniza¬ 
tion of Texas. Under Jackson the negotiation was reopened 
and might have succeeded had he not absolutely refused to 
bribe the Mexican authorities. In the meantime the proph¬ 
ecy of Adams came true more quickly perhaps than he 
had expected. Americans, adventurous frontiersmen and 
cotton planters with their slaves, were pouring into this 
district where rich land could be bought for twelve and a 


TEXAS 


229 


half cents per acre, while in the United States the minimum 
price was $1.25. Although they took the oath of fidelity 
to the Mexican government, the majority were unwilling to 
allow its interference, and at the first indication that its author¬ 
ity would be exercised, resisted. In 1832 there was a revolt, 
and in 1835 a revolution which established the Republic 
of Texas and a government entirely American. The next 
year Santa Anna, the Mexican president, swept through 
the country with fire and sword, driving before him the 
Americans under General Sam Houston, a friend of Jackson. 
Throughout the United States the war fever took hold of Question of 
the people, and thousands made their way to Texas, attracted neutrallty * 
by sympathy and by the unparalleled liberality of the land 
offers made by the new republic to those who would come to 
its assistance. The aid thus afforded Texas by American 
citizens gave Mexico a just ground for complaint, but the 
administration was not seriously at fault, as the neutrality 
laws were somewhat ambiguous and the overwhelming 
pro-Texan sentiment would have rendered a strict interpre¬ 
tation of neutrality impossible unless supported by force. 

The government was more directly involved by its 
order to General Gaines, in case of certain possible Indian 
hostilities, to cross the Sabine and occupy Nacogdoches, a 
position of great strategic importance in Mexican territory. 

It was believed by many that this movement was really 
intended to assist the Texans, and the Mexican minister at 
Washington withdrew in consequence of it. In fact, how¬ 
ever, Gaines did not cross the Sabine, although encamped 
near its banks, until after Houston, by his victory over 
Santa Anna at San Jacinto on April 21, 1836, had practi¬ 
cally assured Texan independence without his assistance. 

The Texan question now began to assume a certain Question of 
political importance in the United States. Jackson’s oppo¬ 
nents accused the administration of being responsible for the 
revolution, and of intending to annex Texas to the United 


230 


JACKSON’S SECOND TERM 


Democratic 
Convention 
of 1836. 


States. The first point to be decided was whether the new 
republic should be recognized. Jackson left this to the dis¬ 
cretion of Congress, but advised postponement. The Senate 
voted recognition, and money was appropriated for the 
establishment of diplomatic relations. The day before he 
retired, March 3, 1837, Jackson nominated a charge d'affaires 
to Texas. Recognition was thus granted, but on annexation 
the administration would not commit itself. Its policy, how¬ 
ever, was said to be foreshadowed by a message which 
Jackson sent to Congress in February, 1837. In this he 
called attention to the extensive claims of American citizens 
against Mexico and asked authority to use the navy to 
assist in collecting them. It was suspected that it was his 
intention to press these claims and thereby force Mexico to 
recognize the independence of Texas or to sell it to the United 
States. In either case annexation would result. Whether 
this motive predominated or whether the message marked 
merely a continuation of the policy to collect American claims 
against all nations, the evidence at present available will 
not determine, for the carrying out of the policy was left 
over to the Van Buren administration. 

Preparations for the presidential election had begun 
unusually early. The Democratic convention was held in 
May, 1836, at Baltimore, the favorite meeting place for con¬ 
ventions at this period. That city could be most easily 
reached from north, south, and west, and the political com¬ 
plexion of Maryland was extremely doubtful, so that it was 
advisable to arouse there the enthusiasm excited by these 
great national gatherings. Van Buren was nominated 
for the presidency rather as the choice of Jackson than of the 
party; and Colonel Richard M. Johnson, the amiable re¬ 
puted slayer of Tecumseh, was selected for the vice presidency. 
No platform was adopted, but the party principles were well 
enough understood. In fact the campaign that followed 
was more clearly a contest of issues than any since 1800. 


ELECTION OF 1836 


231 


In 1828 and 1832 Jackson and Democracy had overshadowed 
any particular issue. In 1836, with a candidate lacking in 
magnetism and distinctly unpopular in many parts of the 
country, the attitude of the party toward particular public 
questions was of more moment, and thanks to Jackson’s de¬ 
cisive action that policy w r as explicit on nearly every point. 
The Democratic party stood for leaving all questions possible 
to the states and therefore against internal improvements 
and a national bank; it stood nevertheless for the preserva¬ 
tion of the Union at any cost and for the active use of the 
national power to extend commercial relations and to pro¬ 
tect American property; the tariff was not an issue. On 
finance the administration stood for hard money, though the 
bulk of the party were as yet in favor of paper. 

The opposition did not call a national convention, partly 
because that system of party government was still opposed 
by many of Jackson’s opponents, and partly because the 
elements objecting to Van Buren were not ready to cooperate 
among themselves. The great bulk of the opposition con¬ 
sisted of men who in 1828 and 1832 had supported Adams 
and Clay, respectively, and who were generally known as 
National Republicans. They now had the advantage of 
personality in appealing to the frontier, as their candidate 
was William Henry Harrison, victor at Tippecanoe and at 
the Thames and author of the land law of 1800. In 1828 
Jackson had carried all the ten frontier states, receiving 
240,000 to 130,000 popular votes. In 1832 the states divided 
nine to one and the vote stood 225,000 to 145,000. In 1836 
there were twelve frontier states, Arkansas having been ad¬ 
mitted in 1836 and Michigan being in the process of admis¬ 
sion. Five of these voted for the opposition, and Van Buren 
received only 285,000 votes to 300,000. In pleasing the fron¬ 
tier the National Republicans somewhat displeased the East, 
and in Massachusetts Daniel Webster ran instead of Harrison 
and received the vote of that state. In Pennsylvania and 


The Demo¬ 
cratic plat¬ 
form. 


Harrison and 
Webster. 


232 


JACKSON’S SECOND TERM 


Southern 

Whigs. 


some other states the Antimasons joined with the National 
Republicans, giving them a strength in the rural districts 
they had never had before. All together Harrison and Webster 
received in the northern states a popular vote decidedly 
larger than that cast in 1832 for Clay and Wirt, gaining, as 
compared with them, New Jersey, Ohio, Indiana, and part of 
Maryland, and losing only Rhode Island and Connecticut. 

The opposition to Van Buren was not confined to the 
supporters of Harrison and Webster. In nine of the eleven 
states south of the Potomac, the opposition candidate 
was Judge White of Tennessee. In these states, in 1832, 
Clay had received 20,000 votes; Judge White received 
145,000, carrying Georgia and Tennessee. This represented a 
new falling away from the Democratic party. This element 
consisted of men who, first one and then another, had 
ceased, between 1832 and 1836, to support Jackson. Some 
had left because they considered that his proclamation on 
nullification contained sentiments inimical to the rights 
of the states. Among these was John Tyler and a large 
faction of the pure Jeffersonian democracy. Others of the 
same element abandoned Jackson after the removal of the 
deposits and other acts of executive power, claiming that 
the President was preparing the way for a despotism by the 
executive. Many of the wealthier planters were alarmed at 
the financial aspects of the attack on the Bank, and were 
equally opposed to the bullionist policy of Benton. They 
desired a credit currency on a sound basis. Many, while 
uneasy at these things, had supported Jackson, confident in 
his personal honesty of purpose, but they left the party now 
that Van Buren took his place. In general these southern ad¬ 
herents of Judge White belonged to the more conservative and 
wealthier classes; they regarded themselves as the custodians 
of the pure traditions of the past, and they breathed with 
relief when they shook themselves free from the party contami¬ 
nated by the spoils system and political organization. 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 


233 


Still a third element of opposition were the nullifiers of 
South Carolina, who rejected Van Buren and would not 
accept Judge White, and so again threw away the vote of 
the state, this time on Willie P. Mangum of North Carolina. 

That Van Buren was successful, although by the narrow 
margin of 25,000 in the popular vote and 46 in the electoral 
college, 1 was a strong testimonial to the popularity of Demo¬ 
cratic doctrines, and a final gratification to Jackson, who could 
now retire with the consciousness of having completely 
triumphed over his enemies. Nor had his successes been 
due to a temporizing or passive policy. He had boldly 
grappled with the real problems before the country; he had 
applied to each such remedy as to his simple practical 
mind seemed likely to be efficacious, and had worked for its 
application, often against the advice of his closest friends and 
in the face of the overwhelming opposition of the people’s 
representatives in Congress; and in every case, even to his 
personal vindication by the expunging resolution, his judg¬ 
ment had finally been indorsed by the people. He retired 
triumphant, leaving in his place a man of his own choice, 
who gave, as his highest qualification for the office, the fact 
that he was the representative of Jackson’s policies, and 
whose retention of Jackson’s cabinet was an earnest of his 
intentions. 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 

The references given at the close of the last three chapters con¬ 
tinue to be of use. In addition, the following historical accounts 
are of value: Foster, J. W., A Century of American Diplomacy , 
272-280. Roosevelt, T., Benton, ch. VII. Shepard, E. M., Van 
Buren , ch. VII. 

^ne state, Virginia, which voted for Van Buren for President, refused to 
vote for Johnson for Vice President. As a result, no one received a majority of 
the electoral votes for Vice President, and Johnson was elected to this office by 
the Senate. 


South 

Carolina. 


Results. 


CHAPTER XV 


The crisis of 

1837. 


Proposed 

remedies. 


THE VAN BUREN ADMINISTRATION 

Scarcely had Jackson withdrawn to the “Hermitage,” 
his country home in Tennessee, and left the government in 
the hands of his lieutenants, when prosperity, which had been 
at high-water mark throughout his administration, ebbed 
like the tide in the Bay of Fundy. From one end of the 
country to the other disaster spread: prices dropped, demand 
for commodities declined, banks closed their doors, and 
mills shut down. The crisis of 1819 had not been so acute, 
nor was that of 1873 s0 extensive. A great amount of specie 
had, before the year 1837, been driven from the country by the 
abundance of paper money. With the first halt in prosperity 
the banks were forced to suspend specie payment, and there¬ 
upon the value of their paper money fell. The majority of 
the business men of the country were engaged in under¬ 
takings far beyond their resources; with the disturbance of 
credit they went into bankruptcy, or were hopelessly in¬ 
volved where bankruptcy was not an authorized procedure. 
Everywhere was financial ruin, and this was often accompanied 
by actual personal distress, particularly in the manufactur¬ 
ing regions. Petitions poured in, asking the administration 
to come to the relief of the country; riots seemed to threaten 
the maintenance of order, and Van Buren so far yielded to 
the popular unrest as to call an extra session of Congress for 
September. 

When Congress met, the leaders of the opposition naturally 
united in laying the blame for the crisis upon the shoulders 
of the Democratic party. Clay believed that the failure to 

234 


THE ADMINISTRATION POLICY 


235 


recharter the United States Bank, the disturbance caused by 
the removal of the deposits, and the Specie Circular had been 
responsible; that the remedy should be the immediate re¬ 
establishment of the Bank. Van Buren found the cause of 
the crisis, not in the policy of the national government, but 
in that of the states. He pointed out that banking capital 
had been allowed to increase between 1834 and 1836 from 
$200,000,000 to $251,000,000, bank notes in circulation from 
$95,000,000 to $140,000,000, and loans and discounts from 
$324,000,000 to $457,000,000, and that states, banks, and 
merchants were heavily indebted to Europe; that this un¬ 
usual and unsound distention of credit had but brought its 
natural result. Calhoun so strongly espoused this view that 
he broke with the opposition, with whom he had been co¬ 
operating since the compromise of 1833, ar *d gave fairly con¬ 
sistent support to the administration. He looked upon the 
Specie Circular as a wise measure, because it pricked the bubble 
of inflation and brought land speculation down to the basis 
of real values. There is little doubt now that the crisis of 
1837 was a natural economic reaction from the fever of specu¬ 
lation that preceded. The Specie Circular may have hastened 
the disaster, by exhibiting the deficiency of real capital, 
but it could not have been long delayed, as a similar crisis 
was taking place in Europe; if the American government 
had not made its call for gold and thereby revealed the bar¬ 
renness of the banks, the European bankers would soon 
have done so. If a well-established national bank had been 
in existence, to exercise a wise regulative influence, it might 
have rendered the crisis less severe, but it is difficult to see 
how the establishment of a bank in 1837 could have much 
relieved the situation. 

The administration policy was dictated by a portion of 
the party, and was based upon Van Buren’s analysis of the 
causes of the crisis. The carnival of paper money had added 
many adherents to the bullionist element, represented by 


Administra¬ 
tion policy 


236 


THE VAN BUREN ADMINISTRATION 


Benton and Jackson. This faction was particularly strength¬ 
ened by a local movement in New York. Here a portion of 
the party had revolted against the dominant Albany Re¬ 
gency, claiming that this clique was becoming as much of an 
aristocracy as that of the Federalists before them; that it 
was time for a new distribution of the spoils. This revolt¬ 
ing faction, from an episode of their campaign, acquired the 
name of “Loco-Focos.” Just before the election of 1836 
they were reunited with the party. Their most important 
political belief was the fallibility of all credit currency and the 
unique efficacy of hard money—gold and silver. In their 
fusion with the party they carried this idea with them, and 
the President became the advocate of this their leading prin¬ 
ciple. It was not, therefore, without justice that the name 
Loco-Focos came to be applied to the whole Democratic 
party, although it was so used by their opponents chiefly 
to recall certain socialistic ideas of the faction, which tended 
to discredit it in the eyes of the conservative. 
plan treaSUry With this backing, Van Buren boldly supported the 
Specie Circular, and in fact extended it to receipts for the 
postal service. He recommended that Congress adopt, as 
a permanent policy, the requirement that all receipts of the 
government be in gold and silver. The newer portion of his 
scheme related to the care and disbursement of this money 
when once collected. He pointed out that two methods 
had been employed by the government in the past: one, 
the use of a national bank from 1791 to 1811 and from 1816 
to 1836; the other, the use of state banks. Both of these 
plans, he thought, had proved unsatisfactory. He recom¬ 
mended, therefore, that the government take care of its own 
money by the establishment of branches of the treasury in 
cities where the major portion of its business was conducted. 
The receiving officers would be responsible until they placed 
it in these subtreasuries, and payments would be made out 
of the money thus collected and stored. By the administra- 


THE STATES AND BANKING 


2 37 


tion this plan was called the “Independent Treasury”; by the 
opposition the “Divorce Bill,” because its object was to 
divorce public and private business. John Quincy Adams 
wrote: “A Divorce of Bank and State ! Why, a divorce of 
Trade and Shipping would be as wise to carry on the business 
of a merchant. A Divorce of Army and Fire-Arms, in the face 
of an invading enemy, a divorce of Law and a Bench of 
Judges to carry into execution the Statutes of the Land, 
would be as reasonable ! ” 

Every step in the policy of the administration was con- Legislation, 
tested in debates which seemed to bring to a head the accumu¬ 
lated bitterness of the decade. Even the obviously prudent 
proposal that the fourth installment of the surplus which had 
not yet been paid to the states be withheld, now that the 
government was confronted with an actual deficit, was op¬ 
posed by Clay and a majority of his supporters. Never¬ 
theless, it was passed. The Independent Treasury Bill was 
defeated by a combination of the regular opposition and a 
number of Democrats calling themselves “Conservatives.” 

The succeeding Congress contained a still narrower Demo¬ 
cratic majority, but it was better united, and with the power¬ 
ful assistance of Calhoun the Subtreasury Bill was at length 
passed in 1840, with the addition that after June 30, 1843, 
nothing but gold and silver should be received or paid out 
by the United States. National business was separated from 
private business, and national politics from all questions of 
the currency, as completely as it was within the power of 
the government to do it. 

This complete withdrawal of the national government The states 
left the states even more independent in their regulation of and banking ’ 
banking than they were while the state banks held the national 
deposits, and were, therefore, held to some form of national 
supervision. To this entire freedom from national control 
was added the sanction of the Supreme Court. In 1835 
Judge Marshall had died. He was succeeded by Roger B. 


238 


THE VAN BUREN ADMINISTRATION 


Taney, who was to hold the chief justiceship until 1864. The 
Court was now in sympathy with the dominant Democratic 
attitude, as five of the seven judges were of Jackson’s appoint¬ 
ment. In 1837, in the case of Briscoe v. The Bank of 
Kentucky , the court confirmed the power of the state to es¬ 
tablish banks endowed with the power to issue paper cur¬ 
rency, though the Constitution forbade the states themselves 
to “emit bills of credit.” Though they could not declare 
such currency legal tender, practically a period of complete 
state independence in financial matters followed, lasting 
until the Civil War. 

Panic of This freedom the states in the different sections pro¬ 

ceeded to use in accordance with their several views. In 
some of those of the frontier it was felt that the remedy for 
their financial distress lay in more banks and more currency. 
Mississippi chartered in 1838 a new $15,000,000 bank. Its 
capital was subscribed in real estate mortgages, and as it 
was not easy to raise money on these directly, the state gave 
its security and agreed to raise the necessary specie. This 
general scheme, though with varying details, was very gener¬ 
ally employed in the newer states, and it recalls the land-bank 
projects of the seventeenth century in England, and of the 
eighteenth in Massachusetts; it marked a primitive stage of 
financial development. The hard times proved to be more 
lasting than these frontier financiers anticipated. Although 
many banks which had not definitely failed resumed specie 
payments in 1838, the next year saw them suspend again, and 
many of them gave up the struggle between February, 1841, 
and April, 1842, when eighty-one banks, with $98,500,000 
capital, became insolvent. Exhausted and discouraged by 

Repudiation five years of suffering, Mississippi in 1842 repudiated the 

debts te debt incurred in behalf of the bank of 1838. Easy is the way 

that leadeth to destruction, and in 1848 the state’s obli¬ 
gations in behalf of the older Planters Bank were also denied. 
In 1840 the territory of Florida began its descent of the same 


THE STATES AND BANKING 


239 


road, and in 1842 Michigan repudiated, in part, certain bonds 
issued in behalf of internal improvements. In each of these 
cases the state set forth certain technicalities to justify its 
action; but, protected by their sovereign character as states 
(for Florida became a state in 1845) and by the Eleventh 
Amendment of the Constitution, they all steadily refused to 
allow a judicial review of their action. 

While most states manfully stood by their obligations, 
though it meant deferred projects of public works and heavy 
taxes, and though strong parties in the repudiating states 
struggled for many years to secure a reversal of their deci¬ 
sion, American finance in general was discredited in Europe, 
and for many years the stream of European capital seeking 
investment in America, which had been an important factor 
in the prosperity of the thirties, was diminished. George 
Ticknor, a Federalist, a conservative, and a capitalist, wrote 
in 1843: “What Prince Metternich once said to me, in re¬ 
proach of our democratic institutions, is entirely true: we 
must first suffer from an evil before we can apply the remedy; 
we have no preventive legislation on such subjects,” but he 
went on to point out that a remedy thus applied is all the 
more apt to be effective. After the hard lesson of the period 
between 1837 and 1842, the excesses of frontier banking be¬ 
came more and more restricted, and while opinions still 
varied from opposition to all banks to a belief that any kind 
of bank could solve’ all economic difficulties, public senti¬ 
ment grew continually more sound. Between 1842 and i860 
the increase in banking capital and currency issues was more 
moderate, and the amount of actual business done grew to 
have a safer proportion to the two. The panic of 1841, 
moreover, had a marked political effect. Before this 
time the states had been able to borrow at better terms than 
individuals and companies. There was, therefore, a constant 
effort to secure state credit for all kinds of enterprises. With 
this blow to state credit, the tendency to link public credit 


Loss of credit 
in Europe. 


Banking 

reform. 


240 


THE VAN BUREN ADMINISTRATION 


Free banking 
anti reserves. 


The civil 
service. 


and private initiative was checked. The era of the private 
corporation was at hand. That this change took place just 
when railroad construction was beginning, was of profound 
significance in determining the character of our economic 
institutions. 

While the frontier was learning its lesson, the older states 
were devising permanent safeguards against a recurrence 
of banking evils. Massachusetts for a long time had had a 
sound system of banking, but it was in New York, which was 
rapidly becoming the leading state financially, that success¬ 
ful legislation was first evolved. In 1829 a safety fund had 
been established by law. Every bank chartered was re¬ 
quired to pay into the state treasury a certain percentage 
of its capital, which was to be used to pay the liabilities of 
any that might fail. This fund proved too small and did 
not prevent disasters in 1837. In 1839 a better system was 
adopted. Every bank was required to deposit securities 
with the state, equal in value to the bank notes that it issued. 
This furnished a bank-note currency which was safe against 
all ordinary business disasters. Another equally important 
part of the plan was the provision that bank charters be not 
granted as heretofore specially by the legislature, but that 
any group of persons, producing the requisite amount of 
capital, and willing to accede to the other requirements of 
the state law, could demand a charter. This “free banking” 
system tended to take banking out of politics and place it on 
a purely business basis. Banking ceased to be a monopoly, 
and the law of supply and demand would in the end regulate 
the amount of capital invested and the amount of currency 
issued. Time proved the efficacy of these provisions, but 
only eleven states copied them before the Civil War. 

It was a discouraging task to administer the government 
during the lean years from 1837 to 1841. Receipts from land 
sales dropped like magic; the customs revenues not only fell, 
but were vacillating. In the first year of the administration 


THE CIVIL SERVICE 


241 


they amounted to only $11,000,000; the next year, with 
the temporary revival of business, they almost doubled, only 
to fall again the year after. In order to meet the expenses 
of government it was necessary to run in debt to the amount 
of $34,000,000, for which treasury notes were issued. 

Every year saw a deficit. Still more discouraging was the 
utter demoralization of the civil service. Nearly all the 
government land officers had used public funds in their pos¬ 
session for the purposes of speculation. When the panic 
came, the value of their holdings fell, and they found them¬ 
selves unable to pay. It was estimated in 1837 that sixty- 
four out of sixty-seven land officers were defaulters. Few 
of these men were intentional rogues; they fully expected 
to pay back the money that they used, and the financial sense 
of their frontier communities did not condemn their action, 
but pitied their misfortunes. Treasury agents stated that it 
would be impossible to find a different class of men to appoint 
to office, and in many cases advised their retention. Prob¬ 
ably this lenient policy reduced the government losses to 
a minimum, but fully $750,000 was never recovered, and the 
opposition naturally attacked a policy which seemed to pal¬ 
liate the offense of using public funds in private speculation. 

Still more serious was the condition of the customs serv- Corruption, 
ice. The collectorship of the customs in New York city 
was one of the most important political positions in the coun¬ 
try, for the number of subordinates, and the assessments that 
they paid made the collector almost dictator in the city 
caucuses. This position had been held under Jackson by 
Samuel Swartwout, who had been appointed almost purely 
because of personal friendship and in opposition to the wishes 
of Van Buren. The latter naturally failed to reappoint 
him, and upon his leaving office, an examination of his 
accounts showed a defalcation of about $1,250,000. This 
would not have seriously reflected on Van Buren’s admin¬ 
istration, but he appointed as Swartwout’s successor, Jesse 


242 


THE VAN BUREN ADMINISTRATION 


The 

Seminoles. 


Van Buren 
and Texas. 


Hoyt, whose conduct of the office was also marked by 
amazing irregularities. Here in New York the losses were 
more clearly attributable, than in the land office, to the 
careless supervision of the government and to the demoral¬ 
ization introduced by the spoils system. The main interest 
was centered on politics, and maladministration followed as 
a natural result. These New York defalcations were clearly 
not the result of misguided ignorance; they were thefts pure 
and simple. 

In still other ways Van Buren reaped the chaff of policies 
from which Jackson had threshed the wheat. The Indian 
removals were now complete excepting the Seminoles of 
Florida. These Indians, taking refuge in the swamps of the 
Everglades, resisted all the attempts of the government to 
execute the treaty for the sale of their lands which they now 
repented of having made. They harassed the settlers with 
raids and outrages, until the latter persuaded General Jesup 
to seize the Indian leader Osceola treacherously, by inviting 
him to a conference under a flag of truce. This act failed to 
close the war, which dragged on until 1842, involved the ex¬ 
penditure of $40,000,000, and exposed the administration to 
bitter attack, particularly in the North. It was alleged that 
the Seminole land was not needed for settlement, and that the 
real object of the war was the recovery of negro slaves who 
had taken refuge with the Indians. 

In diplomacy, also, Van Buren was unlucky. Upon 
him fell the responsibility of determining the policy with 
reference to the new republic of Texas, whose recognition as 
an independent nation w r as Jackson’s last official act. The 
first Texas official representatives brought a request for an¬ 
nexation, which was also desired by a great number of people 
in the United States. By this time, however, the question 
had become so much involved with that of slavery that a 
discussion of the question seemed likely to plunge the country 
into an agitation as distracting as that over the admission of 


VAN BUREN’S DIPLOMACY 


243 


Missouri. Van Buren prevented such a crisis by refusing to 
treat for annexation, thereby angering a powerful element of 
his southern supporters. His efforts to show his party as¬ 
sociates in the South that he would, on the other hand, allow 
no tampering with slavery, proved more irritating to the 
antislavery element in the North than reassuring to the 
slavery advocates of the South, and hence he was distrusted 
by both sections. 

Even more attention was attracted by the situation on 
the northern frontier. During 1837 and 1838 there were a 
few ill-concerted attempts at revolution in Canada. There 
was widespread sympathy for this movement all along the 
northern frontier, from Wisconsin to Maine. Thousands 
of Americans joined “Hunters’ Lodges,” for the purpose of 
assisting the insurgents, with the immediate motives of ad¬ 
venture and of securing the land grants freely offered by the 
insurgent leaders, and with some distant thought of annexa¬ 
tion. Van Buren firmly maintained the neutrality of the 
United States. General Scott was sent to the border, and 
a new neutrality act was passed in 1838. The failure of the 
scheme was laid upon the President, and thousands of votes, 
especially of the Irish along the northern frontier, were 
alienated from the Democrats. William Lyon Mackenzie, 
one of the Canadian leaders, a few years later attacked Van 
Buren and his political associates in a series of books which 
successfully blackened their reputations, not only among 
politicians, but also among historians, for many years to 
come. 

Seldom have so many causes of unpopularity descended 
upon the head of a President of the United States. Whatever 
may be the judgment of financial experts upon the system of 
divorce between the government and business, it was at any 
rate open to popular attack as unfeeling. Van Buren was 
likened to a ship’s captain who, in case of shipwreck, should 
put himself, the crew, and the ship’s papers safely in the 


The 

Canadian in¬ 
surrection. 


Van Buren’s 
unpopular¬ 
ity. 


244 


THE VAN BUREN ADMINISTRATION 


His renomi¬ 
nation. 


The Whig 
party. 


best boat, and leave the passengers to shift for themselves. 
The government offered no relief to a stricken community. 
The entire responsibility for the breakdown of the civil serv¬ 
ice was thrown upon the spoils system, and Van Buren was 
held to be its author. His diplomacy, though safe and sane, 
failed to satisfy the ambitions of either North or South, and 
wdthal his gentle, affable demeanor failed to inspire love or 
respect among the masses. 

In spite of these hampering circumstances, there was no 
opposition to Van Buren’s renomination by the Democratic 
party. All the leaders of the party were committed to his 
policies, the organization was in his hands, and he was much 
more popular among those who knew him than with the 
masses. It was, in fact, for some time doubtful whether it 
would be necessary to hold a convention, but one finally met 
at Baltimore in May, 1840. The chief interest in the action 
of this body was the platform. The reunion of the Calhoun 
nullifiers with the party was marked by the fact that this was 
entirely negative; denying the power of Congress to carry on 
a general system of internal improvements, to assume state 
debts, to adopt a protective tariff, to charter a bank or “to 
interfere with or control the domestic institutions of the 
several states.” Economy, strict construction, Jeffersonian 
principles, and the “separation of the moneys of the govern¬ 
ment from banking institutions ” were commended. 

The unpopularity of the Van Buren administration gave 
his opponents unusual opportunities for success, if only har¬ 
mony could be secured. During the administration the 
different elements of the opposition had been drawing more 
closely together. As early as 1834 the opposition had begun 
to use a new party name, “Whig,” which did not revive any 
recent political memories, but called to mind only the Rev¬ 
olutionary struggle during which it was applied to the pa¬ 
triotic party. John Quincy Adams wrote: “There are no 
two that hold any great political principle in common. Most 


POLITICAL PARTIES IN 1840 


245 


of them call themselves Whigs, only for the sake of calling 
their adversaries Tories.” Apart from opposition to the 
party in power, their strongest bonds consisted in the magnet¬ 
ism of their great leaders, Clay and Webster, and in the fact 
that they represented to some degree a banding together of 
those having vested interests thought to be imperiled by the 
radical doctrines of the Jackson Democracy. As Adams said 
in the letter quoted above: “ Clay, as you know, rose upon the 
broadest shoulders of democracy. But his European ex¬ 
pedition tinged both his principles and his deportment with 
aristocracy — perhaps to the improvement of his character, 
but to the loss of his standing with the Democracy.” The 
one political bond of union among all the Whigs was a demand 
for good government, and a confidence that their leaders 
were best calculated to give the country a clean administra¬ 
tion. Their divergence upon all other questions, and the 
personal independence both of leaders and followers, made 
any close organization impossible, and, perhaps partly through 
jealousy, they always condemned the organization of the 
Democrats as destructive of personal freedom. The unity 
of the Whigs was more social than political. 

Under these circumstances it was very important to 
select a candidate who would arouse no antagonisms. Clay 
was very anxious to secure the nomination and considered it 
but a just return for his long years of political service. Prac¬ 
tical politicians, however, felt that he had too long a record to 
defend, and that his position on public questions was too well 
known; his withdrawal from the Masonic order failed to con¬ 
ciliate the powerful Antimasonic leaders, Stevens and Weed. 
The Whig national convention—for the leaders had deter¬ 
mined again to employ that useful method of securing unity 
of action—met at Harrisburg, in December, 1839. A plurality 
favored Clay, but the NewYork delegation had been won from 
him by that astute political manager, Thurlow Weed, and cast 
its vote for General Scott. General Harrison stood between 


Nomination 
of Harrison. 


246 


THE VAN BUREN ADMINISTRATION 


Campaign 
1840. 


them in strength, and after a number of ballots New York 
voted for him, and he was chosen. As Harrison sympathized 
with the Antimasons and had been the National Republican 
candidate in 1836, John Tyler of Virginia was nominated for 
the vice presidency to give representation to the element that 
had, in 1836, voted for Judge White. The convention adopted 
no platform, nor could its policy be guessed from its candi¬ 
dates. Harrison’s record did not indicate any decided polit¬ 
ical preferences, and any inferences that might be surmised 
from his running in 1836 as National Republican were offset 
by the record of Tyler, who was a genuine Jeffersonian 
Democrat. It was a neutral tinted ticket, properly repre¬ 
senting a coalition party. 

of As if to disguise their lack of unity the Whigs inaugurated 
a campaign of enthusiasm. For the first time the methods 
of the circus were employed for political purposes. Cam¬ 
paign songs were sung, uniformed processions paraded the 
streets, giant mass meetings were held, drawing in the country 
population for miles around. Bizarre bets were made, and 
dignified gentlemen indulged in buffoonery for the delight of 
the masses. Harrison was popularized as “ Tippecanoe,” 
or “Old Tip,” and he was represented as wearing a coon- 
skin cap and drinking hard cider, as opposed to Van Buren, 
who was accused of having English servants and using gold 
spoons. The log cabin was exalted into a symbol of liberty, 
and no procession was complete without one. Logic and 
political argument were thrown to the winds, and the Whig 
party, the party of gentlemen, abandoned itself to a frenzy 
of popular merrymaking. Unusual as such methods appeared, 
they were based upon sound judgment. Life in America 
in the middle of the nineteenth century was far from jolly. 
Particularly in the newer portions of the country the hard 
struggle with the wilderness left little energy for the pursuit 
of pleasure, and to an unusual degree it was a solitary struggle, 
often waged far from any settlement or even neighboring 


ELECTION OF 1840 


247 


habitation. There was little leisure in such circumstances 
for the development of the fine art of amusement. The 
tragedy of the lonely emigrant wife, far from her home as¬ 
sociations, with her nearest neighbors miles away and brought 
together but a few times a year by “bees’’ for barn raising 
or corn husking, was long drawn out and drab and bitter. 
The men fared somewhat better. They met oftener and 
entertained each other by rough practical jokes and those 
bragging tales which are so peculiarly characteristic of Amer¬ 
ican humor. Institutions which nearly touched the people 
naturally adapted themselves to these conditions. The 
churches, with their camp meetings and revivals, their devil 
treeing and violent conversions, afforded an opportunity for 
the outburst of the pent-up emotions of the discouraged 
father or the homesick wife. The colporteurs and itinerant 
preachers were welcome for their society as well as for their 
religious consolation. Political life, with the barbecues, the 
stump speeches, and the processions with gay uniforms and 
the banners flying, satisfied their innate human longing for 
display, and their love for the cruder manifestations of humor. 
The political orator took the place, for many, of all solid 
reading; the public meeting, of the theater; for a great 
number the mere fact of being in a crowd was sufficient re¬ 
ward for a twenty-mile ride over a stumpy road. The Whigs, 
by making politics amusing, made them popular: in 1836 
the" popular vote was about 1,500,000; in 1840, it was over 
2,400,000. That the Whigs adopted these methods be¬ 
cause of their unwillingness to discuss issues, is to a large ex¬ 
tent true, but one can scarcely regret that they gave the 
people a few weeks of relaxation. 

Naturally the Whigs gained the larger part of this increased 
vote, though Van Buren also gained in every state except in 
Kentucky. Harrison received about 540,000 more votes than 
he, Webster, and White had received in 1836; and Van Buren, 
about 365,000 more than he had then received. The Whig 


The election. 


248 


THE VAN BUREN ADMINISTRATION 


gains were distributed over all the country, but they were 
greatest in Maine and New Hampshire, which were disturbed 
over the boundary disputes, and in the regions where the 
ideas of Jefferson retained the largest number of adherents. 
The Democrats carried only 7 states and 60 electoral votes, 
to 19 states and 234 electoral votes given to Harrison; the 
Whigs obtained a majority of 37 in the House and 7 in the 
Senate. 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 


Sources. 


Historical 

accounts. 

Financial 

questions. 


Politics, 

etc. 


For economic questions, Callender, G. W., Economic History , 
578-584 is useful. For politics: Clay’s Private Correspondence, 
ch. XI. Sargent, N., Public Men and Events, II, chs. V and VI. 
Wise, H. A., Seven Decades of the Union. Where none of these are 
available, Tyler, L. G., Lives and Times of the Tylers, chs. 19 and 
20, gives many letters and an intimate though decidedly partisan 
view. 

Bourne, E. G., The Distribution of the Surplus. Dewey, D. R., 
Financial History, ch. X; and his, State Banking. Kinley, D., 
The Independent Treasury. Ormsby, E. McK., The Whig Party, 
ch. XXV. Schurz, C., Clay, II, ch. XIX. Scott, W. A., Repudia¬ 
tion of State Debts. Shepard, E. M., Van Buren, chs. VIII, IX. 
Sumner, W. G., American Currency, 131-161. 

Fiske, J., Essays Historical and Literary, I, VII, VIII. Gar¬ 
rison, G. P., Westward Extension, 43-67. McCarthy, C. f The Anti- 
masonic Party (Am. Hist. Assoc., Report, 1902, I, 367-575). 
Schurz, Clay, II, ch. XX. 


CHAPTER XVI 


HARRISON AND TYLER 

The events which turned the exuberance of the Whig 
victory into bitterness and recrimination seemed to the lead¬ 
ers of the party surprising, disappointing, and accidental, 
but to one looking back at them after a lapse of time, they 
seem natural and in part inevitable. It is comparatively 
easy to build up a party of opposition out of divergent ele¬ 
ments ; there is strong cohesive power in hatred and distrust, 
and active administrations like those of Jackson and Van 
Buren naturally create a host of enemies willing to sink their 
differences in order to obtain a victory over the common foe. 
It is a very different thing to hold such a party together when 
it comes to power and is confronted with the question of how 
to make use of its victory. It has already been shown how 
the Jackson party of 1828 disintegrated as the positive pro¬ 
gram of the administration developed. It could hardly be 
expected that the Whigs could reap any definite fruits of 
their success without alienating some of those who aided to 
elect Harrison. It remained to be seen whether, out of the 
loosely bound Whig party of 1840, the leaders could save, as 
Jackson had done, enough support to carry through a con¬ 
structive program. 

Harrison formed a strong cabinet, with Webster as Secre¬ 
tary of State, and with four friends of Clay, the South 
being represented by three members and the North by three. 
Clay refused a position, but made it evident that he looked 
upon himself as the leader of the party. So eager was he 
to begin work that he persuaded the President to summon 
an extra session of Congress to meet May 31, 1841. At once 
249 


Difficulties 
of the Whigs. 


The patron¬ 
age. 


250 


HARRISON AND TYLER 


Death of 
Harrison. 


John Tyler. 


signs of trouble began to appear. The first dispute arose 
from the distribution of the patronage. The point of greatest 
unity among the Whigs had been their attack upon the spoils 
system. They had condemned the practice of indiscriminate 
removal, they had attempted to establish the principle that 
the Senate should share the removal power, and they had 
denounced the Democratic policy of making appointments for 
political reasons. When they came to power, however, they 
made almost as many removals as Jackson had done. The 
practice of removal once begun, it was found to require un¬ 
usual self-restraint to bring it to an end. If the civil service 
under Van Buren was as corrupt as the Whig orators had 
declared, it was, indeed, necessary to make extensive changes 
of personnel. Moreover, there was as great pressure for ap¬ 
pointment in 1841 as in 1829; in fact, the crowd of applicants 
was greater, and if, as Adams writes, more orderly, it was at 
any rate as persistent. The greater leaders of the party 
were disgusted at this appetite for office and tried to keep 
their hands clean of it; but the lesser leaders were as active 
as the Jacksonian patronage mongers, and soon it was evident 
that now, as twelve years before, political considerations were 
to have the greatest weight in determining appointments. 

It was impossible to keep entirely clear of this turmoil, and 
within ten days after the inauguration Clay and Harrison had 
quarreled over the appointment to the New York customs 
collectorship. How this personal disagreement would have 
affected the carrying out of Clay’s legislative plans, can never 
be known. Before the Congress met, office hunting had had 
a still more serious result. The tireless importunities of the 
crowds which infested the White House broke down the con¬ 
stitution of the President, and were in part the cause of his 
death on April 4, 1841, just one month after taking office. 

The death of Harrison brought for the first time to the 
presidency a man chosen as Vice President. Gouverneur 
Morris and other Federalists had in 1801 opposed the adop- 


JOHN TYLER 


251 


tion of the Twelfth Amendment on the ground that a man 
elected expressly to that somewhat ambiguous position would 
nearly always be of the second rank. They preferred the 
older method, by which each elector voted for two persons for 
President, and the person receiving the second largest number 
of votes became Vice President, believing that in this way the 
latter officer would always be a man of presidential caliber. 
While their method of preserving the dignity of the office 
might not have been effective, the danger that they foresaw 
was a real one. In the present instance still another element 
of danger was present; the vice presidency had been used to 
conciliate a minority faction, and now that the President was 
dead, the representative of this minority fell heir to all the 
executive power. So much alarm was felt among the Whig 
leaders that there was some disposition to treat Tyler as “ act¬ 
ing President,” somewhat shorn of the extreme prerogatives 
of office; but his decided and proper insistence that he be 
credited with the full range of executive power, prevented this 
attempt to stay the natural result of their improvidence. 

The alarm of those Whig leaders who wished to revive 
an active nationalistic policy was certainty justified. Tyler 
was strongly committed by thirty years of public life to the 
strictest school of constitutional construction, nor was he 
likely to modify his views. His leading personal character¬ 
istic was an extreme vanity which had been fostered by the 
established position of his family, the precocious develop¬ 
ment of his talent, and a rare beauty and grace of manner 
which had made the path of life easy for him. The pride of 
his political life was his unwavering consistency, which had 
led him back and forth from one party to another as each 
seemed to him to depart from the clear injunctions of the 
Constitution. That every such change of party had been 
followed by political advancement seemed to him but the 
proper reward of virtue, and the historian must record that 
these changes of party allegiance were made with all sincerity 


Tyler’s char¬ 
acter and 
career. 


HARRISON AND TYLER 


Clay’s pro¬ 
gram. 


The cur¬ 
rency. 


252 

of purpose. He had none of those occasional doubts as to the 
fallibility of his own opinions which are apt to come to the 
humble-minded; he had none of that respect for the opinions 
of others which is developed by the difficulties of life. He was 
a pure man, with high and laudable ambitions, but he lacked 
the comprehensive sympathy and understanding of a states¬ 
man ; he was a man of talent, and a gentleman, but not a 
great man. 

Tyler kept in office the cabinet of Harrison and he met 
the special session of Congress with a message that was some¬ 
what ambiguous and somewhat conciliatory. The message, 
however, received little attention, for Clay at once took the 
lead and introduced a resolution outlining the business of the 
session. The chief measures he proposed were: first, the re¬ 
establishment of the pre-Jacksonian fiscal system, by the 
formation of a new bank and the repeal of the Independent 
Treasury Act; secondly, the reestablishment of the American 
system, by the passage of a tariff act and a bill for the distri¬ 
bution of the proceeds of land sales among the states. There 
were other suggestions of minor importance, and the party 
which had come into power without a platform, found before 
it one of the heaviest programs of work ever suggested for 
immediate accomplishment. 

The restoration of the finances was first taken up. The 
deficit, which Van Buren had met by the temporary expe¬ 
dient of treasury notes, was now provided for by a loan of 
$12,000,000, though the objection to a permanent national 
debt was still so strong that the term of the loan was too short 
to make capitalists eager to buy the bonds. More important 
was the repeal of the Independent Treasury Act, which was 
speedily rushed through and signed by the President. The 
Whigs had now to provide a substitute for the system they 
had overthrown. In doing so they wished to furnish a means 
not only for doing the business of the government, but for 
regulating the currency. They wished to put an end to the 


\ 


CLAY’S PROGRAM 


253 


divorce between the government and the business world. 
Tyler, after discussing the subject in his message, con¬ 
cluded: “To you, then, who have come more directly from 
the body of our common constituents, I submit the entire 
question, as best qualified to give a full exposition of their 
wishes. I shall be ready to concur ’with you in the 
adoption of such system as you may propose, reserving 
to myself the ultimate power of rejecting any measure 
which may, in my view of it, conflict with the Constitution 
or otherwise jeopardize the prosperity of the country — 
a power which I could not part with even if I would, but 
which I will not believe any act of yours will call into 
requisition.” 

Congress could suggest no method other than the estab¬ 
lishment of a bank. Knowing Tyler’s constitutional objec¬ 
tion to such an institution, the Whig leaders took the greatest 
care to meet his views so far as they w T ere known. The plan 
provided for a “Fiscal Bank,” located in the District of 
Columbia, over which the power of Congress was complete. 
The crucial question was with regard to the power to estab¬ 
lish branches in the states. Clay wished the bank to have 
power to establish them, but Congress attempted to compro¬ 
mise by implying the permanent assent of the state unless 
the legislature, at its first session after the passage of the bill, 
protested against such action. The bill passed in this form, 
and Tyler vetoed it on August 16, 1841. Negotiations were 
at once begun between Congress and the administration, 
and a bill was drawn up by Ewing, the Secretary of the 
Treasury, and Webster, which it was understood that Tyler 
would sign. This provided for a “Fiscal Corporation” in¬ 
stead of a bank and deprived it of the pow T er of discount and 
of local exchange, but it was allowed to operate throughout 
the country. On September 9 Tyler vetoed this bill, bringing 
the utmost discouragement to the Whig leaders, and over¬ 
whelming anger to the rank and file of the party, which had 


The bank 
vetoes. 


254 


HARRISON AND TYLER 


been given reason to believe that Tyler had promised to 
accept it. 

Break be- The second veto was the signal for a party crisis. The 

and C thJ yler entire cabinet resigned with the exception of Webster, and 

whlgs - Clay so bitterly assailed the President as to make reconcilia¬ 
tion impossible. Tyler was accused of breaking his -word in 
regard to the second bank bill, and of being a traitor to his 
party. Clay as emphatically declared that the people in 
the election of 1840 had decided for the bank, as Jackson 
had asserted their opposition to it in 1832. One session of 
Congress had sufficed to rend the party in twain. Tyler did 
not at once despair of carrying the bulk of it with him, making 
himself its leader, and being its candidate in 1844. He had 
a coterie of personal friends, called in derision because of their 
number the “corporal’s guard/’ but of an ability that some¬ 
what atoned for their lack of votes. Foremost among them 
was Henry A. Wise, who was to succeed him as the representa¬ 
tive of the purest Virginian political tradition. Another 
prominent figure was Caleb Cushing, who represented a long 
line of individualists that had dominated the thought of 
Salem, Massachusetts, from the earliest colonial times, and 
had continually opposed the aggressive strong government 
element of Boston and other portions of that commonwealth. 
The fact that Webster was willing to retain his place was a 
great encouragement to Tyler, who warmly rejoiced when he 
heard of it, and said, “ Give me your hand on that, and now 
I will say to you that Henry Clay is a doomed man from this 
hour.” 

Whig legisla- Tyler’s hopes proved delusive, for Clay’s magnetic and 
vigorous leadership kept together a sufficient portion of the 
party to give him still a majority in Congress. As this 
majority was far less than two thirds, however, measures 
could not be passed over a veto, and only such parts of his 
program could be carried as Tyler was willing to accept. 
Increased appropriations were made for the navy, and a na- 


WHIG LEGISLATION 


255 


tional bankruptcy bill, always demanded by the business 
interests, was passed, though it remained on the statute 
books only two years. The preemption system, which had 
been maintained since 1830 by annual acts, was made per¬ 
manent. The American system was adopted, but only in 
fragmentary fashion. The first portion attempted was a bill 
for the distribution of the proceeds of land sales. It was urged 
that the funds thus given would enable the states to meet the 
interest on their debts and might prevent the threatened 
repudiation. An object still more prominent in Clay’s mind 
was that, by thus reducing the income of the national govern¬ 
ment, there would be stronger inducement for raising the 
duties on imports at the next session, when the compromise 
of 1833 would work itself out. So clearly was this political 
purpose appreciated that the opposition succeeded in ap¬ 
pending an amendment to the effect that the distribution 
should not be made if at any time the duties should exceed 
twenty per cent. 

When Congress met for the next session, the finances of Thetariff. 
the government were in a rather serious condition. The 
country had not yet recovered its prosperity, and the im¬ 
pending reductions of the tariff on January 1 and June 30, 

1842, threatened a serious deficit. The situation was, there¬ 
fore, favorable for a reestablishment of the protective system. 

Even Tyler stated in his message that, while that compromise 
was sacred and its spirit should control all tariff legislation, 

“ the government may be justified in so discriminating by 
reference to other considerations of domestic policy con¬ 
nected with our manufactures.” The situation was made 
still more easy by the willingness of a large number of Dem¬ 
ocrats from Pennsylvania and New York to vote for pro¬ 
tection. Under these circumstances the protectionist leaders 
would have had an easy task had it not been for the deter¬ 
mination of Clay to join the issue of distribution with the 
tariff. A bill was introduced which raised duties, gave pref- 


Relations 

with 

England. 


256 HARRISON AND TYLER 

erence to freights brought in American vessels, and provided 
for the repeal of the restrictive amendment to the land dis¬ 
tribution bill. Gilmer, of the corporal’s guard, said of this: 
“The restriction in the distribution act of 1841 was designed 
to guard against increasing the burdens of taxation to fill a 
vacuum which might be occasioned by distribution. The 
legislation of 1842 is designed to create a vacuum that it 
may be filled by increased taxation.” The Whig majority 
held firm, and passed first a provisional, and then a perma¬ 
nent, bill, only to have both vetoed by the President. The 
House of Representatives, following the precedent of the 
Senate in 1833, censured the President, who like Jackson 
responded with a “Protest.” Impeachment was threatened, 
but the President was not to be coerced; and the Whigs were 
forced to abandon distribution or take the responsibility of 
adjourning without providing the government with sufficient 
revenue. Clay was in favor of holding out, forcing the Presi¬ 
dent to veto again, and taking the issue to the people, but the 
majority decided otherwise, and the bill without its distri¬ 
bution feature was at length passed. Even this fragment of 
the Whig program was carried only with the assistance of 
twenty Democrats, for thirty-five Whigs voted against it, 
about twenty of these because they wished to hold out for 
distribution and the rest because they disapproved of a pro¬ 
tective tariff. The Whigs soon found cause to congratulate 
themselves on their yielding in this case. Almost coincident 
with the passage of the tariff act came the long-hoped-for 
revival of prosperity, and, whether it were the result of this 
legislation or from natural causes, it could at any rate be 
used by their orators as an argument of their wisdom. 

While Congress and the President were thus at odds, 
Webster was quietly at work adjusting our difficulties with 
England. In 1841 Peel became Prime Minister, and he evinced 
a strong desire for a complete settlement of all outstanding 
difficulties between the two countries. To accomplish this 


FOREIGN RELATIONS 


257 


he sent, as special minister to the United States, Lord Ash¬ 
burton, a man always friendly to America and having close 
relations with Webster. The negotiations, thus pleasantly 
begun, involved many questions, some of long standing and 
some of peculiar delicacy. 

Two problems arose out of the Canadian insurrection. 
The first was that of the Caroline , an American vessel used 
by the insurgents, which the English had seized while at 
dock on the American shore of the Niagara River, and sent 
blazing into the current and over the falls. In the excite¬ 
ment an American citizen was killed. This matter was 
closed by an interchange of notes, which proved mutually 
satisfactory and which were calculated to make such epi¬ 
sodes unlikely in the future. The second case arose as an 
aftermath of the Caroline affair. A certain Alexander 
McLeod, coming from Canada to New York, in 1840, boasted 
of having killed the American whose life was then lost. 
McLeod was promptly arrested and put on trial for murder 
before the proper state court. McLeod asserted that he had 
acted upon instructions from his superior officer, and was 
not personally responsible. The British government upheld 
this view and demanded his release. Webster admitted the 
principle advanced, but could not secure the release of Mc¬ 
Leod from the state court, over which the national govern¬ 
ment had no control. The matter was serious, and for a time 
even Webster feared war. The United States Attorney- 
General was sent to watch the case, and finally McLeod 
was acquitted on an alibi. In 1842 Webster secured the 
passage of an act by Congress which authorized the transfer 
of such cases in the future to the national courts. The lack 
of power on the part of the national government over state 
courts has subsequently given trouble in our relations with 
foreign countries, but no other case of quite so delicate a 
character as this has arisen. 

Several matters were settled by the Webster-Ashburton 


The Caroline 
and McLeod. 


Webster- 

Ashburton 

treaty. 


HARRISON AND TYLER 


Slave trade. 


Slave trade 
compromise. 


258 

treaty, which was concluded in 1842. One question of 
growing annoyance concerned the slave trade. This had 
been a very profitable branch of English commerce until 
Parliament abolished it, after which England was especially 
eager that other nations should not profit by her self-abne¬ 
gation. By 1840 it had been legally abolished by nearly all 
civilized nations, but all were not equally eager or able 
actually to suppress it. With many countries England had 
made arrangements that her navy be allowed to enforce their 
laws. Foremost among the nations not bound by such an 
agreement was the United States, and many slavers hoisted 
the American flag and defied the English men-of-war. The 
English claimed that under such circumstances they had the 
right to “visit” the vessel to ascertain whether it was prop¬ 
erly flying the American flag. The American statesmen, 
remembering the inconveniences caused by England’s exten¬ 
sion of this right of visit into a right to search before the 
War of 1812, utterly refused to consider it as existing in 
time of peace, and demanded that under all circumstances 
the American flag be respected. General Cass, at this time 
minister to France, on his own initiative persuaded that 
country and other European powers to refrain from indors¬ 
ing a proposed convention granting England the powers she 
sought. 

The United States would not allow the right of visit, 
and England would not explicitly give it up. Thereupon, at 
the suggestion of Tyler, Webster and Ashburton compromised 
the matter by providing that a joint squadron patrol the 
African coast, thus providing for the suppression of the trade, 
which was what England particularly wished, and making 
“visits ” of foreign war vessels unnecessary, which was what 
the United States desired to avoid. Cass at once attacked 
this compromise because it did not contain an express re¬ 
nunciation, on the part of Great Britain, of the “right of 
visit.” Webster declared that there was a tacit renunciation, 


WEBSTER" ASH BURTON TREATY 


259 


and there ensued a pamphlet war between them. Events 
proved that Cass was right, and sixteen years later, when he 
was himself Secretary of State, he obtained the concession 
which he thought Webster should have secured in 1842. 

Still more important were the questions regarding the Boundary 
boundary. That on the northeast had been in dispute since questlons - 
1783. In 1838 armed conflicts, dignified in the press by the 
title “Aroostook War,” took place in Maine. That state 
and Congress both appropriated money to place the frontier 
in a state of defense. Peace was temporarily restored by a 
modus vivendi arranged by the indefatigable General Scott, 
but the situation remained acute. Webster and Ashburton 
took up this question in a friendly spirit, and by mutual con¬ 
cessions succeeded in agreeing upon the line from the Atlantic 
Ocean to the Rocky Mountains, which has remained until 
the present day. 

Much as was determined, many problems remained. Questions 
Oregon was left undivided under the joint occupancy agree- Oregon^nd 
ment arranged in 1818 and renewed in 1828. Also unsettled thcCwfe. 
was the case of the Creole. This was a vessel engaged in the 
domestic slave trade between Virginia and New Orleans. 

The slaves rose, killed a portion of the crew, and brought the 
vessel into the British port of Nassau in the West Indies. 

There some of the negroes were hanged for murder, and the 
remainder released upon the ground that they became free 
on touching free soil. The American government claimed 
that the vessel and all the negroes should have been turned 
over to it, and demanded apology and compensation. Lord 
Ashburton defended the British action. The case caused much 
agitation in the United States because of its connection with 
slavery. It was not arranged until 1853, when an arbitra¬ 
tion was agreed upon, and damages awarded to the American 
owners. More important, the general rivalry between Eng¬ 
land and the United States for predominance on the American 
continents remained. Like most compromises which are 


26 o 


HARRISON AND TYLER 


Election of 
1842. 


The Whig 
party in 1844. 


Van Buren’s 
following. 


arranged on the basis of mutual accommodation rather than 
of principle, the Webster-Ashburton treaty was unpopular 
in both countries. In America the failure to settle the 
Creole case and to obtain a renunciation of the claim of 
visitation were unpopular in the South. In Maine the parti¬ 
tion of the disputed territory in the northeast was so much 
disliked that it took that state forever out of the Whig ranks 
and, perhaps, cost Webster the presidential nomination in 
1852. Still, the main object was secured, for fairly amicable 
relations were restored between England and the United 
States, and, possibly, a war was averted. 

With the adoption of the tariff bill and the conclusion of 
the Webster-Ashburton treaty, the last fruits of the Whig 
victory were garnered. The elections of 1842 went over¬ 
whelmingly against them, and while they retained a precarious 
control of the Senate, the Democrats obtained a majority of 
sixty in the House. With the two branches of the legislature 
of opposing political allegiance, and with the President and 
Senate hostile, there resulted a legislative and executive 
deadlock, and political attention was directed toward the 
next campaign. The Whig party had come out of the struggle 
with Tyler, diminished in numbers, but with some gain in 
homogeneity and much in unity of spirit. Even Webster, after 
completing his diplomatic task, and when both he and Tyler 
found that his remaining in the cabinet had not been of 
political advantage to either, resigned and resumed his old al¬ 
legiance. The party leaders had had enough of figureheads 
and compromise candidates. They fully determined to nom¬ 
inate Clay, who had bade an affecting farewell to the Senate 
in 1842 and retired to his seat at Ashland to await the call 
of the people. The Whig program would be a demand for 
the indorsement of what it had done and for opportunity to 
adopt those measures which had failed. 

The Democratic party seemed to be still in the hands of 
the old leaders. It was their belief that Van Buren must be 


POLITICAL PARTIES IN 1844 


261 


renominated to vindicate the party. Jackson was in favor 
of him and he was indorsed by the Globe and by a series of 
state conventions, and a majority of the delegates to the na¬ 
tional convention were pledged to his support. A Van 
Buren platform was as easily formed as one for Clay, and the 
people of the country would have the opportunity to vote intel¬ 
ligently on issues which had long been defined and discussed. 

Besides these regular candidates there were two other 
important aspirants. Calhoun, now once more within the 
Democratic party, planned to secure the nomination he had 
expected in 1832. He left the Senate in 1843, his works and 
a biographical sketch were published, and he was a declared 
candidate. The main issues upon which he opposed Van 
Buren and to which he wished to commit the Democratic 
party, were free trade and reform. He “laid down the broad 
proposition, that imports and exports are reciprocal, and 
mutually limit one another; that we cannot export in the 
long run more than we import, and vice versa — a proposition, 
which,” he wrote, “I think has never been fully realized.” 
On this point he would have the support of all southern and 
many other Democrats, but it was a question which the north¬ 
ern politicians wished to avoid. Calhoun feared also that 
Van Buren’s election would lead again to administrative 
demoralization. He wrote: “There is much, very much to 
do, to reform the administrative departments. It will prove 
to be a difficult task, requiring vast labor, great firmness, 
and no little sagacity. I feel assured, the expenditures may 
be reduced millions, without impairing the efficiency of the 
government, but the work will require the hearty cooperation 
of the executive and legislative departments of the govern¬ 
ment, the former taking the lead; and even then, it will 
require years to effect it. Congress can do little of itself. 
It must be the great work of the next administration; and 
unless it is thoroughly done, all will be lost. If I can be of 
any future service to the country it will be in carrying through 


Calhoun’s 

candidacy 


262 


HARRISON AND TYLER 


Tyler’s plans. 


Sources. 


this great reform. . . . My congressional task, in short, is 
done. ... It rests with the people to say, whether I shall be 
selected to finish the work, which has been carried forward to 
where it now is.” He was opposed to party organization 
and the tyranny exerted by state conventions, and favored the 
choice of delegates to the national convention by districts. 
In a word, he wished to run as Democratic candidate on a 
platform which was chiefly made up of southern demands; 
his weakness lay in his lack of an issue distinctly appealing 
to the frontier and northern democracies. 

The fourth candidate was the President. His hope of 
securing the Whig nomination had vanished, but he had other 
plans. With his natural suavity of manner he found it easy 
to keep on agreeable terms with the Democratic leaders in 
Congress, and he had some thought that he might be the 
choice of that party. In the meantime he actively employed 
the patronage in rewarding and enheartening his own per¬ 
sonal following, and was determined to run independently if 
rejected by both parties. He too, like Calhoun, needed a 
fresh issue, and he was planning to associate with his name 
the question of Texan annexation, which had proved dis¬ 
tasteful to those in control of both party organizations. 

In order to understand the circumstances that shaped 
the fortunes of these rivals, and determined the campaign of 
1844, it is necessary to review the situation of the country at 
large, and note the development of certain new factors that, 
while playing small part in politics before 1843, were to 
dominate them for the next twenty years. 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 

The Papers of J. C. Calhoun (letters to and from him), pub¬ 
lished in Am. Hist. Assoc., Report, 1899, vol. II, are especially illu¬ 
minating for this period. The sources mentioned at the close of 
the last chapter, also, continue to be of use. See also National 
Monetary Commission, Laws Concerning Money. 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 


263 


Dewey, D. R., Financial History, §§ 102, 103. Garrison, Historical 
Westward Extension, 43-84. Lodge, H. C, Webster , ch. VIII. accounts * 
Schurz, Clay, chs. XXII, XXIII. Stanwood, E., Tariff Contro¬ 
versies, II, ch. XI. Tyler, L. G., Letters and Lives of the Tylers, 

II, chs. I-VI. Von Holst, H., Constitutional History, II, chs. 

V, VI. 

Moore, J. B., Arbitrations, I, chs. I-VI; International Law Diplo- 
Digest, II, 24-29. Reeves, J. S., American Diplomacy under Tyler matlc * 
and Polk. Webster, D., Works, V, 116-135; VI, 247-269. 


CHAPTER XVII 


Canals. 


NEW ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS, 1830 TO i860 

The period of the thirties, forties, and fifties was one of 
unusually stimulating activity affecting the whole life of the 
people. Many of the new tendencies and developments 
which first attract attention soon after the War of 1812 now 
attain full stature and become dominating forces, and many 
new factors appear which were destined to vie with them in 
significance. The changes of this period were not perhaps of 
so deep and underlying importance as those between 1815 and 
1830, but they were more widespread and some of them more 
striking. 

Most significant of the economic changes was the im¬ 
provement in the means of transportation. Washington had 
seen the importance of that problem to the future of the 
country and had grappled with it, but hardly anything had 
been done before his death except the building of not very 
good toll roads and bridges. The invention of the steam¬ 
boat had suddenly opened up the immense stretches of navi¬ 
gable water in the interior, and made it possible to live and do 
business on almost every river bank. Then came the lock 
canal, clearing away many of the obstacles which rapids and 
falls offered to the steamboat, and, by connecting the heads of 
rivers, joining one river basin to another. Many seaports 
by such constructions brought to their wharves the products 
of all the surrounding country, and the Erie Canal and the 
Pennsylvania Canal and inclined planes afforded cheap means 
of connection between the East and the West. In Ohio, 
Indiana, and Illinois, canals connected rivers flowing into the 
Lakes with branches of the Ohio, and plans were made to 

264 


RAILROADS 


265 


utilize the portage between the Fox and the Wisconsin. The 
twenties and the thirties were preeminently the period of the 
canal. Already, however, another method had been devised 
which was to supersede water transit, for a time at least. 

The railroad was introduced in 1825, and after a few years Railroads, 
the steam engine came to be used in connection with it. 

Railroad construction was cheaper than that of canals, rail¬ 
roads could be built over many routes where canals were 
impossible, and at first the abundance of firewood and later 
the use of coal made the cost of operation seem small. 

At first they were built largely to carry passengers, and to 
supplement canals. Very few miles were built before 
1830 ; but by 1840, 2302 miles were in operation between 
important centers of population, and extending from Wil¬ 
mington in North Carolina, with small break, to New 
York. From 1840 to 1850, 5043 miles were built, sup¬ 
plementing those of the previous decade and stretching 
over several distances inconvenient for canal construc¬ 
tion, as from Detroit to New Buffalo on Lake Michigan, 
from Sandusky to Cincinnati, and from Chattanooga to 
Charleston and Savannah. Up to this time little had been 
accomplished in the West, where the Mississippi on the one 
hand and the Lakes with the Erie Canal on the other afforded 
such easy access. Moreover, the experiences of the thirties 
had made the holders of capital more cautious, and they pre¬ 
ferred local enterprises. Even in the East, where there was 
the most surplus capital, several of the states were obliged to 
lend their credit in aid of such enterprises. During the fifties 
the situation changed. It had been proved that the rail¬ 
roads paid, which canals had rarely done; capital was at the 
same time more abundant and more accessible to the pro¬ 
moters of new projects; the spirit of speculation revived. 

Private corporations were formed on a larger scale than Corporations, 
before, and investors became willing to venture their money 
farther away from home. 


266 


NEW CONDITIONS, 1830 TO i860 


Land grants. 


Strategic 
problem of 
communica¬ 
tion. 


Sectionalism 
in the West. 


In the West railroads were desired to build up the country. 
Regions untouched by navigable waterways had been left 
unsettled, though surrounded by occupied territory. If 
railroads could be built through them, settlement would follow, 
but such enterprises could not be expected to pay for some 
years, and private capital needed special inducements to un¬ 
dertake the work. Under these circumstances Congress re¬ 
inaugurated the system of national aid, but indirectly. 
Land grants were made to several states in order that 
they in turn might give them to companies engaging to 
construct roads. The system was to grant alternate 
sections of land to the railroad, and the government was 
expected to reimburse itself by the enhanced value of the 
land remaining. The first grant was to the Illinois Central, 
and it was largely owing to this policy that in the fifties 
21,424 miles were built, and that the West, which was 
almost bare of railroads at the beginning, was by i860 
crisscrossed with them, from Oshkosh and La Crosse on the 
north, down the whole east side of the Mississippi, with short 
lines in Iowa and Missouri. 

This network of roads built in the ten years before the 
Civil War had a far-reaching importance. There was a 
southern system which, connecting with the southern rivers, 
answered fairly well the needs of that agricultural region, but 
connected with the northern system only at Washington 
and Bowling Green, Kentucky. This system served the 
Gulf States and Tennessee and Arkansas for both export and 
import. Many products of the upper Mississippi, the Ohio, 
and the Missouri still sought an outlet downstream, and New 
Orleans was still an important port for the middle region; but 
a constantly increasing amount was sent from these valleys 
over the Erie Railroad to New York, over the Pennsylvania to 
Philadelphia, and over the Baltimore and Ohio to Baltimore. 
The Lake region was entirely tributary to New York, using the 
Erie Canal and the Erie and the New York Central railroads. 



























.. 
















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- 



















X 





k\ofu\nibi a 


Si'wwWi 


****&!?&& 


Ft. Fieri 




PR 

[Cheyenne 








KS~Jm 

Grf***' "'V 


Denver 




Pueblo 




Santa R 
^erqueij 


Antonii 


Longitude 


h] 
























95 


85 



ankato 


[and 0 avea 


i'MUwaukj 
!\ Racine I 


Ihdepenilen'ce 
Cedar Rapidsc 


/ Vi'asU'mg^n 


s Moines 


‘Quincy' 


Kansas CitvV 
V^J 
Jefferson 

J • y 


LouisyJ]f t 


' 0 j}£p 


Ohio 




Little 


jluinlna 


Roug^ 


Galveston 


from 


Greenwich 


tr* ia 


ft—R ock 


>^C\\avles to1 \ 

^vanna^ V \ 

RAILROAD DEVELOPMENT 

IN THE 

UNITED STATES 
\ 1860 


Railroads in operation in 18-10 
.. .. .« ..1850 

— << <• <• 1800 
_____Proposed Routes for Trans¬ 
continental Railroads 1800 


SCALE OF MILES 
-1-1- 


800 


ion 


500 














































AGRICULTURE 


26) 


The great factor of communication was dividing the West, which 
had been so much of a unit in 1830, into three sections: the 
Lake region, affiliated with the Northeast; the southern belt, 
looking to New Orleans and other southern seaports; and 
the Ohio and Missouri valleys, the battle-ground of water and 
rail transportation, of northern and southern influences. The 
division of the country at the time of the Civil War was to 
show that by that time iron had become stronger than water. 

Another dividing element in the West was agriculture. Spread of 
Throughout the South cotton culture was coming to be every- aon^ySm. 
where the dominant industry. Along the rich river bottoms 
of the Tennessee it was replacing the more diversified farming 
of the frontier period; it spread down the banks of the Missis¬ 
sippi from the Ohio to the coast, and up the valleys of its 
western branches. Cotton culture carried with it slavery and 
the plantation system. Everywhere the tendency was to¬ 
ward larger estates, greater investments of capital, and the 
crowding out of the small proprietor, as had been the case in 
Virginia and South Carolina, although in no other state even 
in i860 had the process developed so far as it had in South 
Carolina by 1830. Everywhere other products were raised, 
but everywhere the cotton planters were coming to be the 
ruling class. 

In the Northwest the emergence from frontier conditions Agriculture 
was characterized by more general diffusion of wealth and North 
improvement of agricultural methods. The successful farmer 
put a smaller portion of his profits into the cost of living than 
in the South, for social exactions were not so high. There was 
a widespread increase of comfort, but fewer mansions and 
liveried equipages. The portion of his profits which was 
devoted to business was spent for labor-saving machinery 
instead of for slaves. In 1833 the McCormick reaper was 
invented, after 1840 its use increased rapidly, and by i860 
twenty thousand were manufactured yearly. To a small 
extent the use of fertilizers was begun, and in general, through 


268 


NEW CONDITIONS, 1830 TO i860 


the thousands of small farms in this region, there was a 
gradual change from the rough-and-ready methods of the 
frontiersman to the steady industry of the established farmer. 
Many settlers proved incapable of making this change, and, 
selling out their farms, went westward and northward again 
to blaze out homes in the wilderness. They generally sold to 
newcomers with a little capital, who hoped to make their 
profits by hard work and greater skill, and not, as was so 
often the case in the South, to a neighboring proprietor who 
expected to increase his income by using more land and more 
slaves. The system of small farms, cultivated by their owners, 
continued to be characteristic of the whole region north of 
the Ohio. 

The forces which had made for the unity of the Missis¬ 
sippi valley—the frontier stage of development, and the use 
of the great river—grew continually less important; the forces 
of separation — the differences in climate, in soil, in products, 
and in economic and social characteristics — grew constantly 
more significant. At the same time the northern stream of 
population flowing into the Lake region from the Northeast 
brought ideas and customs differing from those of the 
southern settlers who occupied the lower Mississippi, and 
the two streams mingled and strove in the valley of the 
Ohio. The struggle between these opposing forces is one 
of the great features of the history of this period. 

Growth While a new sectionalism was being developed within 

trade. r0P€an the country, similar forces were beginning to break down the 
isolation of the United States, and bring it more in touch 
with the rest of the world. The rapid development of manu¬ 
factures in the twenties and thirties had outrun in some re¬ 
spects the agricultural development. The home market 
argument, so potent in influencing the farmers to vote for a 
protective tariff at that time, seemed justified by its results; 
the country consumed almost all its food products, and in 
1837 wheat was actually imported into New York. The 


OCEAN TRANSPORTATION 


269 


improvement in agricultural methods, and the vast areas of 
land newly opened in the forties and fifties, changed the 
situation, and there was again a surplus to dispose of as there 
had been at the beginning of the century. Fortunately for 
our trade, in England the course of events was different, the 
farmers were unable to feed the industrial population, and in 
1846 the “ corn laws ” (laws laying an import duty on grain) 
were abolished and a free market opened to American prod¬ 
ucts. The two best years for purposes of trade comparison 
are 1836 and 1856, each immediately preceding a financial 
crisis and representing the culmination of a period of prosper¬ 
ity. In 1836 the United States exported $2,561,330 worth 
of animal food, in 1856, $17,665,922 w r orth; exports of vege¬ 
table food products increased from $7,431,119 to $59,390,906. 
Cotton, however, continued to be the leading single export, 
increasing from $71,284,925 to $128,382,351. The total 
value of exports of every kind rose from $128,663,040 to 
$326,964,908. Imports did not increase proportionately, 
barely keeping pace with the growth of population, rising 
only from $189,980,055 to $314,639,942. The greater por¬ 
tion of this increase was in articles like tea, coffee, sugar, and 
other things which could not be produced in sufficient quan¬ 
tity at home. The manufacturers of the country were supply¬ 
ing the domestic market better than before. The increased 
commerce with Europe resulted from the disproportionate 
increase in American agricultural products and the simul¬ 
taneous demand for them abroad, and the balance of trade 
thus created in favor of the United States brought in much 
of the capital used in the building of railroads and other 
improvements. 

This increased commerce demanded increased means of 
ocean transportation, and the improvements were as great 
as those in communication by land. The building of sail¬ 
ing vessels reached a level of efficiency, both for speed and 
for safety, decidedly above that of the past. The Baltimore 


Ocean trans¬ 
portation. 


The Ameri¬ 
can mer¬ 
chant 
marine. 


270 NEW CONDITIONS, 1830 TO i860 

clippers were famous and have not been surpassed. Their 
arrivals and departures could be announced with an amazing 
accuracy. Of greater importance was the application of 
steam to ocean transportation. Although attempts to cross 
the ocean in ships propelled wholly by steam had been made 
as early as 1819, they were not followed up at once, and it 
was for a long time believed that no ship could carry enough 
fuel to take it from continent to continent. By 1839, how¬ 
ever, the problem was well solved, and in that year the Cu- 
nard Company undertook a regular service which has never 
since been discontinued. Improvements were rapid, and the 
duration of the passage was cut down from the eighteen to 
twenty-five days of the sailing packet, and from the fifteen 
days of the earliest steamers, to ten days in 1840 and a little 
over nine days by the middle of the fifties. 

Of the business of ocean carrying, the United States 
obtained a very large share. With the abundance of timber 
and the long experience of colonial times, the American ship¬ 
wrights were able to produce vessels at low cost; and, pro¬ 
tected as they were by our navigation acts, American ship¬ 
owners were able to pay better wages than those of other 
countries and yet charge no higher freights. In order to stim¬ 
ulate American owners to compete in the fast mail service, 
the government in 1845 began the policy of subsidizing Ameri¬ 
can vessels by giving them favorable mail contracts. This 
policy reached its height during the fifties, when the rivalry 
between the American Collins line and the English Cunarders 
attracted world-wide attention; but with the failure of 
the Collins line through marine disasters, the whole subsidy 
policy waned in popularity. Still every decade saw a great 
increase in the tonnage of American vessels engaged in ocean 
traffic. In 1830 it was little over 500,000; in 1840 it was 
750,000; in 1850, about 1,500,000; in i860, nearly 2,500,000. 
The coastwise trade was also growing, and the commerce of 
the Great Lakes was increasing almost beyond computation, 


IMMIGRATION 


271 


so that by i860 the total American merchant marine was 
greater even than that of Great Britain. It represented a 
very great investment of capital, and great fortunes, such as 
that of Commodore Vanderbilt, had grown out of its prog¬ 
ress. The anxious rivalry of Great Britain was indicated 
by the abundant subsidies with which she supplied the 
Cunard line. 

This vast fleet was employed not only in the interchange immigration, 
of commodities, but also in the importation of swarms of im¬ 
migrants seeking new homes in America. Most of the move¬ 
ments of population which have been noted so far as taking 
place after the Revolution were movements of American 
stock. The outflow from the mountains into the piedmont 
regions of the East and the plains of the West, the gradual 
flooding of the Mississippi basin, and the constant rippling 
westward of wave after wave of population, started by first 
one and then another economic or social cause, had nearly 
all merely changed the habitation of the fairly homogeneous 
people which inhabited the country at the time of the Revolu¬ 
tion and of their descendants. Before 1820 foreign immigra¬ 
tion rarely reached 10,000 a year, and this small number was 
chiefly of English origin and quickly assimilated with the 
native population. From that time on there was an in¬ 
crease which continued quite steadily until the middle of 
the fifties. The circumstances that caused this growth were 
threefold. First was the prosperity of the United States, 
as is shown by the fact that immigration grew most rapidly 
in the years of greatest business activity, and declined for a 
year or two after the panics of 1837 and 1857. The second 
was the improvement in ocean transportation, without which 
many would not have faced the journey, and it would have 
been utterly impossible to bring over the vast numbers seek¬ 
ing passage in the early fifties. Finally, the conditions of 
various countries of Europe from time to time incited emi¬ 
gration and determined the character of the new population. 


272 


NEW CONDITIONS, 1830 TO i860 


The coming 
of the Irish. 


Activities of 
the Irish. 


The first important stream of non-English immigration 
was from Ireland. There had always been settlers from 
that island, but to a large extent they had come from the 
north and were of Scotch stock. During this period, how¬ 
ever, overpopulation, famine, and constant political dis¬ 
content sent over hundreds of thousands of the Celtic 
Irish from the southern and central portions of the island. 
Beginning to come in good numbers during the twenties, they 
increased during the thirties, in the next decade 781,000 
came, and in the next, 914,000. 

These Irish were mostly of the peasant class and accus¬ 
tomed to agriculture, but they seldom had money left after 
their arrival and were unable to go west or to buy the high- 
priced farms near at hand. They engaged at first in rough, 
unskilled labor on the canals, railroads, and other large under¬ 
takings of the period. When such a piece of work was com¬ 
pleted, the discharged workmen often settled down in one of 
the towns near by, and drifted into the mills. As they were 
accustomed to a lower standard of living than the natives, 
they were willing to work at smaller wages; and gradually 
their competition, first in one locality and then in another, 
drove the native-born out of such occupations. The jeal¬ 
ousy and hard feeling engendered by this economic rivalry 
was increased by religious differences. These Irish were 
practically all Catholics and extremely devout. It was not 
long before Catholic churches began to rise throughout south¬ 
ern New England and the Middle States, and convents and 
parochial schools competed with the public educational 
establishments which were coming to be looked upon as the 
basis of true democracy. The distrust with which the rigid 
Protestant spirit of the body of the population looked upon 
the growth of Catholic institutions was heightened by the 
part the Irish played in politics. They proved themselves 
adepts in political management and party organization. 
Living, as they did at first, together in separate quarters 


IRISH AND GERMAN IMMIGRATION 


273 


clustered about their churches, and having similar interests, 
they tended to cast their weight on one side, rather than to 
divide between the parties. In the large ports where they 
disembarked and where great numbers of the poorest re¬ 
mained, they soon became an important factor in politics. 
Politicians bid for their votes by favoring appropriations 
to aid their charitable and educational establishments, and 
the Irish Catholics came to be regarded by many as a menace 
to the republic. 

In many places this feeling took shape in riots. In 1834 
an Ursuline convent in the outskirts of Boston was sacked on 
the rumor that girls were confined against their will. In 
New York and Philadelphia riots were frequent, with the 
fault now on one side, now on the other. Prejudice, however, 
was not confined to the rioting classes, and many sought to 
ward off the danger by political measures. Neither of the 
great parties was anxious to take up the issue, because the 
Irish had votes, and because the majority of the population 
really took pride in seeing foreigners flock to our shores. 
It happened, therefore, that from time to time special third 
parties were formed to secure remedial legislation. Such 
factions were active in Philadelphia and New York in 
1835 and 1844 ; in 1847 the Nativist party cast 80,000 
votes in the latter state; and suddenly, in 1852, a temporary 
lull in national politics gave an opportunity for the issue to 
rise into general notice. As the principal basis of appeal 
of the American, or as it was popularly called Know-Noth¬ 
ing, party, it was thoroughly discussed between 1852 and 
1856, and the nation decided to keep its doors open to the 
world. 

A second stream of immigration came from Germany. 
It is significant that the first subsidy granted by the United 
States was to a line running between New York and Bremen. 
German immigration had begun in the seventeenth century, 
and at the time of the Revolution Germans formed a decided 


Anti-foreign 

feeling. 


The coming 
of the Ger¬ 
mans. 


Activities of 
the Germans. 


274 NEW CONDITIONS, 1830 TO i860 

factor in the population of Pennsylvania, Virginia, and New 
York. The stream declined, however, and did not become 
very important again until 1830, when the unsuccessful polit¬ 
ical revolutions of that year sent many of the disappointed 
to America. They were joined during the next few years 
by greater numbers who could not easily adjust themselves 
to the changes caused by the industrial revolution which 
was then sweeping over Germany. The fair reports that 
these sent back encouraged others, and finally the defeat 
of the revolutionary efforts of 1848 induced many brilliant 
young leaders and the more devoted of their followers to 
come to the United States, some as to a temporary refuge, 
and some with the idea of working out their political ideas 
upon more congenial soil. It was even hoped by many of 
them that Wisconsin might become a German state. By 
i860 the German-born population of the United States 
amounted to over a million and a quarter. 

These Germans generally possessed a little money, and 
the greater portion of them passed through the coast states 
and sought the agricultural opportunities beyond the moun¬ 
tains. Some became pioneers, and others bought farms from 
owners who had become restless at the approach of civiliza¬ 
tion and wished to try their fortunes upon the new fron¬ 
tier. With the expanding European market, there was a 
demand for all the breadstuffs that could be produced, and 
hence the economic rivalry encountered by the Irish in the 
East was not found. Among the Germans some were Catho¬ 
lic and some Protestant, they scattered about the country 
instead of living together in close settlements, and their leaders 
took an active part in setting up and supporting the public 
schools. The majority of them did not take so keen an interest 
in politics as did the Irish, but their leaders, particularly those 
who came after 1848, were inclined to do so, and through 
their German newspapers exerted a great influence. Coming 
into the northwestern states, where the population was very 


SHIFTING OF THE POPULATION 


275 


evenly divided between settlers of southern and of northern 
origin, the Germans were to some degree a balancing ele¬ 
ment in the population. They sympathized with the south¬ 
ern portion in their strong belief in individual freedom, op¬ 
posing the strict sabbath and prohibition legislation which 
was being urged by the New York and New England people, 
and consequently becoming, at first, nearly all Democratic 
in politics. At the same time they took the nationalistic 
view of the Constitution, for they had been endeavoring in 
Germany to unify the nation and put an end to the sover¬ 
eignty of the numerous independent German principalities. 
On the whole, they were also strongly opposed to slavery. 
Although the foreign element had become, by 1852, an 
important factor in politics, the feeling between the native 
and foreign population was not so tense west of the mountains 
as in the East. 

This immigration naturally had the effect of causing 
the population to increase with unusual rapidity. In 1820 
it was 9,638,453; by 1830 it was 12,866,020, having increased 
33.5 per cent; in the next decade it increased 32.7 per cent, 
to 17,069,453 ; in the next 35.9 per cent, to 23,191,876; and 
between 1850 and i860, 35.6 per cent, to 31,443,321. 
Throughout the country, population was shifting. In the 
northeastern states tens of thousands were moving west¬ 
ward and were replaced by immigrants. The growth of the 
country population halted, and began, in New England, ac¬ 
tually to decline. This loss was offset by the gain in cities 
and manufacturing towns. The urban population was grow¬ 
ing almost twice as fast as the population of the country at 
large. The slaveholding states were dropping steadily be¬ 
hind. Comparatively few foreign immigrants cared to settle 
there, owing to an inherent dislike of slavery and of the negro, 
the lack of manufacturing development, and the unfortu¬ 
nate position of the small farmers in competition with the 
large plantation owners. The drain of population from the 


Shifting of 
the native 
stock. 


Slow growth 
of the South. 


276 


NEW CONDITIONS, 1830 TO i860 


Growth of the 
Far West. 


Texas. 


slave states into the free states of the West also continued. 
In 1820 the population of the slave area was 4,485,818, or over 
46 per cent of that of the whole country, of which number 
1,558,000 were slaves. During the next twenty years, the 
period of the opening of the cotton belt, the South lost the 
least relatively, having, in 1840, 7,334,431, or 43 per cent of 
the whole, the number of slaves being 2,487,000. Between 
1840 and i860, the period of most active immigration, the 
lead of the North increased rapidly. In the latter year the 
slave states contained 12,315,373 inhabitants, only 39 per 
cent of the total population, and of these 3,954,000 were 
slaves. To put it in another way, the white population of 
the South decreased relatively from about 30 per cent of 
the total population of the United States in 1820, to about 
26 per cent in i860. 

The continuance of the movement westward is indicated 
by the fact that during every decade the states in the Missis¬ 
sippi valley increased at a rate about three times as great 
as those of the coast. During the twenties and thirties the 
greater portion of this western increase was in the area roughly 
broken to civilization before 1820. After the admission of 
Missouri in 1821 it was fifteen years before another state was 
ready for admission, and then Arkansas and Michigan were 
admitted in 1836 and 1837 respectively, indicating the steady 
push of population from neighboring settled territory. There 
was beginning, however, a new period of more adventurous 
pioneering, spurred on by deep-lying motives of religion, and 
love of excitement and of gain, which was to extend the popu¬ 
lation of the United States suddenly to the Pacific, and which 
resulted in the occupation of the Far West. 

The first of these movements into territory lying remote 
and not naturally next in order of occupation, was that which 
has already been mentioned into Texas. Here the excep¬ 
tional motives needed to draw a population so far away were 
the cheapness of the land and the love of fighting, — motives 


THE FAR WEST 


277 


which during this whole period were sufficient to rally hun¬ 
dreds to the banner of any leader, however preposterous his 
plans. Beginning in 1820, this movement had, by 1840, re¬ 
sulted in the establishment of a republic whose independ¬ 
ence was acknowledged everywhere except by Mexico, and 
whose population was fifty or sixty thousand. The situation 
of Texas was regarded as very important strategically. If 
its ports should fall to the possession of the United States, 
that country would control the Gulf of Mexico; if a great 
foreign naval power should hold them, the mouth of the 
Mississippi would be threatened. The diplomats of England 
and some of those of the United States were alert to this 
situation, and courted the favor of the new republic. The 
South was anxious to annex it, because most of its popu¬ 
lation was of southern origin and its institutions and interests 
were practically identical with those of the southern states. 

Far away to the northward was another position of great Oregon, 
significance to the future development of the United States. 

The valley of the Columbia River was the key to the whole 
far northwestern section, and it afforded a western outlet 
for the most natural transcontinental route to the Pacific, that 
of the Missouri River. The United States had certain claims 
to this region, founded on the discovery of the Columbia 
River by Captain Gray in 1792, its exploration by Lewis and 
Clark, and the cession by Spain in 1819. These rights, how¬ 
ever, had never been definitely acknowledged by England, and 
the status of the country had been left doubtful by the joint 
occupation agreements of 1818 and 1828, which allowed 
the subjects of both powers to use freely the territory west of 
the Rocky Mountains between the parallels of 42 0 and 54 0 40'. 

In the meantime the great English Hudson’s Bay Company 
enjoyed almost solitary possession of this great domain, and 
its factor, McLaughlin, was the actual ruler. About 1835 
a missionary interest began to be aroused in behalf of the 
Indians of this region, especially among the Methodists, 


278 


NEW, CONDITIONS, 1830 TO i860 


Great Salt 
Lake valley. 


Congregationalists, and Presbyterians. They sent a number 
of families into the field, and their efforts to raise money for 
the work resulted in a general diffusion of interest in the 
Oregon territory. The missionaries encountered an active 
rivalry from the French Catholic priests who came from 
Canada and acknowledged English authority. The rivalry 
of the Protestant and Catholic missions developed into one 
of American and English, and the former appealed to the 
United States government to assert its claims, occupy the 
territory, and encourage settlement by giving stable land 
titles. Their cause found many champions in Congress, 
particularly Senator Linn of Missouri, who was familiar 
with the situation through the reports of the fur traders of 
the Missouri. Congress often discussed the matter between 
1837 and 1843, and thousands of government documents 
carried accounts of the fertility of the soil throughout the 
country. The result of this religious and political agitation 
was that in 1842, when a government Indian agent went over¬ 
land to Oregon, he was joined by a hundred and fifty settlers, 
and the next spring, from Arkansas, Illinois, and other states 
there came groups of settlers with their wagons displaying 
signs “For Oregon.” Over a thousand pioneers passed over 
the mountains in 1843, and actual settlement was begun. 

The vast interior valley of the Great Salt Lake also owed 
its opening to religious impulse. Joseph Smith, a magnetic, 
visionary young man of a family which had followed a usual 
course of New England migration from Connecticut to Ver¬ 
mont and thence to New York, about 1830 proclaimed him¬ 
self the prophet of a new faith, and published the Book 0] 
Mormon as an exposition of his beliefs. An important phase 
of this new religion was its insistence on the communal life. 
There was at this time a widespread interest in commu¬ 
nism, both in America and in Europe. Religious sects like the 
American Shakers and the German Rappists founded such 
settlements, the most notable being that at New Harmony 


THE FAR WEST 


279 


on the Wabash under the direction of Robert Dale Owen. 
Associations to apply the doctrines of the French philosopher 
Fourier attempted experiments all the way from Massa¬ 
chusetts to Wisconsin and Iowa. Of all these efforts that of 
the Mormons alone proved to have the elements of per¬ 
manence and growth. Converts were numerous from among 
Smith’s rural neighbors in central New York and also 
among the foreign immigrants. The Mormons were unpop¬ 
ular in the districts in which they settled. Persecution 
drove them from New York to Ohio, from Ohio to Mis¬ 
souri, and then to Illinois. Here they prospered for a time, 
but opposition to them was increased when Smith and other 
leaders adopted the practice of polygamy. After the death 
of Smith at the hands of a mob in 1844, they despaired 
of living a peaceful life amid a population of alien religion, 
and decided, under their new leader, Brigham Young, to seek 
peace in the wilderness. In 1847 a host of men, women, and 
children, with wagons and cattle, started westward across 
the plains, and undertook a pilgrimage which demanded 
all their faith. They halted near the Great Salt Lake, in 
a territory which at that time belonged to Mexico, but which 
seemed so remote from all settlement and government that 
they hoped to work out their whole religious and social polity 
without interference for years to come. Through the fifties 
their missionaries practically acted as immigration agents in 
drawing converts from the East and from Europe. 

The most attractive of all the portions of the Far West, California, 
but the least accessible from the Atlantic coast, was Cali¬ 
fornia, and there Spanish settlement, moving north from 
Mexico, had done much to establish a civilization and a 
language alien to that of the United States. Still the hold 
of Mexico was regarded as but feeble. The infant republic 
of Texas aspired to annex it, and, with ports on both oceans, 
to control the transcontinental trade. In the United States 
there was great fear that England might secure it, in 


28o 


NEW CONDITIONS, 1830 TO i860 


exchange for the heavy debts due to her by Mexico. Web¬ 
ster considered the harbor of San Francisco twenty times as 
valuable as the whole Texan territory. Actual settlement 
lagged, owing to distance and the difficulty of transportation; 
but many of the American whaling vessels which frequented 
the Pacific stopped at the California ports for supplies; a 
few Americans settled in the country to trade with them; 
and some of those who came overland to Oregon continued 
down the coast in search of a more genial climate. All 
together by 1845 several hundred Americans were residing 
in California, and there was a general disposition to regard 
it as a future field for American settlement. 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 


Historical 
accounts. 
Transporta¬ 
tion and 
Commerce. 


Immigration. 


Know-Noth- 

ingism. 


Occupation 
of the West. 


Adams, C. F., Origin and Problems of Railroads , 36-79. 
Bishop, J. L., American Manufactures , II, 342-424. Coman, K., 
Industrial History of the United States, ch. VII. Homans, I. S., 
Jr., Foreign Commerce of the United States (1857). Mayer, E., 
Origin of the Pacific Railroads {Publications of Minn. Hist. Soc., 
vol. VI). Rhodes, J. F., United States, III, ch. I. Semple, E. C., 
American History and its Geographic Conditions, 246-273, 337-390. 
Smith, T. C., Parties and Slavery, 1-109. Spears, J. R., American 
Merchant Marine, chs. IX, XI-XV. 

Bromwell, W. J., History of Immigration (with statistics). Byrne, 
S., Irish Emigration to the United States. Faust, The German Element 
in the United States, chs. 15, 16. Sartorius, A., Baron von Waiter- 
hausen, Die Zukunft des Deutschthums in der Vereinigten Staaten von 
Amerika. Smith, R. M., Emigration and Immigration, chs. Ill-VIII. 

Lee, J. II., The Origin and Progress of the American Party. 
Schmeckebier, L. F., History of the Know-Nothing Party in Maryland 
{Johns Hopkins Historical Studies, XVII, nos. 4, 5). Seisca, L. D., 
Political Nativism in the State of New York {Columbia Univ. Studies 
in Hist., vol. XIII, no. 2). Stickney, C., Know-Nothingism in 
Rhode Island (Brown University Historical Seminary, Papers). 

Bancroft, H. H., Oregon. Coman, K., Economic Beginnings of 
the Far West. Garrison, Westward Extension, 3-43. Linn, W. A., 
Story 0} the Mormons. Royce, J., California, ch. III. 


CHAPTER XVIII 

INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL RENAISSANCE 

The intellectual activity of the period 1830 to i860 was as 
remarkable as the economic, and was inseparably inter¬ 
woven with it. The development of a real and widespread 
democracy demanded an adaptation of the newspaper to the 
new circumstances, but without the progress of transporta¬ 
tion facilities this would have been almost impossible. Every 
improvement in communication meant the more rapid and 
more complete diffusion of news, and finally the invention 
of the electric telegraph, first used in 1844, enabled the voters, 
from one end of the country to the other, to read the same 
news at the same time and to vote with an approximately 
equal knowledge of each public question. The greater ease 
in transmitting news decreased the importance of the Wash¬ 
ington newspapers, for the metropolitan dailies began to 
keep correspondents in the capital, with whom they could 
communicate constantly. In 1857 New York had so far 
succeeded to the position of news center, that the practice 
of having an officially recognized government organ at 
Washington was brought to an end. The new city papers 
were more independent than the Washington presses had 
been, which were dependent on government printing for their 
profits. The New York Sun led the way in endeavoring to 
support itself by selling its copies cheaply, amusing its readers, 
and so increasing its circulation. The Herald , under the 
editorship of the astute James Gordon Bennett, quickly 
adopted the new practice, and the Tribune, edited by Horace 
Greeley, and many others followed. In the place of the old 
advertising sheet with a few antiquated letters and verbose 

281 


Intellectual 

activity. 

Newspapers. 


282 INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL RENAISSANCE 


Movement of 
thought. 


Foreign in¬ 
fluences. 


editorials written by an editor looking for some petty office as 
a reward of his party faithfulness, came a paper with news 
columns most prominent, often with sensational headings and 
“faked” stories, and with a page of short, crisp editorials 
written by men whose business and social prestige was too 
great to allow them to accept ordinary government appoint¬ 
ments. Unlike the editors of to-day, most of those at this 
period owned their papers and were therefore their own mas¬ 
ters, and they exerted a greater personal influence than either 
their predecessors or their successors. 

The press was an instrument necessary to the existence 
of democracy at the time, like the party organization and the 
spoils system. Other intellectual movements were in prog¬ 
ress which were to do much to determine the direction 
in which the ruling democracy should move. American 
thinkers and writers were in intellectual communion with the 
wisest and best in Europe, and were making contributions 
of their own to literature and science and art. America 
began to count in the world of thought. The newspapers 
were but one of the agencies by which this intellectual activ¬ 
ity was diffused among the people. 

Before the Revolution, American architecture had fol¬ 
lowed the English, and the finest buildings were of the 
Georgian style. There followed a period when French in¬ 
fluence combined with a democratic reverence for the re¬ 
publics of the past to give a classical tone to American taste, 
and a Greek portico was considered a necessity for a patriotic 
dwelling or public building. To the people of this new genera¬ 
tion, with their minds stimulated by the more subtle philos¬ 
ophy of the Germans and with Goethe as an inspiration, the 
beauties of Italy particularly appealed. The steamship made 
European travel for the first time a customary pleasure, and 
while the fashionable began to seek Paris during the later 
fifties, it was Rome that drew the more influential. Here the 
sculptors Crawford and Story worked, Hawthorne drew in- 


INTELLECTUAL AWAKENING 


283 


spiration for his Marble Faun, and Margaret Fuller lived and 
married. The American architecture of the period bears 
the stamp of Italian influence, and American life was en¬ 
riched by a transfusion of Italian beauty. As in art, so in 
literature, with eyes newly opened to the beauties of the 
world, the thinkers of the time joyed in the delightful task of 
putting their thoughts into attractive and appropriate form, 
no longer satisfied with the mechanical outline and pedantic 
diction of their ancestors. 

This awakening had been felt first in the Middle States Middk 
about the beginning of the century. The writings of Charles States - 
Brockden Brown, James Fenimore Cooper, and Washington 
Irving combined English traditions with a racy and daring 
Americanism. In the period under review New York and 
Philadelphia were the leading centers of publication in the 
country, and Harper's Magazine , of the former city, brought 
together contributors from all over the United States and 
England, and enjoyed a national circulation. In 1855 Walt 
Whitman brought out his Leaves of Grass, which marked a 
sharp severance from European influence and did much to 
increase the self-confidence of American writers. 

In the South the University of Virginia, founded under The South, 
the direction of Jefferson and opened in 1825, more nearly 
approached the European idea of such an institution 
than any other in America. Some of the professors were 
brought over from Europe, its students came from all 
parts of the South, and it did much to stimulate and unify 
the thought of the whole region. One of its students was 
Edgar Allan Poe, whose lyric verse and short stories were 
more widely read on the continent of Europe than the work 
of any other American. At the same time Audubon was 
receiving universal recognition for his scientific studies 
of bird life. Charleston and Richmond were literary centers 
and the Literary Messenger of the latter city enjoyed a 
substantial reputation. The bulk of the intellectual activity 


284 INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL RENAISSANCE 


The New 
England 
renaissance. 


The New 
England 
conscience. 


of the South, however, was devoted to political questions, and 
found expression in the work of her orators and political 
pamphleteers. 

The changes in intellectual and moral concepts most sig¬ 
nificant in their bearing on the history of the period were those 
taking place among the New England population, which by this 
time stretched far to the westward, and was particularly strong 
in central New York and northeastern Ohio. The bonds 
which during the colonial period and afterward had confined 
the virile minds of the people within the strict limits of ortho¬ 
doxy, were broken, and freedom of thought was established. 
So great and genuine was the emancipation that there was a 
short period of chaos, such as always comes when barriers 
are removed, and all kinds of fantastic theories of salvation, 
of habits of life, and of manners of dress were indulged in. 
With the idea that mental and manual labor should be used 
conjointly, Brook Farm was founded; and there numbers 
of the most brilliant figures in the history of the generation 
lived for a few years, vainly endeavoring to practice com¬ 
munism, but actually giving one another the stimulus of 
coeducation under ideal conditions. It was the era of Tran¬ 
scendentalism, of the New England renaissance, when long¬ 
haired men and short-haired women lived in an atmosphere 
of idealism and of youth. 

With all their new-found joy of living and daring accept¬ 
ance of new ideas, they could not free themselves from those 
deep-lying characteristics which had been bred of two cen¬ 
turies of New England life. Most of the leaders in the new 
movements came of ministerial stock, many counted seven 
generations of ministers in direct male line, and the minis¬ 
terial instinct remained. They might believe things different 
from what their fathers had, they might change their beliefs 
from time to time, but everything that they did believe they 
supported with all the dogmatic exclusiveness of the veriest 
Puritans. If they accepted a belief in vegetarianism, they 


EDUCATION 285 

thereupon denounced the consumption of meat by any one 
at any time as not only injurious but sinful, and set about 
vigorously to convert all men to their doctrine. Every new 
fad became with them a religion, demanding, not silent 
passive devotion, but active proselyting energy. Few were 
content, like Hawthorne, to practice literature for its own 
sake; the majority regarded their skill in writing or in art 
only as an instrument useful in bringing others to their ideas. 

The predominant note in all their creeds was the equal¬ 
ity of all men, and their capacity for infinite improvement. 
The Puritan conception of the unworthiness of man in the 
sight of God had gradually yielded to the democratic condi¬ 
tions of American life and the religious attacks of the Uni¬ 
tarians, until all denominations began to point out that at 
least man was God’s noblest work; many of the radicals 
accepted Emerson’s position that man has something of the 
divine within him, and consequently the possibility of mak¬ 
ing himself at one with God. The very complete attainment 
of political equality left comparatively little to be accom¬ 
plished in that direction, and the New England crusaders 
turned their chief attention to obtaining economic and social 
equality. This period was marked throughout the European 
world by great movements for social regeneration, and the 
local developments in America and the general activity of 
European thought interacted to spur one another on. 

One of the fundamental social movements of the period 
was the establishment of free public education under state 
control. The progress of education, particularly elemen¬ 
tary education, had not kept pace with the general develop¬ 
ment of the country. It was not only inadequate, because 
the community had not become fully awake to the responsi¬ 
bility of the whole people for the education of all children, 
but it was undemocratic, because even in schools where the 
education of the poor was provided for, the well-to-do paid 
fees, and their children looked upon the others as paupers. 


The doctrine 
of universal 
brotherhood 
and equality. 


Free public 
education. 


286 INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL RENAISSANCE 


From about 1820 these conditions excited attention and 
controversy. It was a subject which had to be fought out 
separately in every state. In New York, De Witt Clinton 
urged the legislature to action as early as 1826, and the 
“Lancastrian System” was established, which was not in 
itself successful, but afforded a basis upon which, during 
the thirties, a successful scheme was founded. In Penn¬ 
sylvania, the young Vermont lawyer and Antimasonic 
leader, Thaddeus Stevens, secured in 1834 the passage of a 
bill, not entirely satisfactory, but still marking progress. 
During the debate he made a brilliant speech in which he 
defended the taxing of those without children for the educa¬ 
tion of the children of others: “Inasmuch as it perpetuates 
the government and insures the due administration of the 
laws under which they live, and by which their lives and 
property are protected.” The most notable figure in the 
whole movement was that of Horace Mann, who in 1837 
became first secretary of the Massachusetts State Board of 
Education. His reports discussed the fundamental prin¬ 
ciples of education as a science, a profession, and a bulwark 
of the state. By i860 the principle of free public education 
had been accepted by nearly all the northern states and by 
Kentucky and Missouri. After some additional conflict, the 
courts decided that taxes might be levied for higher as well 
as elementary education, and high schools became general. 
In 1839 the first normal school in the United States was 
opened at Lexington, Massachusetts, under the direction of 
Horace Mann, and teaching became a recognized profession. 
Universities had been regarded as proper beneficiaries of 
the public from the founding of the colonies, and now national 
land grants enabled the newer states to establish them without 
delay. The framework of the present educational system was 
laid, though many problems were as yet unsolved, and the 
actual accomplishment by no means equaled the projects 
of the various states as they appeared on paper. 


EDUCATIONAL MOVEMENTS 


287 


One of the characteristics of the American system was 
the entire separation between religion and education. In 
New York this led to some controversy, and Governor Seward 
declared in favor of state aid to religious schools; but public 
sentiment was overwhelmingly opposed to this. The 
Catholics and some other religious bodies in certain states, 
therefore, opposed the free school movement, for they pre¬ 
ferred to send their children to parochial schools, and ob¬ 
jected to being taxed in addition for the education of others. 
This opposition, however, was overcome, though not with¬ 
out lending some bitterness, as has been seen, to the anti- 
foreign movement. In the South the middle class of skilled 
laborers and small farmers was unimportant, and so the 
demand for free public schools was less insistent. Public 
education lagged behind that of the North, though academies 
and colleges, chiefly private, flourished. 

Behind this legislation was a great popular movement 
and widespread interest in education of every kind. Those 
who were too old or in other ways unable to attend schools 
sought other opportunities; and in many towns lyceums 
were formed whose members clubbed together and hired 
lecturers. The ablest men of the time accepted such en¬ 
gagements, partly because literary work paid less than at 
present and lecture fees were welcome, and partly through 
the desire to propagate their views. Edward Everett, dur¬ 
ing the fifties, delivered everywhere his great oration on 
Washington and the Union , collecting money with which to 
purchase Mount Vernon as a national memorial, and en¬ 
deavoring to strengthen the spirit of union. Wendell Phillips 
spoke on slavery whenever he was allowed. At no other 
time in history have the great men of a country come into 
such close personal Contact with a widely dispersed people, 
and the lecture platform became one of the instruments em¬ 
ployed in agitating reforms of every kind. 

Another great social movement of the period was that 


Religious 

opposition. 


Popular edu' 

cational 

movements. 


288 INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL RENAISSANCE 


The temper¬ 
ance move¬ 
ment. 


Prohibition 

laws. 


to check the evils caused by intoxicating drinks. During 
the colonial period indulgence in such beverages was almost 
universal. Some attempts were made to discourage drunken¬ 
ness and to encourage the use of lighter intoxicants in the 
place of spirits, but they were not widespread or effective. 
In 1826 a new agitation was begun, and within a year over a 
thousand temperance societies had been formed. With the 
new facilities for communication afforded by the improve¬ 
ments in transportation, state organizations were effected, 
and in 1835 a National Temperance Convention was held. 
The movement began with scientific studies of the effects 
of intemperance, but their appeal was to a limited constitu¬ 
ency only, and soon more emotional methods were employed. 
The radical element gained control, and in 1836 it was re¬ 
solved that the proper basis for effective work was the preach¬ 
ing of total abstinence. Wave after wave of enthusiasm 
swept over the country. The “Washington movement,” 
originating in Baltimore, and calling upon those convinced 
to take the pledge of total abstinence, was perhaps the most 
effective; and John B. Gough, a reformed drunkard, was per¬ 
haps the most effective spokesman, though Father Matthew, 
the great Catholic temperance advocate, rivaled him in 
influence. The lead in all these movements was taken by 
men, and at first women were even excluded from the con¬ 
ventions. Gradually, however, women workers forced their 
way to the front, as they did in all the social agitations of 
the time. 

During the forties the movement became so strong 
that its leaders were no longer content with making a per¬ 
sonal appeal, but sought legislative support. Neal Dow 
was the chief advocate of this method, and in 1851 he se¬ 
cured the passage of a law in his own state of Maine, pro¬ 
hibiting the manufacture or sale of all alcoholic beverages, 
except for medicinal use. This was speedily followed by 
similar legislation in the other New England states except 


THE LABOR MOVEMENT 


289 


Rhode Island, and in Iowa. Attempts were made to pass 
such laws in other states, and they probably would have been 
successful throughout the Northwest, had it not been for 
the incoming of the Germans with their almost universal 
habit of drinking the less harmful intoxicants, and their op¬ 
position to laws restraining the liberty of the individual. 

The latter reason naturally operated strongly in the South, 
with its Jeffersonian principles, and the prohibition move¬ 
ment made no material progress there. 

The results brought about by thirty years of effort are Results of the 
hardly to be calculated. Wine and spirits were banished movement - 
from the tables of probably a majority of the people in the 
northern states, and hundreds of thousands of men became 
total abstainers. In villages where drunkenness had been 
a common joke, it became a rare occurrence. It is probable 
that in our country at the beginning of the Civil War a larger 
number of persons refrained from the use of alcohol, than 
in any other country in the temperate zone up to that 
period. 

Movements, to ameliorate the conditions of the sick, of Labor legisia- 
the blind, of the insane, of children, and of dumb animals, tlon ’ 
for women’s rights and a hundred other purposes, vied for 
the public attention. Massachusetts led the way in pro¬ 
tective legislation for children in factories. Some of the 
movements were by outsiders for the benefit of the help¬ 
less. Some, like the temperance movement, combined the 
philanthropy of the merciful with the strivings of those per¬ 
sonally affected. In the case of labor, self-help was most 
prominent. The period of the thirties saw the formation 
of labor unions and the beginnings of labor journalism, and 
of the effort of labor to secure favorable legislation by its 
political influence. In the midst of this general interest in 
the uplift of mankind the most helpless class of all, that 
of the southern negro slaves, was not overlooked, and the 
effort to improve their condition was destined to secure the 


290 INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL RENAISSANCE 


World move¬ 
ment against 
slavery. 


greatest share of popular interest and to have the deepest 
influence on politics. 

Like many of the other reforms of the period, that for 
the abolition of slavery was not confined to the United States. 
Slavery was in fact a system of labor which at one time had 
been almost universal. Gradually the European world had 
outgrown it, and during the seventeenth century the growth 
of humanitarian ideas and philanthropic conceptions of the 
rights of man, emphasized by the American and French Revo¬ 
lutions, created a distaste for the institution and a desire 
to rid the world of it. The most obnoxious single feature was 
the slave trade, and England in 1807 and the United States 
in 1808 put a legislative prohibition upon it, after which 
England, having thus forsworn one of the most profitable 
branches of her commerce, used constantly all her great inter¬ 
national influence to extinguish it throughout the world. 

The prohibition of slavery itself was easily accomplished 
in those regions where such legislation was but a recognition 
of its actual disappearance as a vital factor in the life of the 
community, but it was a different matter where it meant 
serious interference with vested property interests, or the 
freeing of an alien race. In England itself and in Massachu¬ 
setts, a judicial decision was sufficient without legislation; but 
fifty years of agitation were necessary to secure, in 1832, the 
abolition by the British Parliament of slavery in the West 
Indies, and $100,000,000 was voted as a compensation to the 
slave owners. After this the movement went on apace, and 
by 1849 slavery had been abolished in their colonies by the 
most important European nations. In the United States, the 
situation was still more difficult, because not only were there 
regions where slavery seemed the very basis of society and 
the slaves were of a despised race, but also these regions con¬ 
sisted of coequal states, instead of colonies, and controlled 
half of the Senate, which gave them a veto on legislation. 

Within the southern states themselves there had been 


WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON 


291 


an active antislavery sentiment from the time of the Revo¬ 
lution, bred of the philanthropic feeling for the rights of 
all men and of the fact that slavery became unprofitable 
with the exhaustion of the tobacco lands. This sentiment 
received an almost solid political support from the mountain 
counties of the northern tier of southern states, and from the 
Quakers, who constituted a powerful element in North Caro¬ 
lina. In almost every state convention the subject came up, 
and Kentucky in 1799, and Virginia in 1830, came within 
a few votes of adopting a system of gradual emancipation. 
By the latter date, however, these fifty years of effort had 
accomplished no more than the freeing of large numbers of 
individual slaves by. the personal action of their masters, 
and the colonizing of a few in Liberia. The unsatisfactory 
condition of the free negroes made an argument in favor of 
the continuance of slavery hard for its opponents to refute, 
and the rise in the value of slaves after 1830, as a result 
of the opening up of the cotton lands of the Gulf States, 
seemed to render any prompt action unlikely. 

In this situation there arose a man concerning whose 
place in history students will probably forever continue 
divided. To some he will appear the chief figure in the 
crusade which brought freedom to the slave and freed the 
country from a disgraceful institution, albeit through the 
throes of civil war; to others as the leader of a movement 
entirely unnecessary and without which slavery would have 
vanished in good time without war and in a manner better 
fitted to adapt the slave to his new condition. How much 
personal responsibility, however, whether for good or for 
evil, can be placed upon William Lloyd Garrison, is a ques¬ 
tion involving the most fundamental concepts of historic 
development and of philosophy. In this age of humanita¬ 
rian reform the slave was sure to attract attention; with the 
growth of national feeling the people of the North were bound 
to feel a sense of responsibility for the existence of slavery any- 


Antislavery 
movement in 
the South. 


William 
Lloyd Garri¬ 
son. 


292 INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL RENAISSANCE 


Beginnings 
of the aboli¬ 
tion move 
ment. 


where in the land; and the resulting agitation was necessarily 
marked by the fierce religious heat and the emotional methods 
which characterized the generation. Personally Garrison was 
an ideal type of the reformer, the enthusiast whose mind 
sees only the object to be accomplished and none of the 
surrounding circumstances which cause the statesman to hesi¬ 
tate, delay, and sometimes refuse to act. He had the enor¬ 
mous forceful nose of moral leaders like Savonarola, Crom¬ 
well, and Pobedonostsev, with the wide-cut mouth of the 
orator; but he lacked the strong executive chin of Cromwell, 
and his eyes had a kindlier gleam than any of the others. 
He held but one conception of slavery; it was a sin and must 
be at once eradicated. He brushed aside all talk of gradual 
emancipation; it should be immediate. He would have no 
compensated emancipation; that would be like paying a 
thief for returning stolen property. He would not discuss 
colonization; for the negro, having been brought to the land 
against his will, should have absolute freedom to stay or to go 
as he chose. He would have no truce with the supporters of 
slavery: “I will be harsh as truth, as uncompromising as 
justice.” So keen was his sensitiveness, that he felt dis¬ 
graced that he and his state were part of a nation permitting 
slavery, and in i860 rejoiced at secession, as it relieved the 
free states from this iniquitous bond. The Union he de¬ 
scribed as “ a covenant with death ” and the Constitution 
as “an agreement with hell.” 

With such a creed, Garrison took up his task in 1829 
by joining with Benjamin Lundy, a veteran Quaker emanci¬ 
pationist, in the publication of the Genius of Universal 
Emancipation. The gentle tolerant persuasiveness of Lundy 
and the aggressive and dogmatic zeal of Garrison, well il¬ 
lustrate the Philadelphia Quaker spirit of personal reform 
and the New England determination to reform the world. 
In 1831 Garrison independently brought out the Liberator. 
Supporters began to rally around him; in 1831 the first of 


THE ABOLITIONISTS 


293 


the new abolitionist societies was formed, in 1832 the New 
England society, and in 1833 the national society. The 
object of these societies was abolition; their method was to 
bring the matter home to the mind of the public, for they 
believed that if the facts were known there would be uni¬ 
versal demand for their solution of the problem. In addi¬ 
tion to publications like the Liberator , which continued to 
be the chief organ of the movement, orators were sent about 
to address whoever would listen to them, and the public 
were successfully kept interested. Still another method was 
to encourage the escape of as many slaves as possible, in 
order that they might personally enjoy freedom, and that 
slaves might become a precarious form of property. To 
accomplish this object publications were circulated in the 
South, well illustrated, that they might appeal to the il¬ 
literate negroes, and gradually a system of refuges, called the 
“Underground Railroad,” was developed, extending by 
many routes from the Mason-Dixon line to points on the 
Canadian frontier and making it easy for a slave, once es¬ 
caping from the South, to reach safety and freedom within 
English territory. 

This work among the negroes caused universal alarm Defense of 
throughout the South, over which the fear of slave insurrec- the South, 
tion hung like a pall. In 1831 there occurred in Virginia 
Nat Turner’s Rebellion, the most serious movement that 
ever took place among the negroes themselves; and for this 
Garrison was held primarily responsible. Almost the en¬ 
tire white population became determined to put an end to 
the movement. The postmaster of Charleston refused to 
deliver abolition literature in 1835, and was in effect sus¬ 
tained by Amos Kendall, the Postmaster-General, and by 
President Jackson, though not by Congress. South Carolina 
imprisoned negro sailors on northern vessels, and when 
Massachusetts sent Judge Hoar to protest, forced him to 
leave the state. Alabama and Virginia each had a con- 


294 INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL RENAISSANCE 

troversy with New York over the extradition of a writer of 
articles which were incendiary according to the laws of those 
states, but whom Governor Seward refused to deliver up. 
On the whole, by law and by occasional violence, the activity 
of the abolitionists in the South was effectually checked. 
In fact a species of popular censorship grew up, the existing 
local movements in favor of ultimate gradual emancipation 
died away, and free discussion of the subject was almost 
universally tabooed. The old defense of slavery, that it 
was a necessary evil, was superseded by the belief that it 
constituted the ideal relationship between the two races, that 
it was sanctioned and blessed by the Bible, and that the 
condition of the slaves was actually superior to that of the 
factory population of the North and of England. Calhoun 
wrote in 1845 : “I look back with pleasure to the progress 
which sound principles have made within the last ten years, 
in respect to the relation between the two races. All, with 
a very few exceptions, defended it on the ground of the 
necessary evil, to be got rid of as soon as possible. South 
Carolina was not much sounder twenty years ago, than Ken¬ 
tucky is now.” The proslavery movement of the South 
came to be based as firmly on moral and emotional arguments 
as that against it in the North. 

Northern In the North, also, the abolitionists met with opposi- 

aboUtion. nt0 tion. Mobs attacked their orators in Boston and other 
places, their schools and halls were burned in Connecticut 
and Philadelphia, and in 1837 Elijah P. Lovejoy, editor of 
an abolitionist paper in Illinois, was murdered. In the Ohio 
River states, moreover, the immigration of free negroes 
was forbidden, and “black laws,” based upon the inequality 
of the negro, were passed. Here, however, persecution rather 
added to the strength of the abolitionists than stayed their 
efforts. Many became interested who were not so extreme 
as were the original leaders. Garrison held: “The ballot 
box is not an antislavery, but a proslavery, argument so long 


THE PROSLAVERY MOVEMENT 


295 


as it is surrounded by the United States Constitution, which 
forbids all approach to it except on condition that the voter 
shall surrender fugitive slaves — suppress negro insurrec¬ 
tions — sustain a piratical representation in Congress, and 
regard manstealers as equally eligible with the truest friends 
of freedom and equality to any or all the offices under the 
United States government.” Many abolitionists, however, 
believed that political agitation should not be neglected. 

In 1837 the national society divided on this question. The 
political wing, under the presidency of James G. Birney, 
formed the Liberty party, and presented the issue to the 
electorate. While they desired immediate abolition, they 
were willing to fight for even small gains. Their first ob¬ 
ject was to secure abolition in the District of Columbia, 
to commit the national government against slavery, and to 
employ every power granted by the Constitution to dis¬ 
solve the institution. While these powers were limited, they 
were sufficient to have crippled slavery. Especially danger¬ 
ous to it was the fact that Congress could regulate inter¬ 
state commerce. In 1840 Birney ran for President, and 
received a few over seven thousand votes. 

The strength of the movement is by no means to be es- The right of 
timated by this vote. There was a widespread sympathy p^ 111011 - 
with the abolitionists, though their methods were held to be 
unwise. This latent sentiment was shown by the manner 
in which their cause came to be identified with that of free 
speech. They very early began to petition Congress to exert 
its powers, wherever it could, against slavery. These peti¬ 
tions greatly exasperated the southern leaders, who saw in 
this way abolitionist literature published at government 
expense. In 1836 the House voted that such petitions be 
tabled without printing, and the Senate that they be re¬ 
ceived, but that nothing else be done with them. In 1840 
the House adopted what was known as the “ twenty-first 
rule”; that they be not received or entertained. Such action 


296 INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL RENAISSANCE 


Attempt 1 
unite the 
South. 


was looked upon as an infringement of the right of petition; 
it excited very general opposition in the North; the signa¬ 
tures on abolitionist petitions increased ten times, rising to 
300,000 in 1838, and John Quincy Adams began a spirited 
fight for their reception, which kept the slavery question 
before Congress at every session, until at length, in 1844, 
the House repealed its rule. The question of slavery had 
thus been given unlimited publicity, and on this one point, 
at least, the antislavery leaders had commanded the political 
support of the North. 

This entrance of the question of slavery into politics 
alarmed the southern leaders to the utmost, particularly 
Calhoun, the most far-sighted among them. Gradually 
he formulated a policy of defense. Politically his object 
was to unite the entire South, so that, regardless of minor 
differences and party allegiance, it should stand as a unit on 
the subject. In 1840 he wrote: “I concur in the opinion 
that we ought to take the highest ground on the subject 
of African slavery, as it exists among us; and have from the 
first acted accordingly; but we must not break with, or 
throw off those who are not yet prepared to come up to our 
standard, especially on the exterior limits of the slavehold¬ 
ing states.” Believing, as he did, that material interest 
would always be stronger than any other, and that the South 
in this case was more strongly interested in retaining slavery 
than the North in overthrowing it, he counted on a division 
in the North through which a solid South could control the 
government. He recognized, however, that such an alliance 
was not sufficient, and was more strongly impressed than 
ever before with the necessity of providing for the expansion 
of slavery in order that the balance in the Senate at least 
might be preserved. That body continued to prove, as it 
had in 1820 and 1833, the bulwark against legislation which 
the South opposed. The House was hopelessly northern, 
not only because the South was dropping behind in popu- 


NATIONALIZATION OF SLAVERY 


297 


lation, but because of the only partial representation of the 
slave population. While it seemed a hardship to the North 
that slaves should be represented at all, in the South it was 
esteemed unfair that they should not all count, for it was be¬ 
lieved that the northern factory hands were as incompetent 
as they, and were driven to the ballot box by the mill owners, 
who thus controlled Congress and passed protective tariffs. 

If the northern alliance and the balance in the Senate 
failed, the last resort of the South was to the Constitution. 

Little was said of nullification; if not a universally recog¬ 
nized failure, it was at least inapplicable to the newly arising 
problems. Calhoun continued to emphasize state rights, Defense of 
and to insist that the states be left entirely alone to control national* 8 
the domestic institutions, but he took much higher ground 
than this. The national government, he held, was instituted 
for the protection and well-being of all the states. In partic¬ 
ular it was the representative of the states in dealing with 
foreign governments. It was its duty to cherish and de¬ 
fend all the institutions of all the states. It had no right to 
pick and choose as to which it should further and which it 
should discourage. Any institution legal in any state was 
national in the sense that the national government was bound 
to recognize and shelter it. In pursuance of this view he 
called upon the government to protect the maritime inter¬ 
state slave trade from the interference of the British in the 
case of the Creole , and strove to commit the government in 
every way to his theory. He held a position precisely the 
reverse of that of Birney, who wished the government to 
exert all its power against slavery, and he sought to rally the 
South to his support. Daily these views made progress. 

The institution of slavery seemed at stake. Calhoun counted 
powerful leaders in the border states among his friends, and 
the radical views of the Cotton South began to predominate 
throughout the slaveholding states. 

Every year the bitterness of feeling became more in- 


298 INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL RENAISSANCE 


Sectionalism 
in churches. 


Rioting. 


tense; the great sectionalism between the slaveholding and 
non-slaveholding states began to overshadow differences 
between East and West, between commercial and agricul¬ 
tural states. On all questions involving the status of slavery 
the North and South each tended to become solid. The 
moral aspect which the question had assumed naturally made 
it a difficult one for those churches which were strong in 
North and South alike. As antislavery sentiment grew in 
the North, northern members wished to place their churches 
on record against slavery and to forbid, at least church officers, 
to hold slaves. Southern members, conscious that they were 
not responsible for the existence of slavery, resented the in¬ 
ference that they were sinning in holding slaves, and adopted 
the rising southern belief in slavery as divinely ordained. 
During the forties the Baptist and Methodist churches 
divided, the Methodist ultimately into three branches repre¬ 
senting northern, southern, and conservative border state 
opinion. The Presbyterians, in 1850, practically separated, 
though they retained their united organization until the Civil 
War. Calhoun wrote in 1834: “I cannot but think the 
course the Western Baptist and Methodist preachers took, 
in reference to the division of their churches, has done much 
to expel Cassius Clay [a Kentucky abolitionist] and correct 
publick opinion in that quarter.” The national parties, being 
less sensitive to moral questions than the churches, still 
resisted the dividing influence, but their cohesion would be 
put to a severe test if a question should enter politics which 
tended to bring into conflict the material interests of the 
slaveholding and non-slaveholding states. Each section 
would feel justified in fighting to the extremity when not only 
its well-being, but a moral principle, was at stake. 

It was ominous that a generation so stirred by profound 
emotions was also to a considerable degree lawless and 
given to violence. In the West the pioneer spirit pervaded 
society, firearms were commonly carried, and law was little 


RIOTING 


299 


observed if it were contrary to the public wish. Settlers 
went where they wished, in either United States or foreign 
territory, and did much what they wished. In the South 
unauthorized force did much to suppress abolitionist prop¬ 
aganda. In the North the “Underground Railroad” was 
legally criminal, yet was conducted by the most reputable 
men and women. Religious riots were common in New York 
and occurred in Massachusetts. In Rhode Island, where the 
old charter of 1663 still served as a constitution and was un- 
amendable, dissatisfaction took the form of revolution in 
1842. This movement, known as the “Dorr War,” was 
unsuccessful and rather amusing from a military point of 
view, yet it brought about the adoption of a new and more 
democratic constitution in 1843. In New York the “anti¬ 
rent” riots, between 1840 and 1852, brought to an effectual 
end the feudal features of landholding under the old Dutch 
patroon grants along the Hudson. In 1853 the Erie pie men 
caused almost a suspension of traffic for two months at that 
important point, because the Lake Shore Railroad attempted 
to lay its tracks along Pennsylvania’s Lake Erie coast, to 
connect its New York and Ohio lines. Philadelphia, unwill¬ 
ing to see a through connection established between New 
York and Chicago, supported the local authorities who wished 
to profit by the change of passengers and goods necessitated 
by the differing gauge of the tracks. In this case Pennsyl¬ 
vania was forced to yield to pressure from the West, and at 
length a standard gauge track was laid through Erie connect¬ 
ing the roads of New York with those of Ohio. The use of 
force became a common method of advancing causes and of 
enforcing public opinion. It was viewed with tolerance, 
was often resorted to by the most respected members of the 
community, and Was often successful. This customary 
appeal from lawful to illegal and physical methods must be 
reckoned with as among the significant tendencies of the 
period. 


300 INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL RENAISSANCE 


Sources. 


Intellectual 
activity and 
characteris¬ 
tics. 


Abolitionist 

movement. 


V -^ 

Slavery and 
the pro¬ 
slavery move¬ 
ment. 


Slavery and 
the Consti¬ 
tution. 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 

Sources for the subjects treated in this chapter, with the excep¬ 
tion of those relating to slavery, are not really available for class 
use. Among the best on the abolitionist side is Recollections of 
our Anti-slavery Conflict, by S. J. May; on the slavery side, The 
Pro-slavery Argument, by W. Harper. The Papers of J. C. Cal¬ 
houn (Am. Hist. Assoc., Report, 1899, vol. II) illustrate the intimate 
thought of the South on the subject; the Life of W. L. Garrison, 
by his sons, gives much source material illustrating the aboli¬ 
tionist sentiment. On labor conditions, J. R. Commons, American 
Industrial Society. 

Hart, A. B., Slavery and Abolition. Levermore, C. H., Rise of 
Metropolitan Journalism (Am. Hist. Review, VI, 446-465). Mc- 
Master, United States, V, 131-155; 343-372. Sparks, E. E., 
Expansion of the United States, chs. XXVI-XXVIII. Tucker, G., 
Progress of the United States, ch. V. Wendell, B., Literary 
History of America, 233-357. White, The Book of Daniel Drew, 
28-113. Callender, G. S., Economic History, ch. XIV. Ely, R. T., 
Labor Movement, 7-60. Simons, A. M., Social Forces in 
American History, ch. XVII. Wright, C. D., Industrial Evolution, 
202-269. 

Frothingham, 0 . B., G. Smith. Garrisons’ Garrison. Hart, 
A. B., Chase. Holst, von, United States, II, 80-120. Rhodes, 
J. F., United States , I, 38-75. Siebert, W. H., The Underground 
Railroad. Smith, T. C., The Liberty and Free-Soil Parties in the 
Northeast, 1-104. 

Allen, W. H., and Crozer, J. P., African Colonization (Philadel¬ 
phia, 1863). Ambler, C. H., Sectionalism in Virginia, 185-202. 
Brown, W. G., The Lower South in American History, ch. I, secs. 1 
and 2; ch. II. Locke, M. S., Anti-slavery in America from the In¬ 
troduction of African Slavery to the Prohibition of the Slave Trade. 
Goodell, W., The American Slave Code. Helper, H. R., The 
Impending Crisis. Nieboer, H. J., Slavery as an Industrial Sys¬ 
tem. Olmstead, F. L., The Cotton Kingdom. Rhodes, United 
States, I, ch. IV. 

On the Constitution and slavery: Curtis, G. T., Constitutional 
History, II, 201-226. Lalor, J. J., Cyclopedia, III, 725-738. 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 


3 Ol 


Rhodes, J. F., United States , I, ch. I. Story, Commentaries, secs. 

1915-1927. 

On petition and free speech: Adams, J. Q., Memoirs, IX, X. 

Benton, T. H., Thirty Years' View, I, ch. XXXI; II, chs. 

XXXIII, XXXVI, XXXVII. Calhoun, J. C., Works, V, 190- 
208. Curtis, G. T., James Buchanan, I, 319 - 357 . Holst, von, 

Calhoun, 124-150; 165-184. Seward, W. H., J. Q. Adams, chs. 

XII-XIV. Story, J., Commentaries, secs. 1880-1895. 

On diplomacy and interstate controversies: Du Bois, E. B ., The 
Suppression of Slave Trade, secs. 68-73. Holst, von, United States, 

II, 312-329. Schuyler, American Diplomacy, ch. V. Stephens, 

A. H., War between the States, II, colloquy XIV. 

Cheyney, E. P., Anti-rent Agitation in New York. Cutler, J. E., Unrest. 
Lynch-Law, ch. IV. King, D., Dorr. Murray, D., Anti-rent 
Episode in the State of New York (Am. Hist. Assoc., Report, I, 37- 
96). Mowry, A. M., The Dorr War. Rhodes, J. F., United States, 

III, ch. I. Smith, T. C., Parties and Slavery, 1-109. 

This period is particularly rich in literature illustrative of its Illustrative 
manners and customs. Most important are the works of Mark ^terature. 
Twain, especially Huckleberry Finn, giving a picture of life along 
the Mississippi, and of Bret Harte, as the Luck of Roaring Camp, 
etc., on life in California and the mines. F. Parkman’s Oregon 
Trail is the best account of the plains. W. A. Butler, in Nothing 
to Wear; and G. W. Curtis, in Prue and I, give somewhat contrast¬ 
ing views of New York. Of course, H. B. Stowe’s Uncle Tom's 
Cabin is of vital interest from many points of view. 


CHAPTER XIX 


Tyler and 
Texas. 


TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND SLAVERY 

The question most likely to develop the growing sec¬ 
tionalism between North and South, and to rend the parties 
into northern and southern factions, was that of territorial 
expansion. Had it not been for the rising division over 
slavery, the course of the expansion movement would have 
been smooth, and Texas would have been annexed in 1837. 
Many in the North believed that the whole Texan situation 
had resulted from a conspiracy to add one or more slave 
states to the Union. While this was not the case, many in 
the South did desire annexation to strengthen slavery in the 
Senate. As both parties were strong in both sections, the 
party managers had endeavored to avoid the question, and 
the leading candidates of both parties were still in 1844 
committed against it. Here lay the opportunity of Tyler, 
the irregular candidate. He thoroughly believed in annexa¬ 
tion, and determined, from the moment he succeeded Harri¬ 
son, that it should be the work of the administration. 
Delayed by the presence of Webster, who took no interest 
in the matter, he pressed for action as soon as Webster left 
the cabinet. Under Upshur, who ultimately succeeded Web¬ 
ster as Secretary of State, a treaty was arranged, but just as 
it was on the point of completion, a sad accident, the explosion 
of a gun on a new gunboat, the Princeton , caused the death of 
Upshur and other members of the administration. The task 
of selecting a successor was a very delicate one. The treaty 
had as yet been kept secret, it was sure to excite political oppo¬ 
sition from both parties, and it was important that the new 

302 


THE TEXAS QUESTION 


303 


secretary add weight to the feeble forces of the administra¬ 
tion. In these circumstances Tyler was forced, somewhat 
against his will, to call Calhoun. The latter, already de¬ 
spairing of obtaining the Democratic nomination, accepted 
in the hope that he might at least bring the Texas question 
into politics, and defeat the candidacy of Van Buren. 

Calhoun closed the treaty, and it was sent to the Senate 
for confirmation in the spring of 1844. It was accompanied 
by certain correspondence intended to give the grounds for 
obtaining it, and to serve as an argument for its adoption. 
Of all the lines of argument at his command Calhoun chose 
the most debatable. He produced letters to prove that Eng¬ 
land was endeavoring to abolish slavery in Texas, he argued 
that such action would endanger slavery within the United 
States, that annexation was necessary to the preservation 
of slavery, and was therefore the duty of the national govern¬ 
ment. He was perfectly aware that the situation was much 
broader than he represented it. England was endeavoring 
to establish her influence in Texas. The Texas cotton 
planters might at any time form a commercial alliance with 
her, and, adopting a system of free trade, put themselves in 
a position to produce cotton more cheaply than their rivals 
in the United States, hampered as the latter were by a pro¬ 
tective tariff. At the same time they would buy their manu¬ 
factured goods of Old England instead of New England, and 
American manufacturers would lose a growing market. It 
seems, in fact, to have been love of their native country, the 
United States, rather than interest which led the Texans to 
desire annexation. If the treaty were rejected, the republic 
might throw herself into the waiting arms of England. 
With all these arguments, and abundant material to sup¬ 
port them, at his hand, Calhoun preferred to place the whole 
issue on the duty of the national government to defend the 
institution of slavery. He was more interested in estab¬ 
lishing that general proposition than in securing immediate 


Calhoun and 
Texas. 


Public senti¬ 
ment and 
Texas. 


Nominations 
in 1844. 


304 TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND SLAVERY 

annexation, and he was so firmly convinced of the justice of 
his position that he believed he could convince a two-thirds 
majority of the Senate. 

Both parties combined to defeat a treaty which thus 
flauntingly brought into politics the most irritating of all 
questions, and which would serve politically only to reflect 
glory upon Tyler and Calhoun. It was rejected by a vote 
of thirty-five to sixteen. But in spite of the defeat of the 
treaty, Tyler and Calhoun both succeeded in the object 
dearest to their hearts. The issue of annexation had been 
launched into politics, and would not down. Throughout 
the West and South the Democrats were overwhelmingly 
in favor of it. Lincoln wrote: “The Locos here are in con¬ 
siderable trouble about Van Buren’s letter on Texas, and the 
Virginia electors. They are growing sick of the Tariff 
question, and consequently are much confounded at Van 
Buren’s cutting them off from the new Texas question. 
. . . They don’t exactly say they won’t vote for Van 
Buren, but they say he will not be the candidate and that 
they are for Texas. ” The difficulty in preventing Van Buren’s 
nomination lay in Jackson’s unswerving friendship for him. 
But just at this juncture a letter of Jackson’s was published 
in which he called attention to the danger of English in¬ 
fluence in Texas and expressed his desire for immediate an¬ 
nexation. 

With the influence of the “Old Hero” thus divided, 
the defeat of Van Buren became only a question of the means 
to be employed. A majority of the delegates to the national 
convention were pledged to vote for him, but by adopting 
the two-thirds rule they made his selection impossible, and, 
after salving their consciences by a few votes in his favor, 
they felt freed from their instructions and sought another 
candidate. The man selected was James K. Polk of Ten¬ 
nessee, who had been the leading candidate for the vice presi¬ 
dency, was a friend and protege of Jackson, and had a dis- 


CAMPAIGN OF 1844 


3°5 


creet and not too well-known record in national politics. 
He was the least conspicuous man who had ever been nomi ¬ 
nated for President, and is known as the first “dark horse.” 
The uninspiring character of the candidate was atoned for 
by the vigorous nature of the platform. The party de¬ 
clared emphatically for the annexation, or, as it was phrased 
with reference to the claims of the United States that the 
territory had been included in the Louisiana Purchase, the 
“ Reannexation ” of Texas. To avoid as much as possible 
any feeling of sectional jealousy, a demand for the “Reoccu¬ 
pation of Oregon ” was added, and the campaign was con¬ 
ducted on the plain and attractive issue of expansion. The 
Whigs pronounced in favor of the issues to which Clay had 
committed them during the struggles of the past four years, 
and nominated him as their candidate. 

The campaign that followed was very different from 
that of 1840 in its seriousness and the general interest in 
the issues at stake. Both parties felt the strain of the in¬ 
creasing sectionalism. Calhoun, in spite of the Democratic 
declaration in favor of annexation, held aloof with the votes 
of South Carolina in his pocket, until by special messenger 
he made sure that Polk would stand for southern interests 
in general. But Polk had also to satisfy the northern Demo¬ 
crats. A large and influential faction were incensed at the 
defeat of Van Buren, while still more, particularly in Pennsyl¬ 
vania, were afraid that the victory of the southern wing 
would endanger the protective system. The majority of 
the Pennsylvanians were Democrats by inclination and in¬ 
heritance, but they had also been the first, and were still 
the most insistent, advocates of protection. In this sit¬ 
uation Polk, while assuring Calhoun of his devotion to all 
southern interests, wrote what is called the “ Kane letter,” 
which was at least susceptible of being interpreted as a dec¬ 
laration in favor of protection. Upon the basis of this 
letter the Democratic orators of Pennsylvania claimed credit 


Campaign 

1844. 


306 territorial expansion and slavery 


Slavery in 
politics. 


Annexation 
of Texas. 


for the existing tariff and successfully called upon the voters 
to support “Polk and the Democratic tariff of 1842.” 

While Polk kept his party together in the North and re¬ 
tained the southern radicals, Clay was less successful. 
Aware that there was a strong feeling in favor of annexation 
throughout the South, he wrote a number of letters quali¬ 
fying his general attitude of hostility to that measure, by 
pointing out certain circumstances under which he might 
favor it. This equivocation alienated many at the North, 
and the Liberty party again ran James G. Birney in order to 
give an opportunity for those desirous of expressing uncon¬ 
ditional opposition to annexation to do so emphatically. 
The result was a decided, though not overwhelming, victory 
for Polk. He received a popular plurality of less than 40,000, 
but an electoral vote of 170 to 105. It is often said that 
Clay lost the election by his hedging, but this is not the case. 
Had he not taken the position that he did, he would, indeed, 
have gained New York and Michigan, where the Liberty 
party held the balance, but he would assuredly have lost 
Tennessee, which he actually carried by only 123 votes, and 
would still have been defeated. Moreover, his position was 
probably honest, representing exactly his opinion. Polk’s 
hedge on the tariff gained him little, for had he lost Penn¬ 
sylvania, he would still have been elected. As it was, the 
Kane letter neutralized the tariff question and allowed 
people to vote more strictly on a single issue than is usually 
the case in a national election, and no doubt could remain 
that the country desired annexation. The election was 
still more significant as the first in which the slavery problem 
was an important factor. The fact that the Liberty party 
held the balance of power in two states made a decided 
impression on the public mind. 

Tyler had been nominated by a convention of his friends, 
but, hopeless of election, he withdrew, sought to identify 
himself with the Democratic party, and took upon himself 


POLK’S ADMINISTRATION 307 

much credit for Polk’s success. He still cherished the hope 
of consummating the union with Texas during his term, 
of passing into history as an augmentor of the republic. 
When Congress met in December, he called attention to the 
popular wish for annexation, to the danger that in case of de¬ 
lay England might anticipate the United States, if not by 
annexation at least by commercial alliance, and he suggested 
that in the absence of a two-thirds majority in the Senate, 
Texas might be annexed by joint resolution instead of by 
treaty. This proposition seemed startling, as the constitu¬ 
tional argument in support of the annexation of Louisiana, 
that the power to annex territory might be inferred from the 
treaty-making power, was thus thrown to the winds. Ne¬ 
cessity, however, acted as a spur, and on March 1 a joint 
resolution was passed permitting Texas to enter the Union 
as a state, under certain conditions, among which was the 
extension of the Missouri Compromise line through her terri¬ 
tory in case it should be subdivided into additional states. 
Benton and a number of others voted for it under 
the impression that Tyler would leave to Polk the working 
out of the details; but the President acted at once, and when, 
on March 4, Polk was inaugurated, annexation was an ac¬ 
complished fact so far as the United States was concerned. 
Texas accepted the opportunity and the conditions, and in 
December, 1845, her senators and representatives took their 
seats. 

Polk proved to be a man of iron will and remarkable 
fixity of purpose. Intensely religious, he had unbounded 
faith in the purity and wisdom of his purposes, and balked 
at no obstacle to accomplish them. This devotion to his 
own ideas made it difficult for him to act harmoniously 
with others, and, politically, his administration was marked 
to an unusual degree by factional controversy; but his 
program was put through. His independence was shown 
at once. Tyler had supposed that his support of Polk, al- 


The South 
controls tht 
administra¬ 
tion. 


308 territorial expansion and slavery 


The free 
trade move¬ 
ment. 


though tardy, would secure the retention of his friends in 
office, but he was disappointed. It was supposed on other 
grounds that Calhoun would be retained as Secretary of State, 
but Polk did not invite him to remain. The most striking 
indication that the new regime would be no tame adden¬ 
dum to that of Jackson, was the taking away by Congress 
of the government printing from Blair, Jackson’s official 
editor, and the giving of it to Thomas Ritchie, editor of the 
Richmond Enquirer , who now came to Washington and es¬ 
tablished the Union. Ritchie was a representative of the 
Jeffersonian Democracy, but he had of late been moving in 
the direction of Calhoun’s views, and his transfer to the 
capital was a sign that the Cotton South was replacing the 
frontier as the predominant element in the Democratic 
party. The new Secretary of State was James Buchanan, 
leader of the Pennsylvania Democracy, and the Secretary 
of the Treasury was Robert J. Walker of Mississippi. George 
Bancroft, the historian, served as Secretary of the Navy for 
a time, during which he obtained the establishment of the 
naval training school at Annapolis. The appointment of 
William L. Marcy, a conservative or “ Hunker ” of New 
York, as Secretary of War, further alienated the “ Barn¬ 
burner ” wing of the party in that state, which was already 
displeased by the defeat of Van Buren in 1844. 

The domestic policy of the Polk administration was over¬ 
shadowed by its foreign policy, but in one respect it was of 
very great significance. There was practically no objec¬ 
tion to the reestablishment of the Independent Treasury, 
and the management of national finance was placed upon 
the basis which has ever since been maintained. The sig¬ 
nificant question, however, was with regard to the tariff. 
Polk in his first message, to the surprise of the Pennsyl¬ 
vanians, recommended a change; and Walker soon submitted 
a report intended to furnish the scheme of the new bill. 
This report was held to mark an important step in the prog- 


TARIFF OF 1846 


3°9 


ress of national financial policy. European economists, par¬ 
ticularly Cobden and Bright in England, had for some time 
been preaching the doctrine of free trade. At first they had 
received little attention from men of affairs, but for a number 
of years their theories had been rapidly gaining adherents. 
In this same year, 1846, Sir Robert Peel, the Prime Minister 
of Great Britain, announced his conversion to the principle 
and took the first step in the new direction by securing the 
repeal of the corn laws. In the United States the doc¬ 
trine proved really popular only at the South. Now Walker 
advocated the new policy, and his report was held to be 
second only to Peel’s conversion in importance. 

The bill framed by Walker’s advice produced a bitter 
fight in Congress. In the House, but one Pennsylvania 
Democrat voted for it, but it passed. The Senate being 
evenly divided, its fate there hung upon Vice President 
Dallas. His position was like that of Tyler. He had 
been nominated to the vice presidency to reassure the 
protectionists of Pennsylvania. Was it his duty to vote in 
accordance with the manifest wish of his state and faction, 
or to support the policy decided upon by his party? He 
decided differently from Tyler and voted for the bill. As in 
Tyler’s case, however, his decision put an end to his career. 
Pennsylvania was frantically angry with Dallas, with Polk, and 
with the party, and at the next congressional election turned 
against the administration. To the rest of the Democracy 
the new bill seemed satisfactory, especially to the Northwest, 
where the increase in the exports of foodstuffs, due to the 
repeal of the English corn laws, was connected with it in the 
popular mind. Actually the changes made by the tariff of 
1846 were not sensational, and the tariff was still protectionist 
to a large degree. Still the declared intention of framing a 
tariff that looked in the direction of free trade, the fact that 
progress in that direction continued until the Civil War, and 
the fact that it was another triumph of the Cotton South over 


The tariff 
of 1846. 


310 TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND SLAVERY 


Oregoa 


Ambitions 
of Polk. 


the northern Democracy, all combined to render it an impor¬ 
tant landmark. 

Meantime the administration was working out the policy 
of expansion which it had been elected to effect. The first 
question dealt with was that of Oregon. Buchanan first offered 
England a compromise which had been several times pro¬ 
posed — that of dividing the territory by the parallel of 
49 0 . Upon England’s rejecting this, Polk expressed his 
opinion that the claim of the United States to the whole 
territory as far north as 54 0 40' was good and should 
be upheld; he asked Congress for authority to give Eng¬ 
land notice that the joint occupancy would be terminated 
within a year, thus making a settlement imperative; and 
he quoted the Monroe Doctrine in support of his contention 
that England should not be allowed to establish a new colony 
on American soil. Feeling became intense and the expansion¬ 
ist sentiment of the country found expression in the phrase: 
“Fifty-four-forty or fight.” In Congress, Calhoun and 
Webster united to prevent any hostile action, and they were 
aided by the new feeling of cordiality between the two coun¬ 
tries resulting from the Walker tariff and the repeal of the 
corn laws. Eventually notice was given to England, but in 
the expressed hope that it would lead to an amicable adjust¬ 
ment of difficulties, and not in the form of a threat. Nego¬ 
tiations were resumed and in the summer of 1846 a treaty was 
framed, which provided for the partition of the territory by 
the parallel of 49 0 , except that England was to retain the 
whole of Vancouver Island. One portion, therefore, of the 
Democratic platform was executed, though in restricted form, 
and the United States for the first time obtained an absolutely 
undisputed hold, with fixed boundaries, upon the Pacific 
coast. 

While the Oregon question was embarrassing relations with 
England, the annexation of Texas had led to serious difficulty 
with Mexico. That country had never acknowledged the 


WAR WITH MEXICO 


311 

independence of Texas. She therefore protested against 
the absorption of territory which she still claimed, and with¬ 
drew her minister at Washington. In fact, however, the re¬ 
public of Texas had successfully maintained its independence 
for nine years, and there was in 1845 no prospect of the re¬ 
establishment of Mexican authority. It seemed probable, 
therefore, that the protest would be formal only, and Webster 
in 1845 anticipated a peaceful settlement of the dispute. 
Polk, however, cherished projects which enhanced the diffi¬ 
culties of the situation. The boundary of Texas was in 
doubt. The old Mexican province of that name had been 
bounded on the southwest by the Nueces River; the republic 
of Texas actually occupied the southern bank of that 
stream, while the constitution of Texas laid claim to all lands 
north and east of the Rio Grande. Congress had, in its 
joint resolution, recognized the necessity of negotiation to 
determine the boundaries of the new state, but Polk was 
determined to assent to no compromise here, and to assert 
and obtain the uttermost limits claimed by Texas. He set 
before himself also the aim of adding to the United States 
the entire region to the west, then included under the names 
of California and New Mexico. 

For the accomplishment of these objects he sent John 
Slidell as minister to Mexico, instructed to call attention 
to unsettled claims for damages on the part of American 
citizens against the Mexican government, and to suggest 
that a readjustment of the boundary on certain terms might 
afford a means of relieving Mexico of these, and of obtaining 
even additional sums from the United States. The Mexican 
government, fearing popular disapproval and a revolution if 
it submitted to such dictation, refused to treat of anything 
else until the Texan affair was definitely settled. Diplomacy 
was therefore at a standstill, and the situation grew contin¬ 
ually more acute, until in May, 1846, Polk was satisfied that 
sufficient cause for war existed, and drew up a message recom- 


War with 
Mexico. 


312 TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND SLAVERY 

mending that Congress take action. Before the message 
was sent in, however, another train of events culminated 
in a more direct cause for war. General Zachary Taylor had 
been ordered to occupy Texas as soon as annexation was 
agreed to, in order to protect it against Mexican invasion. 
At first he confined himself to the Nueces, but when it became 
obvious that Slidell might fail, he was ordered to advance 
through the disputed district to the Rio Grande. Here the 
army encamped in the fields from which the Mexican pro¬ 
prietors had fled, across the river from the Mexican city 
of Matamoras. Such a position was provocative of attack, 
and on April 24 a brush occurred between the troops of the 
two countries. The news of this affair reached Polk just 
before his message was sent to Congress. He thereupon 
revised it, and on May n recommended war chiefly upon 
the ground that Mexican troops had attacked and killed 
those of the United States, upon United States territory. 
“ War exists,” he said, “and notwithstanding all our efforts to 
avoid it, exists by the act of Mexico herself.” 

Campaigns While the war had been brought on by the policy of the 

0 e war ' administration, it was not expected at Washington that actual 
hostilities would result. It was thought that when Mexico 
\ was convinced of the seriousness of the situation, she would 
recede and grant all demands, even to the cession of California. 
The Spanish blood of the Mexicans, however, was aroused, 
the nation entered boldly upon the hopeless contest with the 
superior power of the United States, and, under the lead of 
Santa Anna, offered a stiff resistance. The war lasted nearly 
two years. The United States squadron in the Pacific at 
once seized the ports of California, and an overland expedition 
from the Missouri occupied Santa Fe and obtained control 
of New Mexico. The main fighting movements were 
two. One was directed by General Taylor, who gained 
brilliant victories at Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, 
advanced southwest across the Rio Grande, took Monterey, 


PEACE WITH MEXICO 


313 


and, defeating Santa Anna’s relief expedition at Buena 
Vista, held it. This fighting on the borders might have 
been prolonged indefinitely without bringing a final result. 
Another movement was therefore proposed, to make 
use ofj the sea power of the United States, land an army 
at Vera Cruz, the port of the city of Mexico, and advance 
directly overland to the heart of the country. General 
Winfield Scott was given charge of this expedition, and 
conducted it to a successful conclusion. Every step was 
contested; Vera Cruz offered some resistance, but fell on 
March 29, 1847; the scaling of the mountain wall beyond 
involved a severe struggle at Cerro Gordo; and finally, 
when the central plateau was reached, there was hard 
fighting at Contreras, Churubusco, and Chapultepee. At 
length, however, on the fourteenth of September the city of 
Mexico was captured, and the country lay at the mercy of 
its conquerors. 

The overthrow of effective resistance in Mexico produced 
utter governmental confusion there. Revolutions broke out, 
some of the states of the republic threatened secession, and 
Yucatan actually asserted its independence and formally 
sought annexation by the United States, England, or Spain. 
In the meantime the war spirit was growing stronger in por¬ 
tions of the United States, and the expansionists began to 
clamor for the taking of the whole of Mexico, as advanta¬ 
geous to both countries alike. Polk, however, was not a man 
to yield to popular clamor; he was satisfied with his original 
demands, and accepted the treaty negotiated by Mr. Trist 
at Guadalupe Hidalgo on February 2, 1848, although it 
did not include “Lower,” or peninsular, California. This 
treaty was confirmed by the Senate in May; and thus the 
war closed with a recognition by Mexico of the Texan con¬ 
stitutional boundary and the cession of more than 500,000 
square miles of additional territory, for which the United 
States agreed to pay Mexico fifteen million dollars, besides 


Peace with 
Mexico. 


3 I 4 


TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND SLAVERY 


The election 
of 1846. 


releasing her from claims of American citizens and assuming 
their liquidation to an amount not exceeding three and a 
quarter million. 

Throughout the war even more attention was devoted, in 
the United States, to the political problems which it involved, 
than to the actual hostilities. The Whigs opposed the war, 
and in 1846 and 1847, on that issue combined with the tariff 
dissatisfaction, won a majority in Congress. The South and 
West showed little change, but Pennsylvania, New York, 
and New England turned emphatically against the adminis¬ 
tration. The Whigs were themselves, however, divided into 
“Cotton” Whigs, who were in favor of supporting the war 
now that it was begun, and “Conscience” Whigs, who would 
declare immediate peace and confess that the United States 
was in the wrong. So acute was this division that Palfrey, 
a Whig from Massachusetts, refused to vote for Winthrop, 
a “Cotton” Whig from the same state, for Speaker of the 
House. The “Conscience” Whigs, while intelligent and 
active, were few, and though Palfrey’s breach of party dis¬ 
cipline alarmed the leaders, the more distracting question was 
as to the disposition of the new territory which it was expected 
that the war would bring. 

At a very early stage in the war the administration asked 
for $2,000,000 to be used in negotiating peace. It was under¬ 
stood that this would be given in payment for territory, and 
Senator Branch, a North Carolina Whig, moved a proviso 
that it should be granted on condition that no territory be 
acquired from Mexico. This well represented the Whig 
opinion of the South, in fact conservative southern sentiment 
generally; for it was clearly foreseen that with the growing 
intensity of feeling, a division must occur as to the status of 
slavery in such new territory. The Missouri Compromise 
would not extend to it unless especially applied, and there 
were growing indications that that compromise would no 
longer be satisfactory to the North, and particularly to that 


THE QUESTION OF THE TERRITORIES 315 

large number who believed that the war had been brought 
about for the express purpose of extending slavery. These 
fears were realized when, in August, 1846, David Wilmot, a 
Pennsylvania Democrat, proposed another proviso: that 
in any new territory to be acquired from Mexico “neither 
slavery nor involuntary servitude shall ever exist.” This 
proviso became at once the center of all political interest. 
It passed the House of Representatives and was barely, 
perhaps by accident, defeated in the Senate of the twenty- 
ninth Congress. It was brought up again in the subsequent 
Congress, where Lincoln, who was then serving his only term 
there, says that he voted for it, under one form or another, 
forty-two times. The Wilmot Proviso represented the wishes 
of a majority of the northern people. How strongly they 
would press their desires, and whether, if confronted with the 
danger of sacrificing the Union, they would consent to com¬ 
promise, was a question for the future. 

The majority of the people of the South were as yet will¬ 
ing to agree to an extension of the Missouri Compromise 
line to the Pacific, and a large minority in the North were 
willing to agree to such a solution. This proposition was 
definitely brought forward in connection with a bill to organ¬ 
ize the Oregon territory, which needed a government now that 
it was completely under United States jurisdiction. It was 
provided that slavery be excluded from this territory, and a 
vigorous effort was made in the Senate to insert a clause 
stating that this exclusion was made because it lay north of 
36° 30'. This would have been an acknowledgment that the 
principle of the Missouri Compromise was to apply to the 
new annexations, and would naturally have been followed by 
an admission of slavery south of that line. This attempt to 
commit Congress to the policy of compromise failed in the 
House, and the bill was passed without explanation. Presi¬ 
dent Polk, however, announced formally that he approved 
the bill because it was in harmony with the Missouri Compro- 


The Wilmot 
Proviso. 


The Oregon 
bill. 


316 territorial expansion and slavery 


Calhoun and 

territorial 

contro'. 


“Squatter 

sovereignty.” 


mise, and thus gave the weight of the administration to that 
plan of settlement. 

Both the Wilmot Proviso and the compromise line rested 
upon the view that Congress had the absolute power to con¬ 
trol the territories as it saw fit. This view was perfectly 
natural, as Congress had constantly acted upon it, and in 
particular had excluded slavery by indorsing the North¬ 
west Ordinance in 1789, and by adopting the Missouri 
Compromise in 1820. Calhoun, however, contested this 
primary point upon which both proposals rested. He had 
deeply regretted the Mexican War, because he foresaw pre¬ 
cisely the fundamental controversies to which it gave rise. 
He foresaw the defeat of the South in Congress, and he 
sought to take the whole question from that body and find 
in the Constitution a bulwark for southern rights in the 
territories as well as in the states. He contended that the 
territories, being the common property of the partnership 
of states, must be administered for the common good of all. 
He held, moreover, that the restrictions of the Constitution 
extended to the territories, that slaves were property, that 
the Constitution guaranteed all property rights, and that it 
was therefore the right of any citizen to take slaves into any 
territory, and the duty of the national government to pro¬ 
tect them there. This doctrine of “ non-interference” was 
welcomed by the southern radicals and grew rapidly in popu¬ 
larity in the South. 

Still another view was that taken by Cass of Michigan, 
a view popular in the new communities of the frontier from 
before the Revolution. He also denied to Congress the power 
to regulate slavery in the territories, but instead of finding 
the power in the Constitution, found it in the people. The 
people of the territories, he argued, were not represented 
in the national government; therefore, in accordance with the 
principles of democracy, they should not be governed by it. 
To the people of the territory belonged the right of ad- 


POLITICAL PARTIES IN 1848 


3*7 

mitting or of excluding slaves. This doctrine of “squatter 
sovereignty” was calculated to be especially agreeable to 
those party leaders who feared the disintegrating influence 
of national slavery discussion, but its period of popularity 
was not to come until some years later, nor was it framed as 
definitely by Cass as it was afterwards by Douglas. Cass 
grounded it on justice or natural right more than on the 
Constitution. 

Squatter sovereignty, or “popular sovereignty” as it 
was later called, should not be confused, as it sometimes 
was during the next twelve years, with the idea that Congress 
did not have the power to put conditions upon a state when 
it entered the Union. Squatter sovereignty applied only to 
the territorial period. Many thinkers of all parties and of 
both North and South believed as Pinckney had argued in 
the case of Missouri in 1820, that when once a territory be¬ 
came a state, it entered into all the rights of all the other 
states, and that such rights could not be curtailed by any 
action of Congress previous to admission; that the states 
made from the Northwest Territory, for instance, could intro¬ 
duce slavery if so inclined, in spite of the Ordinance of 1787. 
A few even held the illogical conclusion that when the people 
of a territory organized themselves as a state, and requested 
admission into the Union, Congress was bound to grant their 
request, regardless of their institutions. This question of 
the rights of states, however, was only of subsidiary impor¬ 
tance at this time, although it was occasionally and con¬ 
fusingly interwoven with that of the territories. 

In the midst of this constitutional discussion occurred 
the election of 1848. The preservation of party unity became 
a problem of the greatest difficulty, tasking the utmost skill 
of the politicians. The Democrats nominated Lewis Cass, 
a northern man who was popular in the South because of 
his controversy with Webster over the right of search. This 
nomination, however, did not mean an indorsement of his 


State 

sovereignty 
versus that 
of territories. 


Whig and 

Democratic 

conventions. 


318 territorial expansion and slavery 


The Free-Soil 
party. 


doctrine of squatter sovereignty. In fact, the convention 
emphatically declined to make any declaration of policy 
with regard to slavery in the territories; thus attempting 
to keep North and South together by ignoring the great issue 
which was dividing them, and to conduct the campaign on the 
old line issues. The Whigs adopted the same tactics. Clay 
again desired the nomination, but he had declared at Lexing¬ 
ton in 1847 that the party should disclaim all “wish or desire 
on our part to acquire any foreign territory whatever, for 
the purpose of propagating slavery, or of introducing slaves 
from the United States.” Thurlow Weed again assumed the 
position of President maker, and secured the nomination of 
General Taylor, the favorite hero of the war, a man totally 
new to politics, whose views were not only unknown but 
undeveloped. As James Russell Lowell remarked in the 
Biglow Papers , a series of satiric political poems published 
at this time: — 

“Another pint thet influences the minds of sober jedges 
Is thet the Gin’ral hez n’t gut tied hand an’ foot with pledges, 
He hez n’t told ye wut he is, an’ so there ain’t no knowin’ 

But wut he may turn out to be the best there is agoin’.” 

As no platform was adopted, the voter was left to conjec¬ 
ture as to what Whig policy on the mooted question would 
be, from a knowledge that the majority of the northern Whigs 
were opposed to slavery in the territories, and that General 
Taylor owned three hundred slaves. Even on the question 
of the war, the dividing line between the parties was obscure, 
for the Democrats claimed credit for having fought it and the 
Whigs nominated a war hero. 

This calm ignoring of a vital issue did not quiet popular 
agitation. In the North particularly dissatisfaction was 
keen, and a third party movement was inaugurated. The 
Liberty party served as a nucleus and about it gathered many, 
both Whigs and Democrats, who considered that the terri- 


ELECTION OF 1848 


3 I 9 


torial question was the main issue of the time. It happened 
also that the New York Democracy was seriously divided 
between the administration “Hunkers,’’ or “Hards/’ and the 
adherents of Van Buren, known as the “Softs” or “Barn¬ 
burners.” This split had become so acute, as a result of the 
strong party rule of Polk, that the two factions had for some 
time run separate state candidates, and the “Softs” had been 
refused full recognition by the national Democratic convention. 
The “Softs” had been on the antislavery side ever since Van 
Buren had, in 1844, declared against the annexation of Texas, 
and now a combination was easily effected between them and 
the Liberty party, at a convention held at Buffalo. Van 
Buren was nominated for the presidency, and the party 
adopted the title “Free-Soil” and an unequivocal platform: 
“ Whereas, the political conventions recently assembled at 
Baltimore and Philadelphia, the one stifling the voice of a 
great constituency entitled to be heard in its deliberations, 
and the other abandoning its distinctive principles for mere 
availability, have dissolved the national party organizations 
heretofore existing, by nominating for the chief magistracy 
of the United States, under the slaveholding dictation, can¬ 
didates neither of whom can be supported by the opponents 
of slavery extension. . . . Resolved, therefore, that we, the 
people here assembled, ... do now plant ourselves upon 
the national platform of freedom.” Thus the plans of the 
politicians for snuffing out public discussion of slavery failed, 
and the omens of party disintegration multiplied. 

The election resulted in the triumph of Taylor by a large 
majority, but this was by no means its only interest. The 
new party evinced remarkable strength, Van Buren receiving 
nearly 300,000 votes, and except in New York the greater 
portion of this vote was cast by single-minded antislavery 
men, rather than by “Soft” Democrats. It was ominous to 
note that this vote was entirely sectional, being confined to 
the free states. In the North about 15 per cent of the total 


Election of 
1848. 


320 TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND SLAVERY 


Gold in 
California. 


vote was Free-Soil; and in eleven states, including all those 
of the Northwest, the Free-Soilers held the balance between 
the two regular parties. In New Hampshire and in Ohio, 
they secured a balance in the legislature, and the election 
of two of their adherents to the Senate, John P. Hale and 
Salmon P. Chase. The Democrats gained ground in the 
Northwest, partly because of the Free-Soil vote, but more 
because that section was rejoicing over the expansion of the 
country and the new English market for foodstuffs. The 
Whigs won New York and Pennsylvania, as a result of Demo¬ 
cratic dissension and the tariff of 1846. They also won in the 
South the states of Georgia, Florida, and Louisiana; but 
apparently only because the voters preferred a southern to a 
northern President, for the congressional elections showed an 
opposite tendency, thus making evident a sectional feeling 
in the South as well as in the North. 

To President Taylor, elected as he was without any state¬ 
ment on the subject of slavery in the territories, was intrusted 
the handling of that delicate problem from his inauguration 
until the meeting of Congress in the ensuing December. In 
the meantime a speedy solution had become a practical 
necessity. In January, 1848, gold had been discovered in 
California. Up to this time that region had attracted public 
attention chiefly because of the exploring expeditions under 
the brilliant and popular young son-in-law of Senator Benton, 
Colonel Fremont. Its strategic position had been recognized 
by statesmen who had feared that it would fall from the 
weak hands of Mexico into those of Great Britain. The 
Mexican treaty relieved this fear, but it was believed that 
many years would elapse before actual American settlement 
would become important. As soon as the news of gold 
reached the East, however, there began the most pictur¬ 
esque migratory movement of the century. The quest 
for gold roused all the spirit of adventure that charac¬ 
terized the period, and thousands flocked to the Pacific 


TAYLOR’S ADMINISTRATION 


3 21 


coast, by way of the long, lazy journey around Cape Horn, 
by the Isthmus of Panama, or by the dreary perilous path 
across the arid regions. Before two years passed, California 
possessed a population of about 100,000, nearly all men, 
and men of all sections and all nations, the majority of them 
turbulent and restive in disposition. For the first time an 
American community had come into existence whose economic 
life was based on mining for the precious metals. New 
problems had to be met, and some form of government was 
imperative; the question had become immediate. 

The President showed himself somewhat jealous of the Taylor’s 
greater Whig leaders, and the adviser most powerful with pohcy ' 
him was William H. Seward, the new senator from New York 
and the alter ego of Thurlow Weed, the organizer of Taylor’s 
nomination. Seward was more radically antislavery than the 
older party chieftains, and his influence combined with the 
course of events to determine the presidential policy. The 
main feature of Taylor’s plan was to use the nine months 
before Congress gathered, in organizing state governments in 
the new territory. Congress would, therefore, be confronted 
by the simple question of admitting or rejecting them, and 
the status of slavery would be determined by their constitu¬ 
tions. This plan was easily carried out in the case of Cali¬ 
fornia. Utah applied for admission as the state of Deseret, 
and a like movement was well started in New Mexico, when 
Congress met and the responsibility was shifted to that body. 

The President advised that by awaiting the action of the 
people “all causes of uneasiness may be avoided. With a 
view of maintaining the harmony and tranquillity so dear to 
all, we should abstain from the introduction of those exciting 
topics, of a sectional character which have hitherto produced 
painful apprehension in the public mind, and I repeat the 
solemn warning of the first and most illustrious of my pred¬ 
ecessors against furnishing ‘any ground for characterizing 
parties by geographical denominations.’” 


TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND SLAVERY 


Opposition The presidential scheme was received with violent oppo- 
rK>iicy y ° rS sition. California and Utah had excluded slavery by their 
constitutions, and New Mexico was expected to do so. 
Moreover, the President had taken a vigorous attitude against 
the slave state of Texas, which was involved in a boundary 
dispute with the national government over its western limits. 
The prospect of losing all the new-won territory, and of having 
even Texas curtailed, aroused bitter opposition throughout 
the South. Quitman of Mississippi, a war hero and a “ Fire 
Eater ” as the southern radicals were called, said that for the 
first time in the history of the country the North 'was in 
control of the government. Agitation was everywhere 
intense. Mississippi, at the suggestion of South Carolina, 
called a convention of southern states to meet at Nashville, 
June i, 1850, to discuss southern rights. Many feared that 
a persistence in the President’s policy would bring about 
disunion. Quite apart from such fears, there were other 
reasons why Congress would not be inclined to accept his 
solution. There is a well-grounded jealousy of its rights which 
always renders Congress suspicious when legislative prob¬ 
lems are handled by the executive. This esprit du corps 
was felt to an unusual degree by the Congress which met in 
1849, f° r ^ contained a combination of talent and reputation 
equaled only by that of 1815. This time it was the Senate 
which was the stronger branch, containing, of the men who had 
been at the helm for the last thirty or forty years, Clay, 
Webster, Calhoun, Benton, and Cass, and of the coming 
leaders, Seward, Jefferson Davis, Chase, and Douglas. Such 
a body was not apt to accept as final a solution worked out by 
a President comparatively young in years and totally new 
to the business of politics. Still further, it was proper that 
in such a case, where the different sections were contending 
for so great a prize, the contest should be decided in Congress 
where all sections were represented. 

The task of working out a compromise which should 


COMPROMISE OF 1850 


323 


reconcile the various conflicting interests, and of securing Clay and 

its acceptance, fell to Henry Clay. It was the most difficult com P romise 

political task since the adoption of the Constitution. Just 

that line of agreement had to be drawn which would satisfy 

one section without causing repugnance in the other, for it 

was not enough to secure the passage of an act by Congress, 

but it was necessary to win for it the approval of a majority 

in both sections. For this undertaking Clay was ideally 

fitted. Compromise is a work of sacrifice, the slaughter of 

ideals; it is the proper labor of age rather than of youth. 

Clay’s seventy-four years had been crowded with political 
experience, and he knew every pathway through the maze of 
national affairs. He had recently become a member of the 
Episcopal Church, and while his religion did not displace 
other interests, it gave him a seriousness which had been 
somewhat lacking in his earlier career. The fact that he had 
at last given up his presidential ambition, and that after eight 
years’ absence he had returned to the Senate for the express 
purpose of bringing peace to his distracted country, gave him 
prestige with all his colleagues, while his feeble health added 
a rather pathetic interest to his efforts. His intellect was 
as keen as ever, and through the entire winter and spring he 
fought for his purpose in a manner which Congress has never 
seen surpassed. His plan was laid before the Senate on Jan¬ 
uary 29, 1850, in a series of resolutions. It included a settle¬ 
ment of all points in dispute. California was to be admitted 
with its free constitution, although this would upset the 
balance of the states in the Senate; the remaining territory 
was to be organized without the Wilmot Proviso; the Texan 
boundary was limited, but Texas was to receive $10,000,000 
practically as a compensation. In addition to this adjust¬ 
ment of the territorial problem, a strict fugitive slave law 
was included to protect slave owners against the machina¬ 
tions of the abolitionists; and to soothe the antislavery 
sentiment of the North, the importation of slaves into 


324 


TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND SLAVERY 


Calhoun and 
compromise. 


Webster and 
compromise. 


Radical 

opposition. 


the District of Columbia for purposes of sale was forbid* 
den. 

On March 4 Calhoun made his last appearance in public 
life. In a speech which he had to have read, as he was too 
ill to deliver it, he opposed the compromise. He had come 
to despair of ultimate harmony between the two sections, the 
balance in the Senate was about to disappear, and his only 
hope of the Union now lay in a constitutional amendment 
providing for two Presidents, one from each section, and each 
having a veto. It remained for Webster, the third member 
of the great senatorial triumvirate, to declare himself. Upon 
him its fate was felt to depend. If he opposed it, it would 
be doomed to failure; if he favored it, it might have a chance 
to succeed. Webster realized to the full the responsibility 
that was upon him. Living as he did in daily association 
with the ablest lawyers and business men of the country, and 
regarded by them with an almost unparalleled confidence as 
the one sane conservative force in public life, he acted with 
a deliberation and a confidence which won for him the title 
of “ Godlike.” He now tested the sentiment of the South and 
became convinced that secession was impending. His devo¬ 
tion to the Union was his strongest passion, and to preserve 
it he sacrificed his feelings with regard to slavery. On the 
seventh of March, in a great speech which was awaited with 
breathless interest throughout the country, he pronounced 
in favor of the compromise. He gave it his support fully and 
generously, addressing his argument to the South, as the 
section in greatest agitation. 

Webster’s speech only made it possible that the compro¬ 
mise might pass. It was still opposed by the radicals of both 
sections. Jefferson Davis, who was coming to be recognized 
as the rising leader of the southern radicals, gave all his 
weight against the compromise. The chief spokesmen of 
the northern radicals were Chase and Seward, both of whom 
declared against it, the latter creating a sensation through- 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 


325 


out the country by appealing from the Constitution to the 
“higher law.” It was evident that the majority in Congress 
were not willing to sacrifice sectional interests and their 
slavery or antislavery principles to preserve the Union; or, 
at least, that it was not possible to convince them that the 
Union was really in danger. 

The opening of summer, however, brought changes fa¬ 
vorable to a settlement. On July 9, President Taylor died. 
He was succeeded by Vice President Fillmore of New York, 
who was more docile in the hands of the party leaders. He 
made Webster his Secretary of State, and the entire influence 
and patronage of the administration were turned in favor of 
the compromise. Finally the first attempt to pass the more 
important measures united in the form of an “omnibus” 
bill was abandoned, and each part was passed separately, 
by the votes of the section which it favored plus those of men 
from the other sections who, like Webster, put the Union 
first. Only four senators voted for every part of the com¬ 
promise, though three more would have done so had they not 
been unavoidably absent. 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 

The Calhoun Papers continue to be illuminating. For the 
Polk administration, Polk’s Diary, edited by M. M. Quaife, and 
published in the Chicago Historical Society, Collections, vols. VI- 
IX, is usable. The most significant speeches on the compromise 
are the following: Calhoun, J. C., Works, IV, 542-573. Chase, 
S. P., in Cong. Globe , 31st Cong., 1 sess., app. 468-480. Clay, PL, 
Works, VI, 601-634. Seward, W. H., Cong. Globe, 31st Cong., 1 
sess., 260-269. Webster, D., Works, V, 324. These speeches can 
also be found in many other places. On the tariff, report of Sec¬ 
retary Walker, Taussig, State Papers and Speeches on the Tariff, 
214-251, and also to be found as his regular Annual Report for 
1845, in the Executive Documents of the Twenty-ninth Congress. 

Burgess, J. W., Middle Period, ch. XV. Garrison, G. P., 
Texas, chs. VIII-XXI. Garrison, Westward Expansion, 85-157. 


The Compro 
mise of 1850 


Sources, 


Historical 
accounts. 
Texas ques¬ 
tion. 


326 TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND SLAVERY 


Mexican 

war. 


The terri¬ 
torial ques¬ 
tion. 


The Com¬ 
promise of 
1850. 


Tariff and 
finance. 

Illustrative 

literature. 


Holst, von, Calhoun, ch. VIII. Tyler, Letters and Lives of the 
Tylers, II, chs. IX, X, XI. 

Bourne, E. G., Essays in Historical Criticism, 303-313. Curtis, 
G. T., Buchanan, I, ch. XXI. Garrison, Westward Expansion , 
188-228. Holst, von, Calhoun, ch. IX. Jay, W., The Mexican 
War. Reeves, J. S., American Diplotnacy under Tyler and Polk, chs. 
Ill, XIII. Schurz, Clay, II, ch. XXV. Smith, J., Annexation 
of Texas. 

Garrison, Westward Expansion, 254-285. Holst, von, United 
States, III, chs. XI, XII. McLaughlin, A. C., Cass, chs. VIII, 
IX. Smith, T. C., The Liberty and Free-Soil Parties in the North¬ 
west, chs. VIII-XI. Stephens, War between the States, II, collo¬ 
quy XIV. 

Dodd, W. E., Statesmen of the Old South. Garrison, Westward 
Expansion, 285-333. Lodge, II. C., Webster, ch. IX. Rhodes, 
J. F., United States, I, chs. II, III. 

Dewey, D. R., Financial History. Taussig, Tariff Hh'iry, 
109-154. 

The Biglow Papers, by J. R. Lowell, give a vivid view o* fhw 
anti-war sentiment. 


CHAPTER XX 


BREAKING OF THE BONDS OF UNION 

The passage of the compromise acts of 1850 did not of 
itself assure good will and harmony. The authors of the 
compromise devoted themselves energetically for the next few 
years to securing its general acceptance by both North and 
South. Webster was in a position to accomplish the most. 
He went about the country, spending himself to the very 
limit of his strength in popular orations, lauding it as a finality. 
As Secretary of State he strove to emphasize the grandeur 
of the United States and to arouse an interest in foreign affairs 
that might dull the passion of domestic controversy. Writing 
to a friend, regarding a rather jingoistic letter he had just 
sent to the Austrian representative, M. Hiilsemann, he said 
that he wished to “touch the national pride and make a man 
feel sheepish and look silly who should speak of disunion.” 
Clay, physically unable to make a direct appeal to the people, 
drew up a pledge to be signed by members of both parties, 
not to support for the presidency any man “not known to be 
opposed to the disturbance of the settlement, and to renewal, 
in any form, of agitation upon the subject of slavery.” 
Edward Everett, who succeeded Webster as Secretary of 
State during the last portion of Fillmore’s term, wrote a ring¬ 
ing dispatch upon the Cuban question, calculated to appeal 
to North and South ^like. 

These efforts were not without success. The country 
was enjoying an extreme prosperity, the result partly of the 
steady advance since 1842, and partly of the flood of new capi¬ 
tal afforded by the gold of California. The business interests 
327 


Attempts to 
popularize 
the compro¬ 
mise. 


The com¬ 
promise 
accepted. 


328 BREAKING OF THE BONDS OF UNION 


of the country deprecated disturbing influences. In the 
South, which had fared rather the better in the terms of the 
compromise, the majority nearly everywhere acquiesced. 
The Nashville convention, which had met in June, 1850, held 
an adjourned meeting after the measures had passed, but 
took no radical action. In Georgia the Whig and Demo¬ 
cratic leaders, Stephens, Toombs, and Howell Cobb, com¬ 
bined successfully in favor of peace; in Mississippi, Foote, 
who favored the compromise, ran for governor in 1851 against 
Jefferson Davis, who had opposed it, and defeated him, 
though only by 1,009 votes. South Carolina was at least 
not ready to act alone, and so secession was stayed. In the 
North, feeling was perhaps more intense. Webster was 
mourned by Whittier as a fallen angel, and became anathema 
even to the less extreme antislavery sympathizers. The 
great majority, however, were satisfied to let things stand as 
they were, and when the election of 1852 approached, the 
condition of public sentiment was calmer than it had been 
since 1844. 

Political par- The Whig convention adopted resolutions of a pro-south- 

ties m 1852. ern cast> fevQring the compromise. The presidential candi¬ 
dates were Webster and Fillmore, the nomination of either of 
whom would be an especial confirmation of the compromise, 
and General Scott, who rather represented northern opinion. 
Both Webster and Fillmore came very near being chosen, 
but at length Scott won the nomination, and the Whigs thus 
tried the expedient of going before the country with a candi¬ 
date to please one section, and a platform to please the other. 
This was not an abnormal circumstance, for the platform was 
adopted as drawn up by the committee on resolutions, consist¬ 
ing of one member from each state, thus giving the South a 
large proportion; while the nominations were made in full 
convention, where the numerical weight of the North counted. 

The Democrats were now reunited, harmony was their 
watchword, and when the contest for the nomination between 


ELECTION OF 1852 


329 


four of their great leaders, Cass, Marcy, Buchanan, and 
Douglas, seemed likely to become too serious, they decided 
to nominate Franklin Pierce, an inconspicuous man, of un¬ 
doubted party loyalty, whose selection would cause no jeal¬ 
ousies. They indorsed the compromise without serious 
question, and thus both the great parties stood pledged to its 
continuance. The result of the election seemed still further The election 
to assure its finality. The Democratic party was nearly of l852 ’ 
everywhere supposed to give the best assurance of internal 
peace, and as a consequence of this feeling, Pierce was elected 
by 254 electoral votes to 42 for Scott. The Free-Soil 
party lost decidedly, even beyond what might have been ex¬ 
pected from the return of the Van Buren Democrats to 
the party fold. On the other hand, the overthrow of the 
Whigs was ominous, for an analysis of the vote showed that 
they had suffered even more from those who failed to vote 
than from deserters. Their attempt to please both sections 
had displeased both instead, and actually the party failed to 
rise again, so that the settlement of the territorial ques¬ 
tion had been at the expense of one of the great national 
parties, which had constituted an important bond of union. 

In fact the calm was more superficial than real. Already The new 
by 1852 affairs had almost passed out of the hands of the Ieaders ’ 
generation which made the compromise. The statesmen of 
the middle period were rapidly disappearing ; Calhoun died 
before the compromise was passed, Webster and Clay before 
Pierce was inaugurated. Benton had the unhappier fate to 
outlive his popularity in Missouri, and Van Buren was defi¬ 
nitely out of politics. The new generation was practically 
in the saddle, and it brought to national affairs a somewhat 
different spirit from its predecessor. Younger and without 
the experience and poise which years bring, the new leaders 
were during the next decade less expert than their predeces¬ 
sors in handling public matters. Reared during a period of 
sectional controversy, they lacked that single-minded de- 


33° 


BREAKING OF THE BONDS OF UNION 


Northern 

antislavery 

sentiment. 


Uncle Tom's 
Cabin. 


votion to the Union which the experience of the War of 1812 
had produced in the men young at that time. The majority 
of them looked upon most political questions as moral ques¬ 
tions also. They differed from the abolitionists in being 
men of constructive statesmanlike ability ; they differed from 
the politicians of Jackson’s time in holding intense convic¬ 
tions as to both the expediency and the morality of slavery. 

It was almost too much to hope that such men would 
accept the Compromise of 1850, in the making of which they 
had little share, and which many of them had opposed, as the 
final solution of a vital question. It was inconceivable that 
new questions would not arise, dividing the sections, and if 
they did, a settlement would be even more difficult than in 
1850. It was becoming harder with every passing year to 
make one section understand the position of the other. It 
was significant that, while in the thirties the mobs in the 
North had attacked the abolitionists, in the fifties they at¬ 
tacked the United States officers engaged in returning fugitive 
slaves. The mob had not become abolitionist, but it had 
moved a long way in that direction. During the next ten 
years several states passed “Personal Liberty” laws inter¬ 
fering with the execution of the fugitive slave law, and 
such laws were held by southern statesmen to constitute 
nullification. In Wisconsin, the supreme court of the state 
in a series of decisions actually declared the fugitive slave 
law unconstitutional and denied the right of the national 
courts to enforce it within the state limits, while a justice of 
the supreme court of the same state was elected on a plat¬ 
form of state rights. 

The most striking illustration of the growth of wide¬ 
spread hostility to slavery was afforded in 1852 by the re¬ 
ception given Uncle Tom’s Cabin , which at the same time 
did more to popularize antislavery feeling than any previous 
agency. That novel was so powerful a weapon in molding 
public opinion, that its merits are to this day a subject of 


PIERCE’S ADMINISTRATION 331 

conflicting assertion rather than of criticism. It did not 
endeavor so much to give a scientific description of the aver¬ 
age condition of the slave as a picture of the best and the 
worst possibilities of his life. Its human nature, at least, 
was true enough to convince the great mass of the northern 
people, and its incidents were so well adapted to dramatic 
form that the play written from it reached tens of thousands 
who would never have read the book. When a book like 
Uncle Tom's Cabin became the fetish of one section and was 
excluded from the other, men of acute political foresight 
might well doubt the finality of any agreement on the sub¬ 
ject of slavery, however calm the surface of practical politics 
might seem. 

It was thus in an atmosphere clear of clouds, but sur¬ 
charged with electricity, that Pierce began his administration. 
The impulses given by the Polk administration were still 
dominant in the party. The new President made Marcy 
his Secretary of State, Buchanan minister to England, and 
planned to signalize his administration by the expansion of 
national territory. It had in fact been contemplated for a 
moment by some party leaders to fight the campaign of 1852 
on the issue of “Cuba and Canada.” The annexation of 
Canada was scarcely practicable, but it might have served as 
makeweight in the platform. To advocate the annexation 
of Cuba alone would have stirred the sectional animosities 
which it was sought to quell. If, however, the annexation 
could be brought about between elections, the administration 
might go before the country presenting a record of a kind 
much appreciated by that generation in both West and South. 
It was thought, moreover, that the bringing in of Cuba as a 
slave state would quiet the disappointment of the South over 
California, without too seriously alarming the North. An¬ 
nexation might be brought about by purchase from Spain, 
by revolution within Cuba assisted from the United States, 
or as the result of war with Spain. The first of these methods 


Diplomacy 
as a distrac¬ 
tion. 


332 


BREAKING OF THE BONDS OF UNION 


Diplomacy 
and trans¬ 
portation. 


had been unsuccessfully tried by Buchanan in 1848. During 
the next six years the second was attempted. Several fili¬ 
bustering expeditions were organized by a Cuban, General 
Lopez, who received much popular sympathy in the United 
States. Twice a landing was effected on the island, but no 
general rising followed. In 1851 Lopez lost his life, and 
General Quitman became the leader of the movement, which, 
however, came to naught. In 1854 it seemed as if accident 
would bring about a resort to the third method, for the 
seizure of the Black Warrior , an American vessel, by the 
Cuban authorities, almost led to war between the United 
States and Spain. An apology by Spain, and the good sense 
of Secretary Marcy, however, prevented such a result. The 
administration, therefore, was forced to drop the Cuban 
question or to take deliberate action. Pierce decided upon 
the latter, and ordered Buchanan, Mason, and Soule, the 
ministers to England, France, and Spain, respectively, to 
meet and formulate a policy. In 1854, at Ostend, a watering 
place in Belgium, they consequently drew up what is known 
as the “Ostend Manifesto.” In this they contended that 
the United States should offer to buy Cuba. If Spain re¬ 
fused, the United States would be justified in taking Cuba by 
force, as a measure in self-defense. The dangers they feared 
were, first, that a slave insurrection was impending in the 
island, which would influence the minds of the slaves in this 
country; and second, that England might take Cuba by 
arrangement with Spain, and thus obtain a position imperil¬ 
ing our commerce if not our safety. This document so far 
overstepped the bounds of public morality as generally ex¬ 
pressed, that Marcy recommended that it be disregarded. 
The administration passed without advancing Cuban an¬ 
nexation. 

This failure confined the expansionist activity of the ad¬ 
ministration to the acquirement of a small piece of land on the 
southern border, which was needed for railroad purposes. 


CANAL DIPLOMACY 


333 


The sudden growth of California had made the problem of 
transcontinental transit a matter of prime importance. The 
route by Cape Horn was too long and dangerous. The proj¬ 
ect of a canal at some one of the narrow points in Central 
America, which had been bruited for over three centuries, 
was revived, and companies were actually formed to under¬ 
take the work. The political difficulties, however, were 
almost as great as the physical. The countries of Central 
America were unable to guarantee the safety of transit or the 
security of capital. In 1846 a treaty was made with Colom¬ 
bia by which the United States agreed to guarantee to Colom¬ 
bia the Isthmus of Panama, in return for a free and equal 
right of passage and the right to intervene to preserve the 
neutrality of the route across the isthmus. This treaty was 
in accord with the general policy pursued by the United 
States for the next thirty years, that such passageways, 
whether over land or water, should be enjoyed by all nations 
in common. Other nations were invited to join in the guar¬ 
antee. Owing to the transportation facilities provided by 
Commodore Vanderbilt, the Nicaragua route became more 
popular than that by Panama, and a canal was projected 
through the rivers, lakes, and mountains of that country. 
England was deeply interested in Nicaragua, and in 1850 
Clayton, Taylor’s Secretary of State, and Bulwer, the Eng¬ 
lish minister, arranged a treaty providing that neither coun¬ 
try should acquire special interests in Central America. This 
treaty was extremely unpopular, and was attacked by the 
Democrats as an abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine. 
Many attempts were made to abolish it, but it remained in 
force until 1902. 

The canal project failed, because the undertaking proved 
too great for the financial and engineering resources of the 
time. In 1856, however, a railroad was built over the Panama 
route. In the meantime the desirability of a transcontinental 
railroad which might lie wholly within the territory of the 


Transconti¬ 
nental rail¬ 
roads. 


334 


BREAKING OF THE BONDS OF UNION 


Commercial 

expansion. 


United States, was becoming more and more evident, and Con¬ 
gress was actively at work on the details of the undertaking. 
The surveys of the War Department, however, brought out 
the fact that the route involving the fewest engineering diffi¬ 
culties ran south of the United States boundary as fixed by 
the treaty of 1848. To obviate this difficulty a new treaty 
was made with Mexico in 1853, by which 54,000 square miles, 
known, from the minister who negotiated the treaty, as the 
“Gadsden Purchase,” were acquired, including the desired 
roadway. Sectional difficulties, however, combined with 
financial and other complications to prevent the actual 
work of railway construction. The same treaty provided 
for the mutual use of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec by Mexico 
and the United States, and gave the United States the right 
to intervene to preserve its neutrality. 

Once aroused, the interest in transportation did not stop 
with the routes having this special interest for the United 
States. The Whig administration had begun an attempt to 
open up the great rivers of South America to the commerce 
of the world, and Marcy in 1854 concluded a treaty with the 
Argentine Confederation affecting the Plata, and actively 
negotiated with Brazil and Peru concerning the Amazon. 
Marcy also arranged for the abolition of the tolls collected 
by Denmark from vessels entering the Baltic, though the 
treaty by which this result was accomplished was concluded 
under his successor. He inherited the Whig policy that 
led to Commodore Perry’s successful treaty with Japan in 
1854, which proved of unexpected significance, and him¬ 
self arranged for treaties with Persia and Siam. He con¬ 
cluded treaties on the subject of neutral rights with Persia, 
Russia, and the two Sicilies, and extradition treaties with 
many German states and the two Sicilies. He also revived 
the Jacksonian policy of reciprocity, making with England 
in behalf of Canada an agreement which placed commerce 
upon a most liberal footing for the next twelve years. When 


DOUGLAS AND NEBRASKA 


335 


these treaties are considered in the light of the growing 
American merchant marine, filling the Caribbean Sea and 
circling* South America for the California trade and the 
whaling industry, it may be seen that they might be sup¬ 
posed to bear promise of a revolution in American interests, 
and that it was not wholly visionary to hope that the public 
attention might be diverted from slavery to foreign affairs. 

All questions, however, tended to become sectional. Chi- Douglas and 
cago and St. Louis were little pleased with the southern Nebraska * 
route for the transcontinental railroad. Each planned a 
road, to be built with the aid of government land grants, to 
bring western commerce to their markets. A necessary pre¬ 
liminary was the organization of a territorial government in 
the region to be traversed, which had been left till then to 
the Indians. Pioneer settlers, moreover, had for some time 
chafed at being held within the western boundaries of Mis¬ 
souri and Iowa, and joined with the commercial interests, in 
demanding government and land surveys in the valleys of 
the Kansas and the Platte. The organization of the region, 
however, was blocked by the South, because it lay north of 
36° 30', and would be destined, by the Missouri Compromise, 
to increase the number of the free states. With the admis¬ 
sion of Arkansas in 1836 and of Florida in 1845, there 
remained to be developed into slave states only the territory 
of New Mexico. To break this deadlock, Senator Atchison 
of Missouri, who had succeeded Benton in the Senate, was 
insisting that the prohibition of slavery be repealed. The 
leadership in the solution of the problem, however, was 
undertaken by Senator Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois, long 
chairman of the committee on territories. In 1853 he had 
introduced a bill to organize a territory here, and throw the 
land open to settlement. In 1854 he brought in a new bill 
resembling the first except that it contained the provision 
that the question of slavery should be determined by the 
people of the territory. He subsequently incorporated with 


336 BREAKING OF THE BONDS OF UNION 


Kansas- 

Nebraska 

debate. 


his proposal the direct repeal of the Missouri Compromise. 
He realized that such action would be violently attacked in 
the North, but he hoped to offset this opposition by the 
appeal to the strong popular sentiment in favor of self-gov¬ 
ernment. His plan of squatter sovereignty, which he re¬ 
named popular sovereignty, would, he claimed, take the 
whole vexing question of the status of slavery in the terri¬ 
tories out of Congress. He probably hoped that the South 
would welcome the possibility of territorial gain, while the 
Northwest would rejoice in the new land opportunities and 
commercial openings. Young and vigorous, and counting 
on the gratitude of two such powerful sections, he undoubt¬ 
edly looked to the presidency as a prompt reward. 

The discussion which this bill precipitated was the most 
acrimonious in which Congress had as yet engaged on the 
slavery question. Douglas was attacked for disturbing the 
peace of the country, for sacrificing territory to slavery, for 
proposing an impracticable political scheme. Chase was his 
most successful opponent, although Seward really managed 
the opposition, and Charles Sumner, who had entered the 
Senate from Massachusetts as a result of a contest in which 
the Free-Soilers had held the balance in the legislature, con¬ 
tributed the pure fire of his enthusiasm. Douglas defended 
himself against the charge of being an agitator on the ground 
that his bill but embodied the principles of the Compromise 
of 1850. He found the southern members somewhat doubt¬ 
ful of the gift he came bearing them, and found it necessary 
to amend his bill in order to pass it. As it finally went to 
vote it provided for the organization of two territories, Kansas 
and Nebraska, instead of one; perhaps with the idea that 
one might become free and one slave. On the subject of 
slavery it read: “It being the true intent and meaning of 
this act not to legislate slavery into any territory or state 
nor to exclude it therefrom; but to leave the people thereof 
perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions 


THE KANSAS-NEBRASKA QUESTION 


337 


in their own way, subject only to the Constitution of the 
United States.” 

The vote on the Kansas-Nebraska bill completely de¬ 
molished party lines. In the Senate twenty-eight Democrats 
voted for it and five against; nine Whigs for it and seven 
against. The South was practically solid for it, twenty-five 
to two; the North was divided fourteen in favor and twelve 
against. In the House the contest was closer; forty-two 
northern Democrats out of eighty-six refused to vote for 
this measure, although it had the backing of the administra¬ 
tion. The Whigs were so divided that Seward wrote to his 
wife: “What you have so long wished for has come around 
at last. The Whigs of the North are separated from the 
Whigs of the South, and happily, by the act of the latter, not 
the former.” The bill was passed by an approving South, with 
the assistance of about one half of the northern Democracy. 

Even before the final passage of the Kansas-Nebraska 
bill, on May 22, 1854, the campaign for the control of the 
next Congress began. Few political contests have been more 
important or more bitter. In the North all parties were 
thoroughly demoralized. The Democrats were divided 
between those supporting the bill and those opposing it. The 
Whig party almost vanished, except in a few states like New 
York and Massachusetts, where it was particularly well 
organized. A third party had already, about 1852, entered 
the field, based on the growing feeling against immigrants. 
This feeling first found expression in the formation of secret 
societies. Soon these began to enter politics with the design 
of increasing the period necessary for naturalization, of 
excluding foreigners and Catholics from office, and in general 
of restricting the privileges of those not native-born. Banded 
together in secret societies, with an elaborate ritual, they at 
first threw their weight to whichever of the regular party 
candidates pleased them. Their organization enabled them 
to predict results with startling exactness, and their success 


Kansas- 

Nebraska 

vote. 


Kansas- 
Nebraska 
campaign in 
the North. 


“ Know- 
Nothings.” 


338 BREAKING OF THE BONDS OF UNION 


The Republi¬ 
can party. 


Result in 
the North. 


Campaign in 
the South. 


encouraged them to venture independently. Under the 
name of the American party, but more popularly called 
“Know-Nothings,’’ they carried several state elections, 
and hoped to control the new Congress. The unex¬ 
pected introduction of the slavery question, however, di¬ 
vided them, as it did the other parties. A fourth party was 
formed in the West particularly to meet the Kansas-Nebraska 
issue. At Ripon, in Wisconsin, a meeting called to express 
disapproval of slavery extension adopted the name Republi¬ 
can. This name proved popular and was taken up by a state 
convention in Michigan. Other states followed, and through¬ 
out this region, as well as in Maine, this newest party became 
the meeting place of those who believed slavery to be the 
leading question of politics. Although there were four par¬ 
ties, the issue in every northern congressional district was 
plain. Whether the contest was between two Democrats, or 
between a Democrat and a Whig, a Republican, or a Know- 
Nothing,— everywhere one candidate stood for Douglas’s 
policy and one against further extension of slavery. The 
result w r as an overwhelming rebuke to Douglas and the ad¬ 
ministration which supported him. The Democrats lost 
347,742 votes in the North, and their majority of eighty- 
four in the House was turned into a minority of seventy-five. 

It was a significant and ominous fact that in the South 
there was a campaign as different from that in the North as 
if it were another country. The Whig party here also had 
become moribund, and the majority, leaders as well as rank 
and file, transferred themselves to the American party, which, 
as the immigration question was of little importance in the 
South, trusted largely for vitality to its demand for reform 
in administration. Some who had been Democrats joined 
the Americans, while some Whigs, as Alexander Stephens, 
refused to join the new movement, and became Democrats, 
and the loss and gain in the transfer from the one party to 
the other made the elections sufficiently exciting. The 


THE KANSAS-NEBRASKA QUESTION 


339 


territorial question, however, attracted little attention, and 
there was small divergence between the Americans and Dem¬ 
ocrats on that point. Such discussion as there was, how¬ 
ever, boded ill for the future of both parties. Whereas the 
Americans elected in the North were one and all opposed to 
the Kansas-Nebraska bill because it opened up those territo¬ 
ries to slavery, the Americans in the South attacked it be¬ 
cause, by allowing the squatters to exclude slavery, it violated 
Calhoun’s principle that all the territories were constitution¬ 
ally open to slavery. Whereas Douglas was defending his 
bill in the North on the ground that it established the Dem¬ 
ocratic principle of leaving the matter to the people on the 
spot, Stephens defended it in Georgia on the ground that it 
granted the people of the territory “all the power that 
Congress had over it, and no more.” “The inherent sover¬ 
eign right of the people to establish a government independ¬ 
ently of Congress is not recognized in a single clause of that 
bill.” Henry A. Wise of Virginia, one of the leading Dem¬ 
ocrats of the South, openly attacked the principle of popu¬ 
lar sovereignty as applied to the territories, and in general it 
was understood to apply to the states only, and to mean that 
they could not properly be enjoined from allowing slavery, 
as had been done by the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and the 
Missouri Compromise of 1820. In fact the southern and 
northern Democrats had totally different conceptions of what 
had been accomplished by the Kansas-Nebraska act. For a 
time the ambiguous phrase of popular sovereignty held them 
together, but a union dependent upon a misunderstanding 
was of doubtful duration. In the congressional elections 
of 1854 and 1855 the Democrats lost to the Americans in 
the South, though not so heavily as to their opponents in 
the North. In the last Congress there had been but twenty- 
four southern Whigs; in the new one there were thirty-two 
southern Americans and Whigs. 

By the time Congress came together in December, 1855, 


340 


BREAKING OF THE BONDS OF UNION 


Speakership 

contest. 


The struggle 
for Kansas. 


some degree of order had been brought out of the political 
chaos of 1854. Most of the northern Americans had become 
to all intents and purposes Republicans, and, with some of 
the Anti-Kansas-Nebraska Democrats, supported Nathaniel 
P. Banks, the Republican candidate for the speakership. 
The southern Americans supported H. M. Fuller, and stood 
by the Calhoun doctrine of non-intervention with slavery 
in the territories. The regular Democrats nominated William 
A. Richardson, an advocate of popular sovereignty. No one 
of these received a majority, the vote standing 105 for Banks, 
40 for Fuller, and 74 for Richardson. For two months the 
contest went on and 133 ballots were taken. At last it 
was agreed that a plurality should elect, and Banks was con¬ 
sequently chosen. 

In the meantime the country was being given a practical 
illustration of the working of popular sovereignty. It was 
universally recognized that Nebraska would be settled from 
the North and would decide in favor of a free soil. Kansas, 
however, lay directly west of Missouri, and it was feared in 
the North, and hoped in the South, that its population would 
be proslavery. The spirit in the North was such, however, 
that this could not take place without a struggle, and Kansas 
became a bone of contention. From both sections emigrants 
willing to settle in the disputed territory were assisted in their 
desires, and were furnished with arms, to be used, of course, 
only in self-defense. In this work the North had great ad¬ 
vantages. The very fact that violence might be expected in 
Kansas deterred the slave owners from bringing into it prop¬ 
erty which might readily be lost. Many of the northern 
settlers were abolitionists anxious to promote their cause, 
and even those who had no strong moral convictions on the 
subject were unwilling to throw the territory open to slave 
labor and to capitalistic farmers employing slaves. The 
North had, moreover, more money, more organizing ability* 
and a larger migratory population. 


THE STRUGGLE FOR KANSAS 


341 


On March 30, 1855, while the vanguard of this free-soil 
army was passing into the territory, the first election occurred 
for the territorial legislature. The greater number of votes 
in this election were cast by citizens of Missouri, who rode 
over the border, cast their votes, and returned. Western 
Missouri was strongly prosouthern in sentiment, and while 
its inhabitants were not ready to move into Kansas in order 
to carry it for slavery, they organized “Blue Lodges,” whose 
purpose was to assist their friends across the border. These 
votes elected a proslavery legislature, which speedily passed 
a code of laws encouraging that institution. Governor 
Reeder protested against the election frauds and was re¬ 
moved by President Pierce, who recognized the legislature 
as legally representing the people of Kansas. The Free- 
Soilers, whose numbers grew rapidly during the summer, 
would not submit to a government which they held had been 
fraudulently established. They ignored the territorial legis¬ 
lature and, meeting at Topeka, drew up a state constitution, 
and petitioned Congress for admission as a state, on a no¬ 
slavery basis. Thus popular sovereignty had failed in its 
political object of keeping slavery discussion out of Congress; 
and the same Congress which found such difficulty in electing 
its Speaker was confronted by a new r phase of the territorial 
question. 

The deadlock in Congress prevented action, the request 
for admission under the Topeka constitution was not granted, 
and Kansas was left in the hands of the administration. The 
debate, however, furnished one incident which illustrated in 
a peculiarly dramatic way the growing acerbity of sectional 
feeling. Charles Sumner delivered an oration, published 
later under the title of The Crime against Kansas. His 
style of oratory was polished in the extreme, and acquired 
a special weight from the care and deliberation with which 
he was known to prepare his utterances. With this extreme 
care he combined the fire and straight speaking of a radical 


Popular 
sovereignty 
in Kansas. 


Sumner and 
Brooks. 


342 


BREAKING OF THE BONDS OF UNION 


Brooks and 
the South. 


The Republi¬ 
can party. 


to whom any injustice was a burning sore and any proposi¬ 
tion of compromise was as enraging as an affront to his 
personal honor. The form of his oratory was modeled upon 
that of Athens, and in spite of the delicacy and sensitiveness 
of his taste, he sometimes used images, drawn from ancient 
authors, which were scarcely considered seemly in the nine¬ 
teenth century. He selected as the particular object of his 
attack the venerable Senator Butler of South Carolina, and 
heaped upon his head epithets that, as between two southern¬ 
ers, would inevitably have resulted in a duel. Such repara¬ 
tion was impossible in this case, as Sumner had the New 
Englander’s abhorrence of that method of settling disputes, 
and, owing to the privileges of debate, legal redress could 
not be obtained. Under these provocative circumstances, 
Preston Brooks, Butler’s nephew and a member of the 
House of Representatives, attacked Sumner from behind, 
as he was seated at his desk in the Senate, and beat him on 
the head with a cane into unconsciousness. 

Throughout the South, Brooks was applauded as a hero; 
the support of all but one of the southern representatives 
prevented his expulsion from the House of Representatives, 
a two-thirds majority being required, and he was reelected 
without opposition at the next election. The fact that an 
affair between two representatives of the most refined classes 
of the two sections could degenerate into such a personal 
encounter, and that Brooks’s attack upon a defenseless man 
could receive the approbation of the chivalry of the South, 
was a sign of the chasm which began to widen between North 
and South. 

Under such circumstances, but with some modification 
of popular excitement, the election of 1856 approached. 
The Republicans had already reached a degree of solidarity 
most unusual in a party so young. They met at Philadel¬ 
phia, as Pennsylvania was regarded as being the pivotal 
state, and accomplished their business with a degree of har- 


POLITICAL PARTIES IN 1856 


343 


mony remarkable considering that their members were 
drawn from all preceding parties and included many men of 
great ability and marked individuality who had not pre¬ 
viously acted with any party. Their platform was, indeed, 
inconsistent on the territorial question, for one clause denied 
“the authority of Congress, of a territorial legislature, of 
any individual or association of individuals, to give legal 
existence to slavery in any territory of the United States, 
while the present Constitution shall be maintained,” while 
t that which succeeded, asserted the authority of Congress. 
The intention, authority or no authority, to keep slavery 
out was, however, emphatically evident. They selected 
as their candidate John C. Fremont, a young army officer 
with a brilliant and rather romantic record; and thus avoided 
creating jealousies among the greater leaders. As the 
Whigs predominated, the platform declared in favor of in¬ 
ternal improvements, particularly of a railroad to the Pacific 
and the development of rivers and harbors. The presence 
of Democrats and particularly of a considerable number of 
German-Americans from the critical region of the Northwest, 
prevented them from expressing unfriendliness to foreigners. 
The Republicans were united, determined, and they stated 
precisely what they wanted, but they were obliged to face 
the fact that this unity of purpose was at the sacrifice of 
representation in the southern states. The party was 
purely sectional. 

The American party also held its first national conven¬ 
tion, but was less fortunate than the Republicans, in that a 
distinct split occurred. The majority of its northern members 
seceded, ultimately merging with the Republicans. This 
left the party in the control of the southern element, but it, 
nevertheless, adopted a conservative tone, refused to declare 
itself on the territorial question except to indorse the Com¬ 
promise of 1850, and tried to divert attention to its special 
issue of the foreign peril. Its nominees, ex-President 


American 1 
and Demo¬ 
cratic nomi¬ 
nations. 


344 


BREAKING OF THE BONDS OF UNION 


Election of 
1856. 


Diplomacy 
and the 
crisis of 
1857. 


Fillmore for President and Andrew Jackson Donelson for 
Vice President, were indorsed by a Whig convention, repre¬ 
senting but a small faction of that party. Together they 
bid for the support of the lovers of peace and of union. The 
Democrats were able to present the appearance of union. 
Douglas’s ambiguous phrase, popular sovereignty, still served 
to keep together men of very different views. With two 
new parties in the field they did well to emphasize their 
party continuity by the selection of Buchanan, prominent 
in Democratic councils for nearly forty years, as their candi¬ 
date. Buchanan, moreover, was closely identified with the 
policy of adopting an active foreign policy in order to dis¬ 
tract attention from domestic troubles, and commanded the 
support of the best of the conservative element and of a 
large portion of the business interests of the country. Men 
like Rufus Choate, the friend of Daniel Webster, and a life¬ 
long Whig, now voted the Democratic ticket as affording the 
best chance for continued peace. 

The result of the election was the choice of Buchanan. 
In the North the contest was three-cornered ; the Ameri¬ 
cans held the balance in six states, but won no electoral 
votes. In this section Fremont received 114 electoral votes, 
to 62 for Buchanan. This was not sufficient, however, to 
overcome Buchanan’s overwhelming victory in the South, 
where he received the vote of every slave state except 
Maryland, which voted for Fillmore. 

Buchanan hoped for diplomatic success. He appointed 
as Secretary of State, Lewis Cass, who obtained a satisfac¬ 
tory arrangement with England on the right of search. 
Buchanan’s pet project of the annexation of Cuba, however, 
made no progress; an opportunity for expansion in Central 
America, opened by the filibustering expedition of William 
Walker, took such form that Buchanan himself was obliged 
to discountenance it; and disturbances in Mexico, which he 
might have turned into an occasion for intervention, cul- 


BUCHANAN’S ADMINISTRATION 


345 


minated just too late. His aspirations for a brilliant diplo¬ 
matic record, therefore, came to naught. His administration, 
moreover, was a period of economic distress. So prosperous 
was the country, so full the treasury, and so nearly paid the 
debt, on the eve of his inauguration, that the tariff was 
further reduced, by a combination of the southern and the 
commercial interests. No sooner was this done, however, 
than a financial crisis came upon the country. This was par¬ 
ticularly a railroad crisis, caused by the great amounts of 
capital invested during the decade in enterprises many of 
which were not immediately remunerative. It was heightened 
by general speculation along other lines, especially in land, 
and by the absence of effective banking laws in many states. 
It was not so severe as that of 1837; it affected the South, 
where the banks of Louisiana held strong specie reserves, 
comparatively little, and the West less than the East; but 
for the next few years business was contracted, imports 
declined, and the government was forced to borrow money, 
sometimes finding difficulty in placing its loans. 

The beginning of the administration saw still one more 
attempt to settle the territorial question. A case had for 
some time been before the courts involving the status of a 
certain Dred Scott, a Missouri negro who claimed his freedom 
because his former master, an army surgeon, had at one time 
taken him to reside in the free state of Illinois. This case 
did not necessarily involve any important point, as there 
was good legal precedent for the view that, though to touch 
free soil might make a slave free, the condition of slavery 
would revive on voluntary reentrance into territory where 
slavery was legal. It was, however, successfully urged upon 
Chief Justice Taney that this case might afford the means 
of setting forth the opinion of the Supreme Court on the 
whole question of slavery in the territories; for Dred Scott’s 
wife’s freedom was also at stake, and her claim rested on 
residence in the Minnesota territory, which was at the time 


The Dred 
Scott case. 


346 BREAKING OF THE BONDS OF UNION 


The decision. 


Bloodshed 
in Kansas. 


free under the Missouri Compromise. The prestige of the 
Court was so great, it was argued, that the people of the 
country would unhesitatingly accept its opinion, and thus 
political controversy might be brought to an end. Buchanan 
referred in his inaugural to the forthcoming decision as some¬ 
thing which might set men’s minds at rest. 

Judge Taney himself handed down the decision of a 
majority of the Court. He argued that Dred Scott had no 
right to bring suit before the Court because he was a negro, 
and a negro could not be a citizen of the United States. 
The Declaration of Independence could not be held to declare 
the equality of negroes with white men, because it must be 
interpreted in the light of conditions existing at the time, 
and in 1776 there were negro slaves in every state. He 
further argued that the Missouri Compromise was uncon¬ 
stitutional, for Congress could not take away, without due 
process of law, slave property or any other kind of property 
in the common territories of the United States. Particu¬ 
larly should this principle hold in territory bought, like the 
Louisiana Purchase, with the common funds of all the 
states. This view, though legally differing somewhat from 
Calhoun’s doctrine of “non-intervention,” resembled it in 
that it opened all United States territory, not yet or¬ 
ganized into states, to slavery. This decision made a 
profound impression on the public mind, but it did not 
settle the territorial problem. Rather it weakened the 
respect for the Court. It was pointed out that Justices 
Curtis and McLean dissented, presenting weighty arguments. 
The legal force of the decision was also questioned. A court 
can declare the law only in regard to a case before it; and 
many held that the general questions into which Judge 
Taney entered were really not involved, and that his state¬ 
ments on those points were in the nature of obiter dicta. 

In the meantime, the Kansas question was again exciting 
attention. Locally the situation was becoming more acute. 


WAR IN KANSAS 


347 


In 1855 the free-soil and proslavery factions had met in 
arms during what was known as the Wakarusa War, but 
hardly any blood was shed. In 1856 Lawrence, the free- 
soil center, was burned, and murders became frequent. In 
that year also John Brown began to take a part in the strug¬ 
gle, and he, with his family and neighbors, murdered five of 
the proslavery party in what is known as the Pottawatomie 
massacre. Buchanan professed an intention to observe 
a policy of fair play between the contending factions, and 
appointed Robert J. Walker, an able and honest man, as 
governor. Under him an election for the territorial legisla¬ 
ture was held, which was fairly conducted and which resulted 
in the choice of a free-soil majority. Before this new legis¬ 
lature could meet, however, a convention, called by the first 
or proslavery legislature and elected under such conditions 
as to give it a proslavery majority, came together. This 
convention met in the proslavery town of Lecompton, and 
proceeded to frame a constitution under which Kansas 
should apply for admission as a state. It was afraid 
to submit the results of its work to popular vote, for 
under Governor Walker rejection would be inevitable. 
It was decided to declare the result final without a popu¬ 
lar vote, but to forestall congressional criticism on this 
point, by allowing the people to vote as to whether they 
would have the constitution with or without slavery. This 
was less fair than it appeared, for the protection of all slave 
property already in the territory was provided for under all 
circumstances, and the only point upon which the people 
actually could vote was whether or not they would allow 
further importation. The Free-Soilers refused to vote, and 
consequently the constitution with slavery was reported 
adopted, and the admission of Kansas under it was recom¬ 
mended by Buchanan on February 3, 1858. 

Again acrimonious discussion broke out. Jefferson Davis 
stated that if the North had not attacked slavery, all would 


The Lecomp¬ 
ton debate. 


348 BREAKING OF THE BONDS OF UNION 


Position of 
Douglas. 


have been well, but the contest once begun, the South must 
win or slavery was doomed. Already the free states stood 
sixteen to fifteen. The admission of Minnesota in May, 
1858, was impending. Oregon had a southern population 
and Democratic politics, but when admitted in 1859, chose 
to be free. New Mexico was not ready for statehood, and so 
Kansas was necessary to the South to help redress the balance. 
On the other hand, Douglas did not dare and did not desire 
to support the Lecompton constitution. He had for four 
years been advocating emphatically the principle that the 
people should decide, and he could not support a scheme 
which openly thwarted the popular will. He broke with 
the administration and exerted all his influence to defeat 
the plan. Douglas was defeated in the Senate, but in the 
House his supporters, known as the Anti-Lecompton Demo¬ 
crats, uniting with the Republicans, won. After long debate a 
compromise was at length agreed to, known as the English Bill. 
This admitted Kansas under the Lecompton constitution on 
condition that the people should vote to accept the customary 
land grants instead of the larger land grants that had been 
demanded. Should the vote be adverse, admission under a 
new constitution was to be deferred until the population should 
be as great as that of the average congressional district; and 
no provision was made for any land grants. The majority 
in Kansas, however, voted against the proposition, and thus 
ended the chance of the South to obtain it as a slave state. 

Douglas now became the center of all political attention. 
He had been regarded as the probable candidate of the 
Democratic party in the next election, but his opposition to 
the Lecompton constitution had brought him into open hos¬ 
tility to the administration and endangered his southern 
support. Such a reversal of attitude did this seem, that 
Horace Greeley and other Republicans pronounced him the 
best candidate for their party. His future was determined 
by a contest into which he immediately entered for reelec- 


THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES 


349 


tion as United States senator from Illinois. That state was 
particularly well fitted to be the battleground of contending 
opinions on the question at issue. The first settlement had 
been from the South, and the southern element had filled 
in the lower end of the state, which came to be known as 
Egypt, with its commercial center at Cairo. This element 
had pressed northward and, in the middle portion, occupied 
those districts which were covered with a growth of hardwood 
timber. About 1830 emigrants from New England and New 
York began to come in by way of the Lakes. Chicago com¬ 
menced its wonderful growth, and this northern element 
obtained control of the northern portion of the state. In the 
middle regions the northerners came to predominate in the 
prairie country, which the southerners had failed to occupy. 
In general, these facts determined the politics of the state. 
Not that every one of southern origin took one side and 
every one of northern origin took the other. Abraham 
Lincoln, the leader of the Republicans, was born in Kentucky, 
and Douglas himself in Vermont. Nevertheless, throughout 
this period, not only in Illinois, but in Indiana and Ohio as 
well, a knowledge of the history of settlement is a key to the 
course of politics. In 1856, in eight southern counties of 
Illinois, Fremont received an average of less than ten votes 
each. It was not that there was a love for slavery as an 
institution in the southern counties. Illinois had distinctly 
refused to establish slavery even before the coming of the 
northerners, but there was less abhorrence of slavery, and 
more appreciation of Douglas’s principle of popular sover¬ 
eignty. It was another conflict between the southern belief 
in personal independence and the northern desire to regulate 
the life of the community. 

The Illinois Republicans nominated Lincoln for senator; 
and a series of seven debates was arranged, two in the north¬ 
ern section, two in Egypt, and three in the intermediate 
district. Upon Lincoln rested the burden of attack, and he 


Illinois as a 
critical state 


The Lincoln* 

Douglas 

debates. 


350 ' BREAKING OF THE BONDS OF UNION 


vigorously undertook the task. In the first place, he wished 
to show that Douglas was unfitted to serve as Republican 
leader. This was brought out most emphatically by Doug¬ 
las's own statement that he did not care whether slavery 
was voted up or down in the territories. The Republicans 
did care, and this difference in sentiment was a greater ob¬ 
stacle to an alliance than any number of differences on partic¬ 
ular questions. Lincoln was still more anxious to make 
Douglas an impossible candidate for southern Democrats. 
To accomplish this, and to make impossible a further union of 
inharmonious elements under the ambiguous phrase of popu¬ 
lar sovereignty, it was only necessary to bring out in a sol¬ 
emn public manner the essential difference between Douglas’s 
principle of squatter sovereignty and the southern principle, 
now confirmed by the Dred Scott decision, of non-interven¬ 
tion. He therefore asked Douglas whether, after the Dred 
Scott decision, it was possible for any territory by its own ac¬ 
tion to prohibit slavery ? If Douglas answered that it was 
not, the whole principle of squatter sovereignty fell; if he said 
that it could, it would be equivalent to saying that the Dred 
Scott decision was without force. If he took the first posi¬ 
tion, he was almost sure to lose the election in Illinois; if 
the second, he would lose the support of the South for the 
presidency. It was not that Lincoln created this dilemma; 
he merely made absolutely plain an actual condition which 
had existed for four years. Douglas answered that, while 
the Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, 
allowed slavery throughout the territories, that institution 
could not exist without friendly local legislation, and, there¬ 
fore, a territorial government could, if so disposed, actually 
prevent its existence. 

A further purpose of Lincoln in the debate was to bring 
home to the voters the fact that the Dred Scott decision 
involved not an abstract legal principle, but one of imme¬ 
diate interest to the people of the states as well as of the 


ELECTION OF 1858 


351 


territories. In the speech at Springfield, in which he accepted The na- 
the nomination, he pointed out that there was imminent pStsof* 
jeopardy that slavery might be made a national institution. slaver y* 
“‘A house divided against itself cannot stand.’ I believe 
this government cannot endure permanently half slave and 
half free.” If the Dred Scott decision was correct in assert¬ 
ing that slave property in the territories was under the aegis 
of the Constitution, might not a subsequent decision, follow¬ 
ing the same line of argument, declare that such property 
must be protected wherever found, even in a free state ? 

Lincoln accused Douglas of being involved with Pierce, 
Buchanan, and Taney in a conspiracy to bring about such a 
result. This charge could not stand investigation, but the 
danger to which he called attention was not imaginary. 

Already in New York state the Lemmon case, which in¬ 
volved the status of slaves accompanying persons passing 
through a free state, was on the way to the Supreme Court. 

It can scarcely be doubted that the Court would have 
decided as Lincoln feared. The Republicans felt it necessary 
to control the Court and reverse its decision. All together 
the most important result of the debate was the fact that it 
brought Lincoln to the attention of the nation. 

Douglas secured the legislature and the senatorship, Election of 
but the Republicans cast the larger aggregate vote. The 18581 
northern counties were growing more rapidly than the rest 
of the state, and therefore the legislative apportionment, 
made several years before, favored the Democrats. In the 
other northern states the Republicans were generally success¬ 
ful. When the election was complete, it was found that 
the next Congress would contain: in the Senate, 38 Demo- The new 
crats, 25 Republicans, and 2 Americans; in the House, Con ^ ess - 
88 Administration Democrats, 13 Anti-Lecompton Demo¬ 
crats, 27 Americans, and 109 Republicans. The failure of 
any one party to control a majority again produced a 
deadlock in the election of Speaker, which lasted over two 


352 


BREAKING OF THE BONDS OF UNION 


John Brown, 


months, and which was marked by growing evidence of bad 
feeling. The Republican candidate was John Sherman of 
Ohio, but it was brought up against him that he had indorsed 
a book which at this time created a sensation almost equal 
to that of Uncle Tom's Cabin. This was The Impending 
Crisis , written by Hinton R. Helper of North Carolina, and 
containing a scathing denunciation of slavery, based not 
upon moral, but upon economic grounds, and upon a demand 
for justice, not for the negro, but for the poor white. The 
opposition was strong enough to defeat Sherman, and cause 
the election of William Pennington, a more conservative 
Republican. 

The speakership contest was eclipsed in importance by 
an episode which brought home to the East the violence of 
Kansas, and which illustrates the unnatural condition of 
northern sentiment as the Brooks incident illustrates that 
of the South. John Brown was a virile old man, of the most 
extreme reformer type. His mental outlook was so nar¬ 
row that he approached monomania, and his feeling was so 
intense that he was not content with the usual methods of 
the abolitionists, but believed that he was chosen of God to 
act as His strong right arm. He had that living conviction 
which makes warriors, and the magnetism of an honest man. 
He was among the early free-soil settlers in Kansas, and took 
an active and bloody part in the local contests there. He 
then conceived the broader scheme of establishing himself 
in the mountains of the South, and creating a refuge to which 
slaves could fly. Gradually he would extend his operations 
and would render slavery impossible throughout the South. 
He planned to guide and govern the negroes, and lead them 
to a peaceful mode of life; but the possibility that his plan 
might be accompanied with bloodshed, while he guarded 
against it, did not distress him, for he believed that all slave 
owners were sinners. He had said in Kansas: “I have no 
choice. It has been decreed by Almighty God, ordained from 


JOHN BROWN 


353 


eternity, that I should make an example of these men.” 
On October 16, 1859, he seized the government arsenal at 
Harpers Ferry. Attacked there by government forces, he 
resisted, and was captured. He was tried at Charlestown in 
Virginia, convicted of treason and murder, and hanged. The 
southern states were panic-stricken at this seeming approach 
of slave insurrection, which they always dreaded. Every¬ 
where the militia was put in order and the military resources 
of the states were strengthened. Radical orators held the 
North responsible for the attack, and began openly to declare 
that a union was unnatural where one party to it threatened 
the very life of the other. 

Northern sentiment, however, is most significant. While 
much the greater number of northerners condemned the raid, 
perhaps a majority sympathized with John Brown. Emer¬ 
son referred to him as “that new saint, than whom none 
purer or more brave was ever led by love of men into con¬ 
flict and death, the new saint awaiting his martyrdom, and 
who, if he shall suffer, will make the gallows glorious like 
the cross.” While only four or five men in the North had 
been acquainted with his purposes, these were sane, lovable 
gentlemen, and their acquiescence in a scheme which might 
have deluged the South in blood, is one of the most striking 
manifestations of how far from the normal the public mind 
had wandered. John Brown may have been insane, but he 
was not a madman blindly striking in the dark; his insanity 
received its direction from the vibrant mental atmosphere 
about him. Although his plans were approved by but few 
in the North, the South was justified in regarding him, not 
as an isolated assailant, but as a product of a sentiment, not 
yet dominant, but growing every day more powerful. At the 
North, also, the years 1859 anc * i860 saw a growing interest 
in military affairs. Military companies and regiments were 
formed almost every week, military exhibitions were popular, 
and the New York Zouaves went to Chicago to drill. There 


Northern 
sentiment on 
John Brown. 


354 


BREAKING OF THE BONDS OF UNION 


Break-up of 
the Demo¬ 
cratic party. 


was no purpose to use their arms against the South, but 
there was that unrest which so often precedes hostilities. 

Under such circumstances the Democratic national con¬ 
vention met at Charleston, to determine the momentous 
question whether party unity could be restored. The majority, 
coming almost wholly from the northern and border states, 
pinned their faith to Douglas, but over a third of the mem¬ 
bers, delegates from the Cotton States, could not trust him, 
and blocked his nomination. Finally, the most extreme 
southerners seceded from the convention, which adjourned 
to meet again at Baltimore. There Douglas was nomi¬ 
nated, though not without some irregularity, and the follow¬ 
ing resolution was adopted: “That it is in accordance with 
the interpretation of the Cincinnati platform [of 1856], that, 
during the existence of the territorial governments, the 
measure of restriction, whatever it may be, imposed by the 
Federal Constitution on the power of the territorial legis¬ 
lature over the subject of domestic relations, as the same has 
been, or shall hereafter be finally determined by the Supreme 
Court of the United States, should be respected by all good 
citizens, and enforced with promptness and fidelity by every 
branch of the general government.” A second secession 
took place at Baltimore, which resulted in the choice of 
J. C. Breckinridge of Kentucky, the Vice President under 
Buchanan, as candidate for President on a platform of which 
the distinguishing feature was the resolution: “That the 
government of a territory organized by an act of Congress 
is provisional and temporary; and during its existence, all 
citizens of the United States have an equal right to settle 
with their property in the territory, without their rights, 
either of person or of property, being destroyed or impaired 
by congressional legislation,” and “That it is the duty of the 
federal government, in all its departments, to protect, when 
necessary, the rights of persons and property in the terri¬ 
tories, and wherever else its constitutional authority extends.” 


POLITICAL PARTIES IN i860 


355 


The difference between the two platforms lay in the fact that 
the one stated that citizens of the territories should obey the 
Dred Scott decision, the other that the national government 
was bound to make them obey it. Breckinridge and his 
platform were indorsed by the Charleston seceders at a meet¬ 
ing held in Richmond, and were supported by Buchanan and 
the administration. Thus the fundamental disagreement 
between the southern and northern Democrats became 
visible, and that great party, the last important political 
organization which had vitally bound North and South 
together, was torn asunder. Neither part could claim to be 
the regular representative of the whole. Really Douglas 
was the Democratic organization candidate in the North; 
Breckinridge, in the South. 

The Republican convention met at Chicago, its managers 
realizing that the Northwest must largely determine the 
election. Seward was the leading candidate, and was uni¬ 
versally recognized as the most prominent Republican, but 
he was regarded by many as too radical to be elected. Natu¬ 
rally a man of conservative, temporizing disposition, he 
sometimes yielded to an impulsiveness, especially in speech, 
which caused him to be distrusted. Perhaps two of his 
phrases, “the higher law,” and “the irrepressible con¬ 
flict,” defeated his nomination. They really indicated a 
constitutional defect which rendered him unsuited for the 
presidency, for, unlike Lincoln’s radical statement that a 
“house divided against itself cannot stand,” they did not 
represent a clear-cut belief upon which he was prepared to 
act, but rather a momentary flash of insight, soon clouded 
in his mind, as the phrases were moderated in his speech, by 
suggestions of shadowy expedients, and a genial glow of 
unconvincing optimism. When his defeat became evident, 
the contest was thrown open. Lincoln, as the rival of 
Douglas, was really the logical candidate. The shouting of 
the Chicago mob proved his popularity in the doubtful state 


Nomination 
of Lincoln. 


356 BREAKING OF THE BONDS OF UNION 


The Consti¬ 
tutional 
Union party. 


The cam¬ 
paign of 
i860. 


of Illinois. He was nominated on the third ballot. The 
most important feature of the platform, aside from the 
unequivocal declaration on the territorial question, was the 
plank favoring a protective tariff, which was, perhaps, re¬ 
sponsible for the subsequent Republican success in Pennsyl¬ 
vania. 

The American party of 1856 became the Constitutional 
Union party of i860. It chose as its candidates, John Bell 
of Tennessee and Edward Everett of Massachusetts. It 
did not attempt to define its attitude on the great issues of 
the day, but called upon all citizens to support its candidates, 
who were known to be loyal supporters of the Union and to 
place the preservation of the Union before all else. 

As in every campaign since 1854, there was one conflict 
in the free states, and another south of the Mason-Dixon line. 
In the North, Lincoln ran against the field. His opponents 
sometimes combined as in New Jersey and New York, but 
in most states there were four tickets. The Republicans 
emphasized the slavery question, especially appealing to the 
labor vote. J. M. Forbes had written in December, 1856 : 
“ All other influences sink into insignificance compared with 
that brought to bear for two years past, and especially dur¬ 
ing the past four months, from the stump and by the tremen¬ 
dous machinery of the campaign press, to convince the 
laboring classes here of the aristocratic nature of the institu¬ 
tion of slavery ; of the small number of slaveholders com¬ 
pared with the white population North and South, and of 
the coming issue being whether this small class (supposed to 
rule the South) shall own half the Senate and shall use the 
national arm to extend their institutions at home and 
abroad.” In August, i860, Carl Schurz said at St. Louis: 
“In the North, every laborer thinks, and is required to think. 
In the South the laborer is forbidden to think, lest he think 
too much, for thought engenders aspirations. . . . Our 
laboring man must be a free man, in order to be what he 





































































- 
























































' 














Counties for which no returns were given or whose returns 
were thrown out are, for the most part,left blank. In some cases, 
especially in Texas, they are colored according to the returns of 
some other election, if this served to give a fair indication of the 
situation. Along the frontier the blanks generally represent un¬ 
settled regions. 

In New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey the vote given as 
for Douglas was cast for a Fusion ticket in opposition to Lincoln. 




























































































ELECTION OF i860 


357 


ought to be, an intelligent laborer. Therefore, we educate 
him for liberty by our system of public instruction. . . . 
Your laboring man must be a brute in order to remain what 
you want him to be, a slave. . . . On your plantation fields 
stands another institution, from which your system of labor 
derives its inspiration; that is your schoolhouse, where 
your slaves are flogged.” The Bell and Breckinridge orators 
in the North dwelt on the advantage of the Union and the 
dangers to which it was exposed. They called upon the people 
to defend the Constitution and the Supreme Court, and to 
avoid the evils of a protective tariff such as the Republicans 
proposed. The Douglas men appealed to Democratic 
regularity, and popular rights as represented in the principle 
of squatter sovereignty. 

In the South, Breckinridge was opposed by Bell and 
Douglas. The latter, believing that Breckinridge repre¬ 
sented the most dangerous radicalism, canceled his engage¬ 
ments in the West, where he had a fighting chance of winning 
votes, and made a tour of the South, where the utmost result 
of his endeavors could be to turn the states from Breckin¬ 
ridge to Bell. The Bell orators charged the Buchanan 
administration, which was supporting Breckinridge, with 
corruption, and tried to rally the old Whig vote for reform. 
They also accused Breckinridge of favoring secession. Breck-- 
inridge and his followers urged the South to unite in support 
of its rights. 

The election revealed three sections. Lincoln swept the 
North by a popular vote of 1,840,037 to 1,565,038, carried 
all the electoral votes to the Mason-Dixon line, except three 
in New Jersey, and was elected. Breckinridge swept the 
Cotton South by a popular vote of 220,469 to 173,314, 
carrying all its electoral votes. In the middle region, how¬ 
ever, the majority favored Bell and Douglas, the representa¬ 
tives of conservatism and compromise. In the eight states 
of the upper South they secured 506,102 popular votes to 


The 

election 
of i860. 


Sources. 


Historical 

accounts. 

Kansas- 

Nebraska. 


Kansas 

situation. 


Rise of the 
Republican 
party. 


358 BREAKING OF THE BONDS OF UNION 

377,002, and 48 electors to 25. They were also strong in 
the northern portion of the Ohio River valley. Taking the 
country as a whole, Lincoln and Breckinridge, the radical 
candidates, received 2,747,233 votes to 1,856,836 for Bell 
and Douglas, and 252 to 51 electors. Northern radicalism 
won the North, southern radicalism won the South, and the 
middle region was for inaction with regard to slavery. 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 

For the Kansas-Nebraska debate — if the Congressional 
Globe is not available — American History Leaflets , nos. 2, 17. 
Johnston, A., Representative American Orations , II, 183-255. For 
conditions in Kansas, the report of the investigation committee, 
U. S. Documents, House Reports, 34th Cong., 1 sess., vol. II, no. 200, 
is more vivid than any secondary account. For the Dred Scott 
case, American History Leaflets, no. 23; Hill, Liberty Documents , 
ch. XXI; 19 Howard, 399. For conservative northern opinion, 
Choate, R., Works, II, 387-414. For Republican opinion, Lin¬ 
coln, A., His Book; Lincoln, A., Works, I, 277-518. Lincoln 
and Douglas, Debates. Sanborn, F. B., Life and Letters of John 
Brown. Sumner, C., Works, IV, 137-256. On the election, 
McPherson, E., History of the Rebellion, American Cyclopedia, 
1861, 46-420. 

Brown, W. G., Douglas. Hart, Chase , ch. V. Higginson, 
T. W., Phillips. Hodder, F. H., Genesis of the Kansas-Nebraska 
Act (Wis. His. Soc., Proceedings, 1912). Mason, V., Fugitive Slave 
Law in Wisconsin (Wis. His. Soc., Proceedings, vol. 43, 117- 
143). McDougall, M. G., Fugitive Slaves, secs. 53-62; ch. V. 
Rhodes, United States, I, 424-506. Smith, T. C., Parties and 
Slavery, 121-149. Stephens, War between the States, II, 240-257. 

Jameson, J., Constitutional Conventions, secs. 211-216. 
Rhodes, J. F., United Stales, II, chs. VII, IX. Stephens, War 
between the States, II, colloquy XVII. 

Bancroft, F., Seward, I, chs. XIX, XX. Blaine, J. G., Twenty 
Years in Congress, I, ch. VI. [James Buchananl, Mr. Buchanan's 
Administration. Curtis, Buchanan, II, chs. VI, VHI-XI. Hart, 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 


359 


Chase, ch. VI. Rhodes, United States, II, ch. VII-VIIL Smith, 
Parties and Slavery, 161-174. 

Benton, T. H., Historical and Legal Examination. Corwin, 
E. S., The Dred Scott Decision (Am. Hist. Assoc., Review , XVII, 
52-69). Grey and Lowell, Legal Review of the Case of Dred Scott. 
Rhodes, United States, II, 242-277. Smith, Parties and Slavery, 
190-209. 

Johnson, A., Life of Douglas. Nicolay and Hay, Life of 
Lincoln, vol. I. Rhodes, United States, II, 384-416. Smith, 
Parties and Slavery, 209-249, 286-305. 

The best life of John Brown is that by C. G. Villard. 

Blaine, J. G., Twenty Years in Congress, chs. VIII-X. Fite, 
E. D., Campaign of i860 . Nicolay and Hay, Life of Lincoln, II, 
chs. X-XVI. Rhodes, United Slates, II, chs. X, XI. Stephens, 
A. H., War between the States, II, colloquy XVIII. Wilson, H., 
Slave Power, II, chs. XLIII, XLIV, XLVII-LV. 


The Dred 

Scott 

case. 


Lincoln- 

Douglas 

debates. 


John Brown. 

Election of 
i860. 




CHAPTER XXI 


Secession 
of South 
Carolina. 


DIVISION 

All national party organizations had broken down, three 
of the five great church organizations had become section- 
alized, the Constitution almost alone held the country to¬ 
gether, and the election of Lincoln was taken as a signal for 
its dissolution. 

In the state of South Carolina there was such unity of sen¬ 
timent that discussion and delay were unnecessary. Gov¬ 
ernor Gist had already called together the legislature to choose 
presidential electors, and to provide “for the safety and pro¬ 
tection of the state.” When it met, on November 5, he 
recommended that if Lincoln were declared elected, a con¬ 
vention similar to that which in 1788 had adopted the Con¬ 
stitution be immediately called to consider the question of 
separation from the Union. November 21 was set apart as 
a day of prayer and preparation. On December 17, the 
convention met, and on December 20, it passed unanimously 
an “Ordinance of Secession,” and adopted a “Declaration of 
Causes” to be published to the world. The latter set forth 
that the Constitution of the United States had been adopted 
as an experiment, that it had worked constantly to the dis¬ 
advantage of the South, that the character of the govern¬ 
ment had gradually changed from a federal organization to 
a consolidated democracy, and that the election of a Presi¬ 
dent by a purely sectional party made it unsafe for South 
Carolina longer to remain as a member of the Union. Com¬ 
missioners were sent to Washington to arrange for a division 
of government property and of the national debt; and to 
other southern states to secure cooperation, 

360 


ATTEMPTS AT COMPROMISE 


36 1 


While this was taking place the national administration 
remained passive. It happened that the commander-in¬ 
chief of the army was General Winfield Scott, to whom 
Jackson had in 1833 given orders for the enforcement of the 
federal laws in South Carolina when that state nullified the 
tariff. He recommended that similar orders be given now. 
Buchanan, however, feared that to do so might cause the 
secession movement to spread, southern sentiment being 
extremely sensitive to anything that might be construed as 
coercion. When Congress met, on December 3, he sent in 
his message stating that secession was unconstitutional, was 
in fact revolution, and that while the South had grievances, 
these were not sufficient to justify revolution. To placate 
the doubtful in the South he stated at length his belief that 
the national government did not have the right to coerce a 
state, and he left out the view, which he held in common with 
Jeremiah Black, the Attorney-General, that it did have the 
right to enforce the national laws within a state. He there¬ 
fore offered Congress no plan of action, but left the responsi¬ 
bility to that body. 

Congress once more attempted to bind together the diverg¬ 
ing sections by compromise. The most prominent leader 
in this movement was Senator Crittenden of Kentucky, 
inheritor of the Clay tradition. The plan which he worked 
out was considered by a Senate committee of thirteen. It 
included a number of measures intended to settle all points 
of difference, the most important being a proposed constitu¬ 
tional amendment, by which slavery should be prohibited 
north of 36° 30'' and definitely protected in government 
territory south of that line. This plan was rejected on 
December 28 by the Republican senators after consulta¬ 
tion with Lincoln. The ground upon which Lincoln based 
his refusal was that if slavery should be allowed in all terri¬ 
tory south of 36° 30', there would follow immediately a 
demand for the acquisition of more such territory. Already 


Buchanan 
and seces¬ 
sion. 


Attempts at 
compromise. 


362 


DIVISION 


Failure of 
compromise. 


in i860 the demand for Cuba was found in both Democratic 
platforms, and he believed that it would not be long before 
southern statesmen would again threaten to secede unless 
Cuba or northern Mexico were annexed. It was upon this 
question of future expansion, too, that the southern radicals 
definitely refused to compromise. Lincoln wrote: “As 
to fugitive slaves, District of Columbia, slave trade among 
the slave states, and whatever springs of necessity from the 
fact that the institution is amongst us, I care but little so 
that what is done be comely and not altogether outrageous. 
Nor do I care much about New Mexico, if further extension 
were hedged against.” The Republicans on the House 
Committee of thirty-three, which was considering compro¬ 
mise, offered to organize New Mexico, containing all terri¬ 
tory south of 36° 30' then belonging to the United States, 
without prohibiting slavery, but this offer was rejected. 

A Peace Convention, called by Virginia and meeting at 
Washington with ex-President Tyler in the chair, proposed to 
meet this difficulty incident to territorial expansion, by a 
constitutional amendment to the effect that no territory be 
annexed unless agreed to by a concurrent majority of the 
senators from the free states and from the slave states. This 
suggestion, however, came only just before Lincoln’s inau¬ 
guration, and was not seriously considered. One other 
solution was advocated: to appeal from Congress to the 
people by submitting the Crittenden compromise to popular 
vote. This was defeated in the Senate. Compromise, 
therefore, failed. The actual point of difference was the 
question of extending slavery beyond the existing national 
boundaries. The divergence between the sections, however, 
must not be measured by that alone, but by the distance they 
had to stretch to come even so near together. It was not 
this particular difference which was the cause of the war, but 
rather the conflict of interests between the sections, now 
festered into misunderstanding and distrust as a result of 


THE GEORGIA CONTEST 363 

thirty years of irritation over the slavery question as a 
whole. 

In the meantime the remaining cotton states were dis- The Georgia 
cussing secession. Except in South Carolina there was a contest - 
division of opinion, not as to the constitutionality of secession 
but as to its advisability. The most important contest was 
in Georgia. Alexander H. Stephens counseled delay. He 
argued that the South had received at least its share of the 
benefits of the Union; that in time the right would win as it 
had in the case of the tariff, which was now almost on the 
basis desired by the South; that the election of Lincoln was 
not sufficient cause for disunion; that the Republicans in 
fact professed regard for the constitutional rights of slavery, 
and that this would be sufficient, with some few concessions 
which might be obtained by a convention of southern states 
acting within the Union, to protect the rights of the South. 

Robert Toombs was the chief advocate of secession, 
expressing the radical view that no confidence could be given 
to Republican professions, and that union with the free 
states was dangerous and bound to be fatal to slavery. The 
crucial vote stood 166 to 130; but the final vote on seces¬ 
sion, January 19, stood 280 to 89. The whole discussion in 
Georgia was not so much as to whether “southern rights” 
should be insisted upon, or even as to what these rights were, 
but as to whether secession was, in the existing crisis, the 
best means of obtaining them. When secession was once 
accepted as a policy, the great majority loyally accepted 
the result and joined with their late opponents in making it 
effective. It was not the belief of the majority that war 
would result from secession. Prejudices long fostered painted 
the northerners as cowards who might bluster but would not 
fight. Many of the better informed believed that the 
northern Democrats would not tolerate the invasion of the 
South, and if fighting occurred it would be in the streets of 
northern cities. While nearly all felt a sentimental regret 


3 6 4 


DIVISION 


Secession of 
the Cotton 
South. 


The South¬ 
ern Con¬ 
federacy. 


at the passing of the old Union, the conviction was burned 
deep on their minds that that Union had been of advantage to 
the North and of disadvantage to the South. They were 
stirred by much the same mixture of motives as the colonists 
in 1776, though there was perhaps a little less of regret and 
more of anger. 

Contests similar to that in Georgia went on in other 
southern states, with similar results. Mississippi seceded on 
January 9, 1861, Florida on January 10, Alabama on January 
11, Louisiana on January 26, and Texas on February 1. The 
failure of compromise had, therefore, been followed by the 
secession of all the Gulf States, those primarily given to the 
cultivation of cotton, and to which slavery and the plantation 
system were most vital. 

It was not the intention of the seceding states to remain 
isolated sovereignties. They planned to renew their union, 
under conditions more favorable to themselves, and with the 
old Constitution altered only so far as to make perfectly 
plain and evident the interpretations of it for which they had 
contended. Their plan was to organize a confederation 
which they would invite other states to join, drawing them 
one after the other from the old Union to the new. They 
believed that all the slave states would ultimately take such 
action, and some wished to stop at that point, with a body of 
states homogeneous and therefore harmonious. A greater 
number hoped and believed that the upper Mississippi 
valley would in time find it to its interest to unite with the 
new confederation through which its great river ran and 
in which it would find a market for a great portion of its 
products. The accession of the Northwest, it was thought, 
would bring the Middle States, dependent as they were on 
western commerce. New England was to be left beyond the 
pale. The first step towards reconstruction, according to 
this plan, was the meeting of delegates on February 4, at 
Montgomery, to form a southern confederation. On Febru- 


ABRAHAM LINCOLN 


365 


ary 8 they adopted a provisional constitution/and elected 
Jefferson Davis, Provisional President, and Alexander H. 
Stephens, Vice President. The new government rapidly com¬ 
pleted its organization, and the inauguration of Lincoln 
found a powerful, organized Confederacy, existing within the 
limits claimed by the Union. 

This action had taken place without active interference 
from the government at Washington. A cabinet crisis had 
already taken place at the end of December, i860, on the ques¬ 
tion of the defense of government property in Charleston 
harbor. The southern members had resigned or been re¬ 
moved, and they were replaced by strong Union Demo¬ 
crats of the North. Jeremiah Black became Secretary of 
State, Edwin Stanton, Attorney-General, and John A. Dix, 
Secretary of the Treasury. The change, however, was chiefly 
in tone. Measures were taken to protect government prop¬ 
erty, but they were ineffective, and the actual handling of the 
situation was left to the new President. 

Though few appreciated it at the time, Abraham Lincoln 
was a man ideally fitted to cope with this greatest of all 
national crises. Born in 1809, his tough and sinewy frame 
and his strong, supple mind were at the point of most perfect 
harmony. While his parents were extremely poor, he had in 
his veins the blood of a vigorous stock drawn on the one side 
from New England and on the other from Virginia. Nor was 
his poverty of the kind to breed envy or sycophancy; he 
was poor in a community where there were no rich. The 
conditions of his life developed in him those abilities which 
characterized the statesmen of the frontier, but he avoided 
the consequent dangers. The lack of early education had 
made Henry Clay superficial, and Jackson narrow-minded. 
Lincoln, who educated himself, was always thorough; he was 
never satisfied unless he understood a subject from the bot¬ 
tom. He was always open-minded and was still consciously 
educating himself when elected President. As President- 


inaction of 
the govern¬ 
ment. 


Character¬ 
istics of 
Lincoln. 


366 


DIVISION 


elect, although by diligence and by genius he had become 
master of a style unsurpassed for clearness and effectiveness, 
he asked the schoolmaster at Springfield to correct the 
grammar of his inaugural address. This humbleness of 
mind extended to his political life. He never conceived 
himself, as Webster sometimes did, dictator of events, but as 
an instrument in the interplay of natural forces. When 
he said at Springfield, in 1858: “ A house divided against it¬ 
self cannot stand,” he did not express a purpose, but an ap¬ 
preciation of a great truth, which afforded him a basis for 
action. He was a statesman in his adjustment of principle 
to policy. He formed his political principles with care, and 
when convinced of their ultimate truth, he never sacrificed 
them. He did not, however, hurry their consummation, 
believing that the right was sure to triumph in the end. In 
the belief that the Union must become all free or all slave, he 
worked to make it free; but when the Union itself was in 
danger, he concentrated all his efforts on its preservation, 
postponing the question of slavery until his main object 
should be accomplished. He had the executive faculty of 
acting for the better, when promptness was demanded, rather 
than delaying to discover the best. He was weakest as an 
administrator, sacrificing efficiency for political advantage. 
As a politician in both the large and the narrow sense, he was 
unrivaled. He had an unparalleled insight into the minds 
of men, based on a wide charity toward those who differed 
from him. He had the unusual capacity of regarding men 
as individuals and not in classes, and he appealed to the 
common traits of human nature, which underlie class or 
sectional division. He had that clearness and lucidity of 
mind that is sometimes called common sense, but none of the 
hardness which sometimes accompanies it. He was, in fact, 
primarily an idealist. Otherwise he would not have been, 
as he was, preeminently the leader of the people. His virtues 
of meekness, charity, and faith were the essential Christian 


t 



Abraham Lincoln 


i 


















' < 
































*■ 







































































t 

































* 











FORT SUMTER 


367 


virtues, and they were understood by the nation, which was 
by profession and in its thought Christian. In crudeness of 
manner, as in the substance of his character, he was at one 
with a majority of the people. He understood their desires 
and purposes, and shaped his policies accordingly; they under¬ 
stood him, and gave him increasingly their confidence. 

At his inauguration he set before himself the preserva¬ 
tion of the whole Union. Caution was necessary, for, while 
compromise had failed, the North had not yet spoken on 
the question of coercion as opposed to peaceful separation. 
The abolitionists had welcomed separation, and Horace 
Greeley, General Scott, and many leading Democrats had 
expressed a willingness to let the southern states depart 
in peace. The North had not very generally believed in the 
genuineness of the southern threats of secession and had 
not in i860 voted on the question of union or disunion. 
George Ticknor remarked that there had not been in years so 
much thinking on political subjects as in the six months 
following the election of Lincoln, and that until the people 
had made up their minds, the administration was powerless 
to act. It must be a decision of the whole people, for the 
war could not be fought by a party. 

Each side realized the importance of forcing the other 
to take action, and attention was concentrated upon Charles¬ 
ton harbor, where the national garrison in Fort Sumter was 
surrounded by Confederate batteries. On April 6, Lincoln 
having informed himself of the situation and discussed the 
matter with his cabinet, caused the Confederate government 
to be notified that he would provision the fort. This threw 
upon Davis and his cabinet the responsibility of action. 
Toombs protested against hostile measures, saying, “You 
will wantonly strike a hornets’ nest which extends from moun¬ 
tains to ocean, and legions now quiet will swarm out and 
sting us to death.” His prophecy was unheeded, and on 
April 12 the Confederate forts began the bombardment. 


Northern 

sentiment. 


Fort Sumter. 


368 


DIVISION 


Decision of 
the North. 


Effects of 
coercion. 


At the first news of the firing upon Sumter, the North 
rose almost en masse. Telegram after telegram assured 
Lincoln that there was now but one party, and that, the party 
of the Union. Enlistments and subscriptions of money 
at once began, and men who in January were in favor of 
peaceful separation now aided without remuneration in the 
war preparations. This result was inevitable. The devo¬ 
tion of the North to the Union had been steadily growing, and 
was now one of its foremost political ideals. The northern 
idea of liberty was that of individual liberty and right to 
participate in the government, and not the southern idea 
that each community should be allowed to follow its own 
devices. The northern idea of democracy was that the 
majority should rule, and not the southern idea that there 
should be as little government as possible. The Union was 
undoubtedly more advantageous to the North than to the 
South. It meant a market for northern manufacturers, 
employment for northern vessels. The Democratic party, 
which was least interested in the questions which brought 
on the war, was conspicuous for its Union feeling. Its appeal 
for many years had been that the Union was safest in its 
hands. Benjamin F. Butler, who had been one of Breckin¬ 
ridge’s leading northern supporters, was one of the first to 
offer his services to the President. The period of hesitation 
was at an end, and the North was determined to preserve 
the Union at all hazards. 

With war a fact, it was necessary for the middle region 
to make its decision. North Carolina, Virginia, Arkansas, 
and Tennessee joined with the South, as soon as Lincoln, 
on April 15, issued his proclamation calling for troops. The 
majority in these states regarded secession as unjustifiable and 
preferred to remain in the Union. They believed, however, 
in the right of secession, and did not believe in the right of 
the national government to coerce a state. Their sympathies 
and interests, moreover, were southern, and when war was 


THE OHIO VALLEY 


369 


inevitable and choice must be made, they decided to stand 
by the states which they believed to be acting, even though 
unwisely, within their constitutional rights, rather than 
become the instruments of a national government which they 
believed to be exceeding its constitutional powers. The tide 
of secession spirit swept up through eastern Maryland. Mobs 
in Baltimore cut Washington off from railroad and tele¬ 
graphic connection with the North, while the Virginians 
occupied Harpers Ferry and blocked it from the west. The 
lower Potomac was closed by Virginian batteries. By 
April 21 the capital was in a state of siege. In this emergency 
the government acted with vigor. Communication with the 
North was reopened through Annapolis, April 25. Soon 
after, troops were stationed at Relay House, cutting Balti¬ 
more off from Harpers Ferry. On May 9 communica¬ 
tion between Washington and the North was reestablished 
through Baltimore. The writ of habeas corpus was sus¬ 
pended, and, with this check on the civil law, numerous 
arrests were made, including members of the city govern¬ 
ment of Baltimore. In this way Maryland was Kept within 
the Union. Probably a majority in the eastern part of the 
state would have preferred secession, but they were held in 
check by the loyal element in the western counties and by 
government action. The most ardent secessionists slipped 
away over the Potomac, and the next elections were over¬ 
whelmingly in favor of the Union. With Maryland, went 
Delaware, by force, but also by inclination. 

For no region was the decision so difficult as for the 
Ohio valley. Its population was drawn most largely from 
the South, but slavery and the plantation system were not 
its major interests. It found in the South a great market 
for its foodstuffs and in the Mississippi its traditional outlet, 
but railroads and canals had long been increasingly attach¬ 
ing it to the North and East. Douglas did much to rally 
this region to the North by a series of speeches culminating 


The Ohio 
valley. 


37 ° 


DIVISION 


Kentucky. 


West Virginia 
and eastern 
Tennessee. 


at Chicago on May i. He pointed out that the East also 
might secede, and that the West would then find itself shut 
off from the world. Its only safety was in the inviolability 
of the Union. Dying on June 3, he left as a last message to his 
sons: “Tell them to obey the laws and support the Constitu¬ 
tion of the United States.’’ 

With small hesitation the states on the north bank rallied 
to the Union. Kentucky, however, took the whole summer 
to decide. Its trade drew it both ways. The sympathies of 
the rich “Blue Grass” district were southern, but those of 
the mountain area and the central small farming region 
were against slavery and the plantation economy. It 
adopted a policy of neutrality. Nowhere is Lincoln’s skill 
better shown than in the differing policies he adopted for this 
state and for Maryland. Unable to coerce Kentucky, and 
confident of her ultimate decision, he respected her neutrality. 
At the same time he adopted many expedients to foster 
Union sentiment and aid the Unionists in the state. The first 
actual violation of neutrality came when the Confederate 
government sent in troops to occupy Columbus. Im¬ 
mediately the legislature abandoned neutrality and voted to 
support the old Union. At least two thirds of the population 
favored this course, and although about forty thousand 
Kentuckians enlisted in the southern armies, its national 
quotas were always full. 

State boundaries, as well as national, yielded to this 
supreme strain. The mountain and Ohio valley portion 
of Virginia, long antagonistic to the dominant eastern section, 
broke away, formed a government which claimed to represent 
the whole state, and, with the consent of this government, 
applied to Congress for admission as a new state. It was 
accepted June 19, 1863, under the title of West Virginia. 
Eastern Tennessee and many individuals in North Carolina 
desired to take similar action, but mountain ranges and 
railroads delivered them into the hands of the Confederacy, 


BEYOND THE MISSISSIPPI 


371 

which held them against their will, as the national government 
held eastern Maryland. 

In Missouri the state government was secessionist, but 
there was a strong Union element, largely composed of old 
supporters of Benton, now led by Francis P. Blair, Jr., and 
the Germans. With the aid of Captain Lyon, commanding 
the United States arsenal at St. Louis, that city was secured 
for the Union, and a little later, Jefferson City, the capital. 
A convention had been chosen in February to decide the 
question of secession. This convention, to the surprise of 
the legislature which called it, proved to be strongly Unionist. 
It now declared itself the supreme representative of the 
people, and, the state government having declared for 
secession and joined the Confederate forces, established a 
new and loyal state government. The latter received con¬ 
stantly the support of a majority of the population, though 
thousands of individuals enlisted in the southern armies. 
All the Pacific coast, with all the territories, remained with the 
national government, except that the Confederates occupied 
for a time parts of New Mexico, Arizona, and Indian Terri¬ 
tory. 

On the whole the country divided naturally. Probably 
the only districts held against their will were eastern Mary¬ 
land, which was in the hands of the national government, 
and eastern Tennessee, which the Confederacy controlled. 
Possibly the “ Blue Grass” of Kentucky would have joined the 
South, if it had not formed, as it were, an island surrounded 
by loyal districts. The people of the border states were 
torn with conflicting desires. In the balanced condition of 
their minds the motives which finally determined their 
choice were often trivial. It is, however, generally true that 
the different districts for the most part followed the sym¬ 
pathetic attraction of the section to which they were most 
akin. At the same time it is probably equally true that 
many portions of the border were strongly influenced by the 


Division be- 
yond the 
Mississippi. 


Basis of 
division 


37 2 


DIVISION 


Sources. 


Historical 
accounts. 
Secession and 
compromise. 


Lincoln. 


fact that the national government was with the North. If 
the North had seceded and the South attempted coercion, the 
division would have been rather different, but probably 
not to the extent of fifty thousand square miles or two 
millions of population. 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 

On the secession movement in the South: American History 
Leaflet , no. 12. [Buchanan,- J.], Mr. Buchanan’s Administration, 
chs. VI-XI. Johnston, A., Representative American Orations, III, 
235-274; 294-311. Lowell, J. R., Political Essays, 45-75. Mc¬ 
Pherson, E., History of the Rebellion (see reference in ch. XIX, use 
index for the several states). On Lincoln’s policy: Lincoln, A., 
Works, II, 1-66; also his inaugurals which are found in his Works, 
in Richardson’s Messages, and many other places. 

Adams, C. F., C. F. Adams, chs. VII, X. Bancroft, F., Final 
Eflorts at Compromise (.Political Science Quarterly, VI, 401- 
423). Curtis, Buchanan, II, chs. XIII-XXII. Dabney, R. L., 
Stonewall Jackson, 125-196. Davis, J., Rise and Fall of the Con¬ 
federate Government, I, 247-258. Fish, C. R., The Decision of 
the Ohio Valley (American Hist. Assoc., Report, 1910, 155-164). 
Hart, Chase, ch. VIII. Long, A. L., Lee, ch. V. Johnson, A., Doug¬ 
las, 442-461. Mumford, B. B., Virginia's Attitude toward Slavery, 
pts. Ill and IV. Phillips, Georgia and State Rights (Am. Hist. 
Assoc., Report , 1901, vol. II), ch. VIII. Pollard, E. A., Lost 
Cause, ch. V. Rhodes, United States, III, chs. XIII, XIV. 
Stephens, A. II., War between the States, I, chs. XI, XII; II, 109- 
130. Chadwick, F. E., Causes of the Civil War, 151-184. 

Carpenter, F. B., Six Months in the White House. Chadwick, 
Civil War, 184-247, 278-343. Morse, J. T., Lincoln. Nicolay 
and Hay, Life of Lincoln, II, ch. XXIX; III, chs. XVI-XXVI. 
Rhodes, United States, III, 300-354. Schurz, C., Lincoln. Tar- 
bell, I. M., Lincoln. The best life of Lincoln is that by Lord 
Charnwood, Abraham Lincoln (N. Y., 1916). 


CHAPTER XXII 
THE CIVIL WAR 

The Confederacy possessed many of the elements 
necessary to make a nation. It occupied a homogeneous, 
contiguous territory, of an area amply sufficient. It would be 
much less vexed with the problem of sectionalism than the 
Union it had left, for while there were causes of differences 
between the northern slave-producing states, and those to 
the south which desired an increasing supply, there was more 
uniformity than is usual in a region so large. The political 
views and ideals of the whole people were essentially similar 
and there was an abundance of political experience. The 
permanent constitution, adopted in 1862, was modeled closely 
upon that of the United States. The changes were in part 
to define the rights of the states and of slavery, and in part 
changes in detail. The President was to serve six years and 
was not to be reelected; members of the cabinet might be 
allowed seats in Congress; Congress was not to increase, 
unless by a two-thirds vote, appropriations called for by the 
various department heads, though it could reduce them; 
riders were prohibited, and the President was allowed to 
veto items in appropriation bills. The government was 
manned from top to bottom by men who had had years of 
official experience at Washington, and there can be no ques¬ 
tion that its machinery would have run smoothly, had it been 
launched under more favorable conditions, and that it served 
its purpose satisfactorily during its brief and trying career. 

Economically, the homogeneity of the South was its greatest 
peril. It devoted its energies, to a degree hardly paralleled 
in history, to one industry, and it relied upon the outside 
world for its manufactures, its ships, and even to some extent 

373 


The Con¬ 
federate 
government. 


Economic 
dependence 
of the South, 


374 


THE CIVIL WAR 


The southern 
armies. 


for its food. The one strong point in i*s economic situation, 
was that it possessed a practical monopoly of its favorite 
product. It was upon the power of this monopoly that most 
of the southern leaders relied, and they expected “King 
Cotton” to impoverish the North, and compel the assistance 
of Europe. Theirs was the fallacy of Jefferson’s embargo 
policy; they ignored the fact that both sides would suffer. 
Actually, many New England cotton spinners joined the 
army, while those of Europe, after some genuine distress, 
found cotton elsewhere. The southern monopoly of cotton 
was based, not upon exclusive control, but upon cheapness of 
production; higher prices encouraged Egypt and India to 
raise it. Cotton, therefore, failed under stress of war to 
answer the demands made upon it, and with this failure fell 
the whole scheme of southern diplomacy for obtaining outside 
aid. The Confederacy was thrown upon its own resources. 

These resources, while large in themselves, were small in 
comparison with those of the North. Of the 31,443,321 in¬ 
habitants of the whole United States in i860, the eleven 
seceding states contained only 9,103,342. Of this number, 
3,689,833 were slaves or free negroes, leaving 5,413,509 white 
persons to compare with over 22,000,000 in the North. 
The South drew perhaps 40,000 more fighting men from 
Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, than the North drew 
from West Virginia, Tennessee, and North Carolina, but 
the disproportion between the sections remained over¬ 
whelming. The southern population, however, furnished 
admirable material for war. Two types of southern soldiers 
are represented by Robert E. Lee and “Stonewall” Jackson. 
Lee was born to the best traditions of Virginia. Connected 
by family ties with Washington, he represented the same 
characteristics — administrative ability, chivalric devotion 
to the public good, and dignity of character. Handsome, 
well set up, well bred, and with a comprehensive thought¬ 
fulness which omitted not the smallest detail of army life 



Robert E. Lee 









ECONOMIC RESOURCES 


375 


or the personal welfare and happiness of the common soldier 
or the soldier’s widow, he was the ideal of the southern 
gentlemen who officered much of the army and formed 
much of its cavalry. “Stonewall” Jackson came of the 
rough and vigorous stock of the mountain and piedmont, 
the old frontier region. Prejudiced, and of narrow experience, 
he brought to the work an intense conviction of the righteous¬ 
ness of his cause, and inspired his troops with a fervor re¬ 
sembling that of Cromwell’s “Ironsides.” He represented 
the spirit that made southern infantry a marvel to military 
observers. The population of the South was more accus¬ 
tomed than that of the North to the use of firearms and of 
horses, and to following certain natural leaders, and conse¬ 
quently a military organization was more quickly effected. 

The disproportion in population, however, soon began to tell, 
and the southern Congress was forced, in April, 1862, to resort 
to conscription; gradually extending the ages of those 
called into service, diminishing the number of exemptions, 
and consequently reducing the standard of the troops. 

Ultimately the drain of men became so great that toward 
the close of the war the enrollment of slaves was contem¬ 
plated. Few nations of modern times have put so large a 
proportion of their population in the battle line. The most 
careful studies place the enlistments at a figure larger than 
the total number of men between eighteen and forty-five in 
i860, which was 1,100,000, and it is estimated that the Con¬ 
federacy received the equivalent of three years’ service from 
1,082,119 men, but this number is probably somewhat 
exaggerated. 

The slave population counted heavily in the sum total of Economic 
southern resources. The war was a revelation as to the docile, resources * 
humane character of, most of the American negroes. While 
tens of thousands fled to the northern armies marching 
through the country, there was no slave insurrection, and 
the bulk of them continued to work peaceably in the fields, 


Manufactur¬ 

ing. 


376 THE CIVIL WAR 

although in some districts nearly all the white men who 
usually supervised them had been drawn away. There 
being little market for cotton, the slaves were used partly 
in auxiliary service with the army, but chiefly in the cultiva¬ 
tion of food products. Harvests were good and there was 
generally no lack of the necessaries of life, though tea, coffee, 
and such imported luxuries almost disappeared. In certain 
localities, however, there was much distress, for the means 
of transportation were overtaxed and grew steadily worse 
throughout the war. River and coast trade soon had to be 
abandoned, while the railroad system was not complete in 
i860, and rapidly deteriorated, there being neither iron, skilled 
labor, nor capital to repair it. Toward the end of the war 
the railroads were practically monopolized by the govern¬ 
ment, but even then were scarcely able to supply the armies, 
to say nothing of the nonmilitary population. 

In the matter of war material and manufactured goods, 
the case of the South seemed desperate. It contained but 
290,000 spindles for the manufacture of cotton goods, out of 
5,280,000 in the whole country, while of pig iron it produced 
in i860 only 25,513 tons out of a national production of 
884,474, and only 24,176 out of the 406,298 tons of rolled 
iron. With astonishing energy and success the southern 
people turned to this problem. Richmond and Atlanta be¬ 
came centers for the manufacture of firearms and powder. 
Such trade as was carried on with Europe consisted almost 
altogether in war materials, and was, by the close of the war, 
brought under government control. Probably the southern 
army was not seriously hampered by a lack of the munitions 
of war. On the other hand it was seriously handicapped by 
lack of shoes and clothing. The drain of men into the army 
prevented the development of any form of manufacturing not 
absolutely essential for the prosecution of the war. The 
noncombatant population suffered as much as the troops 
from deprivation of articles usually imported. 


CONCENTRATION 


377 


Southern finance presents a bewildering chaos of experi¬ 
ment, but its net result was to place practically all the re¬ 
sources of the territory at the disposal of the government. 
There was little floating capital and consequently little 
was raised by direct domestic loans, and less than fifteen 
millions by foreign loan. The expedient of paper money 
was tried in every form and to an unlimited extent, with the 
usual result that it depreciated, until at the end of the war it 
had practically no value. Taxes paid in such money natur¬ 
ally were of little avail, and in the last year of the war the 
chief resource was a tax in kind, of one tenth of various 
agricultural products. It was a reversion to the age of barter. 

As the war went on, one power after another was con¬ 
centrated in the central government of the Confederacy, 
until it came to wield more absolute control than any govern¬ 
ment in United States territory had ever exercised. Lovers 
of state rights, like Governor Brown of Georgia, protested; 
in North Carolina a peace candidate for governor received 
twenty thousand votes. To meet more violent opposition, 
Congress suspended the habeas corpus , and political arrests 
were made. Necessity forced the government founded in pro¬ 
test against the centralization of the national government 
to centralize in itself powers hitherto undreamed of. In a 
report of April 28, 1864, the Confederate Secretary of War 
said: “The whole military population capable of bearing 
arms, from seventeen to fifty, is either marshaled to the field 
or organized in reserves, ready to be summoned. One third 
of the currency of the Confederacy has been annulled, and 
taxation of unprecedented amount has been exacted from 
all values. One tenth of the production in kind has been 
claimed without pay, and besides, the residue and all prop¬ 
erty has been subjected to seizure and conversion for 
public use at moderate rates of just compensation. The 
railroads, the great means of internal trade and commerce, 
are made primarily subservient to the necessities of govern- 


Finance 


Concentra¬ 

tion. 


378 


THE CIVIL WAR 


The north¬ 
ern army. 


ment. Even the great writ of personal liberty is suspended 
in cases requisite to preclude evasion of military service, 
to repress uprisings of disaffection or disloyalty. In short, by 
their representatives, the people, not reluctantly but eagerly 
and fearful rather of shortcoming than excess, have through 
regular constitutional action commanded for their country 
and its cause the labor, property, and lives of all.” It is a 
tribute to the political adaptability of the population, that 
this unwonted system was carried out so successfully as to 
throw almost the last ounce of weight into the contest. When 
the war was over the accumulated capital of two hundred and 
fifty years had been swept away, except that represented by 
the education of the people, the land, and such improvements 
of real estate as survived devastation. 

In the North the military spirit was less developed than in 
the South. Particularly in the West, men were restive 
under discipline. They were, however, as willing to fight 
as were the southerners, and they were better educated. 
Their mechanical ability and inventiveness was a constant 
resource. The self-reliance and fearless originality of the 
frontier soldiery sometimes rescued armies from perilous po¬ 
sitions into which their inexperienced generals led them. 
The mechanics of the East could repair and run railroads 
and telegraphs and build earthworks' as well as fight. 
As the war went on discipline improved, the less effective of 
the volunteer generals were withdrawn from important posi¬ 
tions, commands were given to those who proved them¬ 
selves capable and to officers from the regular army, and the 
troops became progressively better. The northern army 
showed more improvement during the four years than the 
southern. The supply of men was always ample. Although 
the Federal government was forced to resort to conscription 
in 1863, it was because the attractions of industry were so 
strong. More votes were cast in the northern states in the 
presidential election of 1864 than in i860. The North 


NORTH DURING THE WAR 


379 


received the equivalent of three years’ service from 1,556,678 
men, and probably over 2,500,000 enlistments were made. 
While the South was drawing all ages into her armies, the 
North was able to rely upon her youth ; nearly one half the 
enlistments were of men under twenty-one. 

Owing to the youth of the majority who entered the 
northern army, industry was less cramped than in the South. 
In fact every year saw the agricultural frontier pressed 
farther westward. Mining discoveries drew thousands to 
Nevada and Colorado. In the East manufacturing grew 
apace. Woolens and iron goods were produced in greater 
quantities than ever before. New industries, such as silk 
making, developed on a large scale. Throughout New 
England, New York, and Pennsylvania, factories arose, and 
the great manufacturing cities of the West, Cleveland, 
Cincinnati, Chicago, and St. Louis, were prosperous. Trade 
was not seriously disturbed. The North was to a large 
extent a self-sufficing community, and it remained open to 
the trade of the world. The loss of the southern market was 
made up by the increased demands for the army; and where 
there was a derangement of industry, enlistment was a refuge 
from unemployment. Only in the Ohio valley was trans¬ 
portation disturbed, and there connection with the East, 
both directly by continuous rail route and indirectly by rail 
to the Lakes and thence by boat, was improved. The 
western armies, moreover, ate more than the South had pre¬ 
viously taken, while the surplus products of the Lake region, 
from which a large part of the armies came, were demanded to 
supply the dearth caused by bad harvests in Europe. This 
occurrence of bad harvests in England and France was 
particularly opportune. Before the war the North imported 
more from Europe than it exported thereto. The balance 
was paid by bills of exchange given by Southerners who 
bought northern goods, and their bills were met in England 
by the southern cotton. Now that the South neither pur- 


Northern 

industry. 


380 


THE CIVIL WAR 


Administra¬ 

tion. 


chased from the North nor exported cotton to Europe, 
financial relations would have been strained had it not been for 
this sudden demand for northern wheat which afforded a 
credit balance in England to meet our payments due for 
our European imports. On the whole, while the war brought 
economic distress into tens of thousands of homes, the major¬ 
ity of the people did not feel any great distress, and the 
North was probably richer in 1865 than in i860. The 
prices of farm products rose just about sufficiently to 
offset the decline in the value of money; those of manu¬ 
factured goods rose somewhat more rapidly; the wages of 
labor, somewhat less. The farmer, therefore, was as well off 
as usual, the laborer less so, the manufacturer prospered. 

In the matter of administration the Federal government 
had the advantage of retaining the capital. Aside from 
this, however, it was on fairly equal terms with the Confeder¬ 
acy. Buchanan had pursued the policy of dividing general 
appointments as evenly as possible between North and 
South, and the Confederacy was able to draw into its 
service a goodly proportion of the men experienced in gov¬ 
ernment affairs. Of those that remained, by far the greater 
number were removed by Lincoln. Never before, even 
under Jackson, had there been so clean a sweep as in 1861. 
The prevailing motive in selecting their successors, moreover, 
was political. The spoils system was still in full vigor, and its 
principles for some time controlled the majority of appoint¬ 
ments even in the volunteer military service. The cabinet 
was framed with the same view. It contained all Lincoln’s 
rivals for the nomination: Seward as Secretary of State, 
Chase at the Treasury, Bates' of Missouri as Attorney-Gen¬ 
eral, Smith of Indiana for the Interior, and Cameron of 
Pennsylvania for War. The remaining members were Welles 
of Connecticut for the Navy and Montgomery Blair of Wash¬ 
ington as Postmaster-General, making, with Lincoln, four 
former Whigs and four former Democrats. This meant, to 


FINANCIAL PROBLEMS OF THE NORTH 381 


be sure, that it contained able men, but it also meant that 
it represented differing policies, and that even apparent 
harmony could be maintained only by Lincoln’s rare tact and 
patience, and then only with some loss of efficiency. Simon 
Cameron, the Secretary of War, proved entirely incapable and 
was replaced in January, 1862, by Edwin Stanton, a War 
Democrat. 

Upon this newly manned and discordant administration State and 
fell the task of suddenly expanding the volume of govern- pnvateai< 
ment business about twenty times. This could never have 
been accomplished had it not been for the assistance of 
the state administrations, which during the first part of the 
war undertook the greater portion of the task of raising and 
equipping the troops. The “War Governors” were a group 
of remarkably efficient men, and they played a larger part 
in the national life during the war than governors had taken 
since the Confederation. They included such men as 
Andrew of Massachusetts, Curtin of Pennsylvania, Morton 
of Indiana, and Randall of Wisconsin. Private citizens, men 
and women, also contributed their services generously. 

The United States Sanitary Commission, a private body, 
took a leading part in providing for the health and comfort 
of the soldiers. Business talent and organizing ability were 
common in the North, and as the war went on they were 
more and more placed at the disposal of the government, so 
that by 1863 the administration of public business was running 
smoothly, and by 1864 one was scarcely conscious of the 
tremendous readjustment which had been made. 

The financial problem of the North is of more interest Taxation, 
than that in the South, because the situation was not so des¬ 
perate and there was greater choice of means. The results, 
moreover, were permanent. From the beginning much 
was raised by taxes, and the proportion increased as the 
war progressed. First came an increase in the tariff. The 
Republicans had stood for protection, and before the war 


THE CIVIL WAR 


Loans. 


382 

began, when the withdrawal of southern members of Congress 
left them a majority, passed the Morrill act. Year by year 
the duties were increased, until they reached a point far 
higher than ever before, and the tendency toward free trade 
which had prevailed since 1846 was reversed. A little later, 
the Hamiltonian device of an internal revenue tax was revived 
as it had been during the War of 1812, and was gradually made 
so comprehensive as to cover almost everything. A direct 
tax upon the states brought in little money, but an income 
tax, though slow to get into running order, was beginning 
in 1865 to pay heavy returns. In 1861 only about one 
tenth of the expenditure was met by taxes; in 1864, over one 
quarter. 

Loans by the close of the war reached the enormous total 
of three billion. At first Chase borrowed on short term loans 
at high interest, hoping that the war would speedily end, 
and that he could refund at lower rates. Later, long term 
loans bearing lower, but still high, interest were arranged 
for. To float these enormous loans was extremely difficult. 
The most successful agent was Jay Cooke of Philadelphia, 
who had them hawked about the country like ordinary 
merchandise to attract the small investor. Before the loan 
system was well started, Congress resorted to paper money, 
making it legal tender for all debts except customs dues. 
By 1865 over four hundred million had been issued. This 
was the first national currency, except gold and silver, since 
the overthrow of the United States Bank. In 1863 Chase re¬ 
vived the idea of a national banking system, though in a 
new form. There was to be no central bank, but any five 
persons who could perform certain requirements could re¬ 
ceive a national banking charter. They were to invest a 
certain minimum amount in government bonds, and could 
issue bank notes to the extent of ninety per cent of this 
security. In 1864 a prohibitive tax of ten per cent was 
levied on the currency of state banks, whereupon many of 


THE BLOCKADE 


383 


them sought national charters. Secretary Chase defended 
this notable reversion from Jacksonian policies, on the ground 
that it would create a market for bonds. It was, however, but 
one of the many extensions of national power to which the 
war was forcing the North as well as the South. Hamilto¬ 
nian and Whig principles prevailed in the Republican party, 
and were slowly coming to do so in the whole North. The 
state banks had been hard hit in 1857, and the financial crisis 
of 1861, caused by the nonpayment of southern debts in 
1861 and by the quick decline of southern state bonds which 
were used as security for much currency in the West, had 
thoroughly discredited them. National regulation was 
demanded, and the war turned a rising ground swell of 
nationalistic reaction into a tidal wave. 

By 1865 the volume of national legal tender currency 
had become several times larger than that it replaced. In 
addition, hundreds of millions of small treasury notes had been 
issued, and postage stamps, national fractional paper currency, 
and private and municipal promises to pay, known as “ shin 
plasters,” passed from hand to hand. There was a plethora 
of currency, and depreciation was heavy and fluctuating. 
In 1861 the banks suspended specie payment, and in the 
spring of 1864 the premium on gold was seventy-five per 
cent; in one crisis in July, it reached one hundred and eighty- 
three per cent; one paper dollar could purchase about thirty- 
five cents in gold. Speculation flourished and prices rose. 
The situation was particularly hard for borrowers, like the 
government, who were forced to create obligations, which, if 
paid under normal conditions, would stand for much more 
than had been received for them. Nevertheless the govern¬ 
ment was able to preserve order in its finances, and every 
year saw money spent for purposes not absolutely necessary. 

In the great conflict between these two sections, the 
South was fighting in self-defense, the purpose of the North 
was to reduce the South. The first essential to the subjec- 


Business 

conditions. 


The block¬ 
ade. 


THE CIVIL WAR 


384 

tion of the South was the control of the sea, because of its 
economic dependence upon the outside world. If the situa¬ 
tion had been reversed, the control of the sea, while still 
important, would have been less vital, because the North 
was to so great an extent self-sufficing. On April 19, 1861, 
Lincoln declared the whole southern coast blockaded. The 
United States navy contained forty-two vessels in commis¬ 
sion, many not immediately available, with which to patrol 
3549 miles of coast containing nearly two hundred harbors. 
The Secretary of the Navy was Gideon Welles, of Connecti¬ 
cut, who proved to be an admirable administrator and who 
was ably assisted by Gustavus Fox, the assistant secretary. 
The Confederates at the outset had only a few warships 
seized in southern navy yards. With practically no specially 
built vessels to encounter, it was possible for the national 
government speedily to fit out merchant vessels for the 
blockade service, and the navy was soon increased largely 
from this source. New war vessels were rapidly built, and 
by the close of the war the United States had 671 vessels, 
of 510,396 tons, mounting 4610 guns, and manned by 51,000 
men. This number was made up of ships old and new, 
propelled by sail, by steam, and by both combined, of ships 
armored and unarmored, and suited for ocean, river, or coast 
defense. Up to November 1, 1864, the navy captured 1379 
vessels. It was not, however, primarily intended to make 
captures, but to prevent trade. In order to assist the navy 
in this purpose, strategic positions on the southern coast 
were speedily occupied. Fort Monroe on the Chesapeake 
and Fort Pickens at Pensacola were never lost by the 
national government. On August 28, 1861, Hatteras Inlet 
was seized; on November 7, 1861, Port Royal in South 
Carolina. In February, 1862, Roanoke Island was captured; 
in April, Fort Pulaski at the mouth of the Savannah River, 
in May> Norfolk, Virginia, and also the great port of the 
southern states, New Orleans. The chief ports remaining 


ATTITUDE OF ENGLAND 385 

in the hands of the Confederates were Wilmington, North 
Carolina, Charleston, Mobile, and Galveston. From these 
numbers of light swift vessels ran the blockade to ports in 
the English West Indies, and some goods were brought in 
through Matamoras and Brownsville on the Mexican border. 
Such trade, however, was very small in volume and came to 
be restricted almost entirely to army necessities. The cap¬ 
ture of Wilmington, January 15,1865, sealed the Confederacy 
to the outside world. 

The Confederate government hoped to break the block¬ 
ade by the building of armored vessels, capable of driving 
away the wooden blockading fleet from the various ports. 
On March 8, 1862, this ambition seemed attained when the 
Virginia , made over from the Merrimac , one of the United 
States vessels captured at Norfolk, sank and disabled several 
ships of the national fleet in Hampton Roads. The next 
day, however, the Monitor , an ironclad designed by John 
Ericsson and embodying many new and revolutionary fea¬ 
tures of naval construction, appeared and engaged the Vir¬ 
ginia in a battle which, though technically drawn, actually 
proved decisive, as the Virginia did not care to renew the 
contest. After this the Federal naval supremacy was not 
seriously in question. 

It was mainly, however, upon the intervention of foreign 
nations that the South relied to secure the opening of its 
ports. Russia, Denmark, and Italy were friendly to the 
North, but the rest of Europe looked to England for 
leadership. In that country sentiment was divided. In 
general the conservative classes favored the South, or per¬ 
haps more exactly were pleased at the prospect of a division 
of the United States, because of the increased weight such a 
division would give to England in American questions. The 
Liberal party, which was in control under Lord Palmerston, 
contained many friends of the North, such as Bright and 
Forster. A large faction, however, at the beginning of the 


Merrimac 

and 

Monitor. 


Attitude of 
England. 


386 


THE CIVIL WAR 


Confederate 

policy. 


war was inclined to support the South. Such men as Glad¬ 
stone saw in the attitude of the national government a 
tyrannical attempt to govern an unwilling community. 
They were opposed to slavery, but Lincoln emphatically 
stated that the purpose of the war was the preservation of 
the Union and not the abolition of slavery. The greater 
number of public men apparently desired delay, and the 
adoption of such a policy as would secure the friendship of 
the winning side. 

The policy of the Confederate government was to force 
the hand of England. It was hoped that by depriving Eng¬ 
land of southern cotton, the cotton mill districts would be 
distressed, and would force the government to open the 
southern ports. It was also believed that the southern 
policy of a low tariff would appeal to England. In addition 
the Confederate government accepted those portions of the 
“Declaration of Paris” of 1856, which declared that a block¬ 
ade to be legal must be effective, and that a neutral flag 
should protect the cargo even if the latter belonged to an 
enemy. This latter policy should be taken in connection 
with the building of a number of Confederate cruisers, the 
most important being the Alabama and the Shenandoah , in 
England. These vessels were not of a character to break 
the blockade, but were swift enough to overtake and power¬ 
ful enough to capture most merchant vessels. Their activi¬ 
ties constituted such a danger to the American merchant 
marine that insurance and freight rates were pushed higher 
and higher. The English vessels, not being liable to capture, 
secured the trade which American vessels had previously 
carried, and by the close of the war the American merchant 
marine had almost disappeared from the high seas. While 
other causes, which will^be noted later, contributed to this 
result, the South believed that its policy was the main cause 
of the change, and that England should reciprocate favors by 
declaring the blockade ineffective, and, therefore, illegal. 


PROBLEMS OF NEUTRALITY 


387 


In 1863 Jefferson Davis, incensed at England’s failure to 
act, threatened to put neutral vessels with enemy’s goods 
under the ban, but the threat was as ineffective as the bribe. 

While these southern policies were not successful in forc¬ 
ing the hand of England, serious and delicate questions were 
continually arising between the Federal government and 
England, which might have resulted in war. Probably the 
volume of business between the northern ports and England 
was a factor for peace, especially the immense exports of 
American wheat which were necessary to supplement the 
bad harvests from which England was then suffering. The 
English Minister at Washington, Lord Lyons, was also a 
quieting influence; and still more the diplomacy of Charles 
Francis Adams, United States Minister at London, was of 
the greatest importance. Northern sentiment, however, 
was irascible. There was a deep-seated feeling that England 
should have favored the North, and small occasions became 
pregnant of war. On May 13, 1861, England proclaimed 
its neutrality, thus acknowledging that a state of war existed. 
Northern sentiment, holding that a rebellion and not a war 
was in progress, took exception to this action, although the 
Supreme Court later in the case of Amy Warwick decided 
that the President’s proclamation of April 19, declaring the 
blockade, marked the beginning of the war. The United 
States government endeavored to perfect the blockade by 
seizing vessels on their way from Europe to Nassau, Mata- 
moras, and other distributing points from which goods were 
sent through the blockade. This action was based on the 
idea that such voyages were actually continuous, the mere 
transshipment not being sufficient to constitute a new voyage, 
and that most of the goods so carried were actually contra¬ 
band. Such seizures were decidedly questionable in inter¬ 
national law. The principle involved resembled that of the 
“Rule of 1756,” against the enforcement of which by Great 
Britain during the Napoleonic wars, the United States 


Northern 

diplomacy. 


Belligerency. 


Continuous 

voyages. 


3 88 


THE CIVIL WAR 


Trent affair. 


Violation of 
neutrality. 


had protested, but during the Civil War only vessels car¬ 
rying contraband were seized. Some of the cases arising 
were, after the war, decided against the government by the 
United States Supreme Court, and others by the Arbitration 
Commission of 1871. During the war, however, the policy 
was carried out without involving foreign complications. 

The subject of the right of search also came up. The 
most important case was that of the Trent , an English vessel 
on a voyage between two neutral ports, from which Cap¬ 
tain Wilkes, commanding the United States ship San Ja¬ 
cinto, removed James M. Mason and John Slidell, Confeder¬ 
ate commissioners on the way to Europe. Immense popular 
enthusiasm over this act in the North, and intense popular 
indignation in England, seemed about Christmas time, 1861, 
to render war inevitable. It was averted by the good sense 
and tact of such men as Prince Albert and Lord Russell on 
the one side, and Charles Sumner and Adams on the other. 
The commissioners were surrendered. Their seizure had 
been in contradiction to all previous American policy, and 
their surrender strengthened the traditional American policy 
on the subject of search, although Seward did not take the 
full advantage of his opportunity in committing England to 
the earlier American policy. England’s lax interpretation 
of her neutral duties, which allowed the building of Con¬ 
federate war vessels in English ports, aroused the just in¬ 
dignation of the North. A crisis was reached on this sub¬ 
ject in the summer of 1863, when certain fighting rams were 
under construction in English ship-building yards, and Lord 
Russell professed to be unable to find evidence that they 
were destined for the Confederacy in spite of general popular 
knowledge to that effect. Adams wrote him: “It is super¬ 
fluous for me to point out to your Lordship that this means 
war.” Just before this note was sent, the English govern¬ 
ment had actually taken steps to prevent the rams from fall' 
ing into belligerent hands. 





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MiS *3 


Little Rock 3 


okson 


'sport 


Selma 


Vicksbin 


Meridian 


Port Hudson 

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PBatonARour 


Galveston @ 


Longitude 90 West 


Kan s 


Evansville 0 

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l CO \ o 

K 4 

W | oPaducah^^ 


| i* 2 2 j, ( yti> r ^ Ft. l><n 

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til,,—3 -Shjlo-h ^ Ag.4d 

2 44 ' _Coriuth 2 1 3 ^ 

3 2 4 i 

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A N l A V- 

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o Pittsburgh 


Columbus 


Gettysbur 


/£\ a°‘^ etanW Bal 


;|(.a.xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ^ 


2 2 (r 
2 / / 
443 /£ 

; 3443/2 
4 ^ 1 \ 
4/ 4 


63 

Richmond 


Lynchburg 5 \ 


hlonroe 

A'folb 


Raleigh- 


Knoxvill&V 


Murfreesboro 


i atttra* 
Inlet __ 


4 3 : 

hatt anoognX 

- - 2 - 3 - 3 A < 3 ^ 

Ramauga 


Columbia.: 




Augusta' 


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%Pulaaki 


Tallahassee, 


aCksonville 


Indianapolis 

Cincinn 


llmTngton. 


& C. Fear 


THE SEAT OF 
THE CTYIL WAR 


Charleston 
X ft.Sumter 


YEAR AND PLACE OF BATTLES 
I, Battles fought in 1801; 2, Battles fought in 1802, eto. 


Line dividing Federal and s-^ 
Confederate territory in A/ 

1801 

Railroads 


Coast forts held by 
Federals, 1801 


"lerA 


MARCHES AND RAIDS 

Operations, Lee, Stuart, ,,,,,,, Meridian Expedition, 
Early, 1801-5, 1111111 1864. 

Price, Missouri, Red River Expedition, 

1801-2 1804. 

„ Bragg and Smith, 11111111 Sherman, Georgia and 

**• Kentucky, 1862. Carolinas, 1804-5. 

X X X X Morgan, Ohio, 1803. -> ■* ->Hood, Tennessee, 1864 


Ohio, 1863. “^'“4-Houd, Tennessee, 1864 

oooooo Wilson, .Alabama, 1805. 

ELEVATIONS 

Over 2000 feet 

500 to 2000 “ ^ SCALE OF MILES- f 

100 to 500 “ 0 25 50 75 100 


Sea Level.to 100 feet 


Greenwich 













































THE WAR IN THE EAST 


389 


In fact by this time English public sentiment would not 
have sustained the government in a policy hostile to the 
North. Really, danger had been greatest in the autumn of 
1862, and the decision had been due rather to domestic 
English conditions than to diplomacy. At that time the 
question of recognizing the independence of the Southern 
Confederacy had been seriously discussed, but the cabinet 
had decided to delay action. On January 1, 1863, came the 
definite Emancipation Proclamation, and with the adoption 
of emancipation by the North, the possibility of English in¬ 
tervention in favor of the South had passed away. 
England had become too thoroughly committed to that 
policy to ally herself formally with a slave power fight* 
ing to maintain slavery. The resolutions relative to the 
recognition of the Confederacy, laid over for consideration 
by the cabinet in October, 1862, were never taken up. Na¬ 
poleon III, who was taking advantage of the temporary divi¬ 
sion of the United States to establish an empire in Mexico 
under French protection, and who hoped to maintain his 
hold by securing the permanence of that division, did indeed, 
in 1863, endeavor to force the hand of the English govern¬ 
ment. His efforts, however, were unsuccessful, and as he 
did not venture to act alone, the Civil War passed without 
breaking the relations between the Federal government and 
foreign powers. 

Deprived of foreign assistance by the failure of its diplo¬ 
matic policy, and cut off from foreign intercourse by the 
blockade, the South was left to encounter the three- or four¬ 
fold strength of the North. The actual contest was fought 
out on land. The vast bulk of the Appalachian mountains, 
one hundred and fifty miles wide, and crossed in the South 
by but a single railroad, that from Richmond to Chattanooga 
by way of Lynchburg, divided the field of operations. 
Though troops were often shifted from one side to the other, 
closely combined operations were impossible, and the war 


British inter¬ 
vention. n 


The war in 
the East. 


390 


THE CIVIL WAR 


in the West was almost independent of that in the East. 
In the latter region the two capitals, Washington and Rich' 
mond, were the objective points. The latter was better 
placed, for its defense actually protected the country back 
of it; while the Confederate forces, following the mountain 
valleys, several times passed to the rear of Washington. Both 
Washington and Richmond proved impregnable to direct 
attack. The Confederates, although winning battles both in 
1861 and 1862 at Bull Run or Manassas, only twenty miles 
from Washington, failed to attack that city. Direct attacks 
on Richmond were defeated at Bull Run in 1861, at Fredericks¬ 
burg in 1863, at Chancellorsville in 1863, and at Cold Harbor 
in 1864. This situation forced the rival commanders to resort 
to more complex strategy. The northern fleet having com¬ 
mand of the mouths of the Virginia rivers, McClellan, the 
commander of the northern forces, in 1862 decided to move 
against Richmond by way of the peninsula between the James 
and the York rivers. By this move Washington and its 
western connections were exposed to an attack down the 
Shenandoah valley. Lee, who at this time was given charge 
of Confederate operations in Virginia, caused “Stonewall” 
Jackson to threaten Washington from this direction, and 
thereby caused the national government to retain a con¬ 
siderable portion of its army for the defense of the capital. 
Swiftly and secretly Jackson turned back and united with 
Lee, who fell upon McClellan and in the “Seven Days' 
Battles” at Mechanicsville, Gaines’ Mills, Savage’s Station, 
Frayser’s Farm, White Oak Swamp, and Malvern Hill, 
drove him back and saved Richmond. McClellan withdrew, 
and Lee, following up his successes, crossed the Potomac 
above Washington and invaded Maryland. After a junction 
of the northern armies, Lee was defeated at Antietam on 
September 17, 1862. In 1863 Lee again invaded the North 
by way of the mountain valleys, some of his troops penetrat¬ 
ing Pennsylvania to the bank of the Susquehanna opposite 


THE WAR IN THE WEST 


391 


Harrisburg. Again, however, all the Federal forces of the 
East combined under General Meade, and Lee was defeated 
at Gettysburg, on July 3, 1863. The situation thus favored 
defense, and for four years neither side was able to gain 
decisive advantage. 

In 1864 General Grant, who was now called from the Grant and 
West to take supreme command, adopted the policy of attri- Lee- 
tion, based on the fact that the North could lose more men 
than the South, and that fighting, therefore, even if not de¬ 
cisive, was of advantage to the North. With greatly superior 
forces he fought Lee through the “ Wilderness” between the 
Rapidan and North Anna rivers, then down to the James, 
and crossing that river, besieged Petersburg, which com¬ 
manded the railway connection between Richmond and Wil¬ 
mington, the chief port for blockade runners. In the mean¬ 
time Sheridan defeated Early at Cedar Creek, October 19, 

1864, and devastated the Shenandoah valley which had for so 
long served the Confederates both as a granary and as a door 
for their invasions of the North. With this outlet closed to 
military operations, the northern forces united. By hard 
fighting and by using his superior forces to extend his lines 
beyond those of Lee, Grant forced the evacuation of Peters¬ 
burg and Richmond on April 3, 1865. Sheridan, with the 
left or southern wing of Grant’s army, by rapid marching 
cut Lee off from the South, securing the Danville railroad 
on April 5. On April 8 he passed Lee’s army and established 
himself on the Lynchburg railroad just west of Appomattox 
Court House, where Lee lay. On April 9 Lee surrendered 
and the war in the East came to an end. 

In the West, the northern objective was the southern The war in 
transportation system, and the strategic features were the the ^ est * 
rivers, railroads, and mountains. The first important 
movement was an expedition by a combined river fleet and 
army under the command of General Grant up the Cumber¬ 
land and Tennessee rivers. This resulted in the capture of 


392 


THE CIVIL WAR 


Corinth. 


Vicksburg. 


Forts Henry and Donelson in February, 1862. The ex¬ 
pedition pushed on, capturing Nashville on the Cumberland 
and reaching northern Alabama by way of the Tennessee. 
The real objective was the little village of Corinth in north¬ 
ern Mississippi, which was one of the most important rail¬ 
road junctions in the South, lying at the meeting point of 
roads to Memphis, Vicksburg, Mobile, and Chattanooga. 
Corinth was situated about twenty miles from the Tennessee 
River, and the Union army under Grant disembarked at 
Pittsburg Landing and encamped between the landing and 
Shiloh Church. Here it was attacked by a Confederate 
army led by Generals Albert Sidney Johnston and Beaure¬ 
gard in April, 1862. It maintained its position, however, 
and after a slow advance under Halleck captured Corinth 
on May 30. This capture cut the shortest route from 
Richmond to Vicksburg. It meant that the Union armies 
had penetrated*almost two hundred miles into hostile terri¬ 
tory, and for a time it seemed that the movement had been 
premature. The Confederates assumed the initiative all 
along the line during the summer of 1862. Forces under 
Bragg and Kirby Smith, debouching from the mountain 
valleys of eastern Tennessee, the one by way of Chattanooga 
and the other by Cumberland Gap, invaded Tennessee and 
Kentucky and threatened Louisville and Cincinnati. An¬ 
other Confederate army threatened to retake Corinth, and 
all these movements were in progress while Lee was making 
his invasion of Maryland. The fortunes of the Confederacy 
were at high tide. In the early autumn, however, all these 
movements were checked; Lee at Antietam, September 17, 
Price and Van Dorn at Corinth, October 4, and Bragg at 
Perryville, October 8. The Union captures were thus 
made secure. 

In the meantime a movement had been going on to 
open up the Mississippi for the double purpose of cutting 
the Confederacy in two and of restoring to the northwestern 


THE WAR IN THE WEST 


393 


states the freedom of its navigation. Joint naval and mili¬ 
tary operations had by the summer of 1862 reduced the 
Confederate positions on the lower Mississippi as far north 
as Port Hudson; on the upper river as far south as Vicks¬ 
burg. The capture of this latter fortress was one of the 
most difficult achievements of the war. It was accomplished 
by Grant on July 4, 1863, the day after Lee was defeated at 
Gettysburg. Port Hudson fell on the ninth, and the Con¬ 
federacy was split into two unequal parts. The next im¬ 
portant position was Chattanooga, which commanded the 
valley of eastern Tennessee and the shortest railway route 
between Richmond and Atlanta. It was captured on Sep¬ 
tember 9, 1863, after a skillful campaign conducted by 
General Rosecrans, who had won appreciation by his de¬ 
fense of Corinth the previous year. The capture of this 
key of the southwest was so serious a blow to the Con¬ 
federacy that Lee sent Longstreet with one of the three 
corps of the Army of Northern Virginia to assist Bragg in its 
recovery. Bragg attacked Rosecrans, defeated him at Chatta- 
Chickamauga, and blockaded the northern forces in Chat- nooga - 
tanooga, where they remained for a time almost in a state 
of siege. Grant was now sent to take command at Chat¬ 
tanooga and by the end of November had defeated the Con¬ 
federates in the battles of Lookout Mountain and Mission¬ 
ary Ridge, and secured the hold on Chattanooga. 

Up to this time, Tennessee had been brought under Atlanta, 
the control of the national government and the western 
transportation system of the Confederacy had been crippled; 
but the cotton belt, the most populous and the richest region 
of the South, protected from attack from the coast by the 
pine barriers, and on the interior by the mountains and 
waste stretches of northern Alabama, had felt the war only 
indirectly. Alexander Stephens could say on March 10, 

1864, “The heart of our country has never been reached 
by them; they have as yet been able to break only the 


394 


THE CIVIL WAR 


Close of 
the war. 


outer shell of the Confederacy.” The next military task of 
the North was to penetrate the mountains and capture 
Atlanta, the most important railroad center left to the Con¬ 
federates and the most important manufacturing city of 
the South. This task fell to General Sherman, as Grant 
was called to be commander in chief of the Union forces, 
with personal command against Lee. After a long, hard 
campaign between Sherman and General Joseph E. John¬ 
ston, Atlanta fell, September 3, 1864. This indeed broke 
the shell of the Confederacy, the rich central plain was 
open to invasion, and the nature of the country favored the 
largest battalions. General Hood, in command of the 
Confederate forces, now abandoned defense and boldly 
and desperately invaded Tennessee. At Nashville, on De¬ 
cember 16, 1864, he was overwhelmed by General Thomas, 
known as the “Rock of Chickamauga,” in the only battle 
of the Civil War where a large army was effectually de¬ 
stroyed. Sherman meantime marched boldly from Atlanta 
to the coast, his army spreading a path of destruction sixty 
miles wide through the very heart and center of the Con¬ 
federacy. On December 20 he reached the coast at Sa¬ 
vannah, capturing that city and sending notice of it to Lin¬ 
coln as a “Christmas gift.” Turning northward, he swept 
through the Carolinas, leaving a broad belt of devastation 
behind him. On April 26, 1865, he received the surrender 
of Joseph E. Johnston, who included in the terms of the 
capitulation all the Confederate forces still in arms. There 
was some fighting in May, but Johnston’s surrender practi¬ 
cally marked the end of the war. 

The South had contested every step and did not yield 
until the great army of the West had swung round to within 
thirty miles of the southern boundary of Virginia and ninety 
miles of the place of Lee’s surrender. 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 


395 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 

Lincoln’s annual messages furnish very satisfactory accounts Sources, 
of activity from year to year. The Diary of Gideon Welles gives 
an intimate account of cabinet problems. The Diary and Corre¬ 
spondence of Salmon P. Chase (American Hist. Assoc., Report, 

1902, vol. II) is also of especial value. Recollections and remi¬ 
niscences are innumerable, but for the most part are valuable only 
when used most carefully and in combination. The annual re¬ 
ports of the secretaries of war and of the navy are usable. 

Adams, C. F., C. F. Adams , chs. XI, XII, XIV-XVII. Historical 
Bullock, J. D, Secret Service of the Confederate States in Europe, South 
Currey, J. S. M., Civil Government of the Confederate States. Davis, during the 
J., Confederate Government. Henderson, G. T. R., Stonewall Jack- war ‘ 
son and the American Civil War. Long, A. L., Lee. Paxson, F. L., 

The Civil War. Pollard, E. A., Lost Cause. Rhodes, United 
States, V, ch. XXVIII. Schwab, J. C., The Confederate States of 
America. 

Fite, E. D., Social and Industrial Conditions in the North The North 
during the CM War. Hart, Chase, chs. VIII, IX, X, XI. Nic- ^ ng the 
olay and Hay, Lincoln, vol. VI, chs. V-VIII, XVIII, XIX; vol. 

X, ch. IV. Rhodes, United States, vol. Ill, chs. XV, XVI; vol. 

IV; vol. V, chs. XXIV-XXVII. Weeden, W. B., War Government, 

Federal and State. 

Alexander, E. P., Military Memoirs. Dodge, T. A., Bird's-eye Military 
View of our Civil War. Formby, J., American Civil War. Grant, °P erations - 
U. S., Personal Memoirs. Ropes, J. C., Story of the Civil War. 

War of the Rebellion, Official Records, Atlas. 

Adams, C. F., C. F. Adams, 144 - 357 , and Studies Military Diplomacy. 
and Diplomatic , Nos. 9 and 10. Callahan, J. M., Diplomatic His¬ 
tory of the Southern Confederacy. Moore, J. B., Arbitrations, I, ch. 

XIV, and Digest of International Law, VII, 383-390, 698-744. 

Woolsey, T. D., International Law, §§ 163-203. 


CHAPTER XXHI 


Centralizing 

legislation. 


Dominance 
of the North, 


POLITICS DURING THE WAR 

During no other four years of United States history has 
so much important general legislation been passed as during 
the Civil War. The tariff schedules were based on the 
idea of protection instead of revenue, a comprehensive 
system of internal revenue was adopted, currency was 
brought under national control and to a large extent 
banking also. The policy of making profit out of the 
public lands was in the Homestead Act of 1862 finally 
abandoned for that of granting one hundred and sixty acres 
to actual settlers at the cost of survey. In the same year 
the policy of land grants to railroads was pressed to its 
greatest extension in the provisions for the proposed roads 
to the Pacific. The same year also saw the establishment 
of a National Bureau of Agriculture and the granting of 
script redeemable in public land to all the states for the 
establishment of colleges of agriculture. 

This extension of the functions of the national govern¬ 
ment marked to a large extent the reversal of the legislative 
programs upon which Jefferson had been elected, which 
Jackson had advocated, and for which the Cotton South had 
more lately stood. It marked a return to many of the con¬ 
structive views of Hamilton, John Quincy Adams, and Clay. 
The democratization of the government remained, but there 
was a reaction as to the policy which the government should 
pursue. Some of these measures were passed under the 
pressure of war necessity. Others were passed because the 
withdrawal of the southern congressmen left the North, 
where the majority had generally favored a stronger govern- 

106 


UNION” PARTY 


397 


ment, in control. The Morrill tariff, the first step in the 
new protective system, for instance, was passed on March 2, 
1861, before the war began but when the secession of seven 
states opposed to protection had left protectionists in con¬ 
trol. This centralizing legislation was passed with com¬ 
paratively little debate; it did not constitute the basis for 
party division. The question remained open as to whether 
it would be repealed when the war was over and the southern 
representatives returned to their places. 

In determining party alignment during this period the 
most important issues were those growing out of the ques¬ 
tion of the Union, the problems of slavery and reconstruc¬ 
tion, and the administration of the war, particularly the 
exercise of executive power. As has already been pointed 
out, the sentiment in favor of fighting to preserve the Union 
was very general. 

Just after the firing on Fort Sumter it seemed as if 
the war might be conducted without the interference of 
party politics. In the autumn elections a “ Union ” party 
appeared in most of the states, the attempt being made to 
combine every one in support of the administration. Gen¬ 
erally the Republicans indorsed a Union ticket. The major¬ 
ity of the Democrats, however, preferred to keep up their 
party organization, partly because the national Republican 
administration was removing so many Democrats from office. 
In some cases Republicans also ran independently of Union¬ 
ists. The Union party failed to put an end to party 
dissension, but in general it took the place of “ Republican ” 
as the designation of the supporters of the administration, 
and it enabled many to cast their influence on that side 
without formally indorsing the tenets of Republicanism. 

The administration party, whether it be called Union 
or Republican, was made up of men who had been identified 
with many different factions and parties, and it was a deli¬ 
cate task to adjust their claims and prejudices. As the war 


“Union 

party. 


Conserva¬ 
tives and 
Radicals, 


39» 


POLITICS DURING THE WAR 


Growth of 
abolitionist 
sentiment. 


progressed, however, old divisions became less keen, and 
their place was taken by a new division between those who 
were radical and those who were conservative on the ques¬ 
tion of slavery. Chase and Sumner believed that to be the 
real question at issue, and wished to declare boldly for 
emancipation. Generals in the field with strong abolitionist 
views, like Fremont and Hunter, strove to force the hand 
of the administration. Seward, always apprehensive when 
vigorous action was proposed, became more and more 
opposed to taking any decisive measures looking to aboli¬ 
tion, and became the leader of the Conservatives. Lincoln 
desired to free the negroes, but he realized the necessity of 
placating the border states as well as the seriousness of the 
negro problem apart from the question of slavery. He, 
therefore, for some time steadily maintained the rights of 
the loyal slave owners. He made the preservation of the 
Union his guiding purpose. 

The progress of the war, however, was marked by a rapid 
development of the antislavery sentiment. The eighteen 
hundred thousand Republicans who voted for Lincoln in i860 
were far from being abolitionists at that time. It was against 
the extension, not the existence, of slavery that they voted. 
On the other hand the twenty-two hundred thousand voters in 
the loyal states, who in i860 had opposed Lincoln and thereby 
expressed themselves as willing to allow slavery extension, 
had so voted, for the most part, not through any friendliness 
toward slavery, but because of their desire for peace. When 
peace ceased to be, a new situation confronted the country 
and most men had to readjust their ideas. In July, 1861, 
Congress almost unanimously voted for Mr. Crittenden’s 
resolution: “That the present deplorable civil war ... is 
not urged upon our part in any spirit of oppression, nor for 
any purpose of conquest or subjugation, nor purpose of over¬ 
throwing or interfering with the rights or established insti¬ 
tutions of the states.” This very session of Congress, how- 


EMANCIPATION 


399 


ever, passed a confiscation act declaring forfeited the claims 
of owners to slaves employed against the United States. This 
first attack on slavery was rapidly followed up. In the spring 
of 1862 slavery was prohibited in the territories, — in taking 
which action Congress overruled the Dred Scott decision, — 
and emancipation with compensation for the owners was 
provided for in the District of Columbia. In July a new con¬ 
fiscation act provided for the freeing of the slaves of all those 
convicted of treason, and some other classes of southern 
citizens. Antislavery sentiment increased in volume and in 
insistence with every passing month. In August, Horace 
Greeley, the editor of the powerful New York Tribune , ad¬ 
dressed to the President an article headed, “The Prayer of 
Twenty Millions,” calling for immediate emancipation. In 
fact, now that war was actually in progress, practicality 
joined with idealism in urging action. Futile indeed would 
war have proved if its end saw still in existence the institution 
that had brought it on. The practical man who before the 
war had been most strongly for compromise or even surrender 
to southern claims, now became anxious to clear up the whole 
problem. This to a considerable extent accounts for the 
steady development of radical sentiment in the North be¬ 
tween 1861 and 1867. Men wished to take advantage of the 
opportunity to accomplish more and more things which they 
desired, but for which they would never have thought of going 
to war. 

Lincoln realized this growing sentiment and during the Emandpa 
spring and summer of 1862 perfected his plan. With regard tlon * 
to the slaves in the loyal states he recommended emancipa¬ 
tion by state action, the national government assisting in the 
compensation of the owners. With regard to slaves in the 
Confederate states, except certain regions already recovered 
by the national forces, he resolved on immediate action based 
on his executive power. On July 22 he read an emancipation 
proclamation to his cabinet, but did not make it public until 


400 


POLITICS DURING THE WAR 


Democratic 

position. 


September 22, when the battle of Antietam assured the safety 
of Washington and prevented his action from being regarded 
as a movement of desperation. His explanation of his de¬ 
cision was that emancipation had become necessary for the 
preservation of the Union; it was a war measure. His pro¬ 
cedure rested upon his military authority as commander-in¬ 
chief of the army — a possibility which had been pointed out 
by John Quincy Adams. It took the form of a proclamation 
announcing that unless the states in rebellion returned to 
their allegiance before January 1, 1863, all slaves therein 
should become free. This proclamation applied only to the 
persons of the slaves, and not to the institution of slavery 
itself. The state laws remained, and, unless further action 
should be taken, slavery might be reestablished. A third 
portion of Lincoln’s plan, the colonization of the freed slaves 
outside the United States, proved to be a complete failure, 
in spite of the attempts of Seward to arrange for their recep¬ 
tion in various semitropical countries. 

The issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation un¬ 
doubtedly prevented the separation of the Radicals from the 
administration party, and Lincoln also succeeded in holding 
the Conservatives. The Democrats, however, maintained 
their opposition. This was based not only on their disap¬ 
proval of emancipation, but on their criticism of Lincoln’s 
interpretation of his constitutional power in other ways. He 
had suspended the writ of habeas corpus on his own authority, 
and arbitrary arrests were numerous and were not confined 
to districts where hostilities were in progress. On September 
24,1862, he renewed the suspension in a proclamation which 
made the discouragement of enlistment a crime. Promptly 
hundreds of men in all parts of the North were arrested for 
speaking and writing against the war, and were imprisoned 
without trial or were tried by military tribunals. To many, 
freedom of speech and political liberty seemed endangered. 
Benjamin R. Curtis, formerly of the Supreme Court, and Joel 


ELECTION OF 1862 


401 


Parker, of the Harvard Law School, attacked Lincoln as a 
despot. Congress later in the year authorized the suspension 
of the writ, but this did not silence criticism. The Demo¬ 
crats also attacked the policy of compensated emancipation, 
and the military policy of the administration. Possibly this 
last was the most potent cause of public dissatisfaction, for 
the war was lasting longer than had been expected. 

Under such circumstances congressional and state elec¬ 
tions were held in the autumn of 1862. On the whole these 
'i elections went heavily against the Union party. Horatio 
Seymour, a Democrat, was elected governor of New York, 
and the Democrats were victorious in New Jersey, Pennsyl¬ 
vania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin. This success of 
the Democrats was not, however, sufficient to affect seriously 
the course of the administration, or the development of na¬ 
tional policy. Congress continued to have a majority of 
Republicans and Unionists, and only in New Jersey did the 
Democrats obtain full control of a state government. In the 
other states mentioned, they controlled some branch of the 
government and were able to some extent to prevent action, 
but not to put through their own measures. Their negative 
influence would have been more important earlier in the war, 
but by this time the national administration had worked 
out its own machinery better and was more independent of 
state assistance. Their power was chiefly exerted in refusing 
to grant state money for bounties to encourage enlistment, in 
opposition, generally futile, to the national draft, and in 
refusing to allow soldiers in the field to vote. 

More important was the fact that the possession of power 
brought clearly to light the existence of two factions within 
the Democratic party. One faction, which was headed by 
Governor Seymour and to which General McClellan belonged, 
believed in supporting the war, but in protesting against the 
use of unconstitutional powers. Their protests were rather in 
the way of a record to be used later, than actual interfer- 


Election of 
1862. 


Democratic 

factions. 


402 


POLITICS DURING THE WAR 


ence, though Governor Seymour actually failed to give the 
national government as complete support as he perhaps 
should have, in enforcing the draft in New York city in July, 
1863, when there was dangerous rioting against the draft offi¬ 
cers. The leader of the other faction of Democrats was Clem¬ 
ent L. Vallandigham of Ohio. His purpose was immediate 
peace, without terms. His supporters came to be known as 
“Copperheads,” and a large number of them were organized 
in a secret society and known first as “Knights of the Golden 
Circle” and after 1864, as “Sons of Liberty.” This faction 
dictated the legislative policy in Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, 
and thwarted the national administration in every way pos¬ 
sible. In 1863 Vallandigham ran for the governorship of Ohio. 
He had been convicted in 1862 under Lincoln’s proclamation 
of September 24, had been banished, and he conducted his 
campaign from the Canadian side of Niagara. Many of the 
“War Democrats” opposed him, the victories at Gettysburg 
and Vicksburg in the summer of 1863 strengthened the ad¬ 
ministration, and he was defeated by a hundred thousand 
majority. 

The election of 1862 had little effect in checking the prog¬ 
ress of radical ideas. Possibly it prevented the consummation 
of Lincoln’s plan for compensated emancipation in the border 
states, but the movement to free the slaves there, neverthe¬ 
less, went on. It was fostered by the enlistment of negro 
troops, which was first authorized in 1862, the law finally 
providing for the freeing of slaves who enlisted, with their 
families, and the payment of a certain sum to their masters. 
In 1864 the fugitive slave law of 1850 was repealed. In 
the same year Maryland and Missouri adopted emancipation. 
In January, 1865, by the necessary two-thirds majority, Con¬ 
gress recommended to the states a thirteenth amendment to 
the Constitution: “Neither slavery nor involuntary servi¬ 
tude . . . shall exist within the United States or any place 
subject to their jurisdiction.” In December, 1865, the 


LINCOLN’S RECONSTRUCTION POLICY 


403 

acceptance of this amendment by three quarters of the states 
was announced to Congress, and slavery ceased to exist. 

In the meantime the problem of the reconstruction of the 
Union was beginning to absorb political attention. This 
question was presented from the beginning of the war by the 
case of Virginia. The western portion of that state, belonging 
to the Ohio valley, was thoroughly loyal and desired incor¬ 
poration as the new and separate state of West Virginia. The 
division of a state, however, required the consent of the state 
as a whole. To secure such sanction, the members of the 
Virginia legislature from this region, with a few from districts 
in the eastern portion held by United States troops, met and 
organized a loyal government, which professed to represent 
the whole state. This government authorized the division 
of the state and the erection of West Virginia. Their action 
was indorsed by Lincoln and by Congress, and West Virginia 
was admitted in 1863. The loyal government of Virginia was 
thereby shorn of nearly all its territory and supporters, but 
since it had been recognized for one purpose, logic demanded 
the continuance of its recognition, and it continued to be up¬ 
held by Lincoln as the legal state government of Virginia 
throughout the war. 

As other territory was recovered, Lincoln proceeded to 
organize it as rapidly as possible. In 1862 he appointed 
Andrew Johnson as military governor of Tennessee. This 
became the first step in his general policy, and he subsequently 
appointed military governors in Louisiana and Arkansas. 
In restoring civil government he operated under the confis¬ 
cation act, which had created penalties for treason and re¬ 
bellion that involved most men in the South. On December 
8, 1863, he issued a proclamation based on his pardoning 
power, extending amnesty to all, with the exception of cer¬ 
tain classes, who should take a prescribed oath of allegiance. 
The proclamation further set forth that when as many as one 
tenth the number of legal voters of a state in i860 had taken 


Reconstruc¬ 
tion, Vir¬ 
ginia. 


Lincoln’s 
reconstruc¬ 
tion policy. 


404 


POLITICS DURING THE WAR 


The Wade- 
Davis plan. 


Election of 
1864. 


such an oath to obey and support the laws of Congress and 
the Emancipation Proclamation, they might organize a state 
government, which should so alter the state law and con¬ 
stitution as to abolish slavery. He would then recognize 
such government as the legal government of the state. Such 
governments were organized and recognized in Tennessee, 
Louisiana, and Arkansas. 

This plan very much displeased the growing body of Radi¬ 
cals. Some, such as Thaddeus Stevens, Chairman of the Com¬ 
mittee on Ways and Means in the House and leader of the 
Republicans in that body, desired to punish the South, to 
enforce the confiscation act. Others, like Charles Sumner, 
less bitter, desired nevertheless to secure greater guarantees 
for the just treatment of the negroes. Many felt that a 
government based on but one tenth the voters of a state was 
Unrepublican and should not be recognized under the clause 
of the Constitution guaranteeing to every state a republican 
power of government. A bill embodying a compromise 
between these views, and known from its authors in the Senate 
and House respectively as the Wade-Davis bill, passed Con¬ 
gress in 1864. To this bill Lincoln applied a pocket veto, 
but he offered it as an alternative to his own plan in a new 
proclamation. He still, however, offered to recognize govern¬ 
ments formed in accordance with his first suggestion, although, 
of course, his recognition would not carry with it the reception 
of senators and representatives by Congress and full equality 
in the Union. 

This difference of opinion led many of the Radicals, as 
the election of 1864 approached, to look for some candidate 
other than Lincoln, whom they regarded as under the in¬ 
fluence of Seward and as hopelessly conservative. Chase, 
the Secretary of the Treasury, was proposed and was not 
unwilling. It became evident, however, that Lincoln had 
been successful in gauging public sentiment, and that the 
great body of people had confidence in him. Many, more- 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 


405 


over, agreed with Lincoln that it was too dangerous an experi¬ 
ment to substitute a new man in the midst of the war. The 
convention which met at Baltimore pursued a conservative 
course. The name Union rather than Republican was em¬ 
ployed, Lincoln was nominated for the presidency, and for 
the vice presidency, Andrew Johnson, a southerner and a 
Democrat, was chosen, to emphasize the non-partisan char¬ 
acter of the movement. Some of the more implacable Radi¬ 
cals met at Cleveland and nominated John C. Fremont as a 
third party candidate. This nomination met with practically 
no response, and opposition was actually confined to the 
Democrats. They attempted to unite their two discordant 
wings. The platform was written by Vallandigham; the 
nominee was General George B. McClellan, a War Demo¬ 
crat. Before the election, Atlanta was captured and other 
victories seemed to promise an early peace. This favored 
the Union ticket, and there can be no doubt, moreover, that 
Lincoln’s popularity was continually growing. He was re¬ 
elected by a majority of almost half a million in the popular 
vote, and 212 electoral votes to 21. Just one month and five 
days after his reinauguration on March 4, 1865, Lee surren¬ 
dered and the war was practically ended. 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 

See references for Chapter XXII. 

Brummer, S. D., Political History of New York State during 
the Period of the Civil War, and Porter, G. H., Ohio Politics during 
the Civil War Period, in Columbia University Studies , vols. 
XXXIX and XL. Burgess, J. W., Civil War and the Cmstitution, 
II, ch. XXVIII. Dunning, W. A., Civil War and Reconstruction , 
1-62. Hosmer, J. K., Appeal to Arms, and Outcome of the Civil 
War. Rhodes, J. F., United States, vols. Ill, IV, V, should be 
used as far as possible. Whiting, W., War Powers. Willoughby, 
W. W., Constitutional Law, §§ 73 2 “ 73 &- 

Adams, C. F., Lee at Appomatox (essay on J. Q. Adams). 
Cooley, T. M., Story's Commentaries, §§ 1923-1927. Davis, J., 


Sources. 

Historical 

accounts. 

Politics, 


Emancipa¬ 

tion. 


406 


POLITICS DURING THE WAR 


Biographies. 


Confederate Government, II, 158-193, 460-476. Pierce, E. L., 
Sumner , IV, XLVIII-L. Nicolay and Hay, Lincoln , IV, chs. 
XXII, XXIV ; V, ch. XII; VI, chs. VI, VIII, XVII, XIX, XX; 
VIII, chs. XVI, XX; X, ch. IV. 

Foulke, W. D., O. P. Morton. Gorham, G. C., Stanton. 
Hart, A. B., Chase. Nicolay and Hay, Lincoln, a monumental 
work by his private secretaries, covering much of the history of 
the war. Pearson, G. H., J. A. Andrew. Seward, F. W., Seward at 
Washington. Woodburn, J. A., Thaddeus Stevens. 


CHAPTER XXIV 
RECONSTRUCTION TO 1872 

The close of the war found the country confronted with 
problems almost as serious and even more complicated than 
those of the war itself. First there was the necessity of re¬ 
establishing normal conditions of government in the seceded 
states. Then there was the problem of readjusting the re¬ 
lationships of the various branches of the national govern¬ 
ment, which had been so sorely strained. Again the national 
finances must be adjusted to conditions of peace, with as 
little disturbance as possible, the diplomatic questions aris¬ 
ing from the war must be settled, and the prestige of the 
United States restored. Finally the South must readjust 
its system of industry to meet the new labor conditions in¬ 
volved by the freeing of the negro. 

At the very outset the most deplorable calamity conceiv¬ 
able was inflicted on the country by the assassination of 
Lincoln on April 14, 1865. In order to appreciate his loss, 
it is not necessary to believe that Lincoln could have saved 
the country the mistakes and passions of reconstruction. Cer¬ 
tainly his sympathetic and tolerant influence would have miti¬ 
gated these mistakes, while the very manner of his death 
aggravated the passions of the time. It is true that the 
Confederate government was in no wise privy to his death; 
it is equally true that thousands in the North believed it to 
be so. Even the tender and great-hearted Phillips Brooks, 
in his funeral sermon, said, “Solemnly, in the sight of God, 
I charge the murder where it belongs, on Slavery. ,, 

Lincoln was succeeded by Andrew Johnson, who 
promptly announced that he would follow Lincoln’s policy. 

407 


Problems, of 
peace. 


Lincoln’s 

assassina¬ 

tion. 


Andrew 

Johnson. 


408 


RECONSTRUCTION TO 1872 


The Presi¬ 
dent’s plan. 


In this purpose he seems to have persevered so far as in him 
lay. He continued Lincoln’s cabinet, which had by this time 
grasped the details of its business, and on the whole the 
machinery of administration ran smoothly. In carrying out 
Lincoln’s general policy toward the South he followed, how¬ 
ever, too much the letter of Lincoln’s precedent. One can 
scarcely believe that Lincoln would have pursued unchanged 
the policy after the war which he had evolved during it. 
Johnson, moreover, in action, was rough, opinionated, and 
narrow-minded, and policy counts for little in politics, if not 
joined with method. He was sure to raise up obstacles which 
Lincoln would never have encountered. Nor could Lincoln 
himself have pursued his policy without friction. Not with¬ 
out doubts had the Radical majority seen Congress adjourn 
in March, 1865, and the problem of reconstruction left for 
nine months, until its meeting in December, in the hands of 
the President. When this responsibility fell, not upon Lin¬ 
coln, but upon Johnson, a southerner and a Democrat, appre¬ 
hension became doubly keen and criticism was inevitable. 

Johnson recognized the governments established by 
Lincoln in Virginia, Tennessee, Louisiana and Arkansas, and 
on May 29 issued an amnesty proclamation, authorizing the 
organization of civil government in North Carolina, which was 
quickly followed by similar ones dealing with the other 
states. These followed much the same lines as Lincoln’s 
proclamation, except that Johnson’s lifelong distrust of the 
ruling class in the South led him to exclude all those whose 
taxable property was over $20,000 from his general pardon 
and therefore from the right to vote. The first act of the 
voters registered under this authority was to be the election 
of a constitutional convention, which was to declare the or¬ 
dinance of secession null and void, abolish slavery, and re¬ 
pudiate all debts incurred in the support of the war. Such 
constitutional provisions having been ratified by popular 
vote, state officers were to be elected, and the Thirteenth 


PLANS FOR RECONSTRUCTION 


409 


Amendment ratified by the newly elected legislature. This 
policy was acceptable to the South, and by December, 1865, 
nearly every state had performed these acts, had been 
recognized by the President as restored to its old constitu¬ 
tional relation, and had elected members to the ensuing 
Congress. The President had withdrawn all obstructions to 
commerce, had turned much property back to the state gov¬ 
ernments, public service corporations, and individuals, and 
had liberally extended special pardons to those exempted 
from the general amnesty. He did not, however, put an end 
to martial law. 

When Congress assembled, it was by no means disposed 
to accept the President’s handiwork. It was felt that so 
great a problem was the business of the legislature rather 
than of the executive. Moreover, the new southern legis¬ 
latures, justly doubtful of the ability of the negro at once to 
adjust himself without friction to freedom, had passed and 
were passing codes of law designed to meet the new situation. 
Many of these codes of law were plainly intended to make 
freedom mean as little as possible; all of them were based 
on the principle of a distinction between the white and negro 
races. Except in Georgia, none of them provided for the 
improvement of the negro by education, which Lincoln had 
considered a necessary complement of freedom. Congress, 
therefore, refused to admit members from any of the seceded 
states, until it should have time to deliberate on the subject. 

The decision to delay the reorganization of these states 
was made with the almost unanimous consent of both the 
conservative and radical factions, and Senator Fessenden, a 
conservative or at least a moderate, was made chairman of 
a Joint Committee of Reconstruction. To the Judiciary 
Committee of the Senate, of which Trumbull of Illinois, 
another moderate, was chairman, was confided the task of 
providing for the negro. The first bill introduced was one 
to extend the life and the functions of the Freedmen’s Bureau. 


Attitude of 
Congress. 


Freedmen’s 

Bureau. 


4io 


RECONSTRUCTION TO 1872 


Break be¬ 
tween the 
President 
and Congress. 


During the war tens of thousands of former slaves had come 
into the Union lines. In dealing with them, there had been 
the greatest variety of authority and of experiment. Gen¬ 
erals, the War Department, the Treasury Department, 
private philanthropists, and speculators had all tried a 
hand. They had been worked by the government, loaned to 
contractors, given separate land holdings, and furnished with 
food, medicine, and all sorts of education. To bring about 
some kind of harmony there had been established by Congress 
in March, 1865, a “Bureau of Freedmen and Abandoned 
Lands.” This was to last for one year only. The new bill 
continued it, although it was still designed to be temporary, 
and very much enlarged the functions of its agents. They 
were given absolute power over contracts entered into by 
negroes, and the right to appeal to the military to enforce 
their decisions. 

This bill was passed on February 6, 1866, and was 
promptly vetoed by the President. He asserted that it 
was inexpedient and unconstitutional. Among his grounds 
for taking the latter position was the fact that it was passed 
by a Congress from which eleven states were excluded. 
An attempt was made to pass it over his veto, but the 
Senate failed to give the requisite two-thirds majority. On 
February 22 the President in a characteristic and intemper¬ 
ate speech attacked the leaders of the majority in Congress. 
The President’s sweeping veto and his violent speech forced 
the main Republican factions, the moderates and the 
radicals, together in opposition. The President had to 
rely upon the Democrats and a few “ conservative ” or 
“ administration ” Republicans. During March it was a 
question whether he could rally over a third of the Senate 
and so defeat the congressional plan. The crisis came over 
the “Civil Rights” bill, providing for the absolute equality 
of blacks and whites before the law. This was passed 
over his veto in April. 


PLANS FOR RECONSTRUCTION 411 

Feeling confident now of a two-thirds majority, enabling Congressional 
it to overrule the President, Congress proceeded rapidly. A plan ' 
new Freedmen’s Bureau act was passed, and the Joint Com¬ 
mittee on Reconstruction soon made its report. It declared 
that no legal civil government existed in the South, and that 
the duty of establishing such a government lay with Congress, 
under the constitutional clause guaranteeing a republican 
form of government to every state. It recommended the 
passage of a fourteenth amendment to the Constitution. 

This amendment embodied in its first section the essence of 
the Civil Rights bill, declaring: “All persons born or natural¬ 
ized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States ; nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws.” Further clauses declared that the war debt 
of the South should never be paid, nor that of the Union 
repudiated, and barred from officeholding certain classes 
of southerners, unless they should be pardoned by a two- 
thirds vote of Congress. Finally, it provided that if any state 
abridged, except for crime, the right of any male citizen of 
proper age to vote, its representation in Congress should be 
reduced in proportion to the number thus deprived. With¬ 
out the latter provision the late slaveholding states would 
gain power by the emancipation of the negro. On the old 
basis of representation, the seceded states had sixty-one votes 
in the House of Representatives; if the negroes counted as 
whites, they would have seventy; if the negroes counted 
not at all, they would have forty-five. The amendment, 
therefore, gave the southerners the choice of negro suffrage or 
reduced representation. On June 13, 1866, this amendment 
was sent to the states for ratification. On July 2, Tennessee 


412 


RECONSTRUCTION TO 1872 


Campaign 
of 1866. 


Election 
of 1866. 


was recognized as reconstructed on the grounds that: “By 
a large popular vote the people have ratified a constitutional 
amendment abolishing slavery and have declared the se¬ 
cession ordinance and the war debt void, and their state 
government has ratified the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments and has done other acts procuring and de¬ 
noting loyalty.” This represented the congressional plan of 
reconstruction. 

The people were to choose between these two plans, 
that of the President and that of Congress, in the congressional 
election of 1866. The President appealed to nonpartisan 
union support. A great convention at Philadelphia on 
August 14 indorsed his policy. He had the assistance of 
Thurlow Weed, Seward’s political manager, of Henry J. 
Raymond of the New York Times , and of many others who 
had cooperated with the administration during the war, as 
well as of the Democrats of North and South. He remodeled 
his cabinet, filling it with his friends, except for the Secretary 
of War, Stanton, and he used the patronage actively to ad¬ 
vance bis views. Invited to assist in laying the corner stone 
of a monument to Douglas at Chicago, he “swung round 
the circle,” arranging to visit and speak at many places during 
his trip. This was the first time that a President had en¬ 
gaged in a campaigning tour, and the character of his speeches 
showed him at his worst. They were coarse and superficial, 
and undoubtedly prejudiced many against him. A riot at 
New Orleans about the same time, in which many negroes 
were killed and the police were implicated in their destruc¬ 
tion, convinced many that the South did not intend to deal 
fairly with the freedmen. 

The result was an overwhelming victory for the congres¬ 
sional plan, and the Republicans secured more than two 
thirds of each house of Congress. During the same period 
the unreconstructed southern states were considering the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and one after another they rejected 


PLANS FOR RECONSTRUCTION 


413 


it. They believed that the Supreme Court would overrule 
Congress, that the election of 1868 would reverse the position 
of parties in the North, and that they could then secure 
better terms. When Congress met in December, 1866, there¬ 
fore, the North and the South were as strongly opposed as 
ever; the North had indorsed the plan of Congress, the South 
had rejected it; politically there was no sign of reconciliation. 

The triumphant majority in Congress turned to the “Thorough, 
leadership of Sumner, the idealistic champion of equality, 
and to Thaddeus Stevens, the remorseless hater of the South. 

Sumner believed that by secession the states had committed 
suicide and lapsed into the condition of territories; Stevens 
thought they had become conquered provinces; both con¬ 
sidered that Congress had a free hand to make them over 
at will. Dissatisfied with Fessenden and Trumbull’s con¬ 
gressional plan worked out during the preceding session, 
they secured the passage of additional acts on March 2 
and 23, and July 19, 1867, their whole policy being denomi¬ 
nated by the title “Thorough.” The existing southern state 
governments were disregarded; the South was divided into 
five districts under military rule. The military comman¬ 
dants were once more to register voters, excluding all whites 
who had ever been disfranchised for participation in the re¬ 
bellion, and admitting negroes. Upon this new basis a 
constitutional convention was to be elected in each state, 
which should draw up a constitution permanently establish¬ 
ing negro suffrage. When this constitution had been adopted 
by popular vote, and the state government provided for had 
accepted the Fourteenth Amendment, reconstruction might 
be considered complete, but members elected to Congress 
must be able to take the “ironclad” oath, to the effect that 
they had not voluntarily abetted the rebellion. 

The compulsory provision for negro suffrage was the Negro 
most important novelty in this plan. Jefferson’s philosophic suffrage * 
statement that all men are created equal had troubled early 


414 


RECONSTRUCTION TO 1872 


“Tenure of 
Office ” act. 


constitution makers, who nearly always desired to exclude 
the negro from voting, but found this principle in their way. 
In the thirties, however, North Carolina and Tennessee dis¬ 
franchised them, and they voted no longer in the South. At 
the same time the rise of abolitionism gave body to the demand 
for equal rights in the North, and every constitutional conven¬ 
tion listened to discussions of negro suffrage. Often the ques¬ 
tion was referred to popular vote. Before the war, however, 
no state, outside of the six — New England, except Connect¬ 
icut, and New York — that had allowed the negroes to vote 
from Revolutionary times, had adopted the practice, though 
popular support was growing and almost half the Republicans 
favored it. During the war there was a rapid growth of 
pro-negro sentiment. Lincoln desired negro suffrage sub' 
ject to limitations, and even Johnson had at one time rec¬ 
ommended such an arrangement as expedient. Congress 
adopted the policy the more easily as it applied only to the 
South, and was backed by the claim that the negro needed 
the suffrage to defend himself, and that the negro voters were 
needed to maintain Republican supremacy when the southern 
states should be readmitted to participation in the national 
government. The fitness of the negro for the suffrage was 
scarcely mentioned. Northern opinion was that the negro 
was naturally equal to the white man, and, in the absence 
of any conception of an evolutionary historic development, 
it was believed that he could escape the consequences of 
degradation in a generation at most. 

To intrust to President Johnson the execution of these 
acts, every one of which he had vetoed, seemed to many 
suicidal. Benjamin F. Butler of Massachusetts and others 
urged his impeachment. The charges that could be brought 
against him, however, were of such a character that it would 
be difficult to secure his conviction, and the majority decided 
that it would be sufficient to tie his hands, without removing 
him. To accomplish this the “Tenure of Office” act was 


IMPEACHMENT 


415 


passed, March 2, 1867. This act reversed the time-honored 
decision of the first Congress, that the power of removal 
rested with the President, and gave it to the President “by 
and with the advice and consent of the Senate,” thus making 
the method of removal the same as that of appointment. 
The Senate had long contended that this was the correct in¬ 
terpretation of the constitutional provision, but only the 
intensity of the reconstruction conflict could bring the rep¬ 
resentatives to agree to a practice which gave so much power 
to the senators. The bill was intended to protect Stanton 
in the office of Secretary of War, but the sequel showed that 
this was precisely what it failed to do. 

The President was anxious to have this act tested by the 
courts, without becoming himself personally involved. His 
plans to this end failed, and on February 21, 1868, he boldly 
produced a crisis by announcing the removal of Stanton. 
The radical leaders immediately took advantage of this ap¬ 
parent violation of a law constitutionally passed, to under¬ 
take his impeachment. The trial which followed marked 
the high tide of bitterness in the North. 

The House managers of the impeachment held that it 
was only necessary to show the President’s unfitness for office, 
and that general charges, even though not admissible in an or¬ 
dinary court of law, were pertinent and sufficient. The Presi¬ 
dent’s legal counsel, including Benjamin R. Curtis, formerly 
of the Supreme Court, and William Evarts, held that he must 
be convicted of some direct illegal act. The President urged 
that his removal of Stanton, even if contrary to the Tenure 
of Office act, was justifiable as being the only means of 
bringing that act, which he regarded as an unconstitutional 
infringement of the executive power, before the courts. The 
case, however, eventually turned on a fine legal point. The 
law provided that cabinet officers were to hold during the term 
of the President by whom they were appointed and one month 
thereafter. After that period the President could remove 


Impeach¬ 

ment. 


416 


RECONSTRUCTION TO 1872 


Finance. 


them without consulting the Senate. The legal arguments 
made it clear that Stanton had been appointed by Lincoln, 
that Johnson was serving a term of his own in the sense of 
the law, and that, therefore, the removal was legal. When 
the final vote was taken seven Republican senators and all 
the Democrats voted not guilty, making over one third of the 
Senate, and the President was acquitted. On May 26,1868, 
he appointed General Schofield in the place of Stanton, and 
for the remainder of the administration had comparatively 
little trouble with Congress. The seven Republicans who 
voted against the impeachment charges had been moved only 
by their conviction of the President’s innocence, and recent 
opinion has approved their act. At the time, however, they 
were read out of the party, and in most instances their politi¬ 
cal careers were ended. 

While the President and Congress were wrangling over 
the reconstruction of the South, they were forced to a cer¬ 
tain amount of cooperation with regard to financial recon¬ 
struction. The first necessity was for the reduction of ex¬ 
penses. This was largely the work of the several secretaries. 
The volunteer army was speedily disbanded and the navy 
reduced. When it came to reducing the civil establishment, 
which had been expanded to meet the increased administra¬ 
tive needs of the war, the task was much more difficult; the 
interest on the debt, moreover, was enormous, and as a result 
the national expenditure after the war was never less than 
five times what it had been before. The reduction of taxes, 
too, was slow. In 1866 and 1868 the internal revenue taxes 
were removed from many objects, leaving, however, the 
excise on spirits and tobacco. The income tax was reduced, 
although it was not repealed until 1872. The main dis¬ 
cussion arose with regard to the tariff. Many of the rates 
had been raised to compensate the manufacturers for the in¬ 
ternal revenue taxes they were obliged to pay. When the 
latter were removed, it was urged that the tariff rates should 


FINANCIAL RECONSTRUCTION 


417 


be reduced, also. In fact the repeal of the internal revenue 
taxes probably increased the amount of protection over what 
it had been during the war, but it is difficult to make an 
exact estimate because there was still another factor. Cus¬ 
toms were paid in gold, and as gold became less expensive, 
they grew practically less heavy. 

The manufacturing interests, however, had grown very Payments 
strong during the war, and were now for the most part solidly debt ‘ 
with the Republican party. Congress therefore refused to 
lower the tariff, and in fact in 1S67 increased the rates on 
wool and woolens by a reclassification, which was embodied 
in the famous Schedule K, later to become the chief point 
of attack in the tariff system. Financially the result was 
that the revenue in every year of Johnson’s administration 
was greater than in any year of the war. With the revenue 
thus maintained, it was possible to reduce the debt, which 
at the close of hostilities stood at about three billions. 

During Johnson’s term $271,496,000 was paid off, and other 
obligations were met so that the total indebtedness of the 
country was reduced by almost five hundred million dollars. 

In addition, the debt, which at the close of the war was in 
many forms, was, for the most part, funded into a regular 
series of bonds. 

More controversial was the question of the currency. Currency. 
From 1836 to 1863 there had been no national paper money. 

The amount afforded by the state banks was about two hun¬ 
dred millions. During the war national paper began to flood 
the country. By 1866 national bank notes amounted to about 
two hundred and eighty millions. In addition there was 
$433,000,000 in unredeemable greenbacks, and treasury notes 
bearing compound interest, many of which were issued for 
small amounts, circulated as currency. Money was abun¬ 
dant, but it was cheap. At the close of the war it was worth 
about one half of its face value. The Secretary of the Treas¬ 
ury, Hugh McCulloch, urged that the first necessity was to 


418 


RECONSTRUCTION TO 1872 


The “Ohio 
Idea.” 


Nomination 
of Grant. 


restore the national credit, to raise the currency to its face 
value, and that the proper method of accomplishing this was 
to reduce the amount of paper in circulation. He retired 
the small treasury notes, and obtained the authority of Con¬ 
gress, April 12, 1866, to destroy the greenbacks as they came 
into the treasury to the amount of $10,000,000 in six months, 
and $4,000,000 in any subsequent month. By February, 
1868, he had withdrawn $44,000,000, besides the $33,000,000 
which was a temporary issue. In addition he had accumu¬ 
lated a gold reserve from the customs duties, which had to be 
paid in hard money. As a result, the value of the currency 
had been raised so that the premium on gold, while varying, 
averaged about thirty per cent. 

To many this progress did not seem desirable. The 
war finance had accustomed people to cheap money and high 
prices. Moreover, debts had been contracted when money 
was cheap; their face value remained the same now that 
money represented more actual value. A debt which repre¬ 
sented 500 bushels of wheat when contracted, now required 
700 to pay off. Senator Pendleton of Ohio devised a plan to 
pay the debt and again enlarge the currency simultaneously. 
The act providing for the issue of certain United States bonds, 
known as 5-20’s, stipulated that the interest be paid in coin, 
but merely stated that the principal be paid in “ dollars.” He 
claimed that these bonds could and should be paid by a new 
issue of greenbacks. As these bonds were steadily becoming 
due and amounted to $1,600,000,000, the country would 
certainly be supplied with all the money it could absorb. 
The plan became widely popular, and this particular detail 
of financial reconstruction vied with the southern question 
in attracting public attention as the campaign of 1868 ap¬ 
proached. 

The Republican convention met while the impeach¬ 
ment trial was in progress. It indorsed the whole congres¬ 
sional policy with regard to the South and to the President 


CAMPAIGN OF 1868 


419 


it stood for the payment of the whole debt in coin, and it 
nominated General Grant for the presidency. The nomina¬ 
tion of Grant was due, not solely to the popularity resulting 
from his military successes, but also to the belief that the 
qualities he had shown as a general, of iron will, capacity for 
selecting subordinates, organizing ability, and sympathy for 
the southern people, were those particularly needed in the 
presidential office at this time. Time brought disappoint¬ 
ment. In politics he had no clear-cut general purpose as he 
had had during the war ; the men to whom he was drawn had 
dash and ability, but too often lacked integrity of character, 
and his loyalty to them often sacrificed public interests; 
the organizing power he showed in the field unaccountably 
disappeared in government administration as in private busi¬ 
ness; and his sympathy for the South was counterbalanced by 
his soldier’s conception that law must be obeyed and dis¬ 
cipline maintained. To him a party was like an army, order 
was the condition of victory, and he became a partisan of a 
narrow type. His habitual silence, however, gave small 
clew to his political views, and in 1868 he was an ideal can¬ 
didate in that men of divergent opinions, knowing his sterling 
personal honesty, could combine in his support. 

The Democratic convention was torn asunder by the con¬ 
test on finance between Pendleton and a conservative faction 
headed by August Belmont. It desired also to reassure the 
country as to its loyalty to the Union. The result was 
again a compromise, as it had been in 1864. The platform 
indorsed the “Ohio Idea,” the candidate was Horatio Sey¬ 
mour, a hard-money man. The Republican policy of 
“thorough” was attacked. Francis P. Blair, who had sup¬ 
ported the Lincoln administration, was selected for the vice 
presidency. 

The election of 1868 showed that the war issue was still 
overwhelmingly dominant. It revealed a more compact 
sectionalism than had any previous election. Grant gained 


Democratic 

convention. 


Election of 
1868. 


420 


RECONSTRUCTION TO 1872 


Fifteenth 

Amendment. 


President 

and 

Congress. 


in the Republican states and lost in the border. The Four¬ 
teenth Amendment had been declared adopted July 28, 1868, 
and all the southern states had been reorganized and were 
allowed to take part in the election except Virginia, Missis¬ 
sippi, and Texas. Six of them voted for Grant, owing 
to the number of negro votes. The Republicans lost in 
some districts, as Ohio, owing to the currency question. 
Grant, however, was overwhelmingly elected, and the radicals 
retained control of Congress. 

Thaddeus Stevens died before Congress met in the 
autumn, and Benjamin F. Butler became the radical leader 
in the House. A number of younger men, however, such as 
James G. Blaine of Maine, Roscoe Conkling of New York, 
James A. Garfield of Ohio, and William B. Allison of Iowa, 
were coming to the front, so that Butler never exerted the 
influence that Stevens had. These leaders were encouraged 
by the result of the election to cap their reconstruction policy 
by making negro suffrage universal by means of a con¬ 
stitutional amendment. It was certainly an anomaly that 
the North should force negro suffrage upon the South, 
and not allow it at home, but a constitutional amendment 
had been discountenanced by the national Republican con¬ 
vention, and several northern states had recently refused 
to grant the suffrage to negroes. Nevertheless the Fifteenth 
Amendment, containing this provision, was rushed through 
Congress and recommended to the states before Grant’s 
inauguration. Its approval was made a condition precedent 
to the admission of Virginia, Mississippi, Texas, and also of 
Georgia, about whose previous admission a dispute had arisen. 
By a remarkable political effort, the assent of three quarters 
of the states was obtained, and the amendment became part 
of the Constitution, March 30, 1870. 

The last eight years had witnessed rapid changes in the 
relations of the three departments of government, whose 
coequal importance the framers of the Constitution had la- 


THE SUPREME COUR 1 


421 


bored so hard to establish. During the war the executive 
had assumed the real direction of political affairs, and so sane 
a jurist as Benjamin R. Curtis asserted, in a pamphlet 
entitled Executive Power , that the nation was practically 
living under a military despotism. Then followed four years 
when Congress became all-powerful, and only a single vote 
saved the executive office from permanent degradation. 
Grant, while not proving the active leader that was expected, 
yet restored to the office a reasonable degree of power. He 
obtained, for instance, a modification of the Tenure of 
Office act. Lacking the legal training which nearly all 
Presidents had had, he sometimes disregarded the constitu¬ 
tional limitations of his office in a manner more dangerous 
than had Lincoln, but in such cases Congress usually checked 
him. On the whole the equipoise between the legislature 
and the executive was restored. 

The prestige of the Supreme Court had suffered severely 
during the war. Congress had ignored the Dred Scott deci¬ 
sion, and Lincoln had disregarded the decision of Chief Jus¬ 
tice Taney in the Merry man case, in which the power of the 
President to suspend the writ of habeas corpus had been 
denied. With the death of Taney in 1864, Salmon P. Chase 
became Chief Justice, and the majority of the Court had been 
appointed by Lincoln. With the close of hostilities the Court 
at once took up cases dealing with war and reconstruction. 
Imthe case of Ex parte Milligan, 1866, it declared that Congress 
had no right to erect military tribunals except in the actual 
locality of hostilities. In 1867, in the cases of Cummings 
v. Missouri and In re Garland, it declared unconstitutional 
a provision of the constitution of Missouri debarring 
from certain professions all who “by act or word manifested 
sympathy with rebellion,” on the ground that it was ex post 
facto legislation. These decisions enraged the majority in 
Congress and threats were freely made to cut down the pow¬ 
ers of the Court, and effect changes in its membership. 


Position ol 
the Supreme 
Court. 


Decline of 

Supreme 

Court. 


422 


RECONSTRUCTION TO 1872 


Revival of 
influence of 
Supreme 
Court. 


Under these circumstances the Court wisely refrained from 
receiving cases that the “Johnson” governors of Georgia 
and Mississippi endeavored to bring before it. A decision 
denying the constitutionality of congressional action would 
undoubtedly have been ignored, or the Court would have been 
attacked. In 1869, in the case of Hepburn v. Griswold , the 
Court decided, by a -vote of five to four, that Congress did 
not possess the power of making greenbacks legal tender for 
debts previously contracted, and that contracts antedating 
the greenback law must be paid in coin. This decision was 
very unpopular, and, a number of changes in the personnel of 
the Court occurring about this time, it was reversed by de¬ 
cisions in the cases of Knox v. Lee and Juillard v. Greeman 
in 1871. 

In other instances the Court was more fortunate. Chief 
Justice Chase, presiding over the Senate in the Johnson im¬ 
peachment trial, successfully maintained the dignity of his 
position. In the case of Texas v. White the court dealt 
with the vexed question of the position of the states during 
the war. It decided that secession had no legal effect and that 
they had continued to be states in the Union. “The Con¬ 
stitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible 
Union composed of indestructible states.” Republican 
governments, as understood in the Constitution, had, however, 
ceased to exist in them, and the duty of restoring govern¬ 
ment rested with Congress. Thus congressional recon¬ 
struction was, in general, found legal. Before Congress 
came together it was the duty of the President to act. Thus 
the governments formed by President Johnson were rec¬ 
ognized. During the war there had been de facto state 
governments, and the Court decided that their acts, where not 
affecting the rights of the national government or of the 
other states, should be held binding. The principles here 
laid down continued to guide the courts in the many cases 
involving secession and the rights of the states which arose 


EXPANSION 


423 


during the next decade. Fully as important were the 
“ Slaughter House” cases. These arose from the widespread 
idea that the clause of the Fourteenth Amendment referring 
to the “privileges and immunities” of citizens of the United 
States applied to all their personal rights, and prohibited any 
state legislation interfering with them. The Court decided 
that the amendment was adopted with special reference to the 
negro, and was not intended to diminish the rights of the 
states as they had been understood. Subsequent decisions 
in cases involving the Fourteenth Amendment have some¬ 
what modified the position first laid down, but it has never 
been given the extension claimed for it by the plaintiffs in 
those cases. By the end of Grant’s administration it may 
be said that the Court had regained its position, and for thirty 
years it was freer from attack than ever before in its history. 

While the political problems resulting from the war at- The French 
tracted the greater amount of attention, those of diplomacy in Mexico - 
were also pressing. Napoleon III had taken advantage of the 
temporary neutralization of the strength of the United States 
to bring about the establishment of an empire in Mexico, 
resting upon French support. During the war, this violation 
of the Monroe Doctrine had to be endured, but when the 
war closed there was such strong popular feeling that 
there was danger of a war with France. Seward handled 
this delicate situation with great skill, keeping the peace 
while he secured the withdrawal of the French troops, de¬ 
prived of whom, the empire of Napoleon’s tool, Maximilian, 
soon fell. 

Seward’s view of the Monroe Doctrine was broad and Expansion, 
positive. He had for years anticipated the gradual, peace¬ 
ful absorption of both the North and South American con¬ 
tinents under the United States flag, and, as Secretary of 
State, he did what he could to accomplish this design. In 
1867 he negotiated a treaty for the purchase of Alaska for 
$7,200,000 from Russia. Sumner, Chairman of the Senate 


Grant and 

Santo 

Domingo. 


Difficulties 
with England. 


424 RECONSTRUCTION TO 1872 

Committee on Foreign Affairs, secured the acceptance of this 
treaty by the Senate, partly on the ground that the country 
could thus express its gratitude towards Russia for her friend¬ 
liness during the war. Seward’s further plans for annexing 
the Danish West India islands and Santo Domingo received 
little sympathy from Congress, which was distinctly anti¬ 
expansionist in tone, or from Sumner, who, while he shared 
Seward’s vision, did not desire the inclusion of semitropical 
countries likely to strengthen the southern influence in na¬ 
tional councils. 

Grant became greatly interested in the Santo Domingo 
question and pressed the matter with little regard for con¬ 
stitutional limitations on his power, securing a treaty of 
annexation which he urged upon the Senate. This treaty 
became a matter of bitter controversy, and, when Sumner 
ultimately secured its defeat, his action created a breach 
between him and Grant that led to important consequences. 
Other questions of foreign affairs Grant left to his Secretary 
of State, Hamilton Fish, who conducted them with a con¬ 
servative and calm good sense that kept peace abroad and 
prevented agitation at home. Throughout the administra¬ 
tion, revolution raged in Cuba, and though a hundred threads 
of connection threatened to draw the United States into the 
conflict, neutrality was successfully preserved. 

Chiefly Mr. Fish’s skill was called into play by our re¬ 
lations with England. The victorious party in the Civil War 
was vindictively indignant with the people of that country, 
for their failure to give whole-hearted sympathy to the North 
during the struggle, for what was considered the premature 
recognition of the belligerency of the Confederacy, and for 
the destruction of thei American merchant marine which was 
universally attributed to the Confederate cruisers built or 
fitted out in England in contravention to what the United 
States claimed were the accepted laws of neutrality. This bad 
feeling prevented the renewal of the commercial and fisheries 


TREATY OF WASHINGTON 


425 


treaty of 1854 with Canada, which expired in 1866, and con¬ 
troversy arose with regard to the water boundary between 
Vancouver Island and the United States. It was with diffi¬ 
culty that the action of Congress was restrained to the civility 
of peaceful relations. Seward’s attempt at reconciliation, 
known as the Johnson-Clarendon agreement, was ignomini- 
ously rejected by the Senate. Sumner in attacking it asserted 
that England was responsible for the prolongation of the war 
by at least two years, and should pay damages to the extent 
of two billions of dollars. He hoped, with the cooperation of 
his friends the extreme Liberals of England, to establish this 
claim, and then to provide for its liquidation by the transfer 
of all British possessions in the western hemisphere to the 
United States flag. It was a fantastic conception, passing 
over the border from the sublime to the ridiculous, near which 
many of the great minds of that idealistic generation hovered. 

Such a proposal, coming from one so influential as Sumner, 
brought negotiations for the settlement of the Civil War 
problems to an abrupt close. 

To reestablish them was a matter of great difficulty, but Treaty of 
it was at length brought about. The quarrel between Presi- Washington - 
dent Grant and Sumner over Santo Domingo came to a crisis 
just at the critical moment, and Sumner, the chief obstacle to 
a peaceful settlement with England, was removed from the 
chairmanship of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. A joint 
commission representing the two countries was appointed, 
which drew up the Treaty of Washington in 1871. This made 
a new twelve-year arrangement with regard to the fisheries, 
granted free navigation of waterways in which the countries 
were mutally interested, and submitted practically all dis¬ 
puted points to arbitration. With regard to neutrality it 
laid down certain rules which were to guide the arbitration 
and were to govern the observance of neutrality in the future. 

The resulting court of arbitration at Geneva ordered the 
payment of about fifteen million dollars to American claim- 


426 


RECONSTRUCTION TO 1872 


Naturaliza¬ 

tion. 


Alien 

government 
in the South. 


ants on the ground that Great Britain had been negligent in 
enforcing neutrality. 

Simultaneous negotiations resulted in an adjustment of the 
long-vexed question of the diplomatic position of naturalized 
American citizens. This question had been growing con¬ 
stantly more important with the increase of immigration, 
and reached a crisis in the arrests of Irish-Americans engaged 
in the Fenian agitation for the independence of Ireland. In 
1871 Great Britain recognized the right of expatriation, and 
between 1868 and 1871 George Bancroft negotiated satis¬ 
factory treaties with several German states. While minor 
points remained unsettled, the main American contention, 
that five years’ residence accompanied by legal naturaliza¬ 
tion constituted a change of nationality, was adopted and 
has since been generally accepted. 

In the meantime the remaining states of the South were 
readmitted, the last being Georgia in July, 1870; but order 
was far from being established. The organization of the 
new governments had fallen chiefly to negroes and to north¬ 
erners. After the war thousands of soldiers and camp fol¬ 
lowers of the northern army had sought their fortunes in the 
South. Most of those who looked to the more ordinary 
methods of business and of farming speedily returned, de¬ 
feated by the unaccustomed economic and labor conditions. 
The bulk of those who stayed justly deserved the opprobrious 
name of “carpetbaggers,” and sought to rise to power 
through negro votes. There were, indeed, many honest, 
philanthropic men among them, deeply interested in the 
negro’s welfare; but their ignorance of the character of both 
negroes and southern whites rendered them almost as dan¬ 
gerous as the unscrupulous. With the assistance of a scatter¬ 
ing of native whites, known to other southerners as “ scala¬ 
wags,” and in the North as “loyalists,” they organized the 
negroes into “Union Leagues,” and, with the aid of favorable 
registration laws, brought them very generally to the polls at 


GOVERNMENT IN THE SOUTH 


427 


the first elections. In the conventions thus elected, it was to 
the carpetbagger that the constructive work naturally fell; 
the votes were cast by negroes but the ideas came from the 
North, and the new constitutions, not only in the reconstructed 
states, but in Maryland and Missouri, were framed upon 
northern models, introducing in some cases the town system 
of local government. In some states there were clauses dis¬ 
franchising thousands of whites; in others a spirit of amnesty 
was shown. 

The governments established under these constitutions Governmental 
were undoubtedly the worst that have ever existed in the 
United States. In all the legislatures there were large num¬ 
bers of absolutely uneducated negroes, few members paid 
taxes, and a majority of the whites were susceptible, in vary¬ 
ing degrees, to corruption. In South Carolina, where the 
excesses were most picturesque, an illiterate legislature spent 
$128,865 f° r stationery in four years, and printing in one 
year cost $450,000; pickles, brandied cherries, a fine coffin, a 
fine cradle, and Colgate’s fancy toilet soap figured among 
the legislative expenses; a few skillful strokes of the pen 
raised a bill of $1.88 to $6880. In addition to this crude 
extravagance there were more subtle financial stealings. 

It was a period throughout the country of disreputable poli¬ 
tics, of speculation, of the increase of state and municipal 
debts. The ruin of the South tempted individuals to specu¬ 
late, and rendered particularly plausible the argument that 
state credit should be extended to aid the work of economic 
restoration, especially that of the transportation system. 

Such legislation began before the establishment of negro gov¬ 
ernments and continued when they were overthrown, but it 
was most reckless in its scope and most carelessly adminis¬ 
tered during the, “carpetbag” period. In South Carolina 
there were fraudulent overissues of bonds to the extent of 
six million dollars, and in four years the state debt increased 
nearly thirteen million. Even the educational legislation, 


428 


RECONSTRUCTION TO 1872 


The Ku- 
Klux Klan. 


commendable as introducing for the first time the free public 
school system throughout the South, was unfortunate be¬ 
cause devised upon a basis far more expensive than its 
impoverished communities could stand. The war had de¬ 
prived the South of its accumulated capital, reconstruction 
was loading it with a burden of debt. Hundreds of thousands 
of acres were sold for taxes. 

At first the native whites were divided into two rather 
bitter factions: the one following B. H. Hill of Georgia and 
ignoring the new government in the hope of a change of 
heart in the North; the other including Robert E. Lee and ex- 
Govemor Brown of Georgia, advising that the attempt be 
made to guide the negro and control the new machinery. 
Actual suffering and an indefinable horror of negro dominance, 
however, soon united them in a fixed purpose to establish a 
white man’s government. The first attempt took the form 
of terrorizing the negro, and was carried out by various wide¬ 
spread secret societies of young men, of which the most 
prominent was the Ku-Klux Klan. By methods running from 
mischievous intimidation to criminal violence and wholesale 
election frauds, alien rule was shaken off, first by one state 
and then by another. The very first legislature elected in 
Virginia was controlled by native whites; in Georgia, real 
alien rule lasted only from July 15, 1870, to January 1, 1871. 
In Tennessee and North Carolina, with the unusually large 
white loyalist population, the negro and the carpetbagger 
had influence, but did not rule. In the other states violence 
and disorder increased. A sense of power and of injury 
incited many of the negroes to brutality, and now blood¬ 
shed was not all on one side, as had been the case in 
most localities immediately after the war. Yet in every en¬ 
counter it was the white man who came off victorious. It 
became very soon evident that, whatever the statute books 
might say, the South was a white man’s country and that 
home rule would in the end mean white rule. 


ELECTION OF 1872 


429 

The Republican leaders were entirely unwilling to yield 
either the principle or the profit of negro suffrage. Grant 
used his authority as President broadly to preserve the 
negro governments by use of military force, and Congress 
conferred the broadest powers upon him. On February 28, 
1870, a law was passed placing elections under Federal control, 
and on April 20,1871, an act giving the President great powers 
for the suppression of the Ku-Klux Klan. By military force, 
the negro governments were maintained in most southern 
states, which meant that the North continued to rule the 
South. 

This condition began to create a reaction in the North. 
In Missouri the “Liberal Republicans” under Gratz Brown 
and Carl Schurz separated from the regulars and obtained 
control of the state, and the movement in favor of universal 
amnesty and the cessation of Federal interference in the 
South spread throughout the border states. Other elements 
among the Republicans, dissatisfied with Grant because of 
his disregard of constitutional limitations, his quarrel with 
Sumner, and his failure to institute a thorough reform of the 
civil service, and with Congress for its continuance of the 
war tariff, affiliated with those of the border, and, as the 
election approached, held a national convention at Cincin¬ 
nati. It was understood that the Democrats, who, led by 
Vallandigham, had agreed to accept fully the results of the 
war and the three amendments, would indorse the candidate 
of the Liberal Republicans and thus concentrate all elements 
opposed to the administration. 

The most promising candidate suggested was Charles 
Francis Adams, whose diplomatic prestige, derived from 
his English mission during the war, had recently been 
enhanced by his service on the Geneva arbitration. The 
convention, however, chose Horace Greeley, Editor of the 
New York Tribune , whose vitriolic attacks upon the Demo¬ 
crats extending over many years made him extremely dis- 


National 

coercion. 


The Liberal 
Republicans. 


Election of 
1872. 


43 ° 


RECONSTRUCTION TO 1872 


Causes of 

Republican 

cohesion. 


tasteful to them. Nevertheless he was indorsed by that 
party, still drifting leaderless since the death of Douglas, 
and he began an active campaign. The Republicans re¬ 
nominated Grant and stood upon their record of the 
last twelve years. The result showed that the war 
issue still dominated politics. Grant was overwhelm¬ 
ingly elected. Even in the border states the loss of the 
Liberal Republicans was more than made up by the 
negroes, who now, under the Fifteenth Amendment, for the 
first time took part in a presidential election in those 
states. 

In i860 the Republican party had been composed of 
many ill-fused elements, and its leadership was conservative. 
In i860 the North would have fought on no issue other than 
that of union. The cohesion of the party, for four years 
in strife with President Johnson, the rise of the radicals 
to leadership, and its continued popular support, need ex¬ 
planation. Its thorough fusion was due to welding in the 
fiery furnace of the war, while its financial policy, especially 
the tariff, belted to it with bands of steel many classes of the 
community. It had, moreover, become synonymous in many 
minds with the safety of the Union. It was but necessary, 
in the language of the day, to “wave the bloody shirt,” to 
rally tens of thousands to Republican candidates. While 
the North was ready to fight only for one supreme object, 
the war being joined, a constantly increasing number had a 
constantly growing program of other things which might 
as well be accomplished now that the opportunity presented 
itself. The great majority wanted the negro freed and wished 
him to have an opportunity, while a good proportion did not 
object if the South got a little hurt in the process. Further, 
the majority in the North were not content to overthrow 
Calhoun’s theory of state sovereignty and national agency, 
but were opposed also to Jackson’s idea of state rights and 
a minimum of national activity. By the establishment of 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 


431 


national banking, national currency, a protective tariff, by 
the extension of its functions in a multitude of ways, the 
national government was making the nation a unit, and ap¬ 
proval of this general policy made the North tolerant of 
many things. It required, indeed, the distress of a great 
financial upheaval to break the hold the Republican party 
had obtained over the North and, through the North, over 
the nation. 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 


Fleming, W. L., Documentary History of Reconstruction, con¬ 
tains material gathered from many sources, illustrating conditions 
in the South. For Congress: Johnston, A., Representative American 
Orations, IV, 129-188. Macdonald, A., Select Documents, nos. 
44-95, 99. McPherson, E. M., History of Reconstruction . The 
Sherman letters (edited by R. S. Thorndike), ch. VIII. U. S. 
Doc. Report of Committee on Reconstruction, 1866. For an intimate 
view of the administration, see Diary of Gideon Welles. The 
more important Supreme Court cases are the following: Texas v. 
White (1868): 7 Wallace, 700. Slaughter House Cases (1872): 
16 Wallace, 36, 273, 746. 

J. F. Rhodes, History of the United States, vols. V-VII, is 
uniformly valuable, and excels the majority of the special studies 
in their own field. Gamer, J. W., Reconstruction in Mississippi, 
chs. II-IV. McCarthy* C. H., Lincoln's Plan of Reconstruction. 
Rhodes, United States, VI, 1-50. Scott, E. G., Reconstruction 
during the Civil War. 

Burgess, J. W., Reconstruction and the Constitution. Cam¬ 
bridge Modern History, VII, 622-644. Dunning, W. A., Essays on 
Reconstruction, chs. II-IV. Garner, J. W., Reconstruction in 
Mississippi, chs. V-XI. McCall, S. W., Stevens, chs. XIII, XV, 
XVI. 

Blaine, Twenty Years in Congress, ch. XIV. Chadsey, C. F., 
Struggle between President Johnson and Congress (Columbia Univ. 
Studies in History, VIII, no. 1). De Witt, C. M., The Impeach¬ 
ment of Andrew Johnson. Dunning, W. A., Essays on Recon¬ 
struction, ch. IV. Fish, C. R., Civil Service and the Patronage, 


Sources. 


Historical 

accounts. 

Executive 
plan of re¬ 
construction. 


Congressional 

recon¬ 

struction. 


Struggle 
between 
Congress and 
the executive. 


Conditions 
in the South. 


432 RECONSTRUCTION TO 1872 

ch. IX. Hart, A. B., Chase, ch. XIII. Salmon, L. P., History of 
the Appointing Power, ch. II. 

F. Bancroft, Seward, II, chs. XL, XLII. Adams, C. F., Adams, 
ch. XIX. Rhodes, United States, VII, 74-173. Burton, T. E., 
Sherman, 172-226. For account of reconstruction under Grant: 
Fleming, W. S., Reconstruction in Alabama. 





CHAPTER XXV 
RECONSTRUCTION COMPLETED 

Economically the histories of North and South during 
the reconstruction period were as different as those of two 
separate countries. The features of southern activity were, 
first, the readjustment of agriculture to the conditions of 
free labor; secondly, the rise of new industries. The dis¬ 
tinctive characteristic of southern agriculture had been the 
plantation system. This was based on compulsory labor 
and the use of capital. Cultivation was by the large field 
system, and the slaves worked in gangs under the direct super¬ 
vision of an overseer. Many northerners wished to break 
up this system directly by the enforcement of the confis¬ 
cation act, and the distribution of the land in small holdings 
among the negroes. This policy failed of adoption, and the 
land, with the exception of a negligible amount, was left in 
the hands of its former owners or restored to them. The 
planters, who continued throughout this generation to be the 
governing class politically in the South, wished to preserve 
the plantation system as it had been. Circumstances, how¬ 
ever, forced a gradual modification. 

Realizing the difficulty of dealing with free negro labor, 
the planters endeavored constantly to attract foreign im¬ 
migration. The foreigners landing in the United States, 
however, found little to attract them in the southern offers 
of employment, when the northern mills were offering higher 
wages, and the West could furnish them with individual 
farms at low rates. The disturbance of public order, the 
unwelcoming social condition in the South, the absence of 


Divergent 
policies in 
the South. 


Decay of the 

plantation 

system. 


434 


RECONSTRUCTION COMPLETED 


Negro labor. 


Small farms. 


direct steamship communication with Europe, and the fact 
that the southern immigration campaign was poorly or¬ 
ganized, all combined to turn away the foreigner. The 
South had to depend on its own population to an extent 
rare in American history. The white population was re¬ 
markably stable, although there was some movement to 
scantily populated districts, as southwestern Georgia, north¬ 
eastern Mississippi, and the trans-Mississippi states. The 
negroes were moved more easily than before the war, when 
the planter had to pay a considerable sum for each laborer 
he secured. There was, therefore, a tendency for them to 
concentrate in those districts best suited to them. 

Forced to use the negroes, the planters started in 1865 
by borrowing what they could from northern bankers, and 
engaged their former slaves for money wages. This system 
proved unsatisfactory, for the negroes felt no responsibility 
and could not be coerced. The crop was in most districts 
a failure, and in spite of the high price of cotton most planters 
found themselves worse off at the end than at the beginning 
of the year. In 1866 a very large number resorted to the 
share system, promising the negro a certain proportion of 
the net proceeds of the crop. This was more successful, 
for it gave the negro a personal interest in the crop. The 
negro, however, was anxious to escape from the gang system 
and from supervision. In 1868 and 1869 many plantations 
were divided up, and each negro family was given a separate 
holding to work for itself, paying a share of the crop and sub¬ 
ject only to a general guidance. Thus certain features of 
the plantation system were very generally abandoned. 

In the meantime a further development was taking 
place. Poor crops, the heavy taxes of the negro governments, 
discouragement, and other reasons led many planters to 
offer their lands, or portions of them, for sale at reasonable 
prices. Thus the poor whites, who had lost little during 
the war, found it possible to buy small farms in the cotton 


CONDITIONS IN THE SOUTH 


435 


’ belt. The cultivation of the land in individual holdings, 
moreover, removed the social stigma which formerly had 
prevented white men from working in the cotton fields with 
the negroes, and many whites took up such holdings on the 
share system. Soon many whites began to pay a fixed rent 
in coin or produce, instead of dividing the crop, and became 
practically independent. The negroes, too, as soon as they 
could afford to buy the necessary farm stock, began to rent 
instead of share, and it was not long before many of them 
bought farms. The progress toward the rented or owned 
farm was hastened by the negro’s dislike of supervision and 
by laws which allowed merchants to lend goods to tenants 
on crop liens, thus enabling the latter to start out with little 
or no capital. The result of these changes was twofold. 

Poor whites began to break down the monopoly of cotton 
culture which had been held by capitalists employing negro 
labor, and over a large area small farms independently run 
began to take the place of the plantations. 

Undoubtedly the net efficiency of negro labor was de- Results, 
creased by the withdrawal of coercion and supervision. This 
was to some extent offset by the entry of whites into cotton 
growing, and by the extension of cotton growing into new 
regions, as a result of the use of fertilizers. It was not, 
however, until about 1880 that southern agricultural produc¬ 
tion reached the ante bellum totals. Under the new condi¬ 
tions, however, the enterprising and deserving, whether black 
or white, were given opportunities previously denied. Of 
those who still ran plantations somewhat different qualities 
were required than before the war, and harder work. A 
greater proportion of the proceeds, moreover, went to labor. 
Gradually the old planter class lost its grip of the cotton in¬ 
dustry. Many of its members went into professional life, 
tried their fortunes in the North, or vegetated on unsuccess¬ 
ful plantations. Southern agricultural society became more 
diversified, but to a great extent the class which had played 


Rise o{ the 
new South. 


436 RECONSTRUCTION COMPLETED 

so large a part in the history of the country, and had produced 
so many of its greatest men, became a memory. 

In the meantime the South was coming to depend less 
completely on its agriculture. The development of non- 
agricultural industries can hardly be said to have been a 
result of the war. It had been delayed in part by the exist¬ 
ence of slavery, but it had begun before the war, and the 
census of 1870 marked practically no progress over that of 
i860. During the seventies, however, it secured a strong 
start. The development of lumber began immediately after 
the war, and furnished much of the capital which the South 
so much needed. The exploitation of the iron and coal 
about Birmingham in Alabama began about the same time. 
Cotton mills began to spring up in the piedmont region, 
where the falls of the rivers were to be found, and where the 
poor white population could be reached and drawn in, 
hardly any negro labor being employed in the mills. The 
capital for these mills was generally furnished, half by the 
neighboring community and half by northern capitalists. 
The first superintendents and foremen usually came from the 
North. The poor whites, however, had been accustomed 
for generations to the making of homespun, and they had a 
mechanical ability which soon proved itself. The manu¬ 
facture of cotton so near the source of its production natu¬ 
rally resulted in some economies, and to these was added a 
saving in the price of labor. The mills were generally located 
in small villages which became economically dependent upon 
them, and laborers were unable to compel as good terms as 
those in the North. The southern states, too, were less 
active in passing protective laws, and cheaply paid child 
labor was abundant. This lowering of the labor standard 
gave financial success, but prevented the production of the 
finer grades of fabrics, for which skilled and therefore well- 
paid workmen are required. In the meantime the southern 
railroad system was changing as well as developing. The roads, 


LABOR PROBLEM IN THE NORTH 


437 


during the seventies, fell largely into the hands of northern 
capitalists. They, following the tendencies of that “Rail¬ 
road Age,” developed trunk lines running through from the 
South to the North, at the expense of the roads running to 
southern ports. Southern business tended more than ever 
before to concentrate at New York, and the South did less 
business directly with England than before the war. These 
tendencies were in the direction of lessening the differences 
between the South and the rest of the country, and bringing 
it into closer touch with the national economic life. The 
memories of the war, reconstruction, and the negro problem, 
however, were sufficient to hold it politically apart. 

In the North the labor problem produced by the war Labor 
was also serious. During the war itself it may be estimated th^North! 
that the labor of a million and a half men was withdrawn 
from industry for three years. For three years, also, America 
ceased to receive its customary supply of immigrants. It 
is not entirely clear how this loss was made good. Women 
worked more than previously. Many children were with¬ 
drawn from school to take jobs or work about the farm. 
Labor-saving machinery both in farm and factory played a 
part. It still remains true that one can scarcely account 
for the maintenance of the volume of production at the 
North until 1863 and its increase after that date, without the 
supposition that there was a general intensification of effort 
under the strain of the war. In spite of the scarcity of labor, 
wages did not at once rise to meet the increase in prices due 
to the depreciation of the currency. The result was the for¬ 
mation of labor unions of various kinds, which now began to 
take on their permanent shape. The close connection of 
the slavery agitation and the labor question secured for the 
laborers the championship of many of the antislavery 
leaders, such as Wendell Phillips. By means of strikes and 
other pressure, wages were generally raised, though even at 
the end of the war they had not risen as much as prices. At 


438 


RECONSTRUCTION COMPLETED 


Land and 
population. 


the same time agitation in Massachusetts and some other 
states resulted in legislation favorable to labor. 

The close of the war threw over a million soldiers 
suddenly back into private life, and at the same time 
caused a revival of immigration on a larger scale than ever 
before. The use of labor-saving machinery for farm 
and factory, moreover, continued to increase. Yet the 
expansion of industry was so great that even while the 
army was being disbanded there was a complaint of 
a scarcity of labor and the overemployment of children con¬ 
tinued and became a permanent condition. The greater 
number of these laborers found occupation in opening 
up new farming lands and in the more intensive culti¬ 
vation of those already broken. In the sixties the system 
of land distribution reached the climax of its perfection. In 
the older states cultivated land changed hands easily and at 
good prices. In Illinois and the surrounding states there 
were vast areas of well-located land held by railroads, land 
companies, and individuals, which was sold at reasonable 
prices and liberal terms as to payment. In Illinois, Michi¬ 
gan, Wisconsin, Alabama, Mississippi, and in all states west 
of the Mississippi River, there was public domain, which could 
be taken up under the Homestead Act. This latter land, 
however, was generally in regions not yet reached by the 
railroads and attracted those who had little or no capital. 
West of the Missouri were enormous districts not yet sur¬ 
veyed where the squatter could settle with no outlay, 
though with constant danger from the Indians. There, cattle 
driving and the cowboy flourished. These opportunities 
were temptingly displayed to the ambitious and dis¬ 
satisfied all over the United States and northern Europe. 
States and landowning railroad companies maintained 
agents abroad, published advertising pamphlets in many 
languages, and supplied the intending immigrant with assist¬ 
ance. 























































CONDITIONS IN THE NORTH 


439 


The whole North was in a state of flux. Native popu- Migration, 
lation was everywhere moving out toward the frontier, even 
from such newly settled states as Wisconsin. Its place 
was taken by migrants from the older states and by the 
European immigrants, who settled most thickly in the East, 
and then, leaving a comparatively small number in the 
intermediate region, furnished an important element in 
Illinois and beyond. Directly north of the Ohio, negro 
migration from the South was a factor. To the customary 
causes of movement must be added the fact that labor-saving 
machinery was beginning to reduce the number required for 
farm management, and purely agricultural counties in set¬ 
tled areas, even in Iowa and Wisconsin, lost population, while 
maintaining and increasing the volume of their agricultural 
production. The disbanding of the army, also, furnished a 
class alert to all new opportunities. 

Development was greatest in the immediate valley of Expansion, 
the Mississippi — in Illinois, Wisconsin, Iowa, Minnesota, 
and also to a less degree in Missouri, Mississippi, and Arkan¬ 
sas. Between i860 and 1870, two hundred and seven thou¬ 
sand farms were opened up in those states. The advance up 
the Missouri valley did not involve so many settlers, but the 
proportion of increase was even greater; the population of 
Kansas tripled, and it became a state in 1861, that of Ne¬ 
braska more than quadrupled, and it became a state in 1867. 

Much of the new settlement in Missouri and Iowa was along 
this stream, and in all, nearly one hundred thousand farms 
were opened up. 

A good proportion of the labor supply was employed Exploitation 
in the work of exploiting the natural resources of the country, resources. 
The adventurous sought to renew the scenes of California 
in Nevada and Colorado, which became states in 1864 and 
1876 respectively, and the Far West grew in population, 
though not phenomenally. In the upper Northwest, in 
Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota, with their untouched 


440 


RECONSTRUCTION COMPLETED 


Manufactur¬ 
ing and the 
tariff. 


forests and swift streams, the lumber industry was making 
rapid advances. In New York and Michigan, great fortunes 
were made in salt, while in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West 
Virginia, the utilization of petroleum and natural gas was 
turning whole rural areas into populous districts, served by a 
network of railroads and pipe lines. 

The development of manufacturing was prodigious. Six 
leading occupations employed in 1870 three hundred and sixty 
thousand more laborers than in i860. In the West, flouring 
and tanning, being based on native products, flourished ex¬ 
ceedingly. New machinery was invented, and great factories 
were erected in St. Louis, Minneapolis, Milwaukee, and 
other centers. In the East undertakings of all sorts grew 
apace, stimulated during the war by government contracts 
and nourished by the tariff, into a development somewhat 
unnatural. The tendency here was toward diversification 
and the manufacture of finer products and specialties. In 
New England the mills dotted the country wherever water 
power existed, for transmission of power had not yet been 
made possible. Many of the mill companies owned their 
villages, with stores and even banks, and their employees 
were much at their mercy. Already, however, in the seven¬ 
ties water power was not sufficient, and many industries were 
concentrating in large towns and cities on the coast, such as 
Fall River, to which coal could be brought by water. Here 
labor was more independent than in the isolated mill villages. 
The native population was employed to a decreasing extent 
in these mills, the main reliance of the New England manu¬ 
facturer being the Irish, English, and French Canadian im¬ 
migrant. The spread of manufacturing in the West strength¬ 
ened the sentiment in favor of protection, increasing the 
area which might be benefited. While there was constant 
agitation for tariff reform, the war rates were in general 
maintained. There was a horizontal reduction of 10 per 
cent in 1872, but rates were restored in 1875. 


TRANSPORTATION 


441 


This was distinctly a railroad age. The closing of the 
Mississippi during the war had developed the habit of 
relying on the railroads instead of on that river, and its 
tonnage decreased from 468,210.34 in i860 to 348,201.44 
in 1870. The Confederate cruisers had caused American 
owners of seagoing ships to sell them, or lay them up during 
the war. The advantage which the English thus gained, 
coupled with the fact that the iron ships now becoming pop¬ 
ular could be produced most cheaply in England, made a 
revival of the American merchant marine difficult. Far¬ 
sighted men like Commodore Vanderbilt turned their capital 
from ships to railroads. The use of petroleum destroyed 
the whaling industry by supplanting the use of whale oik 
Only on the Great Lakes did American shipping increase. 
Railroad construction, on the other hand, went forward 
rapidly. States, cities, counties, and individual farmers 
loaned their credit to help construct lines of local utility. 
Trunk lines between the Mississippi and the coast were com¬ 
pleted and improved, and after the war the long talked of proj¬ 
ect of a transcontinental line was pressed to completion under 
the fostering aid of national land grants and by Chinese coolie 
labor. In 1869 the Union Pacific was completed, and, with 
the laying of the first permanently successful Atlantic cable 
in 1866, it marked a decided step in the binding of the world 
together. Railroad building was pressed beyond the needs 
of the population, with the hope of building up settlements 
along the routes; 1177 miles were reported constructed in 
1865; in 1870, 5525; in 1871, 7760; in 1872, 6167. 

All these undertakings required capital. The occu¬ 
pation of new land meant tens of thousands of farmers in 
debt for the land itself and for its improvements; manu¬ 
facturers invested to the limit of their credit. While man¬ 
ufacturing was mostly carried on by partnerships, corpora¬ 
tions were becoming more numerous. Especially railroads 
were so organized. In general they were built on their bond 


Transporta¬ 
tion by 
water. 


Railroads. 


Speculation 
and credit. 


442 


RECONSTRUCTION COMPLETED 


Currency. 


issues and their stock, and in many cases a part of the bonds 
themselves represented a capitalization of future profits rather 
than actual expenditure. The country was prosperous and 
was accumulating capital, but it was spending more than it 
accumulated in enterprises not immediately remunerative, and 
it was creating obligations far in excess of what it actually 
spent. Fortunes were easily made, and their possessors in¬ 
dulged in a riot of extravagant and ostentatious living. Im¬ 
ports grew more rapidly than exports. In i860 they stood 
$335,20°,ooo to $373,100,000, in 1872 $617,600,000 to $501,- 
100,000. Much of this importation was of luxuries and non¬ 
productive material. To pay for it coin was drawn rapidly 
from the country, and although the mines were turning out 
great amounts of precious metals and the government was 
minting it rapidly, the country was forced to do its business 
very largely in the government’s paper credit currency. 

The currency remained in a chaotic condition. The 
premium of gold constantly varied. It always went up in 
the autumn when there was a great drain upon the East for 
money with which to move the crops. McCulloch at such 
times was in the habit of selling gold from the reserve which 
he had established for the government, and, by supplying 
what the market needed, reducing the gold premium. He 
considered it his duty to keep the value of money as nearly 
constant as possible. In 1869 Jay Gould and James Fisk, 
two New York speculators who controlled the Erie Railroad 
and many other institutions and were in close connection 
with Tammany Hall, sought to corner gold. They brought 
to bear upon President Grant every resource of argument 
and upon his confidential advisers every temptation of 
bribery, to reverse McCulloch’s policy and refrain from inter¬ 
ference with the market. They seemed at first to have suc¬ 
ceeded, and on “Black Friday,” September 24, forced the 
premium up to war-time rates. Grant, however, was finally 
convinced of the dishonesty of their purposes and methods, 


PANIC OF 1873 


443 


and ordered the disbursement of enough gold to stay the 
threatened panic. The administration, however, failed to 
recommend and Congress to adopt any comprehensive plan 
of reform, and the currency remained a constant source of 
uncertainty and danger. 

In 1873 credit became particularly overstrained. In Panic of 
September Jay Cooke and Company of Philadelphia, the 1873 ' 
most conspicuous financial house in the country, failed. It 
was undertaking to finance a second great transcontinental 
road, the Northern Pacific, a proposition perfectly sound, but 
the returns from which were too far in the future. This 
failure proved to be the signal of universal distress, and the 
country was soon in the throes of the worst financial disturb¬ 
ance since 1837. As in that case the panic but ushered in a 
period of economic distress from which the country did not 
recover for fully five years. Banks failed, great mill owners, 
like the Spragues of Rhode Island, went into bankruptcy, 
one fifth of the railroad investment of the country was sold 
under foreclosure, and a still greater proportion passed into 
the hands of receivers. 

The breakdown of the spurious prosperity which had The crisis 
tempted so many beyond their depth was accompanied by ruption" 
astounding revelations of official corruption tainting the fore¬ 
most men in the nation. The most important single instance 
was that of the Credit Mobilier, an organization which was 
formed to build and finance the Union Pacific Railroad, and 
which, it was now discovered, had scattered its stock at 
nominal prices among members of Congress to prevent any 
interference with its land grants. This scandal was hinted 
at before the election of 1872, and was made public by a con¬ 
gressional investigation soon afterwards. For the next four 
years scandal followed scandal, affecting every department 
of the national government, even the judiciary. The Secre¬ 
tary of War, General Belknap, was proved to have taken 
bribes, and was impeached in 1876; and in 1875 the un- 


444 


RECONSTRUCTION COMPLETED 


Indian 

affairs. 


Election 
of 1874. 


Samuel J. 
Tilden. 


earthing of the notorious Whisky Ring, which in ten months 
defrauded the government of over a million and a half in 
taxes, involved General Babcock, the President’s private 
secretary. 

Perhaps the most serious maladministration was in 
regard to Indian affairs. The government and the tribes 
were alike constantly defrauded, and some portion of the 
difficulties with the Indians during this period must be at¬ 
tributed to this cause. Sitting Bull and his “ Hostiles ” were 
constantly supplied with arms and goods from the surround¬ 
ing agencies, by which means they were enabled, from 1868 
to 1875, to strengthen themselves. In 1875 they began war 
and in 1876 completely defeated General Custer in the last 
great Indian victory. Thus the sting of military defeat 
was added to the difficulties accumulating about the adminis¬ 
tration. 

These revelations, combined with the financial distress, 
for the first time shook the hold of the Republicans on the 
North. In the election of 1874, the Democrats won control 
of the House of Representatives. This triumph was appreci¬ 
ated more because of the hope it excited of winning the great 
contest two years later, than for its intrinsic value, for the 
Republicans maintained their hold of the Senate and the 
presidency. In preparing for this contest the Democrats 
put aside the idea of alluring the discontented Republicans 
and chose for their candidate a thoroughgoing Democrat, 
Samuel J. Tilden, leader of his party in New York. 

The reasons for the selection of Tilden emphasize the 
entrance of new factors into politics. His claim to recogni¬ 
tion was based primarily on his activity as a reformer and 
administrator. The period of national exploitation was 
passing, and success would depend more and more on special 
knowledge, on mastery of details, on careful calculation. 
The population was becoming more dense, the increase of 
immigration was rendering it less homogeneous, and the 


MUNICIPAL REFORM 


445 


activit}r of the government was of necessity being extended 
to many fields previously left to private initiative. The dis¬ 
cussion of fundamental principles began to occupy less atten¬ 
tion, and public speeches became more statistical. 

Especially new to Americans were the problems of large 
municipalities. It was really only after the war that Boston, 
Philadelphia, Chicago, and San Francisco became large cities, 
and New York was not old enough to have solved the diffi¬ 
culties of a closely packed population. The questions of 
sewerage, of water supply, of street making and lighting, 
of rapid transit, of the uplifting of the slums, were all new; 
and the popular belief in the fundamental difference between 
European government and American was too strong to allow 
recourse to the methods of European cities. The lower class 
of politicians seem to have been the first to realize the possi¬ 
bilities of this new development. The enormous sums needed 
for the construction of necessary public works, and the pro¬ 
digious profits that might flow from franchises to public serv¬ 
ice corporations, they looked upon as unparalleled opportuni¬ 
ties for successful fraud; and the outgrown system of mu¬ 
nicipal government enabled them to secure the control of these 
new sources of wealth. In New York city there was the 
greatest concentration of opportunity, and the most shame¬ 
less advantage was taken of it. 

In that city Tammany Hall governed. Its influence 
was based upon the good-natured camaraderie of its district 
leaders, its charitable care for a dependent foreign popula¬ 
tion, a system of organization which had been developing 
for eighty years, and a total disregard of political and busi¬ 
ness ethics. At this time its leaders were William M. Tweed 
and Peter B. Sweeney. In league with Jay Gould and the 
Erie Railroad, they were able to control for all practical pur¬ 
poses the state legislature and a considerable portion of the 
judiciary. In 1871 this combination was at the height of 
its power, but during that year the iniquities of its leaders, 


Municipal 

problems. 


Overthrow 
of Boss 
Tweed. 


446 


RECONSTRUCTION COMPLETED 


National 

adminis¬ 

trative 

problems. 


Civil service 
reform. 


which had long been known, were proved to the point of 
legal requirement, and the gang was driven from power. So 
profitable were their methods that at an early stage in the 
investigation they offered a bribe of five million dollars to 
secure a halt in proceedings. A leading part in the popular 
uprising which brought about this result was taken by Thomas 
Nast, whose biting cartoons spoke a universal language com¬ 
prehended by native and foreigner, by literate and illiterate 
alike. The planning of the campaign, however, was largely 
the work of Mr. Tilden. He became identified with the 
cause of good government, was in 1874 elected governor of 
the state, and seemed to be a logical candidate for the presi¬ 
dency at a time when reform had become an issue. 

Although the choice of a candidate because of a record 
for purging municipal and state ills and a talent for the de¬ 
tails of administration was a new idea, it was in line with the 
trend of development. For more than half the time since 
Tilden’s candidacy the presidency has been held by men 
with such a record. Many of the same problems confronted 
the national, as the state and city governments. The war 
had caused a sudden expansion of business, and the national¬ 
istic policy of Congress had rendered it permanent. Never 
after the war were the annual expenses of the government 
less than five times as great as in any year of peace before. 
Business administration became an increasingly important 
function of the government. 

This increase in business was doubtless, in part, re¬ 
sponsible for the governmental demoralization under Grant. 
Already a remedy had been proposed. In the system of ap¬ 
pointment to nonelective offices, on the basis of competitive 
examinations, which had recently been introduced in Eng¬ 
land, Sumner and others of his set saw the annihilation of 
the spoils system and the possibility of equipping the govern¬ 
ment with honest and efficient officers. It was, indeed, true 
that the army of public servants had become so vast that 


CAMPAIGN OF 1876 


447 


personal responsibility was not a sufficient check upon forces 
of favoritism. In Congress, Mr. Thomas Jenckes of Rhode 
Island became the leading advocate of this basic reform, and 
from year to year introduced bills to put it into practice. 
In 1871 an appropriation was passed and a Civil Service 
Commission was established, which introduced the new sys¬ 
tem into a few offices. Although Congress failed to continue 
its support, and the reform leaders and President Grant 
quarreled, the movement went on under the energetic direc¬ 
tion of George William Curtis, the editor of Harper’s Weekly. 
In New York and other places civil service reform associations 
were formed. As was true of the antislavery movement 
and many other projects for betterment pressed forward by 
that generation, the crusade was given a moral tone and was 
pressed with a religious conviction. In 1872 it played a part 
in politics, and in 1876 it became a real factor. While the 
Democrats failed specifically to indorse competitive examina¬ 
tions, they committed themselves to remedy the evils of the 
civil service, and it was believed that Mr. Tilden would draw 
the reformer vote. 

The leading Republican candidate was James G. Blaine, 
who had been Speaker of the House, and had risen steadily 
in popular favor because of his sympathy with reform and 
his conciliatory attitude toward the South. He was op¬ 
posed by several candidates supported by the President, who 
desired a vindication of his administration by the choice of 
some close friend. Just before the convention Blaine be¬ 
came involved in certain charges of financial dishonesty 
from which he could not free himself, and lost the support 
of the reformers within the party. To regain ground he 
practically reversed his attitude toward the South, and made 
a telling and adroit appeal to the war passions which it was 
still easy to arouse. After a contest, the convention chose a 
“dark horse,” Rutherford B. Hayes, who as governor of 
Ohio had pleased the reform element, and who now prevented 


Republican 

convention, 

1876. 


44 » 


RECONSTRUCTION COMPLETED 


Election of 
1876. 


Electoral 

Commission 


their secession from the party. The main issue that filled 
the campaign speeches, however, was that renewed by Mr. 
Blaine, and the Republican orators besought the voters not 
to turn the country over to ex-Confederates and <£ Copper¬ 
heads.’ J 

By this time white rule had been restored in all the 
southern states except South Carolina, Louisiana, and Florida, 
the administration not having ventured to carry out quite so 
firm a restrictive policy after the election of the Democratic 
House of Representatives as before. Excepting these three, 
the southern states were carried by the Democrats. The 
border states, also, for the first time since i860, were solidly 
anti-Republican. In the northern states, the political effects 
of the crisis of 1873 had become modified, and the results 
resembled those of 1868, except that the Democrats offset 
the loss of Oregon, by the gain of Connecticut and Indiana. 
Tilden received a popular majority of over two hundred fifty 
thousand, but the Republicans consoled themselves with the 
thought that Hayes carried the loyal states by one hundred 
thousand, and that Tilden’s immense majority in the South 
was caused by the illegal suppression of the negro vote. 

From South Carolina, Louisiana, and Florida, there were 
double returns, and other contests arose later. If every con¬ 
test were decided in his favor, Hayes would win by a single 
electoral vote. The Constitution was not explicit as to 
whether the President of the Senate, at the time a Republican, 
or the houses of Congress, of which one was Democratic, had 
the power of determining the validity of the votes, and for 
a time it seemed probable that two Presidents would be de¬ 
clared elected and that the country might again be plunged 
into civil war. With most commendable self-control, the 
party leaders agreed to leave the decision to a commission 
appointed in such a manner as apparently to guarantee im¬ 
partiality. The Senate appointed from its body three Re¬ 
publicans and two Democrats, the House, two Republicans 


ELECTION OF 1876 


449 


and three Democrats, and five members of the Supreme Court 
were chosen, of whom two had been members of each party, 
while the fifth was intended to be David Davis of Illinois, 
who was as nearly independent as it was possible for a man 
in public life to be at the time. This attempt to secure a 
non-partisan decision was lamentably unsuccessful. Mr. 
Davis could not serve, and the fifth judge, finally appointed, 
was a Republican. Every vital point was decided by a vote 
of eight to seven in favor of Hayes. The Commission was 
hardly judicial in its attitude, but the more important result 
of obtaining an undisputed succession, however, was secured, 
and Hayes was peacefully inaugurated. 

The character of this contest made a continuance of the 
policy of “Thorough” impossible, and Hayes gladly aban¬ 
doned it, calling to his cabinet Carl Schurz, one of the Liberal 
Republican leaders. Federal troops were withdrawn from 
the South, Democratic governments quietly established 
themselves in the three disputed states, and everywhere con¬ 
trol fell into the hands of the naturally dominant whites. 
Unfortunately, while the negro ceased to participate in 
politics, the negro question continued to be a determining 
factor. The war had brought the great majority of southern 
whites to act together. Reconstruction had cemented this 
union at a time when it might possibly have broken up, and 
the unified effort to regain control of their state and local 
governments had stamped out the last remaining political 
difference. It became the cardinal principle of public life 
that the whites must preserve their supremacy by presenting 
a solid front to the negro. To the bonds forged by a common 
struggle and by common suffering were added those produced 
by dread of a common danger. The instant the South be¬ 
came again self-governing it became “solid.” Since then no 
Republican electoral vote has come from any state that se¬ 
ceded, and Republican congressmen only from those upland 
districts which had never been thoroughly identified with the 


Restoration 
of home 
rule to the 
South. 


The “Solid 
South.” 


45 ° 


RECONSTRUCTION COMPLETED 


Exposition of 
1876. 


Factional 

fights. 


Financial 

legislation. 


southern interests. With this solidity, came loss of national 
influence, as under a party system of government doubtful 
regions have the greatest weight. 

Nevertheless the restoration of home rule in the South 
meant to a considerable degree the restoration of national 
good will, and national feeling was undoubtedly stimulated 
by the great Centennial Exposition held at Philadelphia in 
1876, to celebrate one hundred years of independence. 
Planned upon a scale of magnificence before unknown, it 
exhibited the wonderful material development of the country 
and its essential economic unity. It brought the leading 
spirits of all sections into harmonious cooperation, and 
strengthened national pride and patriotism. At the same 
time the hearty assistance of foreign nations and their artis¬ 
tic exhibits tended to break down that spirit of isolation 
and self-sufficiency which had been such a marked feature of 
American thought since the Napoleonic wars. 

With the positive part of his program, Hayes was less suc¬ 
cessful than with the negative. He was sincerely interested 
in civil service reform and earnestly endeavored to secure its 
extension, but he lacked the force to secure adequate support 
for his proposals. The Democrats controlled the House, and 
the Republicans were divided between the “Half-Breeds,” 
who generally supported the President, and the “Stalwarts,” 
led by Senator Conkling of New York, who violently attacked 
what he denominated the “Snivel service administration 
of Totherfraud Hayes.” 

The main object of political interest, however, had come 
to be the currency question. The crisis of 1873 had naturally 
caused serious thinking upon that subject, and the result was 
a conflict as to remedies. The majority of the Republicans 
believed that one serious cause of the disaster had been the 
fluctuating value of the currency, due to the failure to re¬ 
deem greenbacks in coin. Still the party was divided, and 
in 1873 the Secretary of the Treasury actually issued 


FINANCIAL LEGISLATION 


451 


$26,000,000 additional greenbacks, to tide over the period of 
greatest stringency. A compromise measure, largely the 
work of Senator John Sherman of Ohio, was finally passed on 
January 14, 1875, which provided for the resumption of specie 
payments on January 1, 1879. 

To many, particularly in those rural regions where the 
“Ohio Idea” had been popular, the case appeared very differ¬ 
ent. The tremendous agricultural expansion of this period 
was accompanied to an unusual extent by the creation of 
mortgage indebtedness. Capital was more ductile than it 
had been before. In the newer regions farmers could borrow 
what they needed to establish themselves, and in the older 
districts they went into debt to purchase the farm machinery 
that was becoming a necessity. Many of these mortgages 
had been contracted when paper money was at a heavy 
discount, and its gradual rise in value had meant an increase 
in the burden. As before the Revolution, at the time of the 
Shays’s Rebellion, and under the Jackson regime, the more 
recently developed portions of the country demanded that 
the government use its power to cheapen capital. They 
believed that a generous issue of paper money would have 
prevented all trouble in 1873, and would now hasten recovery, 
which was coming but slowly. The strength of this element The “Green- 
increased, and in 1876 a national party was formed, popu- ment. m ° Ve * 
larly known as “Greenback,” which nominated Peter Cooper 
for the presidency. The ideal of this party was a money 
“manufactured out of material costing substantially nothing, 
redeemable in nothing else, inasmuch as the redemption of 
money is its destruction, nonexportable, deriving its exist¬ 
ence from the will of the government, authenticated by 
the official stamp, and regulated as to its value by limiting 
its quantity.” This party did not play a conspicuous part 
in the election of 1876, but in 1878, an “off year,” when party 
allegiance did not bind so closely, it cast over a million votes, 
elected many congressmen, and pledged others to support 


452 


RECONSTRUCTION COMPLETED 


Restoration 
of specie 
payments. 


Sources. 


Historical 

accounts. 


Grant’s sec¬ 
ond adminis¬ 
tration. 


Administra¬ 
tion of 
Hayes. 


Reform. 


its views. The result was that on May 31, 1878, Congress 
ordered that none of the greenbacks which should be redeemed 
be destroyed, but that they be returned to circulation. 

In spite of this agitation, John Sherman, whom Hayes 
had appointed Secretary of the Treasury, very successfully 
prepared the government for the resumption of specie 
payments. In fact, a short time before the first of January, 
1879, the premium on gold disappeared, and there was no 
longer any temptation to exchange paper for it. With this 
event, the financial disturbances directly caused by the Civil 
War may be considered to have ended, but the fact that the 
currency, and to a certain extent banking, had become 
national rather than state problems remained. 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 

On the reform movements: Curtis, G. W., Orations and Ad¬ 
dresses, I, 1-36; 261-286; 313-366; II, 1-86. Tilden, S. J., 
Writings and Speeches, I, 515-606. U. S. Doc., Fifteenth Annual 
Report of U. S. Civil Service Commission. 

Bigelow, J., Tilden, I, ch. IX; II, chs. I-III. Crawford, J. B., 
The Credit Mobilier. Harding, S. B., Parly Struggles in Missouri 
during the Civil War (Am. Hist. Assoc., Report, 1900, 87-103). 
Merriam, G. S., The Negro and the Nation, 306-361. Rhodes, 
United States, VII, 175-226. Story, M., Sumner, chs. XXIII, 
XXIV. Woodburn, Party Politics in Indiana during the Civil War 
(Am. Hist. Assoc., Report, 1902, 223-251). 

Blaine, J. G., Twenty Years in Congress, II, 317-333, ch. 
XXIV. Boutwell, G. S., Reminiscences of Sixty Years, II, chs. 
XXIII, XXIV, XXVI. Burton, Sherman. Dewey, D. R., Fi¬ 
nancial History, chs. XIII-XV. Dunning, W. A., Reconstruction, 
chs. XIX-XXI. Hart, A. B., Chase , chs. IX, XI, XV. Haworth, 
P. L., The Hayes-Tilden Disputed Election of 1876. McCulloch, H., 
Men and Measures of Half a Century, ch. XVIII. Rhodes, J. F., 
Historical Essays, 243-264. 

Adams, C. F. and H., Chapters in Erie, I-III. Cary, E., 
G. W. Curtis, chs. XV-XVII, XX, XXII, XXIII. Bigelow, Tilden, 
I, ch. VIII. Fish, Civil Service and the Patronage ; ch. X. 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 453 

Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties, 
II, 539-604. Woodburn, Political Parties a?id Party Problems in 
the United States, chs. XIV-XXL 

On railroads: Haney, L. H., Congressional History of Rail¬ 
roads , I, 234-264. Paxson, F. L., Last American Frontier, chs. 
XI-XIII. On Indians: Paxson, F. L., chs. II, VIII, XIV-XVIII. 
On panic of 1873: Sprague, O. W. M., History of Crises under the 
National Banking System. On tariff: Stanwood, E., Tariff Con¬ 
troversies, II, chs. XIV and XV. Taussig, F. W., Tariff, 171-229. 
Mark Twain and Charles Dudley Warner, The Gilded Age. 


Economic 

questions. 


Illustrative 

literature. 


CHAPTER XXVI 


Period of 
transition. 


THE CURRENCY AND THE TARIFF, 1880 TO 1900 

The period of the eighties and nineties was in many re¬ 
spects one of transition. The war issues had for the most 
part been solved, but the memory of them continued to be 
an important factor in politics. Certain results of the war, 
such as the permanence of the Union and the increased 
exercise of national functions, were well established. This 
very fact broadened the scope of national politics, for the 
currency problem which for twenty-five years before the war 
had been a state affair now became exclusively national. 
The war legislation, moreover, still gave shape to discussion 
of the tariff, which took the form of defense of the policy then 
adopted or attack upon it. In the meantime new conditions 
were evolving, and new issues forcing themselves upon 
public attention. In general these issues were of two kinds. 
On the one side government action was demanded upon many 
subjects; on the other there was an attempt to improve the 
machinery of the government. This period of transition 
differed from that between 1815 and 1828 in being marked, 
not by the disorganization of parties, but by their stability 
and effectiveness of organization. Party allegiance passed 
from father to son, and independent voting was generally a 
negligible factor except in the trans-Mississippi district, 
where the currency moved the farmer, and the Chinese 
question the Californian, to desert his party standard. The 
usual tendency of national parties to compromise by adopt¬ 
ing a policy of inaction, left the initiative on many subjects 
to the states. The legislative history of most movements 
begins with the states, then becomes national, and then goes 

454 


FREE COINAGE OF SILVER 


455 


back to those states which were slow in acting. Another 
noticeable feature of the period from 1875 to 1898 is that 
only twice, 1889 to 1891 and 1893 to 1895, did a political 
party control both houses of Congress and the presidency. 
National legislation was, therefore, largely of a non-partisan 
character. In this chapter, the course of national party 
politics will be followed with such notice of changing condi¬ 
tions as seems necessary to explain them. Later, the general 
unfolding of new factors in the national development will be 
traced. 

With the resumption of specie payments in 1879 ended 
all important discussion of fiat money, but not the agitation 
for other kinds of cheap circulating mediums. This now 
took the form of a demand for the free and unrestricted 
coinage of silver. In 1873 the coinage of silver dollars 
had ceased. In 1878 the Greenback element forced a 
compromise measure, known as the Bland act, through 
Congress, by which silver was again made legal tender, and 
the treasury department was instructed to purchase and 
coin not less than $2,000,000 and not more than $4,000,000 
worth of silver bullion per month. In twelve years nearly 
370,000,000 silver dollars were coined, which the govern¬ 
ment credit kept in circulation at a rate considerably in 
excess of the commercial value of the silver they contained. 
This, however, was far from answering the demand, and 
endeavor was persistent to secure the unlimited coinage of 
all silver offered the government. 

This demand was urged by a strong minority in both 
parties, which the party managers generally endeavored to 
quiet by making some compromise. The Democrats in 
1868 nominated a strong money candidate and adopted a 
soft money platform. The Republicans in 1884 declared in 
favor of bimetallism by international agreement. When 
such an arrangement was not forthcoming, the advocates 
of free silver were able to form an independent party of no 


Free coinage 
of silver. 


Silver in 
politics. 


The granger 
movement. 


45O THE CURRENCY AND THE TARIFF 

inconsiderable proportions. In 1880 they cast over three 
hundred thousand votes for a Greenback candidate; 
in 1892, over one million for the same candidate, James B. 
Weaver, running on the Populist ticket. 

While the expansion of the currency was the chief political 
object of this element, other issues tended to increase its 
solidarity. The problem of transportation had, in the earlier 
period, been one of creating the means of intercourse; with 
the phenomenal strides in railroad construction during the 
fifties and sixties, attention came to be centered upon the 
question of rates. American foodstuffs in the European 
market came increasingly into competition with those from all 
parts of the world, and transportation rates became of vital 
importance. In 1865 it was calculated that the 1,062,611 
bushels of wheat raised in Dane county, Wisconsin, were 
worth $1,188,163 home, the railroad charge to the lake 
shore would bring the value to $2,125,222, and the water 
carriage to New York, to $2,444,005. The farmers’ com¬ 
plaints at what they considered exorbitant charges were 
made effective by the rise of rural organizations. In 1867 
the Patrons of Husbandry were organized. The society was 
secret, admitting both men and women. Its object was the 
general improvement of farming conditions, and its granges 
or local branches combined social entertainment with educa¬ 
tion and cooperative buying. Quickly attaining a large 
membership, the granges soon began to influence politics. In 
the early seventies the organized farmer became a factor to 
reckon with in Illinois, Minnesota, Iowa, Kansas, and Wis¬ 
consin. In Wisconsin the Grangers secured control in 
1874 and passed laws fixing maximum railroad rates. This 
legislation was repealed subsequently, but is important be¬ 
cause it came before the courts for review. Chief Justice Ryan 
of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin found it constitutional 
in a very able decision, and this position was confirmed by 
the Supreme Court of the United States in the Granger Cases 


RAILROAD REGULATION 


457 


in 1877. In these decisions there was set forth for the first 
time clearly the legal doctrine that companies running rail¬ 
roads and performing certain other similar functions were 
public service corporations, and as such, were under the con¬ 
trol of the state in which they operated. 

The experience of the later seventies and eighties in¬ 
creased the feeling that railroads should be regulated, but it 
came to be realized that not rates alone were in question. The 
management of many railroads was both inefficient and 
corrupt. Fortunes were made rather by contracts for the 
construction of the roads and their supply than by running 
them. Their profits were drawn away by extravagant pay¬ 
ments to terminal companies formed by the railroad officials. 
The roads were “ watered ” by issuing stock far in excess of the 
cost. It was the attempt to pay dividends on issues thus 
foolishly and corruptly spent or not spent at all which in 
many instances caused the companies to desire high rates. 
The rates were on a financial rather than an economic basis, 
and in many instances they were not charged equally to all 
the customers of the road. Roads by discriminating in their 
rates could and frequently did ruin individuals and even 
towns. Where two or more roads served the same territory, 
rates were determined not by competition but by pools or 
joint agreements. Roads or steamship companies refusing 
to agree were bought up or forced into submission by cut¬ 
ting off their through traffic. The question was one 
of great complexity, and it was one which was national 
in character and required national legislation. In 1866 
and again in 1868 committee reports were submitted 
to Congress which asserted the authority of that body 
to legislate on the subject. In 1874 a report was made to 
the House of Representatives: “Upon the theory that, by 
reason of stock inflation, extravagance, and dishonesty in 
construction and management, and combinations among 
existing companies, the present railroad service of the coun- 


Railroad 

rates. 


National 
regulation 
of transpor¬ 
tation. 


458 


THE CURRENCY AND THE TARIFF 


Concentra¬ 
tion of 
population 
and the 
labor move¬ 
ment. 


Labor 

unions. 


try imposes unnecessary burdens upon its commerce. 
This report advised the building of one or more roads by the 
government to regulate the situation by competition. Eco¬ 
nomic causes produced a rapid lowering of rates, but a report 
of 1886 asserted that this “recognized benefit has been ob¬ 
tained at the cost of the most unwarranted discriminations,” 
and demand arose for regulations of increasing scope. 

Almost at the same time that the farming interests 
were becoming organized, labor was making its first important 
efforts in the same direction. By the close of the Hayes ad¬ 
ministration, manufacturing had recovered from the crisis 
of 1873, and began a new era of marvelous expansion. Steam 
was rapidly displacing water power, bringing with it concen¬ 
tration at points to which coal could easily be brought, as 
on the seacoast and at railroad centers. Particularly in 
New England the village factories failed to recover from the 
shock of 1873, and the population of many towns sank far 
below what it had been a hundred years before, while cities 
grew like magic. The conditions of employment changed. 
The old individual relation, where employer and employee 
were united by a lifetime of associations, was superseded by 
one more purely economic, particularly as the native Ameri¬ 
cans tended to leave the factories to French Canadian, Irish, 
and other immigrants. Corporations, often controlling many 
factories, began generally to take the place of individual 
owners. Laborers changed easily from one factory to 
another, and from place to place, while manufacturers 
settled disputes by dismissing their workmen and hiring 
others, sometimes even importing them from foreign 
countries. Both capital and labor felt the necessity of or¬ 
ganization. Labor unions had been formed in the flush 
times before 1837, they had been formed again and more 
extensively during the war, when by strikes and other 
methods they had forced up wages into some relation with the 
increased prices. In 1869 the Noble Order of Knights of 


THE LABOR QUESTION 


459 


Labor was founded, mainly for the purpose of securing legis¬ 
lation favorable to labor of all classes, and in 1881 the Ameri¬ 
can Federation of Labor united many of the unions, which 
had been formed by the workmen of particular trades, into a 
national body. In 1872 and in 1888 some of the labor leaders 
ran candidates for the presidency, and in 1892, led by the 
superficial similarity of their demands to those of the agri¬ 
culturists, they united with them in the “People’s ” party. 
The majority of the laborers, however, clung to the two 
leading parties, within which they were able to exert great 
power. In this way they secured much favorable legislation. 
State governments regulated the hours and conditions of 
labor, and protected women and children. The national 
government forbade the importation of Chinese laborers 
in 1882, and in 1888 that of any labor under contract. It 
is, in fact, true that during this period those movements 
obtained the quickest and surest success whose leaders 
worked within the old party organizations, rather than 
formed independent parties. 

Among the manufacturers during the war time, associa¬ 
tions were formed to combat the unions. During the seven¬ 
ties a much more important consolidation was beginning. 
The thoroughgoing character of American democracy, which 
gave such opportunity to every man, gave it as well to every 
dollar. Restrictions upon the use of wealth were few, and 
its, accumulation, not only in the community, but partic¬ 
ularly in the hands of individuals, was unusually rapid. 
This wealth, in the hands of the most active and enterprising 
men of the time, did not become, as in Europe, a conserva¬ 
tive factor, but rather intensified the speculative attempts 
to push on the development of the country. Its hold¬ 
ers saw that the greatest opportunities now lay rather in 
organization than in direct exploitation. The vast unities 
of the country, physiographical, and in the customs and 
needs of the inhabitants, afforded unlimited rewards to those 


Concentra¬ 
tion of 
capital. 


460 


THE CURRENCY AND THE TARIFF 


Business 

politics. 


who sought a host of customers and but a small profit on 
each sale. To take advantage of this situation many inde¬ 
pendent establishments were united under one management, 
either by agreement or by outright purchase. In either case 
the resulting organization came to be known as a trust. 
The purposes of the trust were to avoid the expenses of 
many separate managements and to abolish competition. 
Once established, each trust sought to agree with, or to 
drive out, others engaged in its particular business. Ulti¬ 
mately the control of prices would be in its hands. The 
trusts were most numerous in those branches of industry 
which controlled some one great national source of supply 
or some universal need. Earliest among them was the 
Standard Oil Company, formed by John D. Rockefeller. 
There quickly followed trusts to control sugar, whisky, 
tobacco, salt, and many other things, though they were 
seldom to be found in those industries depending upon a high 
degree of mechanical skill. During the same period railroad 
ownership tended to consolidate, the great Vanderbilt system 
being formed between New York and Chicago, and the Gould 
system farther west. The men who formed these combina¬ 
tions were primarily organizers and were among the ablest 
of the time. 

and The man who would rise out of the ordinary in the thirties 
went into politics; in the seventies and eighties such men 
went into business. Equality of opportunity gave unlimited 
possibilities to the strongest, and the “Captains of Industry ” 
showed the same skill in business at this time that the great 
national leaders had earlier shown in political organization. 
To the natural economies which organization brought about, 
many of the leaders in such enterprises sought to add the 
profit which might come from the overthrow of competition, 
from the monopoly of basic natural resources, and from 
the special favors which, as large customers or as part 
owners, they might obtain from railroads and other public 


ELECTION OF GARFIELD 


461 


service corporations. To men doing business on such a 
large scale the effect of public legislation on their private 
affairs was more evident than to the average citizen, and they 
were active in shaping such legislation. All their accu¬ 
mulated capital was drawn into political activity, both in 
order to obtain favorable legislation and for protection 
against the attacks of the agricultural and labor interests. 
The party managers had previously maintained themselves 
chiefly on the forced assessments of officeholders, and when 
after 1883 that source of income was reduced by the progress 
of civil service reform, they began to rely on the contributions 
of capitalists. Party leaders had to steer their course nar¬ 
rowly when the threats of labor leaders were on one side and 
the lures of capital on the other, and joyfully sought to enact 
any legislation upon which the two united. 

The campaign of 1880 was one of the least eventful in 
American history. The most exciting feature was the 
contest for the Republican nomination. President Hayes 
was not a candidate, but ex-President Grant was eager for 
a third term, and was vigorously supported by the Stalwarts 
under Senator Conkling. His leading opponent was James 
G. Blaine, and the conflict was so bitter that, again, as in 
1876, a dark horse was selected — James A. Garfield of Ohio, 
a friend of Blaine, and a man who stood for civil service 
reform. The Democrats chose General Winfield S. Hancock, 
a^rominent Civil War veteran. The subsidence of southern 
issues and the failure of both parties to take a sharply defined 
position on the rising economic problems, made the campaign 
largely a struggle between the rival party organizations. 
The growing power of organized labor was shown by the fact 
that California and Nevada, resenting the failure of the 
Republican administration to prevent the immigration of 
Chinese laborers, changed from the Republican to the 
Democratic column. The Republicans, however, gained in 
the East, and Garfield was elected. 


Election of 
Garfield. 


462 


THE CURRENCY AND THE TARIFF 


Blaine’s 

foreign 

policy. 


Succession 
of Arthur. 


The 

triumph of 
civil service 
reform. 


Garfield appointed Blaine his Secretary of State, and the 
latter embarked upon a comprehensive foreign policy. He 
aimed to revive and extend the Pan-American policy of Clay 
and Adams. He endeavored to make the United States 
the arbiter of the disputes of Latin America, and he resented 
vigorously the interference of European countries in any 
matters concerning either American continent, and partic¬ 
ularly with regard to the building of an interoceanic canal, 
which was at this time being actively pushed by a French 
company headed by Ferdinand de Lesseps, the promoter of 
the Suez Canal. Blaine was one of the few leaders of the 
time who conceived anything like a comprehensive foreign 
policy. He lacked, however, the necessary training, and the 
political appointees selected to carry out his schemes were 
most incompetent. Popular interest, moreover, did not 
support him, for the Americans of the time cared almost 
nothing for foreign affairs. 

In September, 1881, President Garfield died, having 
been shot by a disappointed officeseeker. He was succeeded 
by Chester A. Arthur, a friend of Conkling, who had been 
nominated to the vice presidency with the hope of conciliat¬ 
ing the Stalwarts. President Arthur had the reputation 
of being decidedly a politician rather than a statesman. 
The highest position he had previously held had been that of 
Collector of Customs at New York. He proved to be an 
excellent administrator and filled his unexpected position 
with dignity and poise. Mr. Blaine, however, did not desire 
to serve under him and resigned. The President thereupon 
appointed, as Secretary of State, Frederick T. Frelinghuysen 
of New Jersey, who reversed Mr. Blaine’s foreign policy in 
most particulars. 

Of much greater importance than the change in foreign 
policy was the impetus that the assassination of Garfield 
gave to the movement for civil service reform. Garfield 
stood for reform ; he engaged in a severe factional fight 


CAMPAIGN OF 1884 463 

with Conkling and Platt, the New York senators, on the 
plea of establishing better conditions in New York, and was 
regarded as a martyr to the cause. The next congressional 
election showed a determined public sentiment behind the 
movement, and in 1883 Congress passed the Pendleton Bill. 
This provided for a Civil Service Commission which was to 
arrange for the classification of the government employees, 
and the appointment of large numbers of them on the basis 
of competitive examination. The President was given the 
power to extend these rules over other members of the civil 
service at his discretion. The Commission also had large 
power over the civil service, being particularly directed to 
prevent the assessment of officeholders for political purposes. 

The next campaign resulted in a considerable realign¬ 
ment of parties. The Republicans turned to the leadership 
of Mr. Blaine. They received credit for the Chinese Exclu¬ 
sion Act so strongly demanded by the labor interests of the 
Pacific coast, and as a result they recovered California and 
Nevada. Their platform declared in favor of international 
bimetallism, and consequently no soft money third party 
played a prominent r 61 e in the election. The Republican 
party itself, however, divided on the issue of reform. A 
group of able men, many of them young, opposed Mr. Blaine. 
He had never satisfactorily cleared himself of the charges 
brought against him in 1876, and was regarded as “jingoistic” 
in foreign policy and machine-ridden in politics. In the 
convention they were led by George William Curtis and 
prominent among them was Theodore Roosevelt, a young 
member of the New York legislature. When Blaine was 
chosen, Curtis and many others went over to the Democrats, 
some temporarily and some permanently. These men were 
known as “Mugwumps.” Mr. Roosevelt, however, stayed 
with the Republican party. 

The Democrats adopted a platform resembling that of 
1876, boldly pronouncing in favor of “honest money, 


“Mugwump’ 

campaign. 


Election of 
Cleveland. 


464 


THE CURRENCY AND THE TARIFF 


Cleveland’s 

vetoes. 


the gold and silver coinage of the Constitution, and a cir¬ 
culating medium convertible into such money without loss.” 
Their tariff plank was framed on the theory that the tariff 
should offset differences in the cost of production in this and 
other countries due to higher wages here. Although this is 
practically the Republican position at the present day, it 
was not regarded as so satisfactory to the protectionists in 
1884 as the Republican platform, and Pennsylvania, the 
great protectionist state, swung from the doubtful to the 
Republican column for many years to come. To offset this 
loss and losses that might occur in the West because of their 
position on the currency, the Democrats declared emphati¬ 
cally for administrative reform, and nominated Grover 
Cleveland, who as mayor of Buffalo and governor of New 
York had made an admirable record as a reformer. The 
election was very close, depending upon the vote of New 
York state. The determining number of votes was so small, 
any one of a number of accidents may have been responsible 
for the result. It is claimed, for instance, that Mr. Blaine 
was defeated by an indiscreet clergyman friendly to him who 
described him as fighting “Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion.” 
Cleveland carried the state by 1149 plurality in a total vote 
of nearly one million two hundred thousand, and was elected. 

Cleveland was a man of strong character and individuality. 
He formed a cabinet of men for the most part not well known 
in public life, but who proved to be of ability and who suc¬ 
cessfully cooperated to make the administration a success. 
Most important among them were Thomas F. Bayard of 
Delaware, Secretary of State, William F. Vilas of Wisconsin, 
Postmaster-General, and later Secretary of the Interior, and 
William C. Whitney of New York, Secretary of the Navy. 
Cleveland made more extensive use of the veto than any 
other President. He vetoed a river and harbor bill, a great 
variety of measures of a special, local, or private character, 
and almost three hundred and fifty private pension bills. 


POLITICAL REFORM 


465 


In thus giving a check to the rather indiscriminate voting 
of public money as the result of good nature or logrolling, 
he contributed a distinct public service, and public opinion 
justified his method, in spite of a general disapproval of 
executive interference with legislation. 

The civil service demanded all his strength of character. 
As first Democratic President since 1861 he found himself 
surrounded by subordinate officials hostile almost to a man; 
at the same time he was subject to terrific pressure from 
Democratic politicians hungry for office after so many lean 
years. It was impossible not to make removals, and he 
made many, but he did not lose sight of reform. He sup¬ 
ported the Civil Service Commission in its recommendations, 
extended the rules over many branches of the service pre¬ 
viously left open to political appointment, and took vigorous 
measures to enforce the laws against assessments. His 
administration, in fact, marks the real triumph of that 
reform. 

The adoption of civil service reform by the national 
government was followed by favorable legislation in many 
states and cities. Such laws, however, depend for their 
efficiency upon the support of responsible public officials, for 
many methods of evading their requirements exist. In 1881 
a National Civil Service Reform Association was organized 
in New York city, whose object was to watch and make public 
all violations and to urge the extension of the system. A 
public sentiment favorable to the movement has been built 
up, and on the whole the vigor of the law has been main¬ 
tained and constant progress toward the purification of 
public service, national, state, and municipal, has been made. 
During this same period a system of secret voting, known as 
the “Australian ballot,” was widely adopted by the various 
states, with the result of diminishing the amount of bribery 
and intimidation at the polls. It remained true, how¬ 
ever, that the selection of the holders of elective offices 


Cleveland 
and the dvii 
service. 


Growth of 
the reform 
movement 
and of civic 
conscious¬ 
ness. 


466 


THE CURRENCY AND THE TARIFF 


was practically made by the two great party organiza¬ 
tions. The voter at the polls could merely choose be¬ 
tween two candidates. These party candidates were se¬ 
lected by organizations which were entirely unrecognized 
and unregulated by the law, and were in fact nearly 
always the choice of the party managers. Party caucuses 
were very often held under circumstances which discouraged 
the attendance of the ordinary citizens, and were often so 
managed as to render such citizens powerless if they came. 
Many began to urge that the parties had become actually 
such an important part of the machinery of government that 
their organization should be brought under government 
control, that it was dangerous to leave such powerful bodies, 
actually controlling the adoption of public policies and the 
selection of the most important officials, entirely extra-legal. 
A movement was therefore started to bring the party cau¬ 
cuses or primaries under legal control. Such laws were 
passed in Massachusetts and some other states, but little 
progress was made during this period. Nevertheless, it 
may be said that, on the whole, the movement for civic 
betterment, whose rise was noted during Grant’s admin¬ 
istration, became an established factor under Cleveland, 
and has since that time accomplished much in the purifica¬ 
tion of politics and in making public opinion sensitive to 
violations of political decency. In municipal politics many 
reform campaigns have been fought and many victories 
w r on. Although distinctly reform administrations have 
seldom been long maintained, each reform victory has accom¬ 
plished some definite results, and the subsequent relapse has 
never meant a return to conditions quite as bad as pre¬ 
viously existed. 

-partisan Although the Republicans continued under Cleveland to 

lation. control the Senate, and no Democratic program of legisla¬ 
tion could be carried out, many useful laws of a non-partisan 
character were enacted. In 1887 the Tenure of Office Act, 


INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT 


467 


which had never been literally lived up to, but under the 
shadow of which had grown up the custom of “senatorial 
courtesy,” by which the senators became practical dictators 
of the political patronage within their several states, was 
repealed. In 1886 a law was passed providing that in case of 
the death of the President and Vice President, the succession 
should descend through the cabinet, from the Secretary of 
State downward in order of the date of creation of the several 
departments, instead of going to the president of the Senate 
as had been provided in 1791. 

More important was the passage in 1887 of the Interstate 
Commerce Act. This was largely the result of the Granger 
organization in the West. The states had found that local 
regulation could accomplish little and demanded a national 
law. Bills were drawn up in the Senate by Senator Cullom 
of Illinois, who, as governor of that state, was familiar with 
the working of state laws, and in the House by Mr. Reagan of 
Texas, formerly Postmaster-General of the Confederacy. 
The final bill was framed by a conference committee and 
represented a compromise. It provided that all rates for 
interstate commerce must be reasonable and must be made 
public, it forbade discriminating “rebates,” and “pools” for 
the purpose of fixing non-competitive rates by lines normally 
competitive, and established an Interstate Commerce Commis¬ 
sion to enforce the act. This act is important constitution¬ 
ally, as it brought into full vigor a clause in the Constitution 
giving Congress powers which up to this time that body had 
entirely neglected. Economically it has had large results 
in reforming the conditions of transportation, and politi¬ 
cally it finally introduced into national politics a question 
which since that time has come to have the greatest signifi¬ 
cance. 

Of still greater political importance, however, was the 
discussion over the tariff, for during it the views of both 
parties became defined. During the eighties the growth of 


Interstate 

Commerce 

Act. 


Tariff 

discussion. 


Defeat of 
Randall. 


Cleveland’s 
position on 
the tariff. 


468 THE CURRENCY AND THE TARIFF 

the country resulted in a great increase in the revenue, and 
the desirability of its reduction began to attract attention. 
This naturally increased interest in the tariff which produced 
the larger part of the revenue. The natural method of reduc¬ 
ing the revenue was by reducing the customs dues. In 1882 
a Tariff Commission was appointed to consider the matter, 
and in 1883 the first general revision since the Civil War was 
enacted. While there was reduction in some duties, the 
new act was, perhaps, as protective as the system it repealed. 
The president of the Commission said: “ Reduction in itself 
was by no means desirable to us; it was a concession to 
public sentiment, a bending of the top and branches to the 
wind of public opinion to save the trunk of the protective 
system. In a word the object was protection through reduc¬ 
tion.” 

The Democrats were as always divided, but a majority 
favored lower rates, and in 1883, when they regained control 
of the House of Representatives, which they had lost in 1881, 
they replaced Samuel J. Randall, a Pennsylvania Democrat 
and protectionist, who had been Speaker from 1876 to 1881, 
by John G. Carlisle, who favored a tariff for revenue. 

This change marked a departure from the straddling policy 
which that party had so long carried out with regard to the 
tariff. In 1887 Cleveland devoted his entire annual message 
to the subject and so identified his party with the policy of 
reduction, that only four Democrats voted against the Mills 
Bill, which was formed as a result of his recommendations. He 
urged that the tariff constituted a tax upon the people, that 
by it more money was raised for the government than was 
necessary, and that a much greater amount went directly 
to the manufacturers than to the government. He pointed 
out that under its protection, trusts were being formed which 
prevented domestic competition and so kept prices unrea¬ 
sonably high. He argued that the labor employed in the 
protected industries constituted but a small proportion of 


ELECTION OF 1888 


469 


that of the whole country, and that even such labor would 
gain as much by the lowering of prices as it might lose by the 
lowering of wages. With a lower rate on raw materials, he 
predicted that American manufacturers could compete in 
foreign markets, and by extending their trade area, render 
themselves less susceptible to the influence of local financial 
1 troubles. He did not recommend free trade, but reform. 
“It is a condition,” he said, “not a theory, that confronts us.” 
The Mills Bill could not pass the Senate, which was Republi¬ 
can, but it was put forward as an earnest of what the Demo¬ 
crats would do if they secured full control of the government. 

The Republicans also, in the Senate, framed a bill, not with 
a view to passage, but to exemplify their policies. They 
argued that the revenue might be reduced and the tariff at 
the same time made more protective, by concentrating the 
duties on articles competing with those produced in the 
United States, and that this should be done. They appealed 
for support to manufacturers and to workmen, arguing the 
advantages of high prices and high wages. This appeal to 
labor distinguishes the protectionist speeches of the Repub¬ 
licans from those of the Whigs, and politically it was their 
strongest point. The Chinese Exclusion and Alien Contract 
laws, protecting labor from low-priced competitors, were 
really portions of this protective system. With the farmer 
their case was less strong. The old home market argument 
had little weight when such a large proportion of the crop 
was sold abroad. The protection of wool was the strongest 
direct inducement they could offer this class. Their ablest 
leaders, such as Senator Harrison of Indiana, did not deny a 
connection between the tariff and the trusts, but proposed 
to meet this difficulty by restrictive legislation. 

With the issue thus clearly drawn, the parties went into the 
election, the Republicans nominating Benjamin Harrison, 
the Democrats renominating Cleveland. The intense popu¬ 
lar interest is shown by an increase of about fifteen per 


The pro¬ 
tectionist 
argument. 


Election of 
1888. 


47° 


THE CURRENCY AND THE TARIFF 


cent in the popular vote. While Cleveland gained somewhat 
the larger share of this increase, the Republicans won over 
New York and Indiana, the only two states to change, and 
thus gained the election. More important still, the Repub¬ 
licans won the House, which they had controlled only once 
since 1875, that is, between 1881 and 1883; and, retaining 
a majority in the Senate, they were in a position to carry out 
their policy without compromise. Since 1875 no party had 
had full control of the national government. 

The Republicans had an elaborate and well-balanced pro¬ 
gram which they determined promptly to carry out, but 
first it was necessary to consolidate their control. Having 
loudly attacked the election frauds common in the South, 
by which negroes were prevented from voting, they unseated 
a large number of Democratic members of the House, 
chiefly from that section, and put Republicans in their places. 
For more permanent results, they looked to an election law, 
designed to protect the negro voter. This Force Bill of 1890, 
framed by Senator Lodge of Massachusetts, failed to pass, 
as many within the party realized the danger of reviving Civil 
War issues. It was the last attempt to control the southern 
electorate by national authority. More successfully the 
Republicans sought to render the method of doing business 
in the House of Representatives less dilatory. This was the 
work of Thomas B. Reed, of Maine, the new Speaker, who so 
extended the functions of his office as to earn the title of 
“Czar.” He practically destroyed the power of the minority 
to delay progress either by the usual motions or by refusing 
to vote. Moreover, he consolidated in his own hands the 
power thus gained for the majority. He controlled the calen¬ 
dar which provided for bringing bills before the House, and 
arranged long in advance the speakers who should be recog¬ 
nized. Under his leadership, Congress was able to pass an 
extraordinarily heavy program. 

For many years numbers of western states had been 


McKinley tariff 


47 i 


clamorous for admission. In the evenly balanced conditions 
of the parties, however, every vote was important; and in 
each case a new state was assumed to be of advantage to 
one party or the other. It had, therefore, proved impossible 
to authorize admission when the House was controlled by 
one party and the Senate by the other. Most of the states 
which were now ready were Republican, and Congress was 
glad to take this opportunity to strengthen the party, and 
to gain the gratitude of the West, at the same time doing 
; something which must sometime be done. In 1889, by an “Om¬ 
nibus Bill,” they admitted North and South Dakota, Mon¬ 
tana, and Washington, and in 1890, Wyoming and Idaho. 
By dividing Dakota, and by omitting New Mexico and 
Arizona, which were Democratic, they secured a decided 
advantage in Congress. While the first twelve new senators 
and seven representatives were all Republicans, however, the 
control of that party over the new region was soon proved to 
be far from stable. 

With the machinery thus ready, the Republicans addressed 
themselves, first, to the task of getting rid of the surplus. 
In large measure they considered it desirable to do this by 
increasing expenditures. Twenty millions were used in 
refunding the direct tax levied upon the several states dur¬ 
ing the Civil War. A still greater expenditure, and one des¬ 
tined to be a charge upon the treasury for many years, was 
involved in a dependent pension bill which raised the amount 
annually required for that service from about ninety million 
to one hundred and forty million. Increasing sums were 
also voted for the new navy, the beginnings of which had 
been made under Arthur and Cleveland, by their efficient 
secretaries, Chandler and Whitney. 

Chief in importance, however, was the tariff. Their bill, 
which was passed in 1890, was popularly known by the name 
of McKinley, who was chairman of the House Committee 
on Ways and Means, but it received significant changes in 


The “ Omni¬ 
bus Bill.” 


The dis¬ 
persal of 
the surplus. 


McKinley 

tariff. 


47 2 


THE CURRENCY AND THE TARIFF 


the Senate, where Senator Aldrich of Rhode Island had 
charge of it. The principal feature of the bill was, that 
duties on competitive articles were raised, being in many 
instances placed so high as to discourage importation, and 
thus actually diminish the revenue. On the other hand, 
the duty on certain raw materials such as sugar was abol¬ 
ished, the sugar planters being compensated by a direct 
bounty. Thus protection was increased and revenue re¬ 
duced. As the bill originally stood it contained little that 
would appeal to the farming interests or would tend to the 
development of an export trade. Blaine, at this time again 
Secretary of State, said that it did not provide a market for 
a single pound of American pork or a single barrel of American 
flour, and that he would give two years of his life for two 
hours on the Senate floor to oppose it. Blaine wished to 
amend it by providing for reciprocity with the other countries 
of America, a policy which was in line with his general idea 
of developing friendly relations with those countries and in 
accordance with the recommendations of the Pan-American 
Congress which had met at his call in 1889. His criticisms 
were supported by many members of Congress and much 
public sentiment in the northwestern states. As a result, 
the bill was amended by Senator Aldrich, to the effect that 
though sugar, molasses, tea, coffee, and hides remained on 
the free list, the President was to have power to impose cer¬ 
tain prescribed duties on those articles whenever he should 
consider that the duties imposed by other countries on “the 
agricultural or other products of the United States” were 
“reciprocally unjust or unreasonable.” This reciprocity 
provision was, however, made general instead of American 
as Blaine had proposed. Under it a number of treaties were 
negotiated by which “unjust and unreasonable” duties on 
United States products were reduced, but these were not 
long enough in force to show how far such a policy might 
ultimately be of benefit. 


REPUBLICAN PROGRAM 


473 


The Republican expedient of securing and expanding 
foreign markets by legislative and administrative regulation 
contrasted with the Democratic plan of obtaining them by 
freer trade and less legislation, and showed that the funda¬ 
mental party differences, found in the earliest days of the 
republic, were still at the bottom of the respective party 
politics. Cleveland, like Jefferson, would leave the individual 
as free as possible and use government to maintain that 
freedom; McKinley and Blaine would have the government 
foster private enterprise by beneficial legislation. The same 
difference is noticeable in the attitude of the two parties 
toward the trusts. Whereas Cleveland proposed to 
attack them by removing their support in the tariff, the 
Republicans proposed preventive legislation. Already 
twenty-five states had passed laws against them, and now 
Senator Sherman brought in a bill which after much dis¬ 
cussion and many changes passed and came to be popularly 
known as the Sherman Anti-Trust Law of 1890. This law 
declares “any contract, combination in the form of a trust 
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce 
among the several states,” illegal, and its promoters punish¬ 
able by fine or imprisonment. This was intended to appeal 
particularly to the western states, but it was ten years before 
its enforcement seriously began, and twenty years before 
the courts made its meaning reasonably clear. 

The Republicans also repealed in 1891 the preemption law 
of 1841 under the cover of which the sheep raisers of the 
western plains were securing vast holdings. This law had 
worked fairly well in regions where land had to be broken to 
cultivation by individual effort, but it led to fraud and mo¬ 
nopoly in regions where exploitation at little expense but on 
a large scale was possible. This was a western measure, but 
one which while it pleased some alienated others. Another 
measure adopted with an eye to the West was Senator 
Sherman’s Silver Purchase Act of 1890, which repealed the 


Anti-trust 

legislation. 


Sherman 

Anti-Trust 

Law. 


Silver Pur¬ 
chase Act. 


474 


THE CURRENCY AND THE TARIFF 


Reaction. 


People’s or 

Populist 

party. 


Bland Act of 1878, and provided that the treasury purchase 
four million five hundred thousand ounces of silver every 
month, and pay for it in new treasury notes which should 
not be legal tender. This act was intended to raise silver to 
the ratio of sixteen to one with gold, which had been estab¬ 
lished by the government in 1834, but which had ceased to 
correspond with the actual fact. It represented rather 
a sop to the western cheap currency advocates and silver 
mine owners, than the convictions of Senator Sherman and 
the Republican leaders. It was a compromise intended to 
quiet the agitation for free coinage of silver. 

No party had ever before adopted at one time such a 
comprehensive system of legislation, and the politicians’ 
feeling that action is dangerous was justified by the imme¬ 
diate and violent reaction that followed. The silver mining 
states were not satisfied with the Purchase Act, the North¬ 
west did not regard the reciprocity and anti-trust legislation 
as sufficient attention to their wants, the East was alarmed 
at the vastly increased expenses combined with the reduction 
in revenue. The tariff was everywhere regarded as an ex¬ 
treme measure and was popular only in those districts directly 
favored. As happens often when defeat is approaching, 
local causes cooperated to weaken the Republicans. Thus, 
in Wisconsin a controversy regarding religious teaching in 
the schools worked against that party. The Democrats 
carried the House of Representatives by an overwhelming 
majority and a deadlock ensued for the last two years of 
Harrison’s administration. 

Between 1889 and 1892 a new movement of unrest had 
been taking shape in the West, the successor of the Granger 
and Greenback parties. Prosperity during the last fifteen 
years had driven the frontier of discontent somewhat farther 
west, but it had gained territory by the expansion of agricul¬ 
tural population into the country extending to the bases of 
the Rocky Mountains and the development of mining commu- 


ELECTION OF 1892 


475 


nities in the mountains. Politically its power was increased 
by the admission of the six new states. In part, conditions 
simply reproduced those that had always existed on the 
frontier wherever it had been, but economic distress was 
aggravated by the fact that in the Kansas-Nebraska region 
farmers, tempted by a few 7 exceptionally wet years, had 
pressed into semi-arid regions which they did not know how 
to cultivate. A number of dry seasons found them in debt 
and left them bankrupt. Organizations called Farmers’ 



Election of 1892 


Alliances and Industrial Unions were formed in 1889. These 
spread rapidly, and soon found a foothold in the South, 
where the farmers were continually in debt to the merchants, 
who charged high rates for money. In 1891 a national 
convention met in Cincinnati, the title of “People’s” party 
was adopted, and a comprehensive platform framed demand¬ 
ing the free coinage of silver at the ratio of sixteen to one, a 
graduated income tax, a national paper currency to be loaned 
on the security of land and crops at two per cent interest, 
and government ownership of railroads and telegraphs. 








476 


THE CURRENCY AND THE TARIFF 


Election of 
Cleveland. 


Crisis of 
1893. 


This party secured control of Kansas and other states, and 
in 1892 nominated for the presidency James B. Weaver, the 
Greenback candidate of 1880. 

The Republican and Democratic parties presented the 
same candidates for the presidency as in 1888, and practically 
the same platforms. The Republicans lost heavily in the 
West, where the Populist party carried twenty-two elec¬ 
toral votes that would normally have been Republican. The 
election, however, was decided in the East. Here the Repub¬ 
licans lost nearly everywhere by the “stay at home vote.” 
Harrison was able, and a good administrator, but he was 
unsympathetic and could not arouse enthusiasm, and nearly 
every one was still dissatisfied with some feature of the 
Republican program. The Democrats about maintained 
their figures of 1888, won the doubtful states, and elected 
Cleveland, together with a majority in both houses of Con¬ 
gress, thus attaining full control of the government for the 
first time since the Civil War. 

Two causes rendered this an almost barren victory. 
First was the severe financial and industrial panic which 
came upon the country in the fall of 1893. The enormous 
industrial advances of the past fifteen years had led to an 
undue expansion of credit. Suddenly public confidence be¬ 
came shaken, credit vanished, and tangible resources were 
insufficient. Thousands of enterprises were forced into 
bankruptcy, and nearly all others were carried on at a re¬ 
duced scale. A period of hard times, with failures, and with 
the cities filled with unemployed, succeeded. The govern¬ 
ment was poorly equipped to deal with this situation. The 
radical financial changes introduced by the Republicans 
had made it very difficult for the congressional leaders to 
forecast the revenues and expenses, and as these two sides 
of the balance sheet are, by congressional practice, arranged 
by separate committees, the uncertainty of the estimates 
was even greater than it might otherwise have been. The 


CLEVELAND’S SECOND ADMINISTRATION 


expenditure for pensions proved to be greater than had 
been anticipated, and the occurrence of the panic reduced 
the revenue more than had been counted upon in framing 
the tariff. The result was a deficit. 

The second cause was the division within the party on 
the silver question, which now became acute. A great in¬ 
crease in the production of silver was accompanied at this 
time by a movement on the part of many governments, 
particularly that of British India, to put their finances upon 
a gold basis and discontinue their purchases of silver. As a 
natural result, the market value of silver rapidly declined 
and that held by the United States was becoming daily of 
less value. As the government was bound to redeem the 
notes issued against this silver in either silver or gold as the 
holder might demand, the strain on the treasury was enor¬ 
mous. To meet this situation, President Cleveland, in 
August, called a special session of Congress, by which the 
silver purchase clause of the act of 1890 was repealed. This 
drastic method of handling the financial situation recalls the 
“Specie Circular” of Jackson, and, indeed, Cleveland seems 
to have had in mind the “hard money’’ policy pursued by 
the Democrats after the panic of 1837. This policy of adopt¬ 
ing hard money at the very moment when the cry for soft 
money was heightened by the universal economic distress, 
not unnaturally led to a serious break between the small 
number of Democratic senators favorable to silver, and the 
majority of the party. As these silver senators, represent¬ 
ing the newer agricultural states and those interested in 
silver mining, held the balance of power in the Senate, the 
administration having passed this measure only with Re¬ 
publican support, the remainder of the Democratic legisla¬ 
tive program was endangered. 

The most important feature of this program was a tariff 
bill, and one was at length passed, in 1894. It was obtained, 
however, only by a series of compromises which made it far 


The silver 
question 
becomes 
acute. 


The Wilson 
tariff, and 
the Demo¬ 
cratic pro¬ 
gram. 


Labor 

troubles. 


478 THE CURRENCY AND THE TARIFF 

from the consistent measure desired by the administration, 
or designed by its author, William L. Wilson of West 
Virginia. Duties were lowered, certain raw materials, par¬ 
ticularly wool, were placed on the free list, and a duty was 
reimposed on sugar. As the estimated revenue was still 
below requirements, and as the sugar duty was one which 
would fall heaviest upon the poor, the same bill was made 
to include an income tax to apply only to incomes of over 
four thousand dollars. This law was subsequently declared 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, and consequently 
the government was continually embarrassed in its finances. 
A total deficit of over one hundred and fifty millions accumu¬ 
lated during the four years, and the administration, in order 
to maintain the practice of redemption in gold, was forced 
to contract a “gold loan” at a rather heavy rate, from a 
group of New York bankers headed by J. Pierpont Morgan. 

While the administration was struggling with these diffi¬ 
culties it was widely held responsible for the panic itself and 
all its consequences, though few grounds could be urged for 
such a charge except that the event happened at the time. 
The panic had not only aggravated the distress of the West, 
but had hit much more severely the industrial East. Here 
the new labor organizations had for some years been resort¬ 
ing to strikes, which often endangered and occasionally 
broke the public peace. In 1892 much blood was shed at 
Homestead in Pennsylvania. In 1894 a great railroad strike, 
originating among the employees of the Pullman Company, 
was declared at Chicago, which tied up traffic at that im¬ 
portant point, and threatened to result in serious violence. 
Governor Altgeld of Illinois refused to call out the state 
troops. Thereupon, President Cleveland sent federal troops 
to Chicago, on the ground that the United States mail was 
interfered with, and the result of his action was that the 
strike was broken. The President through this act appeared 
to the discontented industrial workers as an opponent, as 


CAMPAIGN OF 1896 


479 


his antisilver policy had made him appear to the discon¬ 
tented farmers and miners. In 1894 the Democratic ma¬ 
jority in the House of Representatives was lost, further 
party legislation was blocked, and the President was at odds 
with most of his party. 

Under these circumstances the campaign of 1896 began. 
The Republican convention met first. It nominated for 
the presidency William McKinley, the author of the tariff 
bill of 1890 and at the time governor of Ohio. The managers 
hoped to make the fight hinge once more on the tariff ques¬ 
tion. The convention, by a vote of 812§ to 110J, declared 
in favor of the gold standard. This led to a bolt from the 
party. Many of the Republican advocates of free coinage 
followed Senator Teller of Colorado in a secession whose 
goal depended on the result of the Democratic convention. 
That convention was strongly divided on the currency ques¬ 
tion. A vigorous minority supported the gold policy of the 
Cleveland administration. If the gold advocates had won, 
there would undoubtedly have been formed a powerful third 
party, for the currency question was the one of paramount 
public interest, and was bound to force itself into politics as 
had the Texas question in 1844. It happened, however, 
that the silver advocates captured the convention, which 
declared in favor of the free coinage of silver at the ratio of 
sixteen to one. With a platform radically new, a new 
leader was desirable, and was found in William Jennings 
Bryan of Nebraska, who captivated the convention by a 
remarkably dramatic speech closing with an appeal not to 
“ crucify mankind upon a cross of gold.” This convention, 
also, was followed by a party split, certain leaders known as 
the “Gold-Democrats” nominating General Palmer of Illi¬ 
nois and General Buckner of Kentucky on an independent 
ticket. This loss was fully made up by the accession of 
Senator Teller and his followers, while the Populists also 
fused with the Democrats. 


Nominations 
in 1896. 


480 


THE CURRENCY AND THE TARIFF 


election The net result was that the issue on the currency ques¬ 
tion was plainly presented to the people. From the seven¬ 
teenth century it had been a potent factor in American 
politics, but never before had an opportunity been given 
for a contest on it so devoid of complications. The cam¬ 
paign was distinctly educational. Mr. Bryan made a vigor¬ 
ous campaign, speaking all over the country, and the Repub¬ 
lican campaign was admirably organized by Mr. McKinley’s 
friend, Mark Hanna of Ohio. The result of the campaign 



was a complete change in the party alignment of the sections. 
Bryan carried all those states which could be considered as 
still showing frontier characteristics. He carried all the 
states voting for Weaver in 1892, he won from the Republi¬ 
cans Nebraska, South Dakota, Washington, and Wyoming. 
In the region west of the Missouri and excepting the older 
communities of California, Oregon, and North Dakota, he 
carried the entire forty-five electoral votes, where in 1892 
the Democrats had not obtained a single one. In addition 
he carried the Solid South and the single border state of 





















MCKINLEY’S ADMINISTRATION 


481 


Missouri, where the conditions producing the silver move¬ 
ment were still powerful. The Republicans, on the other 
hand, swept the entire North above the Missouri River, 
winning sixty-four votes Democratic in 1892, besides Cali¬ 
fornia, with Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, and Ken¬ 
tucky, border states solidly allied with the South and with 
Democracy since 1872. The popular vote was enormous, 
reflecting the immense popular interest. Mr. Bryan re¬ 
ceived nearly a million more votes than any candidate had 
obtained at any previous election, and his success in uniting 
for the first time the agricultural and mining interests of the 
West with the labor interests of the East marked him as a 
force to reckon with in the future. Nevertheless McKinley 
defeated him by six hundred thousand in the popular vote, 
and 271 to 176 in the electoral vote. 

The excessive representation of the thinly populated 
western states in the Senate left the silver element still 
powerful, and the Republicans promptly revived the coin¬ 
age of silver, though to the extent of a million and a half 
a month, only. The rapid rise of prosperity, however, 
speedily contracted the area of financial discontent, and 
unparalleled discoveries of gold mines and the increase in 
gold production throughout the world caused that metal 
to be sufficiently abundant. By 1900, therefore, it was 
found possible to put the country definitely upon a gold 
basis by act of Congress. In the same year a slight readjust¬ 
ment of the national banking law resulted in an increase in 
bank note circulation. 

With still greater promptness the Republicans proceeded 
to the reestablishment of their tariff system. Under the direc¬ 
tion of Nelson Dingley, chairman of the Committee on Ways 
and Means, a tariff bill was presented to Congress at an extra 
session. Mr. Reed hastened its passage, and it was adopted 
in 1897. This returned with emphasis to the highly pro¬ 
tective features of the McKinley tariff, but revenue needs 


The end 
of currency 
agitation. 


Dingley 

tariff. 


Sources. 

Historical 

accounts. 


482 THE CURRENCY AND THE TARIFF 

led to the imposition of a duty on sugar. There was pro¬ 
vision for reciprocity, but, except within narrow limits, the 
assent of both houses of Congress was made necessary. 
In practice this provision proved sufficient to enable the 
administration to prevent retaliation because of the Dingley 
duties, but not to obtain the opening of new markets. 

The Republican program of 1890 was once more in 
effect, but before the end of the century arrived it had be¬ 
come evident that a new era was at hand, and that both 
parties must adjust themselves to new conditions and attack 
new problems. 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 

Cleveland’s Message, Richardson, Messages, VIII, 580-591. 
Wallace, Harrison and Morton, 278-295. 

D. R. Dewey, National Problems . Croly, H., Marcus Hanna. 

E. E. Sparks, National Development. Stanwood, E., American 
Tariff Controversies, vol. II. Taussig, F. W., Tariff History, 155- 
283. Dewey, D. R., Financial History, chs. XIX, XX. Paxson, 

F. L., The Last American Frontier. Turner, F. J., The Contribu¬ 
tions to the West of American Democracy, Atlantic Monthly, Jan., 
1903. U. S. Department of Agriculture, Yearbook, 1902, 109-113. 
Buck, S. J., Granger Movement. Ringwalt, J. L., Transportation 
Systems, 229-233, 265-269. Ripley, W. Z., Railway Problems: Rates 
and Regulation. Coman, K., Industrial History (rev. ed.), 354-374. 
Adams, T., and Sumner, H. L., Labor Problems. 


CHAPTER XXVII 


THE SPANISH WAR AND DIPLOMACY 

When McKinley was inaugurated few persons imagined 
that the chief concern of his administration would be foreign 
affairs. Since the Napoleonic wars the United States had 
been so isolated from European complications that separa¬ 
tion was thought of as normal and permanent. The Monroe 
Doctrine had for seventy-five years represented an actual 
condition. The annexations of the forties and fifties, more¬ 
over, had rounded out American territory, and seemed to 
quiet the intrigues and disputes which up to the Civil War 
had unsettled our relations with other American powers. 
Nevertheless, powerful influences were at work to draw us 
out of this quietude. 

While the better known aspects of the Monroe Doc¬ 
trine, refraining from interference with European affairs 
and preventing European interference in America, had be¬ 
come well-accepted public policy, one side of it was far from 
realization. The United States had not become in any 
sense the leader of the American republics. England had 
sustained Canning’s policy better than this country had 
supported that of Adams and Clay. England held the 
greater portion of Spanish-American trade, and exerted more 
influence than the United States. Germany, too, by trade 
everywhere and by colonization in Brazil, was taking second 
place. Mr. Blaine, as Secretary of State in 1881 and 1889 
to 1892, had sought to change this condition. His policy 
was to make the United States the arbiter in Spanish-Ameri¬ 
can disputes, whether they were between different American 
powers, or between any of them and European countries. 

483 


International 

isolation. 


Blaine and 
the Monroe 
Doctrine. 


484 


THE SPANISH WAR AND DIPLOMACY 


Venezuela 

affair. 


He desired also to unite the American countries by recip¬ 
rocal treaty privileges, and to bind all together by means of 
a Pan-American Conference which should recommend these 
and other common policies to the several countries. Mr. 
Blaine’s projects resulted in disappointment, partly because 
of mismanagement, but chiefly because of public apathy. 
They were based, however, upon the growing need of the 
expanding industrial development at home for foreign trade. 
They represented one solution of the pressing problem of 
trade expansion. 

It is not surprising, therefore, that, although Mr. Blaine 
was somewhat discredited by his work as Secretary of State, 
his ideas were taken up after his death. His first line of 
policy in fact received its most daring expression under 
Secretary Olney, during Cleveland’s second administration, 
in the case of the Venezuela affair. This arose from a bound¬ 
ary dispute between that country and Great Britain. As a 
conclusion to a protracted negotiation, Mr. Olney asserted 
that the United States, in following the Monroe Doctrine, 
had the right to demand the settlement of such a dispute by 
arbitration, in order that it might be convinced that Great 
Britain was not encroaching upon an American power. 
While this might be considered a reasonable, if somewhat 
far-fetched, extension of the doctrine laid down in Monroe’s 
message, Mr. Olney’s further statements that the fiat of 
the United States was law upon the American continents 
and that existing European colonies on this continent were 
temporary, certainly represented new aspirations rather than 
established facts. President Cleveland supported Secretary 
Olney with a message in 1895 so vigorous that nervous 
public sentiment anticipated a war between the United 
States and Great Britain. The latter country, however, 
assented to arbitration, on a somewhat restricted basis, and 
the matter was amicably arranged, although, of course, 
Great Britain did not accept Mr. Olney’s general principles. 


CANAL POLICY 485 

The general popularity of the Venezuelan policy was in 
marked contrast with the response to Mr. Blaine’s policies, 
and revealed a growing interest in foreign affairs. 

This interest was further illustrated by the change of 
attitude with regard to an interoceanic canal. Interest in 
this project had declined for a time after the construction 
of the transcontinental railroads, which seemed to answer all 
needs. In the eighties, however, the discontent over rail¬ 
road rates drew attention to the advantage of establishing a 
water route that might, by competition, lower them. As 
such a canal must be constructed through Colombia or 
Nicaragua, neither of them able to finance or protect it, 
and would be used by shipping from all the countries in the 
world, its international position must be settled before capi¬ 
tal would be invested. The traditional policy of the United 
States had been for a canal of which the advantages should 
be open equally to all nations and of which the neutrality 
should be guaranteed by international agreement. The 
Clayton-Bulwer treaty of 1S50 with Great Britain had 
placed us under obligation to that country to maintain this 
policy. When, however, in 1878, the formation of a French 
company made the construction of a canal an immediate 
possibility, it was found that another idea had developed. 
Mr. Evarts, Secretary of State under Hayes, and afterwards 
Mr. Blaine, asserted that such a canal must be American, 
and under the control of the United States government. 
President Hayes said it would constitute part of “the coast 
line of the United States.” Steps were taken for the forma¬ 
tion of an American company to use, as the French had 
taken the Panama route, that through Nicaragua. 

This new policy was opposed by President Cleveland, 
and the Clayton-Bulwer treaty stood in the way. The 
French company, too, discovered difficulties, financial and 
physical, and as a result practically nothing was accom¬ 
plished during the nineteenth century. The problem, how- 


Canal 

policy. 


Failure of 

canal 

projects. 


486 


THE SPANISH WAR AND DIPLOMACY 


The Pacific. 


Samoa and 
Hawaii. 


ever, was one which could not permanently remain unsolved, 
and the attitude of the United States gave another indica¬ 
tion of its rising interest in foreign affairs. 

While American problems were thus becoming more 
important, a new field of interest was opening up in the 
Pacific. From the time of the Confederation, American 
vessels had frequented that ocean, their trade comprehend¬ 
ing the Oregon coast, the Hawaiian Islands, and China. 
These traders were followed by whalers whose chief purpose 
was securing whale oil, which down to the discovery of 
petroleum was widely used as an illuminant. After the 
Civil War this occupation gradually died away, but for many 
years it had kept the American flag in the Pacific. The 
whalers were followed by missionaries who were as daring, 
and whose influence, particularly in Hawaii, was more last¬ 
ing. To these general influences the United States had 
from 1791 added a claim by discovery to the Columbia 
River and the Oregon country. This claim had become more 
definite after the treaty of 1819 with Spain, which had given 
us all her rights as far south as the forty-second parallel. 
The treaties with England in 1846 and with Mexico in 1848 
gave us a fixed hold on that portion of the Pacific coast of 
America which contains the best harbors, while the annexa¬ 
tion of Alaska in 1867 stretched out an arm toward Asia. 
In the meantime the treaty of 1844, which secured the open¬ 
ing of “treaty ports” in China, and that of 1854, which 
opened up Japan to the Western world and marks the new 
birth of the Japanese nation, added prestige to power. 

In 1878 a treaty, almost inadvertently made so far as 
the government at Washington was concerned, promised 
our good offices to the government of the Samoan Islands. 
During Cleveland’s first administration that government got 
into difficulties with England and Germany. The United 
States interfered, and after a long and somewhat turbulent 
negotiation became a party to the General Act of Berlin of 



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PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC 


487 


1889. By this act the independence of Samoa was recog¬ 
nized, but its government was to be under the tutelage of 
Great Britain, Germany, and the United States. Thus for 
the first time we were drawn into the responsibilities of a 
protectorate, and an “entangling alliance” with two Euro¬ 
pean powers. In the Hawaiian Islands we had long taken 
a special interest. We had, in fact, asserted since 1842 
that practically, from their position, they came under the 
protection of the Monroe Doctrine. In 1892 a revolution 
in the islands resulted in the formation of a republic there, 
dominated by American influence, which immediately 
requested annexation by the United States. This request 
was readily indorsed by the Harrison administration, and 
the matter was pressed by J. W. Foster, who had suc¬ 
ceeded Mr. Blaine as Secretary of State in 1892. Cleveland 
opposed annexation, and upon becoming President in 1893, 
withdrew the treaty for that purpose which he found before 
the Senate. The question was, however, sure to be brought 
up again under McKinley. This gradual growth of Ameri¬ 
can influence in the Pacific had been the result rather of real 
underlying forces and of favorable accidents than of general 
policy. As a result, however, the United States stood in 
1898 in a position where the future control of that ocean and 
the development of the countries in and about it must 
receive its attention. 

The immediate question, however, which forced foreign 
affairs before the public was a revolution in Cuba. The 
revolution there during Grant’s administration had brought 
the United States and Spain several times to the verge of 
war, but a combination of the skillful diplomacy of Secretary 
Fish and accident had preserved the peace. In 1895 a new 
revolution broke out. The proximity of the island to the 
United States, the large investments held there by United 
States citizens, and the fact that many Cubans held United 
States naturalization papers, all brought constant annoy- 


Situation in 
Cuba. 


488 


THE SPANISH WAR AND DIPLOMACY 


Negotiations 
Detween 
United States 
md Spain. 


ance. Although President Cleveland, and after him Presi¬ 
dent McKinley, endeavored earnestly to enforce the neu¬ 
trality of the United States, the Spanish government was 
not satisfied and protested that the revolution would die 
out but for aid from this country. The United States as¬ 
serted, as it had under Secretary Fish, that its position gave 
it the right to insist that the Spanish government bring the 
revolution to a close within a reasonable time, or grant the 
demands of the Cubans. American public sentiment was 
particularly excited by the Spanish war methods. Es¬ 
pecially obnoxious was the reconcentrado policy, carried out 
by General Weyler, of concentrating the population in cer¬ 
tain centers and then devastating the surrounding planta¬ 
tions in order to prevent the insurrectionary bands from 
living on the country. The most objectionable features of 
this policy resulted from the inability of the Spanish govern¬ 
ment properly to maintain the people in the reconcentrado 
camps, and its unwillingness to admit relief from the United 
States. 

The United States would probably have intervened in 
the autumn of 1897, but the Liberal party in Spain came to 
power under Senor Segasta and promised to satisfy our 
government if only time were given it. Its intentions seem 
to have been pacific, and it is probable that it desired peace 
even at the expense of the cession of the island to the United 
States. Spanish public sentiment, however, was less yield¬ 
ing, and surrender might have meant the fall not only of the 
ministry but of the dynasty. In January, 1898, a letter of 
the Spanish minister at Washington, Senor de Lome, attack¬ 
ing President McKinley, was made public. Soon after Sena¬ 
tor Proctor of Vermont visited the island and reported an 
intolerable condition of affairs. The press of both coun¬ 
tries continually fanned the war spirit. In the midst of 
this high feeling, the United States battleship Maine was 
sent to Havana, ostensibly on a friendly visit, but really to 


THE SPANISH WAR 


489 


show the seriousness of our intentions. On February 15, 

1898, this vessel was blown up The American people believed 
that this was the work of the Spanish government, and 
public sentiment blazed into a call for war. On March 27 
the United States government sent an ultimatum, demanding, 
together with other things, immediate amnesty, to be followed 
by negotiations conducted through President McKinley. The 
Spanish government was anxious to accede to these demands, 
and did so in practically all points except putting the nego¬ 
tiations in the hands of the President. It, however, assured 
General Woodford, the United States minister at Madrid, 
that Spain was willing to make such terms as the United 
States demanded. President McKinley still desired peace, 
but Congress was for war and was supported by public sen¬ 
timent. Many of those well informed doubted whether 
Spanish public sentiment would allow that government to 
carry out its promises. 

On April n President McKinley sent in a message recom- Outbreak of 
mending forcible intervention. Congress decided not only to war * 
intervene, but also to recognize Cuban independence, al¬ 
though no fixed government could be found to represent it. 

This recognition afterwards tied the hands of the United 
States during the peace negotiations by preventing annexa¬ 
tion, which for a hundred years our leading statesmen had 
regarded as the ultimate destiny of the island. The action 
of Congress was immediately followed by war with Spain. 

The war was quick and decisive. Cuba was promptly War. 
blockaded. A fleet from Spain under Admiral Cervera broke 
through the blockade and entered Santiago. Its attempt to 
leave that port, however, resulted in its defeat and capture 
by the American fleet under Admirals Sampson and Schley 
at the battle of Santiago, July 3. In the meantime an 
army under General Shafter had been landed near Santiago, 
a conspicuous portion of which consisted of the “Rough 
Rider ” regiment, raised by Colonel Roosevelt, who resigned 


490 


THE SPANISH WAR AND DIPLOMACY 


Peace. 


his post as Assistant Secretary of the Navy to take part in 
the war. On July 17 the city of Santiago was captured. 
A fortnight afterwards an army under General Miles began 
the occupation of the island of Porto Rico. It happened 
that when the war broke out, Spain was contending also 
with a revolution in the Philippine Islands. An American 
fleet had been assembled in Asiatic waters under Admiral 
Dewey, and on May 1, in the dashing victory of Manila 
Bay, he destroyed the Spanish fleet operating in the islands. 
American forces were soon landed, and in cooperation with 
Aguinaldo, the leader of the Filipinos, attacked Manila. 

On July 22 Spain indicated her willingness to treat for 
peace. President McKinley appointed a Peace Commission 
headed by William R. Day of Ohio, who in April had been 
appointed to succeed John Sherman as Secretary of State. 
The Commission met the Spanish commissioners at Paris 
and on December 10 a treaty was signed. Spain relin¬ 
quished all its claims to Cuba, passing over the occupation 
to the United States, the intention of the United States 
being to turn the island over to its own revolutionary gov¬ 
ernment. All other Spanish possessions in America were 
ceded to the United States, together with Guam, an island 
of the Ladrones group in the Pacific. In addition Spain 
ceded the Philippines on the payment of twenty million 
dollars. The cession of the West Indian islands was a 
natural result of the war; the fate of Cuba was determined 
by the action of Congress in recognizing its independence; the 
cession of Guam to be used as a coaling station was not 
surprising; but the cession of the Philippines marked a 
new departure in United States policy. They were remote, 
were well populated by peoples alien in race and language, 
and could not be expected to become a field for the expan¬ 
sion of the American people, although it was hoped that 
capital and trade might find openings in them. President 
McKinley was in August undetermined as to the wisdom of 


RESULTS OF THE WAR 


491 


taking the archipelago. Strong pressure, both religious and 
commercial, was brought to bear, however, and there was 
a fear that if we did not take them Germany would. The 
treaty marked a change in American policy, not only in 
taking these islands, but in providing that the status of 
their inhabitants, as well as of those of the other cessions, 
be left to the determination of Congress. It had been cus¬ 
tomary to incorporate annexed territory into the United 
States, making its regular inhabitants citizens. 

The future of these annexed territories required con- imperialism, 
gressional action. The occupation of Cuba under General 
Leonard Wood lasted until May 20, 1901, when the control 
of the island was turned over to its own government. Cer¬ 
tain conditions, however, were imposed by what is known 
as the Platt Amendment, which were incorporated in the 
treaty of 1903. These were intended to prevent the repub¬ 
lic from falling under European influences, to provide for 
the sanitation of Cuban cities, from which yellow fever 
had so often spread to the United States, and to secure 
naval stations to the United States. In the Philippines the 
natives were as little willing to recognize United States as 
Spanish authority. For two years they resisted under the 
lead of Aguinaldo, and it was not until 1902 that peace was 
effectually established. In the meantime Congress had been 
discussing the question of civil government for the various 
new possessions. In 1900 a government on the territorial 
plan was established in Porto Rico. The Philippines were 
left until 1902 under the control of the President, who in 1900 
appointed Judge William Howard Taft of Ohio as Governor. 

In the case of both regions special tariffs were established, 
with the difference that Porto Rico was ultimately to have 
free trade with the United States, while in the case of the 
Philippines duties were to be permanently collected on goods 
sent from the islands to the United States, though they 
were lower than those on foreign imports. The act of 


49 2 


THE SPANISH WAR AND DIPLOMACY 


1902 for the permanent organization of the Philippines, 
moreover, though it extended the other constitutional 
guarantees of personal liberty to the islands and provided 
for a legislative assembly, did not provide for jury trial or 
the right to bear arms. Taking it as a whole, therefore, 
this legislation placed the Philippines in the rank of a colony 
and not of a coequal part of the United States. The action 
of Congress in thus making rules to govern territory abso¬ 



lutely without regard for the restrictions placed on its power 
by the Constitution was contrary to the theory involved 
in the Dred Scott decision. In 1901 the Supreme Court, in 
what are known as the Insular Cases, sustained Congress 
and practically reversed that decision. In the meantime 
the government was promoting the development of the 
islands, improving the sanitation of the cities, transportation, 
and particularly education. So successful were the methods 
employed, that by 1912 English was as commonly used as 
Spanish had been previously. In 1899 the United States 



















UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 


493 


came into the possession of another colony by an agree¬ 
ment with Great Britain and Germany, in accordance with 
which the independence of the Samoan Islands was abrogated 
and the islands divided between Germany and the United 
States. In 1898 Hawaii had been incorporated into the 
United States by joint resolution as in the case of Texas, 
and numbers of small islands in the Pacific, such as Midway 
and Wake, were occupied as coaling and cable stations. 

In the midst of these events came the election of 1900. 
To many the adoption of a colonial policy and the waging of 
war in the Philippines for conquest seemed an abandonment 
of the traditional principles of equality and self-government 
upon which our liberty was based. They not only believed 
that the Filipinos should be let alone for their own sake, 
but they feared that the extension of the power of the execu¬ 
tive and of Congress would be reflected in this country. The 
Democrats took up this attack on Imperialism and again 
nominated Mr. Bryan for the presidency. The Republi¬ 
cans indorsed the policy of the administration and renomi¬ 
nated Mr. McKinley, joining with him, as candidate for the 
vice presidency, Colonel Roosevelt, whose war reputation 
had already won him the governorship of New York. The 
overwhelming success of President McKinley showed that 
the people at large were not alarmed at the fears of the 
Anti-Imperialists, although it was doubtless in part due 
to continued distrust of Mr. Bryan’s financial views. 

The Spanish War and the accessions of territory which 
it brought involved important changes in the relations of the 
United States with the rest of the world. The diplomacy of 
the five years following was more important than that of any 
other period after the annunciation of the Monroe Doctrine. 
Fortunately the direction of our foreign relations at this time 
fell to a man probably better fitted for the task by training 
and experience than any other American since John Quincy 
Adams. John Hay began his public life as private secretary 


Election of 
1900. 


Secretary 

Hay. 


494 


THE SPANISH WAR AND DIPLOMACY 


Attitude of 
Europe. 


to President Lincoln. He had many years of experience 
abroad, both in diplomatic positions and as a private citizen. 
President McKinley appointed him Ambassador to Great 
Britain in 1897, and in 1898 made him Secretary of State. 
The holder of the latter position is usually a man of political 
influence, and serves, under the President, as political head 
of the administration. Mr. Hay devoted himself, however, 
exclusively to diplomatic affairs. He served until 1905. 
Under President McKinley he had practically a free hand in 
diplomacy. After the succession of Mr. Roosevelt in 1901, 
Mr. Hay continued tc shape the general policy of the govern¬ 
ment, although the President assumed the direction of par¬ 
ticular questions. 

The emergence of the United States as a world power at 
first created alarm and dislike among the European powers, 
with the exception of England. France was heavily inter¬ 
ested in Spanish bonds, and Germany was anxious to secure 
colonies and had probably expected to buy the Philippines. 
Other countries were alarmed by the rapid inroads of Ameri¬ 
can trade which followed the economic recovery of the late 
nineties. While Americans complained because the trusts 
sold goods abroad cheaper than at home, foreign countries 
feared that this “dumping” would destroy their home in¬ 
dustries. New York began to be a market for foreign bond 
issues, and the financial relations of Europe and America 
bid fair to become reversed. The American “invasion” was 
in 1898 and 1899 a topic for international conferences, and 
it seemed likely that we would become the object of inter¬ 
national antagonism. This virulent “anti-Americanism,” 
however, was short-lived. The “dumping” of American 
products into the European markets was to a considerable ex¬ 
tent a temporary phenomenon, due to the great accumula¬ 
tions in the hands of the trusts, so many of which had 
been founded in 1898 and 1899. Soon American production 
and consumption reached a better balance, and the Ameri- 


UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 


495 


can invasion ceased to be so menacing. Moreover, if the 
United States wished to play a part in world politics, it was 
obviously able to do so. It was better policy to cultivate 
friendly than unfriendly relations with it. The Emperor of 
Germany in particular fostered this favorable reaction. He 
sent his brother Prince Henry of Prussia to visit the United 
States in 1902, ordered a racing yacht to be built in America, 
which was christened by Miss Alice Roosevelt, daughter of 
President Roosevelt, and made provision for a Germanic mu¬ 
seum at Harvard University, and for exchange professorships 
between German and American universities. France followed, • 
sending in 1902 a distinguished delegation to assist in the un¬ 
veiling of a statue at Washington to General Rochambeau, 
commander of the French forces in the American Revolution, 
and in other ways promoting friendly sentiments and 
intercourse. 

England had been friendly throughout, welcoming the 
advance into world politics of a new nation of kindred blood 
and law and speaking the same language. Her international 
position was at the time described by Lord Salisbury as one 
of “splendid isolation,” but with the advent of the Boer 
War in 1900 her isolation seemed more dangerous than 
splendid. This cordiality between the United States and 
Great Britain was an unusual experience, for distrust and 
bickering had marked their relations for the greater part of 
the time from the Revolution. It greatly facilitated the 
settlement of outstanding questions between the two coun¬ 
tries, although in many cases England was forced to insist 
strongly upon her position because her great colony Canada 
was involved and would brook no slighting of her interests. 
English relations, however, were difficult, for many in that 
country wished the friendliness between the two countries 
to materialize into an alliance, and there was danger that 
the United States might be drawn from its traditional 
policy of avoiding foreign entanglements. By skillful diplo- 


Position 

England 


496 THE SPANISH WAR AND DIPLOMACY 


United 
States and 
Europe. 


United 
States and 
Pan-America. 


macy this danger was averted, while at the same time many 
long-standing problems, such as the Alaska boundary, were 
settled satisfactorily. 

On the part of the United States an appreciation of its 
new position is shown by the creation in 1897 of the diplo¬ 
matic grade of ambassador. Up to this time our highest 
representatives abroad had been ministers plenipotentiary. 
Secretary Hay showed a disposition to take part in all inter¬ 
national conferences for the discussion of world-wide prob¬ 
lems. Particularly the United States was conspicuous in 
the Hague Conference of 1899 for the promotion of universal 
peace, and in the formation of the permanent court of arbi¬ 
tration at The Hague. This was no new policy, for the 
United States had always shared in the discussion of non¬ 
political international questions, and had always been the 
leading advocate of arbitration and the foremost in the use 
of it. Its position, however, was now more powerful and 
its influence greater. In a note of 1902 on the treatment 
of Jews in Roumania, Secretary Hay indicated that the 
question of immigration might give the United States the 
right to interfere, or at least protest, with regard to Euro¬ 
pean conditions. He did not, however, press the matter, 
and effectually maintained our traditional position of non¬ 
intervention in disputes peculiarly European. 

The corresponding position, that European powers 
should keep out of American affairs, was vigorously main¬ 
tained. The most serious question that arose concerned the 
collection of debts due by Spanish-American powers to 
Europeans. Professor Drago of Argentina urged the view 
that private debts should not be collected by national power. 
The United States was not willing to support this doctrine, 
but nevertheless feared the effects of forcible intervention 
by European powers. It used its influence in some cases to 
secure payment, in others to have claims submitted to arbi¬ 
tration, and in the case of the republic of Santo Domingo 


THE PANAMA CANAL 


497 


assumed the administration of the public revenues and the 
payment of the creditors. Secretary Hay did not make 
much progress toward the creation of Pan-American co¬ 
operation. His successor, Secretary Root, however, inter¬ 
ested himself in this matter, and Pan-American conferences 
have now become regular and of increasing importance. 

The acquisition of territory in the Pacific rendered the 
necessity for an interoceanic canal more pressing. A fleet 
might be needed in either ocean; without a canal two fleets 
would be required. Secretary Hay preferred a canal con¬ 
structed under international guarantee, but the demand for 
an American canal had grown to be insistent. In 1901 he 
negotiated a new treaty with Great Britain to take the 
place of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, which would allow an 
American canal, provided that equal rates be charged the 
vessels of all nations. It had by this time become evident 
that the building of the canal was too great a task for 
a private corporation, and Congress finally decided to un¬ 
dertake it. In the meantime the question of location arose. 
A long contest between the advocates of the Panama and 
Nicaragua routes resulted in the Spooner Act of 1902, which 
authorized the President to arrange with the old French 
company, which had begun work but had abandoned it, 
and with Colombia for the Panama route, if he could do 
so “within a reasonable time and upon reasonable terms,” 
but otherwise to accept the offer of Nicaragua. President 
Roosevelt bought out the French company for $40,000,000, 
but Colombia refused to ratify the Hay-Herran treaty which 
had been drawn up at Washington, and which accorded 
privileges to the United States. President Roosevelt with¬ 
drew our representative at Bogota, July 9, 1903, and pre¬ 
pared to insist on our rights to construct the canal under 
the treaty of 1846. On November 3, however, the province 
of Panama revolted from Colombia. It was promptly recog¬ 
nized as independent by the United States and it as promptly 


The inter 

oceanic 

canal. 


The Far 
East. 


498 THE SPANISH WAR AND DIPLOMACY 

granted the United States all the latter required, including a 
ten-mile strip of territory from ocean to ocean, for which the 
United States was to pay ten million dollars in cash, and, 
after 1912, a quarter of a million a year. The interna¬ 
tional difficulties in the way of canal construction, therefore, 
were cleared away, and the work of sanitation in the canal 
zone and of actual construction was begun. 

The Pacific and the Far East did not fall within the scope 
of the Monroe Doctrine. In that region the United States 
and the great world powers met on equal terms, and Secre¬ 
tary Hay not only assumed an equal interest with England, 
France, Russia, Germany, and Japan, in the “ concert of 
powers/’ but also in some respects the leadership. In 1900 
the United States cooperated with the other powers in deal¬ 
ing with the Boxer outbreak against foreigners in China. 
Secretary Hay also secured assent, at least professed, to the 
“open door” policy of allowing all nations equal commercial 
privileges in colonies, protectorates, zones of influence, and 
especially in China. At the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese 
war he secured the restriction of hostilities to a specified 
area, and obtained guarantees of the territorial integrity and 
independence of China. The war was, moreover, brought 
to a close at the suggestion of President Roosevelt. During 
all this period, in spite of real difficulties due to our desire to 
restrict the immigration of Chinese and Japanese and the 
sensitiveness of their governments to discrimination, and 
difficulties less real arising from the fear of the “Yellow 
Peril,” friendly relations were maintained with China and 
Japan. No one can doubt that the United States has 
acquired a permanent interest in eastern Asia and that 
American capital and enterprise will share in the awakening 
of that continent. By 1905, therefore, most of the difficult 
problems existing in 1898 had been solved, and new policies 
had been outlined to meet the questions arising from the 
Spanish War. 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 


499 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 

Macdonald, Select Documents, nos. 109-129. Harrison, B., 
Views of an Ex-President, 185-272. Howe, A. H., Insular Cases 
{House Exec. Doc., 56 cong., 2 sess., no. 509). Thayer, J. B., Our 
New Possessions. Schurz, Carl, Speeches, Correspondence, and 
Political Papers, 6 vols. From i860 to 1904 he delivered a speech 
or wrote a letter in each presidential campaign, summarizing the 
issues, and presenting one side very strongly. 

Latane, J. H., America as a World Power. Bancroft, Seward, 
II, ch. XLII. Henderson, J. B., American Diplomatic Questions, 
137-208. Benton, E. J., International Law and Diplomacy of the 
Spanish American War. Chadwick, F. E., Relations of the United 
States and Spain. Coolidge, A. C., The United States as a World 
Power. Fish, C. R., The Path of Empire, vol. 47 of Chronicles of 
America. Latane, J. H., Diplomatic Relations between the United 
States and Spanish America. McLaughlin, J. L., and Willis, H. P., 
Reciprocity. Reinsch, P. S., World Politics. Sargent, H. H., 
The Campaign of Santiago de Cuba. Taussig, Tariff History, 251- 
409. Thayer, W. R., John Hay. 

Elliott, C. B., The Philippines. Jones, C. L., Caribbean In¬ 
terests of the United States. Le Roy, J. A., The Americans in the 
Philippines. 


Sources. 


Historical 

accounts. 


Dependen¬ 

cies. 


CHAPTER XXVIII 


Growth of 
population 
the North. 


INDUSTRIAL AND SOCIAL CHANGES 

The practical elimination of the currency question from 
politics by the election of 1896, with the adoption of the gold 
standard in 1900, and the sudden expansion of United States 
interests beyond its borders, which have been the main topics 
of the last two chapters, prepared the way for a new epoch of 
development. They were, however, rather the symptoms 
than the causes of change. In order to understand thoroughly 
how they and other political conditions came about, it is 
necessary to observe the manner in which the United States 
was growing. 

In 1870 the total population of the United States was 
about thirty-eight and a half million; in 1910 it was over 
ninety-one million, excluding that of the colonies. About 
twenty-four millions of this increase was in the states north 
of the Mason-Dixon line and the Ohio, and east of the Mis¬ 
sissippi, with Iowa. In this region the increase amounted to 
about one hundred and ten per cent; the additional popula¬ 
tion was occupied for the most part in manufacturing, mining, 
transportation, and commerce, and lived in urban communi¬ 
ties. Although agricultural productions doubled, the popula¬ 
tion of purely agricultural regions was generally stationary, 
and often declined. The rapid extension of the use of agri¬ 
cultural machinery after 1870 enabled the farmer to dispense 
with some labor. The manufacture of farm products, such 
as flour milling and meat packing, became concentrated in 
large cities. The growth of railroads and, after 1900, the use 
of automobiles tended to centralize farm trade at favorably 
located towns from thirty to fifty miles apart, stunting the 

500 


POPULATION 


501 

intermediate towns. The states in this group showing the 
greatest increase were: those devoted to general manufactur¬ 
ing, like Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Jersey, and Penn¬ 
sylvania; states not fully developed in 1870, like Michigan, 
Wisconsin, and Iowa; and New York and Illinois, contain¬ 
ing the great cities of New York and Chicago. 

The former slave states, excluding Florida, Texas, and 
Arkansas, gained about twelve million, or one hundred per 
cent. In certain districts, particularly in West Virginia and 
on the southern and eastern slopes of the mountains, iron 
mines and iron and cotton mills had come to employ tens of 
thousands, but the great bulk of the increased population 
was engaged in agriculture. The cotton crop increased about 
fourfold, and machinery was able to do little to lessen the 
labor of its production, while other crops had come to be 
raised much more extensively than before. While the aver¬ 
age yield per acre increased, to a still greater extent the growth 
in production represented the occupation of the waste spaces, 
so abundant in the South during the plantation era. 

The remaining seventeen millions of increase, pouring 
into the outlying areas, expanded their population almost 
six hundred per cent. Their task was the familiar American 
one of extending the frontier and subduing the wilderness 
to civilization. They pressed agriculture to and beyond the 
western boundary of sufficient rainfall, about the hundredth 
meridian, recoiling in the nineties before a succession of dry 
years which caused much of the distress from which arose 
the Populist movement. Sheep ranches drove before them 
the cattle from the ranges between the hundredth meridian 
and the Rocky Mountains, and farms encroached upon the 
sheep ranches. In the mountains, miners and capitalists 
from the East met those from the Pacific coast, uniting the 
two frontiers. The Indians, not without fighting, were first 
confined within reservations, and later these reservations 
were contracted in size and subdivided. By 1910 the tribal 


Growth of 
population 
the South. 


Expansion 
of the 
population. 


502 


INDUSTRIAL AND SOCIAL CHANGES 


Disappear¬ 
ance of the 
frontier. 


Conserva¬ 

tion. 


holdings of the Indians had been practically eliminated. In 
fact, it may be said that by 1900 the primary exploitation 
of the surface of the United States was complete; by 1910 the 
first wave was being deflected northward into Canada. By 
1912 all the continental area of the United States, except 
Alaska, had been admitted to statehood, Utah in 1896, 
Oklahoma in 1907, and New Mexico and Arizona in 1912, 
completing the list of the states, forty-eight in all. 

The existence of the frontier had been the distinguishing 
feature of American history. Its conquest, with the exception 
of a few regions like semiarid Utah, had been the work 
of individuals, and it had offered continuously an oppor¬ 
tunity to the individual for economic independence. Its 
spirit of individualism had permeated the political as well as 
the economic life of the whole nation. Land was always 
available throughout the country. When the pioneer ad¬ 
ventured into the wilderness, he sold the farm he had broken, 
often to some farmer from a still older region, who in turn sold 
his well-developed acres to some one with capital and the 
desire for a settled life. Landownership was always shifting 
and land opportunity was always open. Other industries 
had to offer high rewards to prevent men from taking ad¬ 
vantage of the situation and becoming landowners. When 
the front rank found its advance barred, the recoil was felt 
through the whole body politic ; the whole nation had to re¬ 
adjust itself to new conditions. 

Realization came promptly. Up to 1900 the country 
exulted in its strength and its limitless resources. By 1910, 
it had come to dread the exhaustion of its natural resources 
and a well-developed movement for conservation was in 
progress. More careful attention to the soil was urged, in 
order that the fertility which for many years had been reck¬ 
lessly exploited might be restored by scientific farming. 
“Dry farming” was developed, in order that crops might be 
raised in the semiarid areas. Irrigation was undertaken by 


CONSERVATION 503 

private enterprise, and extended by vast government projects, 
to open up the arid sections. Experimenters, like Luther 
Burbank of California, worked to discover plants that would 
grow in the unirrigated deserts. It was found that the enor¬ 
mous forests of the country had been dangerously reduced, 
not only by careless cutting, which took no thought of re¬ 
placement, but by fires lit by sparks from railroad engines 
and other causes. The country was threatened, not only with 
lack of lumber, but with alternate flood and drought, owing 
to the deforestation of the regions in which the rivers rose. 
Geologists pointed out that the supplies of coal and iron 
were not limitless and that water power should be developed 
and preserved to take their place. To meet this situation the 
national government, state governments, and great corpora¬ 
tions like the Pennsylvania Railroad, established forest re¬ 
serves. The total reserves of the national government by 
1910 amounted to about three hundred thousand square 
miles. A National Forest Service was begun in 1898, and 
states and corporations followed in the scientific study of 
forest problems, the promotion of forest growth, the preven¬ 
tion of forest waste, and the preservation of forests about the 
river heads. The use of cement as a substitute for wood and 
iron has somewhat lessened the demands upon the forests. 
Less directly connected with the movement, but practically 
bearing upon it, has been the development of electricity. 
By this means water power has. been made available for 
many new purposes, and can be transmitted over long dis¬ 
tances. Thomas Edison and many others are at present 
engaged in experiments for the production of a more perfect 
storage battery which would render electricity still more use¬ 
ful, and enable civilization to employ the forces of the wind. 

Not only was there alarm lest resources should be ex¬ 
hausted, but also over their ownership and employment. While 
the public believed that the natural resources were without 
limit, it was not a matter of active concern how much was 


Control of 
resources. 


504 


INDUSTRIAL AND SOCIAL CHANGES 


secured by any person or group of persons. When it came to 
be realized that all the anthracite coal in the country lay in 
one small district, the public became interested in its owner¬ 
ship. It was discovered that a very large amount of the 
natural resources upon which the future must depend were 
held by a comparatively small number of individuals and 
corporations. Thus a large proportion of the timber of the 
country was held by the Pacific railroads and the Weyer- 
hauser companies. Hence there arose a demand that the re¬ 
maining resources be administered primarily for the benefit of 
the public and that some control be exercised over the use 
of those already in private hands. Thus the conservation 
movement became a political issue. 

The new task before the nation, the study and the eco¬ 
nomical utilization of its resources, demanded a new kind of 
training. The old type of self-sufficing “Jack-of-all-trades” 
which had been required in the days when men must shift 
for themselves and be independent of their neighbors, must 
give way to the expert trained to do some one thing extremely 
well, and willing to work in cooperation with others and under 
direction. The great rewards would go to those who had the 
ability to organize the services of others. Specialized edu¬ 
cation became necessary to furnish experts required by the 
national economy, and education must be freely offered to the 
masses if they were to continue to enjoy that equality of 
opportunity which the free bounty of nature no longer af¬ 
forded. The problem of education was no longer merely to 
give inspiration and a mental training for life in general, but 
it must give also fitting for some special walk in life. To 
the old professions must be added a list of new. To retain 
the old spirit of education, while making an adjustment to 
this new need, gave rise to problems of the utmost delicacy 
and difficulty. The institutions of the higher education, 
especially the universities maintained by the various states, 
have responded quickly to this call. Schools and colleges of 


NEW POLITICAL IDEALS 


5©5 


agriculture, mining, engineering, forestry, commerce, chem¬ 
istry, and many other subjects turn out each year experts 
who are speedily absorbed into the work of the country and 
raise the level of its economic efficiency. On the whole the 
lower schools have adjusted themselves less easily. Manual 
training and technical high schools, and in some cities high 
schools to fit for some special occupation, as textile work, 
have been founded. Still, skilled and educated laborers are 
not relatively as numerous as scientific experts. To meet 
this need “ continuation ” schools are being established, 
where instruction is given to those who have already begun 
their life’s work. 

With this change in the character of American society, The expert 
there came, naturally, a tendency towards a change in po- jff e public 
litical ideals. American democracy, as it found expression 
in the philosophy of Jefferson, desired individual liberty. 

It looked upon government as a means of perfecting that 
liberty, by protecting the individual. Jacksonian democracy 
preserved a strong love of individual liberty, but it laid more 
stress on the idea of equality, acting on the supposition that 
all men were of much the same ability and could and should 
be equally trusted with the affairs as well of government as 
of business. There was a growing tendency, moreover, to 
insist upon the right of the majority to do what it liked. 

This latter tendency has grown steadily stronger since the 
Civil War. Year by year the majority has shown more dispo¬ 
sition to regulate the life of the community for its own good. 

It is somewhat the old New England idea that man should 
have liberty to do that which is good, that is, as now inter¬ 
preted, what is good in the eyes of the majority. It is also 
connected with a trend of thought among European peoples 
toward state socialism. In part a reaction against the ex¬ 
treme laissez faire doctrines of the middle of the nineteenth 
century, and exhibited only as a tendency to favor particu¬ 
lar measures, it has become for many a definite program. 


Conditions 
of change. 


506 INDUSTRIAL AND SOCIAL CHANGES 

and in 1912 a Socialist party cast over eight hundred thousand 
votes for Eugene Debs, its candidate for the presidency. At 
the same time there has developed the feeling that the real 
democratic equality is equality of opportunity, not the insist¬ 
ence on equality of ability. As the functions of government 
have increased, there has been an increasing willingness to 
trust their execution to those specially trained for the work. 
Democracy has become willing to carry out its purpose 
through experts. 

Two movements have, therefore, marked the advance of 
democracy during this period, especially from 1890 to 1910; 
one that for the more direct control of government by the 
majority, the other for the employment of specialists. Both 
these movements have found expression more easily in the 
case of state governments than in the case of that of the 
nation. The American state system gives an ideal oppor¬ 
tunity for experiment. One state may try a suggested plan ; 
failure means but a restricted loss, and success serves to stim¬ 
ulate others to adopt similar measures. This has had a 
corresponding disadvantage in the fact that state laws on 
similar subjects differ, creating great confusion, particularly 
in the case of the laws of marriage and divorce. Of late, 
however, there has been a tendency for the states to keep in 
touch and consciously to profit by each other’s experience. 
Legislative reference libraries keep the legislators informed 
of what is being done elsewhere, and, since 1908, the governors 
of the several states have met regularly to discuss public 
policy. The field for experimental observation in govern¬ 
ment, moreover, has not been confined to the United States. 
Travel, study in European universities, and the growing 
intimacy of relationships throughout the world resulting 
from improved facilities of communication have rubbed off 
much American provincialism. We no longer regard our¬ 
selves as a peculiar people, as in fact we are less so than before 
the disappearance of the frontier. There has been, therefore, 


PROBLEMS IN GOVERNMENT 507 

an increasing willingness to profit by the experience of others, 
particularly by that of Australia and New Zealand. 

The movement for direct control of the government by 
the people has included laws to control party machinery and 
constitutional changes to place legislation more closely in 
the hands of the people. Nearly all states have regulated, 
some more, some less completely, the primaries by which the 
various parties select their candidates. Several states have 
provided that election expenses must be made public, and 
some have limited their amount. To prevent undue influ¬ 
ence being brought to bear upon members of the legislature, 
some states have forbidden lobbyists and some provided that 
they must be registered. In Oregon and some other states 
most of them western, the initiative and referendum of laws, 
and the recall of public officials, by popular vote to be taken 
upon petition, have been provided, and the question as to 
the advisability of such legislation has become everywhere 
an issue. A movement for woman’s suffrage arising during 
the anti-slavery struggle began now to take effect. Massa¬ 
chusetts and many other states allowed women to vote on 
educational matters. Wyoming from its admission in 1890 
included them in the general electorate. Fifteen other states 
followed this example before the question was settled for all 
by the federal Nineteenth Amendment in 1920. 

While nearly all state constitutions have been largely 
made over by substitution or amendment, all attempts to 
change the national constitution were unsuccessful until 
1913. The changes then made, which will be noted later, 
were not extensive, and it remains the oldest working frame 
of government in the world, and, interpreted by the court 
decisions of over one hundred and twenty years, sometimes 
acts as a bar to popular wishes. Nevertheless there has been 
no large movement to change it, except by a few amend¬ 
ments which do not provide for direct government. Instead 
there has grown up a demand that the courts interpret it liber- 


Direct 

government. 


5°8 


INDUSTRIAL AND SOCIAL CHANGES 


Commission 

government. 


ally to meet modern conditions, and, in order to bring the 
courts under popular control, it has been proposed that 
judges be subject to recall, or that decisions of the courts, 
in cases involving constitutional interpretation, be liable to 
reversal by popular vote. 

The movement for the employment of specialists has 
found its most active expression in the experiments with the 
commission form of government. Commissions of all kinds 
and dealing with all varieties of questions have been largely 
and increasingly used. Some have merely powers of inves¬ 
tigation. This has been true of national commissions such 
as the Tariff Commission, authorized by the Payne-Aldrich 
tariff bill of 1909, to study the relative conditions of produc¬ 
tion in this country and elsewhere, with a view to determin¬ 
ing the tariff rates necessary to equalize them, and the 
Aldrich Monetary Commission, appointed to study the whole 
question of finance and to report a plan for the reorgani¬ 
zation of the national banking and currency laws. Some 
have administrative powers, as the park commissions in 
Massachusetts and other states. Wisconsin has led the way 
in the employment of commissions which combine powers of 
investigation with administrative and semi-judicial powers. 
The Rate Commission of that state constantly passes 
upon questions which are really judicial. Its decisions are 
theoretically subject to review by the courts, but practi¬ 
cally have proved final. Commissions with legislative 
power have been created for the government of cities. 
The first to attract attention was that which was given 
control of Galveston after the practical destruction of 
that city by the devastating tidal wave of 1900. Its success 
in meeting the situation aroused general public interest, and 
many cities have adopted the method of giving to a small 
elective commission the powers previously exercised by the 
larger councils. The idea underlying the administrative com¬ 
missions has been that of confiding to experts, chosen with 


ECONOMIC LEGISLATION 509 

as little relation to politics as possible, the task of collecting 
information and performing non-political acts. The direc¬ 
tion of public policy has been retained under public control 
and the commissions are responsible to the public. In most 
cases they are appointed and are removable by the executive 
authority; the city commissions are elected and are gener¬ 
ally subject to recall. Moreover, the generally reliable 
character of the reports which they present affords a more 
substantial basis upon which an intelligent public opinion 
can be built up, than has previously existed, and the method 
in general makes the public will more speedily operative 
than heretofore. 

The popular will, thus made effective, has sought both 
to curb the powers of corporations and to regulate the life 
of the individual. At the beginning of the period, corpo¬ 
rations, deathless and powerful, and in many cases practically 
holding monopolies of their respective fields of business, 
enjoyed nearly all the advantages of individual liberty secured 
to the people by our form of government. In a field of free 
competition they seemed to be the strongest, if not the fittest, 
who were the most apt to survive. During the past twenty 
years their powers have been steadily curtailed. Laws pro¬ 
hibiting railroads from giving passes have somewhat dimin¬ 
ished their influence on public opinion, while rate commissions, 
by making rates equal to all users, have prevented special 
bargains by which railroads had been able to control shippers 
and vice versa. Public utilities commissions, like those of 
New York and Wisconsin, have the power to see that all 
corporations serving the public perform their duties satis¬ 
factorily to the public. New systems of taxation have been 
devised, forcing corporations to contribute at least their 
share of the public expenses. Revelations of the scandalous 
conduct of certain insurance companies have brought almost 
universally laws for their control. The effect of these state 
regulative measures has been much greater than that of the 


Economic 

legislation. 


INDUSTRIAL AND SOCIAL CHANGES 


510 

national Sherman Anti-Trust Law, and they have much 
aided in the work of the national Interstate Commerce Com¬ 
mission, but they probably represent only a broaching of the 
problem. 

Social legis- Along the line of social control, laws have been passed 
regulating smoking and drinking, for the supervision of con¬ 
ditions in factories, limiting the employment of women and 
children, and for compulsory education. Newer in concep¬ 
tion is the assumption by the states of the war against dis¬ 
ease, particularly tuberculosis, and the provision for state 
parks. There is some tendency for the states to assume 
active control of the police, in order to carry out these and 
other measures, the authority for which rests chiefly on the 
police power. State assumption of power has not, however, 
diminished the activity of the municipal governments, any 
more than the increase of federal functions had reduced that 
of the states. Increasing density of population, its growing 
diversity, inequalities in wealth, decadence of certain social 
groups, the weakening influence of the home upon children, 
and the thickening problems of an aging civilization 
demand always more control by law, more sacrifice of indi¬ 
vidual liberty for the common good; and, with a rather re¬ 
markable adaptability, the American people have shown a 
prompt appreciation of this necessity and a willingness to 
change the form of their democracy in the hope of preserving 
its essence. 

The foreign- While these changes in the methods and purposes of 
government were taking place, the composition of the popu¬ 
lation was also undergoing change. In the decade between 
1870 and 1880 immigration amounted to over two million 
eight hundred thousand, in the next to five million two hun¬ 
dred thousand, in the next to three million six hundred thou¬ 
sand, and between 1900 and 1910 to almost eight million eight 
hundred thousand. These totals do not accurately represent 
the increase in foreign population, because many immigrants 


IMMIGRATION 


511 

return to their native countries; but in 1900 the population 
born abroad or of foreign parents was twenty million eight 
hundred and thirty-nine thousand. Only six hundred thou¬ 
sand of this foreign population lived in the South, and half 
that number were in the single state of Texas. About 
fourteen and a half million consisted of English, German, 
Irish, and Scotch, which nationalities have been coming to 
America from the beginning, and form the basis of the Amer¬ 
ican stock. A newer element was that from the Scandi¬ 
navian countries. More than half the nine hundred and 
ninety-eight thousand Swedes were in Minnesota and Illinois. 
The Norwegians numbered six hundred and eighty-four 
thousand, and were for the most part farmers in Minnesota 
and Wisconsin. Two hundred and sixty-six thousand Danes 
were scattered through the middle parts of western states, 
and Finns and Icelanders were fairly numerous along the 
northern border. These Scandinavians, like the British 
and Germans, were fitted by similarity of racial charac¬ 
teristics and political training to assimilate quickly the more 
fundamental American traditions. 

More than three and a half million of the foreign-born in 
1900 consisted of more alien elements, and they constituted 
the greater proportion of the immigration of the next ten 
years. The French Canadian element in 1900 amounted 
to six hundred and thirty-five thousand, two thirds of whom 
were in New England. They lived, for the most part, 
in groups of their own, about the cotton mills in which 
they worked, and, with some notable exceptions, took little 
part in the general life of the community. The mines of 
Pennsylvania drew many Hungarians, who proved to be a 
turbulent element, often disturbing the public peace. On the 
Pacific Chinese immigration became important from the time 
of the discovery of gold. Popular prejudice against the 
Chinese was strong, not only because of their alien mode of 
life, but also because of the low standard of wages they were 


Immigration 
of new 
elements. 


512 


INDUSTRIAL AND SOCIAL CHANGES 


New condi¬ 
tions of im¬ 
migration. 


willing to accept; and the question of their immigration 
dominated California politics during the seventies. With 
the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Bill of 1881, the question 
became less politically acute. The immigration of Chinese 
laborers has been, on the whole, prevented since that time, 
but those in the country constitute an element which has 
proved as yet not assimilable. A somewhat similar problem 
was presented early in the twentieth century by the immigra¬ 
tion of Japanese, but under President Roosevelt an arrange¬ 
ment was reached with the Japanese government which 
limited this movement, in the meantime the cities and 
factories throughout the country were becoming crowded 
with Russians, Jew and Gentile, Italians, Poles, Bohemians, 
Austrians, and Greeks. Where these foreigners reached the 
soil, with the exception of the Chinese, they speedily became 
a part of the community; intermarriage was frequent and 
lines of nationality tended to disappear. In the cities, how¬ 
ever, they were inclined to live in separate quarters and to 
preserve their characteristics. 

Much of the immigration since 1880 has been of what 
may be called an unnatural character. The enforced immi¬ 
gration of slaves has been prohibited since 1808, the importa¬ 
tion of coolies since the Civil War, and of laborers under 
contract since 1888; Chinese and Japanese have also been 
excluded. But the road to America has been made so easy 
that it no longer requires any special fortitude and courage 
to make the transit. The conditions which previously in¬ 
sured that the voluntary immigrant to America was possessed 
of some special qualities fitting him for success have ceased 
to operate. In fact the highly colored accounts spread 
broadcast through the discontented districts of Europe by 
competing steamship companies have tended to draw over 
many who are merely weakly restless and inefficient. These 
feebler newcomers are welcomed by those great employing 
interests whose factories and mines require little intelligence 


IMMIGRATION PROBLEMS 


513 


from the laborer, and who are glad to supplant the highly 
paid and independent native workmen. In many cities, 
particularly in New England, New York, and Pennsylvania, 
these underpaid and unenlightened unfortunates live in social 
conditions from which America has previously been spared, 
separated as completely from the native population as if 
inhabitants of a different century. When the natural revolt 
against these conditions takes place, it assumes a more dan¬ 
gerous and revolutionary character than earlier disputes 
between capital and labor. The most significant attempt to 
organize this class has been that of the Industrial Workers 
of the World, and the most important crisis which has occurred 
has been that produced by the Lowell strike of 1912. 

The enormous amount of immigration and its changing 
character attracted wide attention, but led to little direct 
public effort. The activity of the national government has 
been limited to preventing the coming of Chinese and Jap¬ 
anese, and prohibiting the entry of sick, criminal, and de¬ 
pendent individuals. The local governments have contrib¬ 
uted much by their public schools systems, which have been 
open to all alike and have enabled practically all immigrants 
to acquire the English language and some knowledge of 
American history and habits. Quite as much has been ac¬ 
complished by private efforts. Particularly “social settle¬ 
ments, ” such as Hull House at Chicago, founded and directed 
by Miss Jane Addams, have helped the newcomers in their 
difficulties and taught them American ways. The children 
of the immigrants seem eager to adapt themselves to American 
conditions, and it is to be hoped that foreign quarters will 
become a thing of the past, as have those of the Irish, who in 
the middle of the nineteenth century lived quite as much by 
themselves. It is plain, however, that the proportion of 
these newer nationalities to the whole population is so large, 
that when they have become assimilated, the characteristics 
of the whole population will have somewhat changed. 


Problems o£ 
the foreign- 
born. 


INDUSTRIAL AND SOCIAL CHANGES 


5H 


Commerce 
and finance. 


Conditions 
peculiar to 
the South. 


While the United States continued increasingly to 
be a receiving nation from the standpoint of migration, it 
became more and more an exporting nation from the stand¬ 
point of commerce. The amount of imports in proportion to 
the population did not increase nor substantially vary from 
1870 to 1910, while the proportion of exports increased almost 
fifty per cent. The most significant change in the character 
of trade was the growing importance of exports of manu¬ 
factured goods; for, while they were still in 1910 of smaller 
amount than those of cotton, provisions, and other natural 
products, the possibilities of their development began to 
engage general attention. Reciprocity, free trade, the ac¬ 
quisition of colonies, and closer relations with other coun¬ 
tries were all discussed as methods of expanding the market 
for these products, which, unlike the traditional American 
exports, must come into competition with those of European 
factories. This interest grew rapidly between 1900 and 1910, 
during which years the home demand for foodstuffs and the 
active rivalry of Canada, Argentina, and Australia fore¬ 
shadowed the end of the export provision trade, while the waste 
of American forests threatened a future dependence upon 
other nations for lumber. It became increasingly obvious 
that our balance to other nations must be paid by making 
better or cheaper finished articles, rather than by garnering 
the fruits of nature. Throughout this period the United 
States continued to be dependent on foreign nations for the 
ocean transit of both passengers and goods. The great 
volume of American exports, however, enabled the country 
easily to pay for these services, to accumulate nearly all the 
capital required for its industrial undertakings, and to enter 
foreign fields, particularly China, as a lender of money. 

While the South shared in many of these changes and was 
growing into closer touch with the rest of the country, it is 
still necessary to observe some special conditions there. The 
South gained scarcely at all by immigration. Nevertheless, 


NEGRO PROBLEMS 


515 


during this period, more nearly than at any time since the 
formation of the government, it held its own in the increase 
of population. Both the white and the negro elements 
contributed, the gain in the whites being proportionately 
somewhat greater. There was some immigration from the 
North, partly of a leisure class seeking health and a quiet 
country life, and partly of business men and skilled mechanics 
drawn by the rapid development of manufacturing. For 
the most part, however, the gain came because the South was 
able to retain its own sons now that the diversification of 
industry and the breakdown of the plantation system opened 
more widely the opportunities for advancement. From the Negro 
time of the Hayes administration, the South has been left P roblems - 
a free hand in the solving of the race problem. This has 
meant white rule. At first the negroes were held from voting 
by force and fraud. Beginning in 1890, one state after another 
adopted constitutional regulations debarring the great ma¬ 
jority of the negroes from the suffrage. These regulations 
were based for the most part upon educational qualifica¬ 
tions, but, by admitting the descendants of all voters of 
i860, or by some such provision, allowed illiterate whites 
to vote. Such “ grandfather ” clauses were, in 1915, de¬ 
clared by the Supreme Court to be in violation of the 
fifteenth amendment and void. For twenty-five years, 
however, they substituted a method supposedly legal for 
force. Now southern opinion seems content to apply the 
same tests to blacks as to whites, though election officers 
may favor the latter. Lynching and the crimes which 
caused it are on the decline, and there seems to be a general 
diminution in the use of “ private law ” and increasing re¬ 
spect for the law of the land. Southern state and local au¬ 
thorities are now doing somewhat more for negro education 
than earlier, though much aid is still given by the North. 

Negro education, moreover, as a result largely of the 
work of Booker T. Washington, President of Tuskegee In- 


Politics in 
the South. 


516 INDUSTRIAL AND SOCIAL CHANGES 

stitute, has become more practical. On the whole the re¬ 
lations between the blacks and whites are better than ever 
before, and the negro of ability and skill has a good chance 
in life, though the negroes as a race have not as yet proved 
economically efficient. 

The negro still influences politics. While the North has 
candidly left the South to treat the relation of blacks and 
whites as a local problem, sentiment and tradition have 
proved too strong in the South to allow it to give up its polit¬ 
ical unity and cease to insist on its separateness. Southern 
congressmen from manufacturing districts vote with those 
from similar districts in the North, but they retain nearly 
always the name of Democrat; the South remains politically 
solid, and its party allegiance being taken for granted, 
exerts comparatively little influence on national affairs. 
Local politics, however, have not been devoid of interest. 
For many years the old leaders of the planter aristocracy i 
known as the Bourbons, kept control, their prestige being 
enhanced by their success in the movement for the reestab¬ 
lishment of home rule in 1876. The material foundation for 
their power, however, had disappeared; the planter aristoc¬ 
racy no longer existed as a class, its members being scattered, 
many into the professions, some into the North, some 
unable to face new conditions, and only a few retaining their 
old manner of life. The natural result has been that since 
1890 there has been a rise to power of the poorer white 
farmer, in some states gradually, in some, as in South Caro¬ 
lina under the leadership of Senator Tillman, accompanied 
by a sharp fight. Among the issues upon which this fight 
has been made, have been temperance, currency, industrial 
education, and the regulation of railroads and monopolies; 
but the ingrained southern individualism yields slowly and 
has prevented adoption of any such elaborate system of 
control for the latter as has been provided in the states of 
the North. The same tradition and the unorganized con- 


IDEALS 


517 

dition of the labor element have allowed factory legislation 
to lag behind the development of the factory system. 

Throughout the whole country and among all its diverse 
streams of population, the predominant questions of the time, 
in public and private life, come more and more to be immedi¬ 
ate, practical, and complex. The general truths for which 
the earlier generations contended are mostly established, 
and their limitations realized. Equality of opportunity and 
equality before the law, belief in the brotherhood of man and 
in the sovereignty of the people, are accepted as forming the 
most satisfactory basis for government, but they obviously 
do not of themselves solve the problems of government. It 
is not enough to make man free, it is necessary to keep per¬ 
petual watch and ward. Many of the new issues arise on 
questions of detail, questions of better or worse, not of right 
or wrong. Continued interest and study are more important 
than enthusiasm. The new leaders of thought are increas¬ 
ingly students unable themselves to present their views to 
the public. The essay, the poem, the editorial, the sermon, 
the oration, the first-hand utterance of the leader to the 
people are largely supplanted by the popularized semi- 
scientific article in the magazine. Literature has declined 
in quality and in influence. Poetry has become the pleasure 
of the dilettante, not a real force; philosophy languishes; 
theology attracts interest chiefly when it offers health to the 
body as well as peace to the soul. Humanitarianism is more 
widespread, more self-devoting than ever before, but it has 
become, not only more practical, but more material. Ideals, 
however, remain potent. Foremost among the national ideals 
is the preservation of democracy, although there is more 
inequality of condition than in the time of Jackson, and more 
appreciation of the difficulties of making it a vital living 
force. Political morality rests upon a higher plane than at 
any time since the first period of the republic, and political 
interest is far more widespread than at that time. The 


Ideals and 

public 

opinion. 


Historical 

accounts. 


518 INDUSTRIAL AND SOCIAL CHANGES 

energy and the self-reliance developed by the conquest of 
the continent remain as a heritage for the nation in solving 
its new and more humdrum problems. 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 

Hart, A. B., Ideals of American Government. Ross, E. A., 
Changing America. Encyclopedia Britannica (nth ed.), XXVII, 
634-663. Bois, W. E. B., The Souls of the Black Folks. Brown, 
W. G., The Lower South. Caffey, F. G., Suffrage Limitations in the 
South {Pol. Sci. Quart., XX, 53). Dunbar, P. L., Folks from Dixie. 
Hart, A. B .,The Southern South. Tillinghast, J. A., The Negro in 
Africa and America. Washington, B. T., Up from Slavery, and 
Working with the Hands. The South in the Building of the Nation. 
Turner, F. J., Social Forces in American History {Am. Hist. Review, 
Jan., 1911, 217-233). Van Hise, C. R., Conservation of Natural 
Resources, and Concentration and Control. Addams, J., Twenty 
Years at Hidl House. Riis, J. A., The Battle with the Slum. 


CHAPTER XXIX 


POLITICAL ADJUSTMENTS AND LEGISLATION 

On September 6,1901, while attending the Pan-American 
Exposition at Buffalo, President McKinley was shot by an 
anarchist. He died on September 14, and was succeeded 
on the same day by the Vice President, Theodore Roosevelt. 
While the latter thus became President unexpectedly, having 
been elected to an office which carries with it little prestige 
or power, he embodied more conspicuously than any other 
man in the country the new forces which were coming to the 
front in politics. 1 

Entering politics at the age of twenty-four as member 
of the New York legislature, he speedily became interested 
in civil service reform. From 1889 to 1895 he served on the 
United States Civil Service,Commission, doing much to pro¬ 
mote its efficiency, and to spread the movement. As presi¬ 
dent of the New York City Police Board, 1895 to 1897, 
he showed great energy in breaking up the connection of 
the police force with vice and “graft” which had been exposed 
by various investigations. Appointed by President Mc¬ 
Kinley as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, he resigned at 
the opening of the Spanish War, and organized and served 
as Lieutenant Colonel of a regiment of “Rough Riders,” 
enlisted largely from the “cowboys” of the western plains 
with whom he had become familiar by residence in North 
Dakota, 1884 to 1886. During the war he distinguished 
himself, not only by gallantry, but by an attack on the effi¬ 
ciency of the War Department, which resulted ultimately in 
the resignation of Secretary Russell A. Alger. At the close 
of the war he was elected governor of New York. Securing 

519 


Roosevelt 

succeeds 

McKinley. 


Roosevelt’s 

career. 


520 POLITICAL ADJUSTMENTS AND LEGISLATION 


Civil service 
and labor. 


High 

finance. 


this position in opposition to “Boss” Thomas C. Platt, at 
that time senator from New York, he came to be looked upon 
as a leader by those who wished to change the old order 
of things. His career as governor confirmed his hold on 
this element, and he became a leading power in politics. In 
the Republican convention of 1900 he was chosen as candidate 
for the vice presidency, not only because of the strength he 
would bring to the ticket, but because Senator Platt and 
Senator Hanna of Ohio, the political managers for President 
McKinley, considered that he would be least dangerous to 
the established order in that position. In all the offices in 
which he had served Mr. Roosevelt showed an unusual ca¬ 
pacity for work, and a remarkable vigor and directness in 
urging his opinions. 

As President, Mr. Roosevelt continued his work for 
civil service reform, very greatly extending the number of 
“classified” positions which came under the examination 
rules, and improving the consular service, which was still left 
open to personal appointments. He showed great interest 
in the problems of labor. In 1902 a strike of the anthra¬ 
cite coal miners for a time caused great distress through¬ 
out the North and threatened a cessation of industry by 
cutting off the coal supply. The President induced both 
sides to submit their cases to a commission which he appointed, 
and whose decision brought peace. In 1903, at his sugges¬ 
tion, Congress created a new department of government —• 
that of Commerce and Labor—to investigate and help remedy 
industrial conditions. 

During these years the movement to concentrate the 
control of industry went on with greater rapidity than ever 
before. In 1900 J. Pierpont Morgan arranged the United 
States Steel Company, with stocks and bonds amounting to 
$1,100,000,000 — the greatest corporation ever organized. 
Controlling ore properties, transport lines, and factories, it 
was able to prevent disputes between different branches of 


ELECTION OF 1904 


521 


the trade, to carry out great economies, and for several years 
to fix the price of steel products. E. H. Harriman com¬ 
bined railroad with railroad, the Union, Central, and South¬ 
ern Pacific, the Illinois Central, the Oregon Short Line, and 
smaller units, securing a firm grip on transportation within 
the quadrilateral formed by Chicago, Portland, San Diego, 
and New Orleans. His only competitors were the Santa Fe 
and the Gould system, consisting of the Missouri Pacific and 
allied lines. In New England, the New York, New Haven, 
and Hartford, under the initiative of Mr. Morgan, was rap¬ 
idly acquiring a monopoly of transportation by land and sea, 
by steam and electricity. In the far northwest, James J. 

Hill, builder of the Great Northern, attempted to complete 
his hold by uniting with that road the Northern Pacific and 
the Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy. As the two latter were 
directly competing roads, a merger would be illegal, so the 
Northern Securities Company was formed to hold and vote 
a majority of the stock of both. The era of competition in 
transportation seemed about to end. By direction of the 
President, however, suit was brought under the Sherman 
Anti-Trust Law against the Securities Company, and the 
Supreme Court in 1904 ordered it dissolved as a trust within 
the meaning of the law. In 1912 the Court ordered the 
Union Pacific to give up its control of the Southern Pacific. 

Before Mr. Roosevelt’s becoming President, four Vice Election of 
Presidents had become chief executive by the death of the I9 ° 4 ' 
elected President. All of them had desired election to the 
office to which they had thus accidentally arrived, but in 
no case had they even received the nomination of their 
party. Mr. Roosevelt, however, had by 1904 taken so 
strong a hold on the public good will that he was unani¬ 
mously nominated by the Republican convention to succeed 
himself. In the Democratic convention the conservative 
wing triumphed, choosing Judge Parker of New York as 
candidate, and enjoining silence on the currency question. 


522 POLITICAL ADJUSTMENTS AND LEGISLATION 


Corporation 

control. 


Crisis of 1907. 


They made their issue with the Republicans chiefly on the 
tariff and imperialism. The result of the election was the 
overwhelming victory of Mr. Roosevelt. Mr. Parker 
failed to call out the full Democratic strength that Mr. Bryan 
had developed in 1896 and 1900, while the Republicans 
cast an unprecedented vote. This result was not unexpected, 
and it had in fact been thought possible that Mr. Roosevelt 
might break the solid South. All thought of this, however, 
had been abandoned before the election as the result of 
southern agitation at his inviting Mr. Booker T. Washington, 
a negro, to luncheon. 

Thus triumphantly elected, Mr. Roosevelt proceeded 
to urge, still more vigorously than before, an elaborate pro¬ 
gram. The questions of corporations, trusts, and transporta¬ 
tion continued to attract the widest public interest. Mr. 
Bryan, in many respects the leader of the Democratic party, 
urged the public ownership of railroads as the best solution 
possible. Mr. Roosevelt advocated regulation. In 1905 the 
Interstate Commerce Act was supplemented by a provision 
enabling the government to secure additional information, 
and in 1906 a substitute act was passed giving the Interstate 
Commerce Commission power to fix railroad rates for inter¬ 
state commerce, subject to revision by the courts. The 
President also ordered the Attorney-General to bring suit 
against a number of the trusts under the Sherman Anti- 
Trust Law. 

In the same year there occurred an industrial and financial 
crisis. This was mainly due tv overspeculation in indus¬ 
trial securities which in many cases represented anticipated 
earning capacity rather than real value. It was probably 
hastened by the defects in the banking system, and to some 
extent by the destruction of property in the San Francisco 
earthquake and fire of 1906. While the interruption of busi¬ 
ness was not so great as in 1873 and 1893, people felt the 
crisis keenly, for prices of necessities did not fall so far as after 


ROOSEVELT’S ADMINISTRATION 


523 


those crises, and the price of meat advanced. As in 1873 and 
1893 concentration of industrial and financial control was 
stimulated, the stronger organizations swallowing up those 
weakened by the disturbance of credit. To the absorption 
of the Tennessee Coal and Iron Company by the United States 
Steel Corporation, the President gave his approval, arguing 
that not all trusts were bad, and that in this case the ad¬ 
vantages outweighed the disadvantages. This position was 
attacked by those who believed it possible to prevent trusts 
from holding monopolies in their respective fields, and who 
wished to restore competition. Discussion raged on the plat¬ 
form and in the press, but it was several years before the 
conflicting views became well defined. To improve the cur¬ 
rency situation the Aldrich-Vreeland bill was passed in 1908, 
which increased the elasticity of national bank note issues. 

A commission to make a thorough study of currency and to 
report a plan for permanent relief had previously been pro¬ 
vided for. 

Some of the most notable events of Mr. Roosevelt’s ad- Peace and „ 
ministration were in the field of diplomacy. In 1904 the Blg Stlck ’ 
way for the Panama Canal was cleared of diplomatic prob¬ 
lems, as has already been pointed out. Promptly work on 
the canal was begun and was pushed with vigor. In 1905 
Mr. Roosevelt helped to bring the war between Japan and 
Russia to a close, by suggesting a negotiation in United States 
territory. In 1906, in recognition of this service, he was 
awarded the “Nobel Peace” prize. In his negotiations with 
the Spanish-American powers, Mr. Roosevelt pursued a 
policy which came to be known as that of the “Big Stick,” 
insisting on the maintenance of order and the recognition of 
obligations. No hostilities, however, resulted, and some 
progress was made towards the settlement of disputes by 
arbitration. 

While Mr. Roosevelt in practice stood for peace, he urged Army and 
strongly that the United States should be prepared for war, navy ‘ 


524 POLITICAL ADJUSTMENTS AND LEGISLATION 


Conservation 
and social 
problems. 


and found much support in Congress for his suggestions. 
The national militia law was revised, and the regular army 
was reorganized on modern lines with the control vesting in 
a general staff of which General Leonard Wood became 
chief. While the army was reduced from the war footing of 
1898, it remained over twice as large as it had been before the 
Spanish War, amounting to about sixty-seven thousand men. 
The navy was much more largely increased, and in 1907, by 
direction of the President, a large portion of it cruised round 
the world, as a test of efficiency which it stood most com- 
mendably. 

One of the subjects most congenial to Mr. Roosevelt was 
that of conservation. By executive order he withdrew 
large areas of public land from sale, for the purpose of in¬ 
vestigating their natural resources, and he recommended 
that Congress pass legislation protecting the interests of the 
general public in such minerals, water powers, and forests 
as should be found in them. The forest sendee under Mr. 
Gifford Pinchot was reorganized by Congress and granted 
new powers and appropriations. Congress also, in . 1902, 
granted the proceeds of the sales of public lands in many 
western states to be used for carrying out irrigation projects, 
a large number of which, opening up thousands of acres 
to cultivation, were undertaken. In 1908 the President 
called a meeting of the governors of the several states 
to discuss the whole conservation problem. President 
Roosevelt also gave his attention to a vast number of subjects 
affecting the welfare of the country, some of which were fitted 
to become topics of legislation and some were not. In 1906 
a Pure Food Law and a Meat Inspection Law were passed, 
the first of which especially, actively administered by Dr. 
Wiley, drew widespread popular approval. Commissions 
were appointed to investigate a great variety of matters, 
such as the question of employers’ liability. The labor of 
women and children was made a matter of study by the 


ELECTION OF 1908 


525 


Department of Commerce and Labor, and the questions of 
safety devices on railroads and the working hours of railroad 
employees were actively discussed in Congress. The Presi¬ 
dent interested himself in race suicide and divorce. 

While much legislation was passed^ during Mr. Roose- Election of 
velt’s presidency, much of it was passed in the form of 1908 • 
compromise measures unsatisfactory in many respects to those 
whose pressure forced it through, but accepted as marking 
progress. A great deal, moreover, depended on the spirit 
in which this legislation should be administered, and many 
problems remained as yet untouched. The choice of Mr. 
Roosevelt’s successor, therefore, excited the keenest interest, 
for Mr. Roosevelt announced that he considered that he 
had served two terms and would abide by the precedent 
set by Washington against more than one reelection. The 
power of making this choice practically lay with Mr. Roose¬ 
velt himself, so strong was his hold on his party. He selected 
Judge William Howard Taft, who had served as commissioner 
and governor in the Philippines, 1900 to 1904, and as Secretary 
of War, 1904 to 1908. The Democrats for the third time 
nominated Mr. Bryan. The campaign was fought on what 
were known as the “Roosevelt Policies,” though the hard 
times following the crisis of 1907 caused some emphasis to be 
laid on the tariff, one of the few fields of legislation upon 
which there had been no recent lawmaking. Both parties, 
however, talked of reduction, and so no clear issue was made 
upon it. The election again resulted in a decided victory 
for the Republicans, although Mr. Bryan received almost a 
million more votes than did Judge Parker in 1904. 

President Taft announced that his administration would The tariff, 
continue the policies of his predecessor, but changed most 
of the cabinet. Mr. Knox, who had been Attorney-General, 
succeeded Mr. Root as Secretary of State, and Mr. Ballinger 
was promoted from the commissionership of the General Land 
Office to be Secretary of the Interior. In 1910 the Interstate 


Election of 
1910 and 
Canadian 
reciprocity. 


526 POLITICAL ADJUSTMENTS AND LEGISLATION 

Commerce Commission was again given more power, and a 
Commerce Court established to review its decisions. The 
latter, however, proved unpopular and was discontinued 
in 1913. The main interest centered upon the tariff. The 
agitation on this question had become so acute that a special 
session was called’ to deal with it. The result was a new 
act, known, from Mr. Payne, chairman of the House Com¬ 
mittee on Ways and Means, and Mr. Aldrich, chairman of the 
Senate Committee on Finance, as the Payne-Aldrich law. 
This bill proved a bitter disappointment to those who had 
expected a substantial revision downward. The President 
shared this view, but signed the bill, building hope of relief 
on the fact that the law provided for a Tariff Commission. 
This commission was to study conditions and supply Congress 
with information which would enable it to frame a tariff on 
the basis of offsetting differences in the cost of production in 
the United States and other countries. The President also 
hoped to modify the tariff substantially by reciprocity treaties. 

Both these hopes of President Taft were disappointed. 
Before the Tariff Commission was ready to report, the elec¬ 
tion of 1910 took place, and the disappointment of the country 
found expression in returning a large Democratic majority 
to the House of Representatives, thus breaking the control 
of the government which the Republicans had continuously 
held since the first inauguration of McKinley in 1897. In 
1911 the President succeeded in securing an agreement for 
reciprocity with Canada. This was not universally popular 
in the United States, but, nevertheless, was formally ap¬ 
proved. It, however, became at once the subject of violent 
controversy in Canada, and practically the sole issue in a 
general election there. The contest resulted in the defeat of 
the Liberals, led by Sir Wilfrid Laurier, who had secured the 
pact, by the Conservatives, who opposed it. This election, 
therefore, defeated the arrangement after the United States 
had accepted it. 


THE PROGRESSIVES 


527 


The Payne-Aldrich law not only brought defeat to the Re¬ 
publicans in Congress, but also practically marked a breach 
between the administration and a group of Republicans in 
Congress known by their opponents as “Insurgents” and 
calling themselves “Progressives.” The leader of this 
group was Senator La Follette of Wisconsin. In 1901 he 
had become governor of that state after a long fight with the 
established party organization. As governor he secured 
the passage of a primary law, the establishment of a rate 
commission with extremely broad powers, a law providing 
for the taxation of railroads on the basis of their physical 
valuation, and many other progressive measures. Coming 
to the Senate in 1906, he in general cooperated with Presi¬ 
dent Roosevelt, although he expressed strong dissatisfac¬ 
tion because the Interstate Commerce Act of 1900 did not 
provide for the physical valuation of the railroads, and 
criticised many details of legislation and of executive action. 
He violently opposed the Payne-Aldrich bill, and became a 
constant critic of the Taft administration. A similar posi¬ 
tion was taken by Senators Dolliver and Cummins of Iowa, 
Clapp of Minnesota, Bourne of Oregon, Beveridge of Indiana, 
and others. The Progressive movement was relatively stronger 
in the Senate than in the House, because in most cases there 
had been a long state fight, and when it was won, the leader 
was elected to the Senate. It was not, however, without 
strength in the House. In the last session of the first or Re¬ 
publican Congress under President Taft, the Insurgent Repub¬ 
licans combined with the Democrats in an attack on Speaker 
Cannon. Chosen to that position in 1903, he had concentrated 
in his hands even greater powers than Mr. Reed had exercised, 
and had used them to a large extent in opposing legislation 
desired by the new element in politics. In 1911 a change in 
the House rules was brought about, reducing the power of 
the Speaker and intrusting to a committee elected by the 
House much of the power he had held. 


The Republi¬ 
can Progres¬ 
sives. 


528 POLITICAL ADJUSTMENTS AND LEGISLATION 


Passing 
of former 
leaders. 


Legislative 
and executive 
progress. 


The growth of the Progressive movement was marked by 
the retirement of many of the men who for a long time had 
exercised a controlling influence in national politics. In 1907 
Mr. Spooner of Wisconsin resigned from the Senate. In 
1911 Senator Hale of Maine, who had been a member of that 
body since 1881 and had become the senior member in point 
of service, failed of reelection, and in the same year Senator 
Aldrich of Rhode Island declined reelection. In 1912 Senator 
Crane of Massachusetts announced that he would not be a 
candidate for reelection, and Senator Cullom of Illinois 
was defeated in the primary election in that state. These 
changes, with the deaths of Senator Hanna of Ohio, in 1904, 
of Senators Hawley and Platt of Connecticut in 1905, and of 
Senator Allison of Iowa in 1908, removed from political life 
more active leaders than had passed in any similarly short 
period except that between 1850 and 1854. 

With the Republican party divided on many issues, and the 
Democrats in control of the House after 1911, it was difficult 
to secure legislation. Yet a system of Postal Savings Banks 
was established by Congress in 1911, and in 1912 a Parcel 
Post. Postmaster-General Hitchcock, moreover, very much 
improved the administration of the Post Office, eliminating 
the deficit which had for many years existed in that depart¬ 
ment. A department of labor was established and a bureau to 
supervise mines, with a view to increasing the safety of the 
workers. Congress and the executive combined to press with 
vigor the construction of the Panama Canal. The splendid 
work of Colonel Gorgas in sanitation rendered the Isthmus 
safely habitable, while Colonel Goethals, of the army engineer¬ 
ing corps, pressed the work of construction even more rapidly 
than planned, insuring its readiness for use in 1914. The 
cost bids fair to be about four hundred millions, close to 
the estimates of 1909. Congress also recommended to 
the states two amendments to the federal Constitution: 
one giving Congress power to impose a national income 


NEW LEGISLATION 529 

tax such as the Supreme Court had declared unconstitutional 
during Cleveland’s administration, and the other providing 
for the popular election of United States senators. In 1913 
these proposals were ratified by the proper number of state 
legislatures, and they have become respectively the Sixteenth 
and Seventeenth Amendments to the Constitution. 

On controversial questions, however, action was blocked. 
The President was particularly interested in the question of 
the settlement of international disputes by arbitration and 
secured treaties with England and France which it was hoped 
would make war with those countries practically impossible. 
The Senate, however, fearing that the treaties diminished its 
constitutional powers over treaty making in the future, 
amended them in such a way as to limit their scope consid¬ 
erably. In 1911 and 1912 the Democratic House passed a 
number of bills reducing the tariff on certain classes of goods, 
such as woolens, which also passed the Senate by a combin¬ 
ation of Democrats and Progressive Republicans. The Presi¬ 
dent, however, vetoed them. Thus a partial deadlock 
existed, and public interest began to center in the next 
presidential campaign. 

In the meantime the executive conduct of President Taft 
was severely criticised, particularly with regard to the 
question of conservation. A controversy arose between Mr. 
Gifford Pinchot, Chief of the Forest Service, and Mr. Ballinger, 
Secretary of the Interior, with regard to what were known as 
the “Cunningham” coal claims in Alaska and to the opening 
up to public sale of certain lands on Controller Bay in the 
same territory. The Secretary was accused of having un¬ 
duly favored certain capitalists and having allowed them to 
obtain a practical monopoly of Alaskan coal, and these 
charges were widely believed. The President supported 
Mr. Ballinger, and Mr. Pinchot left office in 1910. In 1911 
Mr. Ballinger also resigned. A somewhat similar controversy 
arose in the Department of Agriculture over the enforcement 


Deadlock on 
arbitration 
and tariff. 


Criticism of 
the execu¬ 
tive. 


530 POLITICAL ADJUSTMENTS AND LEGISLATION 


The courts 
and the 
trusts. 


of the Pure Food Law, which resulted in the resignation of 
Dr. Wiley in 1912. 

The judicial system during Mr. Taft’s administration 
was also subject to more severe criticism than at any other 
time since the Johnson administration. In 1911 the Supreme 
Court, on suit brought by the Attorney-General, dissolved 
the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, the oldest of the 
trusts, holding it to be in violation of the Sherman Anti- 
Trust Law. While this action pleased the Progressives, the 
form of the decision did not. The Court held that the intent 
of the law was not to prevent all combinations in restraint of 
trade, but only those which were “ unreasonable.” It was 
argued by many that in “reading the word reasonable” into 
the law, the Court was amending an act of Congress, and was 
assuming legislative power. This decision brought to a head 
the dissatisfaction with the courts which had for some time 
been brewing, particularly because of their use of the injunction 
in labor troubles, and the decisions of both state and national 
courts declaring unconstitutional, laws representing the 
social, economic, and political tendencies of the time. Many 
began to demand that judges be subject to recall, and Cali¬ 
fornia adopted in 1911 an amendment to her constitution 
providing a method of recall. Subsequent decisions of the 
Supreme Court interpreting the Anti-Trust Law, such as that 
in the case of the Tobacco Trust in 1912, convinced many 
that the dissolutions ordered by the Court were not com¬ 
plete enough to be effective, and that the Anti-Trust Law 
was not, at least as interpreted, sufficient to restore an era of 
competition. Many others came to believe that com¬ 
petition could not be restored, and that combinations of 
capital should not be prohibited, but regulated. Attention, 
moreover, was attracted to the concentration of financial 
control in the hands of a few men, of whom J. Pierpont 
Morgan was the most important. It was claimed that a 
money trust existed, which practically held in its hands the 


CAMPAIGN OF 1912 531 

industrial and transportation trusts by supplying or denying 
them money. This trust was less tangible than the others, 
but if such control was exercised by any group of banks or 
bankers, the fact was of high importance. In 1912 the 
House of Representatives appointed a committee, headed by 
Mr. Pujo of Louisiana, to investigate the facts. 

Under these circumstances the election of 1912 ap¬ 
proached. President Taft was a candidate for reelection. 
The successful prosecution of several trusts by Attorney- 
General Wickersham, and the refusal of the Interstate Com¬ 
merce Commission to approve an increase of railroad rates, 
were unpopular with the “stand-pat” element of the party, but 
its leaders, nevertheless, determined to support the President. 
The Progressives, however, angered by the tariff vetoes, the 
dismissal of Pinchot, and other acts, disapproved his 
candidacy. Senators La Follette and Cummins both were 
declared candidates, but the bulk of the Progressive support 
went to ex-President Roosevelt, who made a vigorous cam¬ 
paign for the nomination. The convention which met in 
June was controlled by the conservative element and Presi¬ 
dent Taft was nominated. The balance of power in the 
convention, however, was held by delegates whose seats were 
contested. In practically all such contests the Taft dele¬ 
gates were seated by the national committee, which made up 
the temporary roll of the convention, and were finally recog¬ 
nized by the convention organized on the basis of this tem¬ 
porary roll. Mr. Roosevelt claimed that such action con¬ 
stituted a theft of the nomination. He maintained also that 
the bulk of Mr. Taft’s strength came from states, as those 
of the South, where the Republican party was small and 
powerless to secure electoral votes. He therefore refused 
to recognize the nomination of Mr. Taft, and subsequently 
a call was issued for a new convention to meet in August. 
At this latter convention he received the nomination for the 
presidency on the National Progressive ticket. The long- 


Split of the 
Republican 
party. 


Democratic 

nomination. 


532 POLITICAL ADJUSTMENTS AND LEGISLATION 

standing differences in the Republican party, therefore, 
finally resulted in a distinct split, although certain Progres¬ 
sives, such as Senator La Follette, distrusting Roosevelt 
personally, stood aloof from both candidates. 

The Democratic party looked forward confidently to elect¬ 
ing a President in 1912. The leading candidates were the 
men who had been brought to the front by the victory of 
1910; Mr. Clark of Missouri, Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, Mr. Underwood of Alabama, who as Chair¬ 
man of the Committee on Ways and Means had led the major¬ 
ity in the House, and various state governors, as Foss of 
Massachusetts, Baldwin of Connecticut, Wilson of New 
Jersey, Harmon of Ohio, and Marshall of Indiana, while 
many thought it possible that Mr. Bryan might be nominated 
for a fourth time although he was not a candidate. The 
Democratic party, like the Republican, was divided into 
Conservatives and Progressives, although the division was not 
so acute. Of the candidates, Governor Harmon, who had 
been Attorney-General during Cleveland’s second administra¬ 
tion, was regarded as most pleasing to the Conservatives. 
Governor Wilson was a newcomer in politics. He had been 
for many years well known as a writer on political and 
historical subjects, and in his Congressional Government , 
published in 1885, had for the first time called public atten¬ 
tion to the method by which Congress actually did its work 
— that is, by the committee system. His occupation, how¬ 
ever, was education, and he resigned the presidency of 
Princeton University only in 1910 to become governor of 
New Jersey. In that position he was instrumental in securing 
the adoption of a comprehensive scheme of progressive meas¬ 
ures, and he was generally regarded as the most progressive 
of the candidates. Speaker Clark was regarded as standing 
between the extremes and for a time seemed likely to secure 
the nomination, receiving at one time a majority vote in 
the convention. The Democrats, however, adhered to the 


CAMPAIGN ISSUES 


533 


two-thirds rule as had been their custom from their first 
convention in 1832. Mr. Bryan attended the convention and 
fought to have the party declare for a progressive platform 
and a candidate absolutely progressive in fact and in repu¬ 
tation. In this fight he was successful, and on the forty- 
sixth ballot Woodrow Wilson was nominated. 

As the campaign progressed the main issues came to be, 
besides a strongly felt, though somewhat vague, difference 
between Conservatives and Progressives, the tariff and the 
trusts. Both Mr. Taft and Mr. Roosevelt stood for a protec¬ 
tive system but for a revision of the existing law, in accordance 
with expert advice, toward lower rates. Mr. Wilson stood for 
immediate, but gradual, revision downward toward a tariff for 
revenue. On the trusts, Mr. Taft stood for the enforcement 
of the Sherman Law with the idea of reestablishing compe¬ 
tition. Mr. Wilson believed that the Sherman Law, with 
additional legislation and a properly adjusted tariff, would re¬ 
store competition. Mr. Roosevelt maintained his idea that 
not all trusts were bad, that in many cases monopolistic con¬ 
centration was economically necessary, and that strong regula¬ 
tive measures by the national government could prevent 
abuses. The campaign was marked, as that preceding the 
nominations had been, by personal charges and counter¬ 
charges, and the personal factor was unusually important in 
determining the result. Hundreds of thousands voted ac¬ 
cording to the confidence they felt in the one candidate or 
theA>ther, rather than from a clear opinion on the points at 
issue. 

In the election Mr. Wilson carried forty states and 435 
electoral votes, and the Democrats secured an overwhelming 
majority in the House and a small one in the Senate. In 
the popular vote Mr. Wilson, with about six million three hun¬ 
dred thousand, ran somewhat behind the figures previously 
obtained by Mr. Bryan. As many previously Republicans 
voted for him, the difference was somewhat greater than 


Campaign 

issues. 


Election of 
1912. 


534 POLITICAL ADJUSTMENTS AND LEGISLATION 


Historical 

accounts. 


would at first appear. Probably the bulk of the Democrats 
who left their party voted for Mr. Roosevelt, who received a 
popular vote of about four million one hundred thousand, 
and 88 electoral votes. The states that he carried included 
Pennsylvania in the East and California and Washington in 
the West. In twenty-two states he ran second. Mr. Taft’s 
three and a half million popular votes were inadequately rep¬ 
resented by 8 electoral votes, those of Vermont and Utah. 
In nineteen he ran second. The Republicans, however, either 
because Mr. Roosevelt’s personal popularity exceeded the 
drawing power of the new party, or because the short time in¬ 
tervening between the convention and the election prevented 
widespread organization by the Progressive party, won most 
of the congressional districts not carried by the Democrats, 
and upon them would fall the burden of organized opposi¬ 
tion. As Mr. Wilson and Mr. Roosevelt were both regarded 
as Progressives, although many Democrats and some Republi¬ 
cans of conservative tendencies voted for the former, it was 
obvious that a very great majority of voters were dissatis¬ 
fied with existing conditions and demanded an effective con¬ 
sideration of the new problems with which the nation finds 
itself confronted. While no such legislative revolution as 
those of 1800 and i860 seems impending, the election prob¬ 
ably marks the end of the recent period of hesitation and a 
definite launching upon a new era of national organiza¬ 
tion. 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 

Allen, P. L., America’s Awakening , containing short sketches 
of contemporary leaders. LaFollette, R. M., Autobiography. 
Leupp, F. E., The Man Roosevelt. McCarthy, Charles, The 
Wisconsin Idea. Munroe, W. B., Initiative , Referendum , and 
Recall. Ogg, F. A., National Progress , 1907-1917, vol. 27 of The 
American Nation. Paxson, F. L., The New Nation , vol. 4 of River¬ 
side Series. Roosevelt, T., An Autobiography. 


CHAPTER XXX 


THE NEW DEMOCRACY 

In 1913 for the first time since 1861 the Democrats came 
into effective control of the government. Between 1893 
and 1895 they had held the presidency and a majority in 
both houses, but internal divisions had prevented the carry¬ 
ing out of a logical program. Now harmony seemed 
possible. The first effect of the political revolution was to 
bring into administrative responsibility a new group of 
leaders. Naturally an unusual proportion came from the 
South. Of ten cabinet members, four were: J. C. McRey- 
nolds of Tennessee, Attorney-general; A. S. Burleson of 
Texas, Postmaster General; Josephus Daniels of North 
Carolina, Secretary of the Navy; and D. F. Houston of Mis¬ 
souri, Secretary of Agriculture. The South was still stronger influence of 
in Congress. Clark and Underwood continued as speaker the South " 
and floor leader respectively in the House, while in the 
Senate F. M. Simmons of North Carolina became chairman 
of the committee on finance and J. S. Williams of Mississippi 
the chief spokesman of the administration. 

It was the West, however, which furnished the new re- Bryan, 
gime, with its most compelling figure in William Jennings 
Bryan. Thrice defeated for the presidency, and without 
having served in public office since his brief tenure in Con¬ 
gress nearly twenty years before, he had never lost the hold 
on the people he had established in the thrilling campaign 
of 1896. From a thousand political and Chautauqua plat¬ 
forms his geniality constantly radiated, and the magnetism 
of his good nature and his uprightness tied millions to him 
. 535 


536 


THE NEW DEMOCRACY 


Social 

changes. 


Woodrow 

Wilson. 


as to a friend. In a sense unusually real he had made Mr. 
Wilson President, and the latter’s administration could not 
have accomplished a single one of its aims had Bryan been 
slighted; as a matter of course he was offered the principal 
position in the cabinet, and became Secretary of State. Yet 
his appointment was disapproved by many. Some, believ¬ 
ing him to be moved chiefly by political ambition, feared 
he would betray the administration. Others feared his 
radical tendencies. Still more doubted his ability satisfac¬ 
torily to administer large responsibilities and particularly 
foreign affairs. In practice his personal relations with the 
President showed his genuine good faith, while the con¬ 
fidence that his presence in the cabinet gave to the more 
radical element in the party afforded the leaders a greater 
freedom in handling public questions, and particularly that 
of the currency, than could have been attained in any other 
way. His management of diplomacy was more open to 
criticism, and particularly his choice of ministers to foreign 
countries showed in some instances that lack of a discrimi¬ 
nating judgment of men which is so often the concomitant 
of good nature. In addition he exercised a leading influence 
in changing the social tone of official life at Washington, to 
harmonize more with that of the usual American household. 
His decision to serve no wine at the official banquets was 
criticized, but was also widely approved. The abolition of 
the use of wine in the navy by Secretary Daniels still further 
emphasized the temperance tendencies of the new order. 

People were not long in learning, however, that the real 
leader of the new administration was to be the President. 
Woodrow Wilson came to office with less political experience 
than any of his predecessors except Taylor and Grant, but 
without hesitation he assumed the leadership, and soon 
demonstrated a driving force seldom before equaled. Reti¬ 
cent and unspectacular, he convinced the public of his com¬ 
plete probity and his absolute independence. His influence 


WOODROW WILSON 


537 


with Congress lay in his simple and direct expression of the 
requirements of public opinion and of morality as he saw 
them. With a scholar’s disregard of tradition, he threw 
aside that which Jefferson had established of restricting 
communication between Congress and the executive to 
writing, and read his messages in person. With an unshak¬ 
able insistence on his own views, not unlike that of Jackson, 
Polk, and Cleveland, he possessed something of the persua¬ 
siveness of Jefferson. He pushed through obstacles to 
achievement with joy in the fight and with unusual success. 
Whether he will prove equally successful in dealing with 
questions where combination, conciliation, and compromise 
are necessary, is yet a question. 

Confronted by the not unjust demand of a party long out 
of power for a prompt redistribution of public offices, he 
nevertheless succeeded in clearing Washington of office- 
seekers and developing his policy in peace. In the case of 
officers subject to confirmation by the Senate, except those 
in the diplomatic and consular corps, the majority were 
allowed to complete their terms, at the close of which, in 
most cases, new men, Democrats, were nominated. The 
consular service was left on the whole untouched; the 
diplomatic service, on the other hand, was almost altogether 
renewed. 

If there was any one task which public opinion imposed 
upon the victorious party, it was. the revision of the tariff. 
A special session of Congress was called, and Mr. Under¬ 
wood presented a bill which had been in preparation since 
1911. While to some extent a compromise like all tariff 
bills, it was quite obviously based on the principle of revenue 
rather than protection. The rates on cotton, iron, and 
woolen manufactures were reduced, in some cases to less 
than half those previously in force ; to the free list were 
added many of our own products, chiefly raw materials such 
as wool and lumber; while, on the other hand, duties were 


The civil 
service. 


Tariff and 
income tax. 


538 


THE NEW DEMOCRACY 


imposed on certain raw materials not produced in America 
and free under the protective acts. It was estimated that 
on the whole the customs revenue would be reduced, and so, 
as in 1894, an income tax was added. The sixteenth amend¬ 
ment having settled the question of constitutionality, its 
proceeds could now be counted upon. It exempted incomes 
under three thousand dollars, or four thousand in the case 
of married couples, and the rate was graduated, rising with 
the income. The corporation tax which had been adopted 
in 1911 was continued, though in modified form. The bill 
was signed by the President October 3, 1913. Embodying 
as it did an almost complete revision of our revenue system, 
it was not without some surprise that the financial year 
closed July 1,1914, with an almost exact balance of revenue 
and expenditure. Its economic results were less easy to 
gauge, and its effects on prices and on trusts were by no 
means certain when the next congressional election took 
place. 

President Wilson feared that the passage of new tariff 
would be followed by what he subsequently called a psy¬ 
chological panic ; that is, business depression produced not 
by actual adverse conditions, but by fear of such conditions 
aggregated by the desire of many financial leaders to prove 
the new policy a mistake. To prevent such an occurrence 
he urged that the same session of Congress which passed 
the tariff should pass also a currency bill. The adminis¬ 
tration measure, known as the Glass-Owen bill, was largely 
based upon information gathered by the Aldrich commission, 
although it did not follow its main recommendations. 
Amended vigorously in the Senate, it became a law before 
Congress met in regular session, December, 1913. Its pur¬ 
pose was to decentralize and bring under public control the 
banking resources of the country, and to provide a currency 
which should be more elastic without being less sound. In 
practice there had grown up a distinction between “ country 


FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS 


539 


banks ” and certain great institutions, particularly in New 
York. In the latter the “ country banks ” deposited their 
cash reserves, on which they received interest. It resulted 
that the control of bank resources was strongly centralized, 
and there is little doubt that during the panic of 1907 J. P. 
Morgan practically handled the available cash of the nation. 
This distinction was recognized by the creation of “ Federal 
Reserve Banks,” whose number, between the limits of eight 
and twelve, and whose location were left to executive dis¬ 
cretion. The stockholders and customers of these new 
banks were to be banks, their directors were to represent 
the banks, the business community, and the government, 
and they were to be supervised by a Federal Reserve Board 
of seven government officials, including the Secretary of the 
Treasury, who were to be advised by a Federal Advisory 
Council chosen by the Reserve banks. National banks 
were obliged to subscribe for stock, and state banks and 
trust companies were permitted to do so, though it was dis¬ 
covered that many of them were prevented by state laws. 
The new banks were to hold in deposit reserve funds for the 
banks, to act as clearing houses, to have powers of foreign 
exchange, and in general to do for the smaller banks what 
had been done by the great institutions of New York. The 
established currency of the country was not disturbed, but 
the Federal Reserve Board was given power to issue through 
the Reserve banks, a new paper currency, based in part on 
cash reserves, though they could be at times disregarded, 
and in part on the ordinary instruments of credit, as short¬ 
term notes. This currency was to be receivable for all public 
dues, and to be redeemable in gold at Washington. It was 
intended that it should be issued chiefly in times of panic, 
when private credit was distrusted, and it was arranged 
that it should flow back and be destroyed when not needed. 

These two laws represented the most fundamental change 
in the revenue, banking, and currency system which had 


Trust legis¬ 
lation. 


Election 
of 1914. 


540 THE NEW DEMOCRACY 

been made since the Civil War. During its regular session, 
1913 to 1914, Congress devoted its energies largely to the 
trust question. The Clayton act amended the Sherman act 
in the light of a quarter of a century of experience, and a 
Federal Trade Commission was created to control corpora¬ 
tions doing general business in more than one state, with 
powers somewhat similar to, though not so extensive as, 
those of the Interstate Commerce Commission over corpora¬ 
tions engaged in interstate transportation. 

These new acts had not been long enough in operation 
when the congressional elections of 1914 occurred, for the 
public to have gained any distinct impression as to their 
effect. The outbreak of the Great War, moreover, so com¬ 
plicated the economic conditions of the whole world, that 
even the closest student was at a loss in disentangling the 
results of war from those of legislation. The elections, there¬ 
fore, had no great political significance. The most impor¬ 
tant feature was the return of more than half the Progres¬ 
sives to the Republican fold. The latter party gained still 
further votes from the reaction that seems always to follow 
a great victory in the presidential year; it carried several 
states which had voted for Wilson, and sent to the House 
some of its old leaders defeated in 1912, such as Mr. Cannon, 
and many new members. The Democrats, however, retained 
a working majority in the House, and increased their lead in 
the Senate. 

Meantime the attention of the country was more or less 
withdrawn from internal affairs, by a number of foreign 
complications. The chief interest of Secretary Bryan in his 
department lay in the cause of peace, and he negotiated a 
series of new arbitration treaties, designed to prevent the 
hasty outbreak of war. Of particular questions, that of the 
rights of Japanese subjects in California was especially 
troublesome, owing to the inability of the national govern¬ 
ment to control state legislation. The desire of Congress to 


THE MONROE DOCTRINE 


541 


exempt American vessels from tolls for the use of the Panama 
Canal, which was incorporated in the law of 1913 regulating 
its use, brought about difficulties with Great Britain, for the 
Hay-Pauncefote treaty of 1901 had provided that there should 
be no discrimination. President Wilson maintained that this 
was an international obligation which it was our duty to 
observe, and in 1914 Congress withdrew the exemption. 

A more important and perplexing problem, however, 
involved Mexico and the Monroe Doctrine. Under the 
Roosevelt and Taft administrations the doctrine had gradu¬ 
ally been extended to include the interposition of the United 
States in disputes between European and Spanish-American 
states, and our assumption of responsibility for seeing that 
the latter lived up to their obligations. In 1911 we asserted 
that no foreign corporation should be allowed to receive con¬ 
cessions that might prove dangerous to us at strategic points 
in America, though outside our jurisdiction. The coloniz¬ 
ing activity of the Japanese began to excite some alarm, but 
we maintained our principles of exclusion against her also, 
although we did not, as in the case of the European powers, 
abstain from all interference with Asiatic affairs. It was still 
our obvious purpose to prevent the establishment of any for¬ 
eign influence on American soil, which should serve as a basis 
for a system of balance of power such as exists in Europe, 
Asia, and Africa. At the same time our attention had be¬ 
come more and more centered about the Caribbean, that por¬ 
tion of South America south of the equator not being so inti¬ 
mately within our sphere of influence, and being also more 
self-sufficing, dominated as it came to be by the orderly and 
established governments of Brazil, Argentina, and Chile. 

Mexico, the most important country in our immediate 
vicinity, had long seemed quiet, and billions of dollars had 
been invested in her progress by Americans, English, French, 
Germans, Spaniards, and men of other nationalities. In 
1911 her tranquillity vanished with the passing of the Diaz 


The Monroe 
Doctrine. 


Troubles in 
Mexico. 


542 


THE NEW DEMOCRACY 


Pan-Ameri¬ 

canism. 


Protection 
of the 
border. 


regime. His successor, Madero, was overthrown by General 
Huerta in 1913, and was imprisoned and shot. Huerta 
assumed the presidency, only to face the immediate revolt 
of the north, under Carranza, governor of the state of 
Coahuila. President Wilson refused to recognize any govern¬ 
ment in Mexico, on the ground that we could not morally 
give cognizance to a government founded on violence and 
without constitutional authority. He believed that our fail¬ 
ure to recognize Huerta would deprive the latter of credit, 
and that by “ watchful waiting ” we should see the quiet 
extinction of his government, and a return to peace and 
order. This “ nonrecognition,” although it seemed to many 
unduly passive on our part, really marked the most extreme 
extension of the Monroe Doctrine, for it involved us for the 
first time in a general supervision of the internal affairs of 
the American republics. 

Unofficially we treated with Huerta, who controlled south¬ 
eastern Mexico, and Carranza, who controlled the northwest. 
Difficulties with Huerta led in March, 1914, to the occupa¬ 
tion of Vera Cruz by United States troops. At this point 
the A, B, C governments of South America — Argentina, Bra¬ 
zil, and Chile — offered, and we accepted, mediation, a con¬ 
ference being held at Niagara Falls which did much toward 
preventing war. In addition, it helped convince Spanish 
America that our policy was disinterested, and became the 
starting point of a new departure in Pan-Americanism, which 
at the meeting of the American Scientific Congress at Wash¬ 
ington in December, 1915, developed a cordiality never be¬ 
fore reached. 

In Mexico confusion continued. Carranza overthrew 
Huerta, only to be attacked by his own lieutenant Villa. 
Our government possessed a weapon of interference in the 
control of the shipment of arms, which Congress had placed 
in the hands of the President. At first we supported Villa, 
but upon his defeat by Carranza, we came to pin our hopes 


PROTECTION OF THE BORDER 


543 


of order upon the latter, and in November, 1915, recognized 
his government. Villa, however, remained at large, and in 
the spring of 1916 emerged from his mountain hiding places 
and raided our territory. The President promptly ordered 
General Pershing with twelve thousand regulars to cross 
into Mexico, on the ground that the Mexican government 
was not able to restrain its citizens and we were justified in 
taking what steps were necessary to defend our border. He 
also ordered out our state militia to replace the regulars 
along our side of the border. The whole operation was 
under the charge of General Funston, who had won his 
reputation by the capture of Aguinaldo in the Philippines. 
A joint commission of United States and Mexican repre¬ 
sentatives was, in the meantime, arranged, which we hoped 
would discuss the general problem of the regeneration of 
Mexico. This hope, however, proved delusive. Villa re¬ 
mained uncaught and grew in strength, and, this new policy 
having failed to produce pacification, the regulars were, 
early in 1917, withdrawn from Mexico, and the return of 
the militia, after six months of hard training, was begun. 

Suddenly in August, 1914, more than half the world was 
involved in war. The United States was confronted by a 
greater world conflict than that of the Napoleonic period. 
While it was relatively stronger than it had been a century 
before, the growth of trade and intercourse had rendered the 
fabric of its civilization more dependent upon that of other 
nations, and the fact that its population was composed of 
immigrants from both the warring groups, suggested the 
possibility of a division of sentiment more dangerous than 
that between the French and British sympathizers under 
Washington. 

In the face of these dangers the Wilson administration 
determined to pursue a policy of strict neutrality based upon 
those precedents and agreements relating to the rights and 
the duties of neutrals which had developed out of our past 


The Great 
War. 


Administra¬ 
tion policy. 


544 


THE NEW DEMOCRACY 


Diplomatic 

service. 


International 

problems. 


experience. In by far the greater number of instances these 
practices were admitted by both belligerents to be the law 
governing their actions. In some cases, however, there were 
disputes, and in others the belligerents claimed that modern 
conditions rendered an old rule obsolete or alleged that the 
disregard of some rule by the other belligerent justified a 
departure from that or from some other rule on their own 
part. The disputes arising from these causes in the case of 
Great Britain and her allies related for the most part to 
trade; those with Germany and her allies, to the personal 
safety of Americans on the high seas. The administration 
persistently asserted the American position in all such cases, 
and in June, 1915, Mr. Bryan resigned from the state depart¬ 
ment on the ground that our policy should be directed pri¬ 
marily to the maintenance of peace rather than the mainte¬ 
nance of our rights. He was succeeded by Robert Lansing, 
a man of wide knowledge of international law but without 
great political experience. His appointment indicated that 
the exigencies of the foreign situation were recognized as 
greater than those of domestic politics. 

As in all similar cases, we found that neutrality had its 
duties. Most of the belligerent countries requested us to 
take charge of their affairs in the countries with which they 
were at war. The performance of this courtesy did not in¬ 
volve us in expense, but called for a greatly increased staff. 
This led to reorganization and the passage of a law, Febru¬ 
ary 5, 1915, which placed the entire diplomatic service, with 
the exception of the ministers and ambassadors, upon a 
classified basis. To prevent the use of our territory for hos¬ 
tile purposes, of which there were many instances early in 
the war, it was found necessary to reorganize and increase 
our secret service. Since the summer of 1915, it has been 
effective. 

As the war went on, Germany and her allies were cut off 
from the outside world by the operations of Great Britain 


INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS 


545 


and her allies. While this caused some industrial distress 
in the United States, the volume of our commerce increased 
enormously, owing to the demands of the British allies for 
war munitions and supplies of all kinds. The scope of our 
manufacturing expanded, and, in particular, our long lan¬ 
guishing merchant marine revived without the national 
assistance which the administration at first thought would 
be necessary. While it was in accordance with our policy 
and with international law for a neutral to trade wherever 
possible, many German sympathizers and peace advocates 
urged that we put a total embargo on the export of muni¬ 
tions. Extremists on the other side thought we should have 
protested against the violation of Belgian neutrality at the 
opening of the war, and after the sinking of the Lusitania , 
May 7, 1915; without warning, by a submarine, and with 
the loss of many American lives, demanded immediate war 
with Germany. The administration insisted that the prac¬ 
tice of which this was an example was intolerable, but con¬ 
tinued the negotiations it had begun when, in February, 
1915, Germany had first announced this policy. Finally, after 
the sinking of the Sussex in March, 1916, Germany agreed, 
May 4, to abandon its practice of sinking vessels indis¬ 
criminately wdthout warning. As we passed through crisis 
after crisis, the chance that the United States might be 
forced to take part in the war became more evident, and 
attention was devoted to the problem of preparation. 
Upon the question of creating a permanent national volun¬ 
teer force, standing between the regular army and the 
militia, the secretary of war, Mr. Garrison, resigned, and was 
replaced by Mr. Baker. Congress finally, in 1916, passed 
the Hay bill, a complicated measure, which provided for the 
strengthening of the regular army and the militia, and the 
creation of a corps of reserve officers. The execution of 
this measure was much interfered with by the high wages in 
industry, and a vigorous movement for universal compul- 


546 


THE NEW DEMOCRACY 


Nominations, 

19x6. 


Campaign, 

1916. 


sory service began to make headway. With little opposition 
or discussion, a great expansion of the navy was provided for. 

Under these circumstances the election of 1916 drew near. 
The Democrats, without hesitation, renominated Wilson and 
Marshall. The Republicans, by a great majority, called 
Mr. Hughes from the Supreme Court, with Mr. Fairbanks 
of Indiana as his running mate. The Progressives, meet¬ 
ing at the same time, again selected Mr. Roosevelt, just be¬ 
fore Mr. Hughes’s nomination, and very possibly in the hope 
that he would receive the Republican nomination also. 
When Mr. Hughes accepted, however, Mr. Roosevelt gave 
him his support. The Progressive vice-presidential candi¬ 
date, Mr. Parker of Louisiana, refused to retire, and the 
disposition of the Progressive party became one of the chief 
problems of the campaign. It was a poor year for third 
parties. The Socialist vote decreased, the Prohibition can¬ 
didate received but small support in spite of the growing 
popularity of that issue, and the Progressives were impor¬ 
tant only as individuals who might vote with one of the 
major parties, and whose good will might be secured by 
recognition of their principles. 

The campaign turned chiefly upon foreign relations. 
Hughes and Roosevelt urged that a more emphatic policy 
by our government would not have brought on war but 
would have secured better recognition of our rights by both 
belligerents. The official German-American organizations 
supported Hughes. W T ilson was attacked in the East as 
pro-German; in the West, as pro-British. A strong appeal 
was made to the women who since 1912 had secured the 
vote in Nevada, Montana, and Illinois; making twelve 
states in all, of which Kansas and Illinois alone were east of 
the region of the Rocky Mountains. The Republicans sent 
a woman’s train through the country, and declared in favor 
of the Susan B. Anthony amendment, making woman suf¬ 
frage national. Wilson declared in favor of woman suffrage 


CAMPAIGN, 1916 


547 


by state action, and the Democratic voters called on the 
women especially to vote for the man “ who kept us out 
of war.” A new issue was suddenly injected into the cam¬ 
paign by a threatened national strike of railroad men. 
President Wilson, after many conferences, recommended to 
Congress a program granting the men their demand for 
an eight-hour day, and including other measures intended to 
prevent a recurrence of such a situation. Congress passed 
only the eight-hour provision, in the form of the Adamson 
bill. The strike was averted, but many felt that a danger¬ 
ous precedent had been created in that Congress had acted 
under stress of an ultimatum by a single industrial interest. 

The election brought out a new sectional division, long 
existent but not so apparent in politics, and the importance 
of the Far West. Hughes carried all the East and the old 
Northwest, except New Hampshire and Ohio, and almost 
nothing else. The result was uncertain for days, awaiting 
news from California, emphasizing in the public mind the 
shift of the political center, which for so many years had 
been in New York. While the greater number of women 
voters favored Wilson, their vote was not very dissimilar 
from that of the men in the regions where they voted, and 
few conclusions could be drawn from their actions. Wilson 
was reelected by an electoral vote of 277 to 254, and by a 
popular plurality of about half a million. The Democrats 
retained control of the Senate, but neither party secured a 
majority in the House, where the balance rested with five 
independents and small party men. 

Assured of popular support, President Wilson initiated a 
more positive policy with reference to the Great War. He 
asked the various belligerents to state to us the terms upon 
which they would be willing to make peace, and, in a speech 
to the Senate, he urged that a world federation to enforce 
peace, if founded upon principles in accordance with our 
ideals, would not be a violation of our traditional policies, 


Election, 

1916. 


An effort 
for peace. 


548 


THE NEW DEMOCRACY 


The Great 
War at the 
end of 1916. 


Germany de¬ 
cides to risk 
war with 
the United 
States. 


Sources. 

Historical 

accounts. 


and asked for consideration of such a project. Before dis¬ 
cussion had taken shape, however, a new crisis was upon us. 

In the meantime, three campaigns had brought no military 
decision in the Great War. The initial drive of the Germans 
failed to reduce France, though it won control of Belgium and 
the richest industrial regions of France. The Verdun drive 
of 1916 left the French army and spirit still intact. Germany 
had indeed realized for the moment her dream of Mittel- 
Europa, occupying Serbia, crushing Roumania, and so open¬ 
ing a path to the Orient. The British, however, still held 
its gates, Egypt and Mesopotamia, had quenched the back 
fires of revolt Germany had raised in India and other parts 
of the world, and with their allies had taken most of the 
German colonies. Their blockade, growing in intensity, was 
causing great scarcity in Germany. 

Under these circumstances there was a bitter struggle 
within the governing class of Germany, between those who 
thought her aggressive designs should be given up for the 
present and a reasonable peace concluded, and those who 
wished to make the final gamble: the indiscriminate, un¬ 
lawful use of submarines. They believed that it was pos¬ 
sible thus to separate Europe from America, as Russia was 
separated from the Western Powers; and that it would 
therefore be a matter of military indifference whether the 
United States came into the war or not. At the end of 
1916, this extreme military party won the upper hand. 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 

Current History , published by the New York Times. Gerard, 
J. W., My Four Years in Germany. 

Corwin, E. S., The President's Control of Foreign Relations. 
Fish, C. R., American Diplomacy. Ogg, F. A., National Progress , 
1907-1917 , vol. 27 of the American Nation. Paxson, F. L., The 
New Nation, vol. 4 of Riverside Series. Robinson, E. E., and 
West, V. J., The Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson. 


CHAPTER XXXI 

THE UNITED STATES IN THE GREAT WAR 

On January 31, 1917, Germany withdrew her pledge of 
May 4, 1916, limiting the activity of her submarines within 
lawful bounds. After careful deliberation, and in the face 
of our protests, she announced her intention of waging war 
to the death against all merchant ships, enemy or neutral, in 
certain ‘‘ zones,” which included those parts of the seas where 
most of our ocean-going marine was employed. 

On February 3 President Wilson, personally addressing 
Congress, announced that he had recalled Mr. Gerard, our 
ambassador to Germany, and had given Count von Bern- 
storff, the German ambassador to the United States, his 
passports. Still bent on exhausting every possibility of 
peace, he recommended not war, but armed neutrality, such 
as we had employed in 1798 against France, in order that 
Germany might be absolutely convinced of our determination 
to defend our rights, and have still a chance to withhold her 
hand. In accordance with this recommendation, a measure 
for arming our merchant ships was prepared, which was 
supported by an overwhelming majority in both houses of 
Congress, but was prevented from passing at that session 
by “a little group of willful” senators, who “filibustered” 
against it, taking advantage of every technicality of the 
Senate rules of debate. Nevertheless the President, assured 
of the support of immense majorities in both houses, on 
March 12, proclaimed an “armed neutrality” in force. 

What was in February a threat, became in April a fact. 
In March five American ships were sunk without warning, 

549 


Germany 
flouts inter¬ 
national law. 


Armed 

neutrality. 


War 

exists. 


550 


THE GREAT WAR 


The issue. 


and twenty American lives lost. Moreover a diplomatic 
note of January 19 was made public, signed and later acknowl¬ 
edged by Mr. Zimmermann of the German foreign office, pro¬ 
posing to Mexico an aggressive alliance against us in case 
we went to war with Germany, and suggesting that Mexico 
take measures to bring Japan into the alliance. A flood of 
evidence began to rush upon us, showing that Germany, in 
violation of her professions and of international law, had 
been using our territory as a base for operations not only 
against her enemies, but against us also. For years she had 
supported a propaganda intended to make our German-born 
population loyal to her, rather than to the United States, to 
whom most of them had sworn allegiance. During the war 
she spent millions here to win public opinion and to influence 
Congress. Her spies made their way into the centers of 
government, sought to demoralize our labor system, and 
recklessly destroyed American lives by blowing up factories, 
docks, and ships. It was evident that Germany had been 
waging war against us for nearly three years. On April 2, 
1917, President Wilson recommended that Congress accept 
the state of war thus thrust upon us, and on April 6 Congress 
voted a declaration of war. 

President Wilson pointed out that while we had not 
entered the war until it was plainly evident that Germany 
was actually fighting us, we sought “nothing for ourselves' 
but what we shall wish to share with all free peoples.” 
“We have no quarrel with the German people. ... It 
was not upon their impulse that their government acted in 
entering this war.” He reasserted his hope of world federa¬ 
tion, but stated: “A steadfast concert for peace can never 
be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. 
No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith 
within it or to observe its covenants.” He did not recom¬ 
mend immediate war upon Germany’s allies, Austria- 
Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria. With the enemies of 


AMERICAN IDEALS 551 

Germany, — Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy, and 
many smaller nations, — he recommended the most inti¬ 
mate cooperation, but not alliance. His analysis of the 
struggle*as one between democracy and autocracy had just 
received striking confirmation in a democratic revolution in 
Russia. 

In entering the Great War, the United States seemed to 
many to be breaking away from a safe anchorage in which 
the wisdom of Washington and Jefferson had moored her, 
and John Quincy Adams, with the Monroe Doctrine, had 
secured her. President Wilson, however, as spokesman of 
the American people, made it abundantly evident that our 
country continued to seek the same ends and to be inspired 
by the same purposes as in the past. In his message to 
Russia, June 9, 1917, he said: “No people must be forced 
under sovereignty under which it does not wish to live. No 
territory must change hands except for the purpose of secur¬ 
ing those who inhabit it a fair chance of life and liberty.” 
Such self-determination of peoples, and non-intervention 
with their domestic affairs, has been the aim of Americans 
from the days of John Winthrop. In his reply of August 27, 
1917, to the Pope’s proposal for peace, he said: “They [the 
American people] believe that peace should rest upon the 
rights of peoples, not the rights of Governments. . . . The 
test, therefore, of every plan of peace is this: Is it based 
Upon the faith of all the peoples involved?” This is the 
very essence of the Declaration of Independence: “That to 
secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, 
deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.” 

The means of securing these purposes have ever varied. 
In the Revolution we were content to secure them for our¬ 
selves alone. The experiences of the Napoleonic wars 
convinced us that we could not safely anticipate their en¬ 
joyment by ourselves unless they prevailed throughout 
the American continents. The tightening, by steam and 


American 

ideals. 


New 

methods. 


552 


THE GREAT WAR 


Navy and 
loans. 


electricity, of the bonds which hold the world together had 
long caused many to think of the whole world as that house 
which Lincoln said “divided against itself, cannot stand.” 
The aggressions of Germany convinced President Wilson 
that a world half autocratic and half free cannot be “safe 
for democracy.” 

Our leaders had never taught that we lived for ourselves 
alone. Lincoln believed that the fundamental issue at stake 
in the Civil War was democracy, that it was our duty to 
prove to the world, for the world, that democracy could be 
efficient; for if it could not govern our area, intended by 
nature to be one, it must yield to such form of government 
as could. President Wilson believed that in 1917 democracy 
must prove its strength against autocracy. If, through 
division or failure to organize its strength, democracy were 
to fail, the world would fall to the victor. To maintain 
our deep-seated ideals, it was no longer sufficient to separate 
ourselves and our immediate neighbors from Europe. We 
must recognize our neighborhood with the whole world. In 
his message to Russia, he said: “The brotherhood of man¬ 
kind must no longer be a fair but empty phrase; it must be 
given a structure of force and reality. The nations must 
realize their common life and effect a workable partnership 
to secure that life against the aggressions of autocratic and 
self-pleasing power.” 

Two things only could we do at once; send our navy and 
lend money. Our fleet was ready for instant action, and 
steamed to join the navies of our associates in keeping open 
the lanes of traffic against the submarines. Money we had 
in plenty, but to lend it, we had to work out a financial sys¬ 
tem. It was decided to raise funds in part by increased 
taxation and in part by loans. In 1917, $2,000,000,000 was 
borrowed at 3^%, and nearly $4,000,000,000 at 4%; in 
1918, $11,000,000,000 at 4}%; in 19x9, $4,500,000,000 at 
3§% and 4f%. Popular subscription was relied on, 


MILITARY SERVICE 553 

and the “Liberty Loan” drives were made campaigns of 
education as to the purposes of the war. 

By an act of October 3, 1917, income taxes were greatly increased 
increased, particularly in the case of large incomes, and other taxes ‘ 
internal taxes were increased in amount and variety. As 
many industries had been stimulated by the war demands of 
Europe for three years, we could not use the European system 
of taxing “war profits,” but laid a heavy general “excess 
profits” tax. It was estimated that these taxes would meet 
one third of our expenses, a very large ratio for a nation to 
pay by taxation in war time. Actually they produced a still 
larger proportion. 

The army was in much better condition than ever before, The army, 
but was woefully unequal to the demands upon it. An 
increase of the regular army was already provided for, and in 
a year it almost quadrupled by volunteering. The National 
Guard, under the act of June 3, 1916, became at once, in war 
time, part of the “army of the United States.” The main 
reliance for numbers, however, was upon a selective service 
draft, authorized May 18, 1917. On June 5, 9,659,382 men 
between the ages of 21 and 30 were registered, from whom 
men were called to service as the provisions for training them 
were created. Before the first could be called, however, it 
was necessary to provide trained officers. Officers’ camps 
were established, where, under rapid and skillful instruction, 
thousands of young Americans were given the elements of the 
profession of war. On September 12, 1918, men between the 
ages of 18 and 45 were registered. 

The chief contributions desired from the United States, Food and 
however, were food and ships. Three years of the most ships * 
devastating war the world has ever seen, with the employ¬ 
ment of tens of millions of the world’s workers in the battle 
line and in war industries, had produced a condition in which 
only by changes of diet habits, and by most exact distribution, 
could the world be fed. At the same time the enormous toll 


5S4 


THE GREAT WAR 


Shipping 

policy. 


Control of 
food, fuel, 
and trans¬ 
portation. 


taken by the Submarines from the world’s merchant tonnage 
threatened to sever us from France, at the very time when 
we were uniting our fortunes with hers. 

Already in 1916, a Shipping Board, with powers similar to 
those of the Interstate Commerce Commission, had been 
authorized. In April, 1917, the United States Shipping 
Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, with a capital of 
$50,000,000 belonging to the national government, was 
authorized to undertake ship construction, and a Shipping 
Committee of the National Council of Defense was appointed 
to establish full cooperation between public and private 
agencies. Thus organized, the United States began to be 
again a great shipbuilding nation. 

The vital matter of food production and distribution was 
treated in an act of August 10, 1917. This gave extraordi¬ 
nary powers to a Food Administrator, and the President 
at once appointed Herbert C. Hoover, who had made an 
undying record by his administration of relief work in invaded 
Belgium. The same act provided for a Fuel Administrator, 
to which position President Harry A. Garfield of Williams 
College was appointed. In January, 1918, the entire control 
of the railroads was taken over by act of Congress, and was 
placed in the hands of Mr. McAdoo, Secretary of the Treas¬ 
ury. As at the time of the Civil War, emergency meant 
nationalization of effort, in fact internationalization of effort. 
It meant, also, public control. Hosts of other acts and orders 
brought this subject and that, prices, quantity, quality, and 
disposition of products, under regulation. The United States 
became the purchaser for its associates, and loaned them 
money according to their needs. 

Largely by our insistence, the control of military opera¬ 
tions against the Germans was centralized in a Supreme 
War Council, and General Foch, in the spring of 1918, was 
made supreme commander. Under stress of emergency the 
forces within the United States which had been resisting the 


CIVIL SERVICE 


555 


logic of national unity and world unity, collapsed. The ques¬ 
tion of the extent to which this readjustment would prove 
permanent was left to be determined after the war. 

The sudden expansion of the function of the national 
government, and of the scope of government, national and 
state, made it necessary to call into public service much of 
the ability of the country which had previously been em¬ 
ployed privately. In part this was done by bringing experts 
in all lines into the civil service, the universities contributing 
a remarkable percentage. Existing unofficial organizations 
were called in as well, such as the Red Cross, the Young 
Men’s Christian Association, the Knights of Columbus, the 
American Library Association, and many others. A new 
form of organization was created in the semi-official Councils 
of Defense. In August, 1916, Congress authorized a National 
Council of Defense “for the coordination of industries and 
resources for the national security and welfare.” With the 
outbreak of the war, every state followed this national 
example, and the system was soon carried into practically 
every city and county. Through these councils the busi¬ 
ness experience of the country was largely placed at the 
disposal of the government, and the mass of unaccustomed 
regulations was carried out and made plain to the public. 
To an amazing degree they carried out their work by simple 
explanation, without recourse to law and far beyond the 
limits of actual law. 

This ready acceptance of the novel demands of modern 
war indicated a popular approval of the nation’s course 
which could not be gainsaid. To no other war in which the 
United States has engaged, was there so little opposition. 
The most prominent of the opponents was Senator LaFol- 
lette, of Wisconsin, who opposed the armed neutrality, the 
war, and the draft. In spite of overwhelming evidence, 
he claimed that the war had been brought on by capital¬ 
istic influences, that “Germany had been patient with us”; 


Civil service. 


Public 

opinion. 


556 


THE GREAT WAR 


The German- 
born. 


Secret service 
and censor¬ 
ship. 


The Wiscon¬ 
sin senatorial 
election of 
1918. 


and he sought to arouse distrust of the government’s finan¬ 
cial policy and of the nations associated with us. An¬ 
other element of opposition came from the Socialists. This 
party officially condemned the war; whereupon some of 
the Socialists, including many of their intellectual leaders, 
left the party and became valiant supporters of the ad¬ 
ministration. 

Still another body of discontent was among the German- 
born. For them the situation was indeed painful, torn as 
they were between love of kindred and the ties of their youth 
on one side, and their neighbors and their oath of allegiance 
on the other. The overwhelming majority of the German- 
born Americans were loyal in their obedience to the law; 
a majority, especially of the younger citizens, were loyal in 
spirit as well as in act. A few became unreconcilable traitors. 
By malicious rumor, by incitement to disobey the draft, by 
incendiary fires, by tampering with our machines,, they de¬ 
layed our progress, deceived our associates, and caused the 
death of our men. 

To meet these acts of treason, Congress passed, in June, 
1917, an espionage act, and the administration developed our 
secret service into high efficiency. To meet the misrepre¬ 
sentations of the opponents of the war, the President estab¬ 
lished, in April, 1917, a Committee on Public Information, 
to present the facts of the case to the American public, and 
to exercise also a censorship over military information. 

As 1917 was not an election year, there was no definite 
nation-wide test of public opinion concerning the govern¬ 
ment’s policy. National interest was high, therefore, in a 
special election called in Wisconsin in March, 1918, to fill a 
vacancy in the United States Senate caused by the death of 
Paul Husting, a young and promising member of that body. 
That state had for many years supported Senator LaFollette, 
and it had a greater percentage of German population than 
any other state in the Union. The Socialist party denounced 


MILITARY SITUATION 


557 


the war, and advocated the immediate withdrawal of our 
army from France. The LaFollette candidate, running for 
the Republican nomination, counseled obedience to the 
law, and presented no program of action except heavier 
taxation. Loyalty candidates in both Republican and 
Democratic parties indorsed President Wilson’s war policy 
and pledged him their full support. The results showed that 
the genuine Socialists had not much changed in numbers as 
a result of the war, constituting about 15% of the electorate. 
Sixty or seventy thousand Germans who voted for the 
LaFollette candidate in the primaries, voted in the regular 
election for the Socialist candidate, thus proving that racial 
ties counted for more with them than political views or 
those of religion, for most of them belonged to parties and 
religious bodies strongly opposed to the social doctrines of 
socialism. These elements, however, did not constitute a 
majority of the German element, and, combined, amounted 
to only about one quarter of the state’s voters. This vote, 
in the state where the opposing elements seemed strongest, 
indicated that the nation was united as never before. 

When the United States entered the war, the military 
situation of the Allies was very strong. The armies of France 
and England seemed invulnerable, and had for some time 
been edging the German army slowly back. Russia in spite 
of her defeats seemed solidly to block Germany from the 
resources of the East, and the Russian Revolution was held 
to have finally overthrown all pro-German influences, and 
to have given a new inspiration for the fight of democracy 
against autocracy. It was believed that the Allied lines 
would hold, if only the United States could help defeat, by 
naval activity and by the building of ships, the submarine 
which was cutting the world in two, and could furnish sup¬ 
plies of food, money, and munitions. In the meantime, the 
United States was to organize with care and reasonable de¬ 
liberation her vast military resources, to throw them when 


The war 
indorsed. 


Military 
situation in 
April, 1Q17. 


558 


THE GREAT WAR 


The 

American 

program. 


Situation at 
the end of 
1917. 


fully prepared into the last effort to crush the German line 
of defense. 

While, therefore, the first United States destroyers reached 
Europe on May 4, 1917, under the command of Admiral 
Sims, and the first American troops arrived in France on 
June 26, these efforts were regarded rather as testimonials 
of good will than effective contributions, and the national 
energy was chiefly directed to the training of millions, to 
the creation of shipyards out of mud flats, to the establish¬ 
ment of giant factories, to the undertaking of great projects 
of research, and to all the apparatus of colossal production 
on the American system of standardized parts, all of which 
when in operation would crush Germany by their very weight. 
This program for an overwhelming and united effort could 
but mean victory in the end, if the Allied lines held; it con¬ 
trasted with the other possible policy of immediate production 
on a small scale, calculated to plug a line that showed signs 
of breaking. 

With the autumn of 1917 the European situation changed, at 
first gradually, and then with startling rapidity. The con¬ 
trol of the Russian Revolution rapidly shifted from the hands 
of the experienced statesmen, the Cadets, into those of the 
meteoric Kerensky, who, with an idealism that failed to 
inspire the people, tried to renew the Russian military of¬ 
fensive. The Russian peasants, however, demanded peace; 
the workmen, vengeance on the classes that had oppressed 
them. On November 4 Kerensky was overthrown by the 
Bolsheviki, who, led by Lenine and Trotzky, signed on 
December 15 at Brest-Litovsk an armistice with Germany 
that freed her armies in the east, and seemed likely to throw 
open to her the whole resources of eastern Europe. Even 
before this absolute release of her forces, the gradually 
diminishing pressure of Russia had enabled the Central 
Powers to undertake a drive against the Italian front which 
threatened the whole of northern Italy, and actually pene- 


GERMAN DRIVE OF 1918 559 

trated to the line of the Piave, which was a weak natural 
barrier to their continued advance. The arms of the Allies 
made progress only in western Asia, where the capture of 
Jerusalem on December 9 was but small compensation for 
what had been lost in Russia and Italy. 

When the year 1917 closed, therefore, the superficial situa¬ 
tion favored the Central Powers. They had eliminated one 
of the three great separated masses opposing them, and 
cleared one of their fronts. The future, however, was not 
promising to them. Russia was too demoralized to afford 
them resources, and their submarine campaign had failed 
in its purpose of cutting America from Europe. Already the 
European Allies were invigorated by American financial 
aid, their food supplies were maintained, and they were 
inspirited by the promise of the future. The leaders of the 
Central Powers realized that their only hope lay in utilizing 
the advantages of their military release on the east to crush 
the western line before the military power of the United 
States gathered in strength behind it. 

With masterly technique though without the simple direct¬ 
ness which characterizes the military genius of great military 
leaders, General Ludendorff proceeded to make the final 
gamble. On March 21, 1918, he began his great drive, at¬ 
tempting to separate the French and British armies; when 
he failed to take Amiens, his ultimate failure was probably 
determined, but with skill and desperation he continued 
his attacks, first against the British line to the north, and 
then, in May, against the French to the south, advancing 
directly toward Paris. These attacks were accompanied 
by every concomitant of force and terror. On March 23 
“Big Bertha” began to bombard Paris from a distance of 
75 miles, and air raids deprived the citizens of Paris and 
London of sleep night after night. The courage and the 
confidence of the Allies never failed, but many anticipated 
the capture of Paris, and over a million people left the city. 


/ 


The German 
drive of 191& 


THE GREAT WAR 


American 
forces to the 
rescue. 


Allied 

victories. 


560 

It was evident that the power of the United States must 
be transmuted from a threat to an actuality. On March 27 
General Pershing offered the services of American troops, 
although not yet organized into army units, wherever needed. 
In fact, Americans had first clashed with the Germans as 
early as November 3, 1917, but the larger number had been 
kept back for training and organization. Now, however, 
those in France were hurried into the lines, brigaded with 
the French or British, wherever the stress was greatest. 
American marines and soldiers at and near Chateau-Thierry 
helped to stop the advance on Paris; and on June 25 
they held the Germans at Belleau Woods, a turning point 
of the campaign. Meantime the American program was 
speeded up, and in June troops began to cross the Atlantic 
in numbers that had been held to be impossible. The British 
cut down other services to furnish additional ships, and con¬ 
voys swept across the ocean, laden beyond any capacity to 
afford more than bare resting room for the men. In spite 
of convoys, two ships, the Tuscania and the Otranto , were 
lost with many lives; and hundreds of influenza victims, 
on ships and in camps, made the final sacrifice as truly in 
the line of duty as those killed at the front. 

With these fresh forces assembling, Marshal Foch was 
enabled to anticipate the time when the numerical balance 
of effectives would be in his favor. The Germans had forced 
a salient to the Marne between Rheims, which the French 
still held, and the outskirts of Soissons, which had fallen. 
On July 15 they began their fifth and last drive from the 
east side of this salient; on July 18 Marshal Foch sent his 
prepared American and French forces against the west side. 
The Allies drove steadily onward, and by August 3 they 
obliterated the salient after bitter and costly fighting, which 
probably sealed the fate of the German Empire. Allied 
attack followed attack without ceasing, the superb genius 
of Marshal Foch creating salient after salient, from which 


VICTORY OF THE ALLIES 561 

the Germans were forced to withdraw. On August 8 the 
British, assisted by French and American units, began a 
drive from the west. On August 20 a French drive, which 
again included American troops, began from the south. 
On September 13 the Americans cleared the obstinate 
St. Mihiel salient, and on September 22 began the arduous 
task of driving the Germans from the Argonne, which ended 
in the capture of Sedan on the eve of the armistice. 

In the meantime fighting intensified almost from end to 
end of the inhabited globe. Russia separated into hostile 
communities and factions, and in August Allied forces entered 
her vast territory at Archangel, Vladivostok, and Baku, to 
assist the Czecho-Slovaks who, deserting the Austrian army 
and afterward organized in the Russian army, found them¬ 
selves now in Siberia beset by the Bolsheviki. On Septem¬ 
ber 19 General Allenby began an attack on the Turks in 
Syria, which swept forward at cavalry speed until he had early 
in November cleared the whole Syrian coast, and broken 
the line of the Berlin-Bagdad railroad. Meanwhile the 
British forces in Mesopotamia had cut the Turks from 
Persia. On September 1 the British, French, Serbians, 
Greeks, and Italians began a month of fierce and victorious 
fighting on the Macedonian front. On October 30 the 
Italians let loose their torrential drive against the Austrians. 

The Central Powers had lost their final gamble, and the 
imposing edifice of their power rapidly cracked and fell under 
these blows. The first indication of weakening came on 
September 27, when Bulgaria applied to the British govern¬ 
ment for an armistice which was granted on September 30, 
the terms amounting to unconditional surrender. On 
October 7 Austria qffered immediate peace on the basis of 
President Wilson’s addresses, but he replied on October 19 
that the recognition of the freedom of the Czecho-Slovaks 
by the United States had created new conditions. On 
October 14 Turkey announced that she must conclude peace, 


Surrender of 

Germany's 

vassals. 


562 


THE GREAT WAR 


Germany 
begs for 
peace. 


Revolution 
in Germany. 


and an armistice on terms similar to those dictated to Bul¬ 
garia was soon arranged. On November 4 Austria accepted 
similar terms. Meanwhile, on September 30, Prince Maxi¬ 
milian of Baden became Chancellor of the German Empire, 
and on October 5 he began negotiations for peace. He at¬ 
tempted to create a rift between the United States and the 
Allies, by asking President Wilson to act as intermediary. 
The latter saw and escaped the trap, but he kept open the 
line of negotiation to serve the ends of all. On October 10 
the British packet Leinster was sunk by a submarine, with 
the loss of 480 lives, and during the early days of October 
the Germans in withdrawing from northern France indulged 
in an orgy of destruction. President Wilson pointed out 
the inconsistency of such action with a sincere desire for 
peace, and brought an end to indiscriminate submarine war¬ 
fare and the policy of destroying private property on land. 
He caused the German government to make its offers pre¬ 
cise, and he stated on October 23: “If we must deal with 
the present Imperial Government of Germany, we cannot 
trust it, and must demand surrender.” Finally, having 
clarified the situation, without committing the United States, 
he informed the German government that he would take 
up the question of an armistice with his co-belligerents. 

With the failure of the German Imperial plans, the internal 
weakness of the empire, sustained as it was by force, became 
apparent. In Austria the Czecho-Slovaks proclaimed and 
established the independence of Bohemia and neighboring 
districts. The Jugo-Slavs did the same in the south, captur¬ 
ing the Austrian fleet on November 3. Hungary, on October 
27, moved toward independence. In Germany, violent 
revolutionary forces began to show themselves on the surface. 
On November 8 Bavaria declared herself a republic, and on 
November 9 William Hohenzollern renounced the thrones 
of Germany and Prussia, and the next day fled to Holland; 
the pack of German princelings falling with him. 


WILSON'S FOURTEEN POINTS 563 

On November n German envoys, representing a govern¬ 
ment headed by Frederick Ebert as Chancellor and relying 
upon the support of the “citizens” of Germany, signed an 
armistice the terms of which were dictated by Marshal Foch 
and Admiral Wemyss as military representatives of the 
Allied and associated nations. The terms included the 
surrender of almost the entire German fleet and immense 
military stores, and the military occupation of the left bank 
of the Rhine with bridgeheads and a neutral zone beyond. 
They gave practically complete military control to the armies 
dictating the terms. 

In demanding and accepting these armistice terms, both 
sides agreed that the final peace should be concluded on the 
basis of President Wilson’s “fourteen points” with certain 
clarifications and qualifications. These points included the 
abolition of secret treaties; equality, so far as possible, of 
trade conditions; reduction of armaments; a settlement of 
the question of captured colonies according to the interest 
of their populations; self-determination for Russia; the 
evacuation and restoration of Belgium and northern France; 
the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France; the readjust¬ 
ment of the Italian boundary to include within Italy the area 
Italian in population; self-determination for the peoples 
of Austria-Hungary; the evacuation and restoration of 
Roumania, Serbia, and Montenegro; self-determination 
for the peoples of the Turkish Empire; and an independent 
Poland. President Wilson stated that by restoration he 
intended the fullest possible indemnification for the ravages 
of the cruel and illegal warfare which Germany had con¬ 
ducted, not only in the regions particularly indicated but 
everywhere on land and sea. The Allied nations stated that 
they reserved judgment on President Wilson’s second point 
— “Absolute freedom of navigation upon the sea.” All 
agreed to his final point — “A general association of nations 
must be formed, under specific covenants for the purpose of 


Armistice of 
November 
11, 1918. 


Wilson’s 

fourteen 

points. 


S 6 4 


THE GREAT WAR 


The peace 
commission 


The Peace 
Conference 


affording mutual guarantees of political independence and 
territorial integrity to great and small states alike.” 

In December, President Wilson went to Europe to take part 
personally in the peace negotiations, thus breaking once 
more the traditions attaching to his office. On the American 
Peace Commission, besides the President, were the Secretary 
of State, Robert Lansing; Henry White, who had the longest 
record of foreign service of any living American; and Colonel 
House. They were accompanied by a large staff of experts 
who had, since the beginning of war, been studying the 
problems involved in peace. 

The Peace Conference which met at Paris and Versailles 
during the first five months of 1918, is comparable only with 
that at Vienna in 1815. It was more numerous in personnel 
and it represented a greater portion of the world; whether 
its results will prove as important is a matter for the future 
to determine. A very striking difference lay in the fact that 
the defeated nations were not represented; it was a confer¬ 
ence of the victorious nations, allied, as Great Britain, France, 
and Italy, or associated, as the United States, to draw up 
terms to be submitted to the four nations that had been 
beaten. While cases were presented by all the [nations rep¬ 
resented, and by peoples, like the Bohemians, long politically 
submerged but who hoped to become independent, the deci¬ 
sions came to rest more and more with the chiefs of the four 
most important states: Lloyd George, Prime Minister of 
Great Britain, Clemenceau, Prime Minister of France, 
Orlando, Prime Minister of Italy, and Woodrow Wilson, 
President of the United States. 

President Wilson’s diplomatic skill and success will remain 
a question until a century has brought to light all the secret 
memoirs of the conference, if, indeed, they will not always 
remain matters of opinion. There can be no doubt, how¬ 
ever, that he was the central figure of the conference. Nearly 
every problem that arose involved some one of his fourteen 


THE TREATY WITH GERMANY 


565 


points, and throughout, he was contending that some practi¬ 
cal scheme for the organization of a League of Nations be 
included in the final treaty. The result was, as was inevit¬ 
able where so many partners were represented, compromise. 
The League of Nations was included, but some of the fourteen 
points were seriously blunted, especially, perhaps, in the case 
of the rights conceded Japan in the Shantung peninsula. 

The treaties drawn up by the conference for the four 
defeated nations were ultimately accepted by those nations 
and by the Allies. The German treaty, however, in the 
United States became the basis for one of the fiercest political 
contests in our history. Before leaving for Europe, President 
Wilson had asked the people to strengthen his hands by 
electing a Democratic Congress. This request caused bitter 
resentment, and was in itself one of the causes for the return 
in November, 1918, of a large Republican majority in the 
House of Representatives and a small one in the Senate. 
Criticism of the President, partly vindictively personal, and 
partly for his ignoring of the Senate in the negotiations, 
became intense, the leader of the critics being Senator Lodge 
of Massachusetts. This criticism was extended to the treaty 
when it was submitted to the Senate and its terms became 
known. To one group who may be called the conservatives, 
the idea of a League of Nations seemed a departure from the 
principles of the Monroe Doctrine, without being an effective 
substitute. To the liberal or radical group the provisions 
for reparations, annexations, mandatories, and particularly 
the practical control of the Sarre Valley given to the 
French, seemed the negation of those hopes for a new world 
that had burned so high when Wilson went abroad in 1918. 

The Senate divided into three overlapping groups. Some 
Democratic senators stood for the acceptance of the treaty 
as it stood; some Republican senators favored the cutting 
out of all reference to the League of Nations; moderates of 
both parties strove for amendments which would make 


The treaty 
in the 
Senate 


566 


THE GREAT WAR 


The election 
of 1920 


certain that the United States could continue her old policy 
of avoiding foreign entanglements. The bone of contention 
was Article X, which, while somewhat vaguely worded, 
seemed to imply an obligation upon each signatory power to 
active maintenance of the territorial integrity of all the 
others. 

The President, as had been his custom, appealed directly 
to the people to compel the Senate to accept the treaty as a 
whole. While the treaty was still in formation he had made 
a hasty trip to the United States to prepare the way, and in 
August, 1919, he started upon a nation-wide campaign. In 
the midst of this campaign, worn out by the strain of the 
past five years, he was stricken by a shock from which he 
did not completely recover during the remainder of his term. 
On November 19, 1919, the treaty was rejected in the Senate 
by a vote of 38 for the treaty to 53 against it. 

It was a dreary period of United States history that fol¬ 
lowed the illness of President Wilson. There was a political 
stalemate between the executive and legislative departments 
and this was aggravated by a personal hostility almost as 
keen as in the days of President Johnson. The executive 
was blunted in its action by the incapacity of its head, and 
for some time, until the substitution of Bainbridge Colby 
for Robert Lansing as Secretary of State early in 1920, by 
divided purposes. The result was that the necessary meas¬ 
ures of reconstruction were blocked, almost the only im¬ 
portant piece of legislation being the Esch-Cummings Act 
which restored the railroads to private ownership. 

With the government in deadlock, political interest 
centered in the coming presidential election. The Demo¬ 
crats, meeting at San Francisco, nominated Governor Cox 
of Ohio, who had a good record for executive efficiency during 
the war, and who supported the general policy of President 
Wilson. There was a widespread popular movement for Mr. 
Hoover, whose handling of the food administration had made 


THE ELECTION OF 1920 


567 


his name a household word throughout the world. He ulti¬ 
mately declared himself a Republican, but the presidential 
primaries held in various states indorsed rather, General 
Wood, Governor Lowden of Illinois, and Senator Johnson of 
California. The Republican convention, which met at Chi¬ 
cago, selected Senator Harding of Ohio, a man little known 
in the country at large, but well approved by the colleagues 
with whom he had worked in the Senate. 

The campaign was unsatisfactory from the point of view 
of definition of issue, and of popular discussion. The Repub¬ 
licans did not definitely reject the idea of a League of Nations, 
but attacked rather the President’s assumption of power. 
Dissatisfaction with both candidates gave rise to much talk 
of a third party, but the different dissatisfied groups proved 
to be irreconcilable among themselves, and their vote was 
divided among a Farmer-Labor, a Socialist, and other candi¬ 
dates. Mr. Harding was elected by an overwhelming major¬ 
ity, which swept even into the “Solid South” and carried 
Tennessee, the first of the eleven states declaring secession in 
1861 to vote Republican since the obscuration of the negro 
vote. On March 4, 1921, he took office, confronted by many 
problems of domestic reconstruction and by the task of 
making peace with Germany, and of formulating a foreign 
policy to take the place of that of President Wilson, which 
had been rejected in the elections of 1918 and 1920. 

In the presidential election of 1920 women, for the first 
time, voted in all the states by virtue of the Nineteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution, which was ratified in 
August, 1920. The Eighteenth Amendment, prohibiting 
the manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquor for beverage 
purposes, had been adopted early in 1919. 

In domestic affairs the new administration aimed at re¬ 
turning to pre-war conditions. The Fordney-McCumber 
Tariff, protectionist in character, attempted to meet the 
difficulties caused by the fluctuations in the exchange value 


President 

Harding 


Constitu¬ 
tional amend¬ 
ments 


Domestic 

policy 


S 68 


THE GREAT WAR 


Foreign 

policy 


Politics 


of foreign currencies by leaving much discretion to the 
President. To protect American labor an immigration law 
was enacted to limit strictly the number of arrivals from 
foreign countries in a fixed proportion. 

In foreign affairs Mr. Hughes, now Secretary of State, 
called a conference of interested nations to meet at Wash¬ 
ington to discuss the limitation of naval armaments and con¬ 
ditions in the Far East. With skillful leadership he secured 
agreements to reduce naval expenditures, to regulate the 
employment of submarines and gases in case of a new war, 
and to stabilize the Far East. After thorough investigation 
he recognized the government established in Mexico by 
President Obregon. In conjunction with President Harding 
he urged that the United States adhere to the World Court, 
established at the Hague under the auspices of the League of 
Nations, but largely in accordance with a plan drawn up 
much earlier by Elihu Root, and to which J. B. Moore of 
Columbia University had been elected as a judge. 

These were the achievements of the first two years. In 
August, 1923, President Harding died suddenly, while he 
was returning from a trip to Alaska. He was succeeded by 
Calvin Coolidge, the Vice President. In the new Congress, 
elected in 1922, the Democrats gained slightly, and the bal¬ 
ance of power was held by a group or “block” of progressive 
Republicans, headed by Senator La Follette, which was not 
in full accord with the administration. 


INDEX 


Abolitionists, settle in Kansas, 340; welcome 
secession, 367. Sec Antislavery. 

Adams, Charles F., Minister to England., 387; in 
Trent affair, 388; diplomatist, 429; cited, 388. 

Adams, John, Minister to England, 23; obtains 
Dutch loan, 24; Vice President, 46, 47, 70, 
74; President, 75; cabinet, 75, 80; diplo¬ 
matic problems, 76, 77; relations with Hamil¬ 
ton, 78-81, 83; removals, 78, 91; sends 
commission to France, 79; restores neutrality, 
80,84; presidential candidate, 81; appoint¬ 
ments, 84, 92; son, 135; cited, 48. 

Adams, John Q., peace commission, 126; joins 
Republicans, 135; internal improvements, 135, 
178, 192, 210; presidential candidate, 162, 
175, 178, 182, 231; Secretary of State, 162, 
172, 175; ability, 162, 226; discusses seces¬ 
sion, 166; arranges Florida purchase, 169; op¬ 
poses English alliance, 170, 172; electoral 
vote, 175, 176, 182, 186, 218; chosen by 
House, 176; character, 177, 178; supports 
civil service, 178; foreign policy, 179; Indian 
policy, 179,180; tariff, 181, 204; secret socie¬ 
ties, 216; diplomatist, 226-228, 493; member 
of Congress, 228; Mexican negotiation, 228; 
opposes Independent Treasury, 237; fights 
for right of petition, 296; constructive views, 
396; Pan-American policy, 462, 483; cited, 
244, 400. 

Adams, Samuel, Revolutionary leader, 33; dis¬ 
approves Constitution, 41. 

Addams, Jane, social work, 513. 

Adet, Pierre A., French minister, 75; schemes 
for West, 75, 76. 

Agriculture, in South, 6, 267; in Middle States, 
9, 136; embargo injures, 106; New England, 
134-136; use of McCormick reaper, 267 ; im¬ 
proved methods, 269; readjustment in South, 
433-435; expansion in area, 439,474Granger 
movement, 456, 474, 475; doubles produc¬ 
tion, 500, 501; irrigation extends, 502, 503. 

Agriculture, National Bureau of, established, 
396; trouble in, 529. 

Aguinaldo, Emilio, Philippine leader, 490, 491. 

Alabama, Confederate cruiser, 386; claims, 424- 
426. 

Alabama, cotton cultivation, 144, 146; immi¬ 
gration, 146; admitted to Union, 146, 164; 
Indian lands, 179, 191; population, 192; 
nullification convention proposed, 205; elec¬ 
toral vote, 218; extradition trouble, 293; 
secedes, 364; invaded, 392; public domain, 
438. 

Alaska, purchase, 423, 486; boundary, 496; 
territory, 502; coal lands, 529. 

Albany (N. Y.), trade,. 135. # 

Albany Regency, political ring, 150,. 236. 

Aldrich, Sen. Nelson B., protectionist, 472; 
tariff bill, 526; retires, 528. 


149; 

Eng- 


Aldrich Monetary Commission, functions, 508. 

Aldrich-Vreeland Bill, passed, 523. 

Alger, Russell A., Secretary of War, 519. 

A ten Contract Law, protects labor, 459, 469. 

Alien Law, Federalist measure, 77; Republicans 
attack, 87; expires, 94. 

Allison, Sen. William B., Congressional leader, 
420; death, 528. 

Altgeld, Gov. j. P., in Pullman strike, 478. 

Amazon River, attempt to open, 334. 

Ambassador, diplomatic grade created, 496. 

Amelia Isknd, pirates, 169. 

American Icderation of Labor, founded, 459. 

American party, policy, 273, 339, 343 ; successes, 
338; slavery divides, 338-340, 343; nomina¬ 
tions, 344; m election of 1858, 351; becomes 
Constitutional Union party, 356. 

“American system,” devised by Clay, 
partly adopted, 255. 

Ames, Fisher, urges tariff, 51; friend of 
land, 65, 70; cited, 52, 65. 

Amiens, treaty of, 95. 

Amnesty proclamations, 403, 408. 

Amusements, in 1840, 247. 

Amy Warwick, court decision, 387. 

Andrew, Gov. John A., aids Lincoln, 381. 

Annapolis (Md.), commercial convention, 32; 
route via, 369. 

Antietam (Md.), battle, 390, 392, 400. 

Anti-Federalists, origin of name, 40; leaders, 42. 

Antimasons, form party, 216; alliances, 232, 
245, 246. . . 

Antislavery, Quakers lead agitation, 25; m Vir¬ 
ginia and Maryland, 141, 291; societies, rise 
and decline, 164, 291; growth of sentiment, 
243, 289, 290, 295, 298, 330; Kentucky, 291; 
New England Abolition Society, 293; Na¬ 
tional, 293; northern opposition, 294; fac¬ 
tions in party, 295; war develops sentiment, 
398,399. ,, . 

Appalachian Mountains, passes, 9; minerals, 9; 
character of settlers, 146; effect on war 
operations, 389. 

Appomattox Court House (Va.), Lee’s surrender, 
39i. 

Arbitration, of Civil War claims, 425, 429; 
Venezuelan, 484; Spanish-American disputes, 
496; United States attitude, 496; deadlock, 


Arbitration Commission (1871), decisions, 388. 

Architecture, in America, 282, 283. 

Argentine Confederation, treaty, 334; trade 
rivals, 514. ... , . , 

Arizona, in Civil War, 3715 admission denied, 
471; admitted, 502. 

Arkansas, Indian title extinguished, 179; ad¬ 
mission to Union, 231, 276, 335; transporta¬ 
tion, 266; Oregon emigrants, 278; secedes, 
368; military governor, 413; reconstruction, 


Xlll 





INDEX 


Central Falls (K.I.), growth, 133. 

Central Pacific Railroad, in merger, 521. 

Centralization, tendencies toward, 31, 33; in 
Constitutional Convention, 36, 37; opponents, 
40, 54; advocates, 50, 54; legislation of 
1799, 78; dangers urged, 82; unpopular, 84, 
85; Republican tendency, 101, 108, 129, 160, 
161, 173; influence of Supreme Court, 129- 
131; West favors, 147; in Confederacy, 377, 
383; in North, 383, 39^, 397, 43°, 43i- 

Cerro Gordo (Mex.), battle, 313. 

Cervera, Admiral Pascual, fleet captured, 489. 

Chancellorsville (Va.), battle, 390. 

Chandler, W. E., Secretary of Navy, 471. 

Channing, AVilliam E., Unitarian leader, 152. 

Chapultepec (Mex.), battle, 3x3. 

Charleston (S. C.), early importance, 8; Genet 
visits, 63; trade, 139, 140; Courier, cited, 
19S; customs port, 205; Literary Messenger, 
283; postmaster, 293; Democratic conven¬ 
tion, 354, 355; harbor forts, 367, 385. 

Charlestown (Va.), trial of John Brown, 353. 

Chase, Salmon P., Free-Soil Senator, 320, 327; 
opposes Compromise of 1850, 324; squatter 
sovereignty, 336; Secretary of Treasury, 380, 
404; policy, 382, 383 ; favors early emancipa¬ 
tion, 398^ Chief Justice, 421, 422. 

Chase, Justice Samuel, impeached, 93. 

Chattanooga (Tenn.), railroad connections, 389, 
392; capture and siege, 393. 

Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, cited, 191. 

Cherokees, in Georgia, 191. 

Cherubusco (Mex.), battle, 313. 

Chesapeake, Leopard fires on, 104, 105; affair 
settled, 116; fights. Shannon, 120. 

Chesapeake Bay, British harry coast, 123; fort, 
384. 

Cheves, Langdon, in Congress, 114; favors 
navy, 116; president United States Bank, 
158, 212. 

Chicago, commercial growth, 335, 349, 379, 
445, 501; New York Zouaves visit, 353; 
Republican convention, 355; speech of 
Douglas, 370; Douglas monument, 412; 
Pullman strike, 478. 

Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy Railroad, in 
merger, 521. 

Chickamauga (Tenn.), battle, 393. 

Chile, gains independence, 168. 

China, American trade, 486, 514; treaty ports, 
486; Boxer outbreak, 498. 

Chinese, in California, 454; on Pacific Coast, 
511-513; labor excluded, 513. 

Chinese Exclusion Act, 459, 461, 463, 469; 
effect, 5x2. 

Chisholm v. Georgia, cited, 51. 

Choate, Rufus, supports Buchanan, 344. 

Choctaws, in Mississippi, 191. 

Cincinnati (O.), trade, 139; Democratic con¬ 
vention, 354; manufactures grow, 379; Con¬ 
federates threaten, 392; Liberal Republican 
convention, 429; Populist, 475. 

City of Mexico, captured, 313. 

Civil Rights bill, passed, 410, 411. 

Civil service, under Washington, 50; Adams, 
78; Jefferson, 91-92; nonpartisan under J. Q. 
Adams, 178, 182; reform, 182, 187, 461, 462, 
4 6 5» 520 ; Jackson’s use of, 188-190; demorali¬ 


zation, 240-242, 446; Harrison’s use of, 250; 
Tyler’s, 262; reform associations, 447, 465; 
Commission, 447, 463, 465, 519. 

Civil War, causes, 21; opening, 368, 387; con¬ 
traband trade, 388; important legislation, 
396, 454; resulting problems, 407, 433-438, 
452; increases centralization, 454; tax re¬ 
funded, 471; pensions, 471, 477. 

Clapp, Sen. M. E., Progressive leader, 527. 

Clark, Champ, presidential candidate, 532. 

Clark, Gen. George Rogers, agent of Genet, 64 

Clark, W’illiam, explorer, 99. 277. 

Clay, Cassius M., Kentucky abolitionist, 298. 

Clay, Henry, Speaker, 116, 156, 163, 167; 
favors British war, 116; peace commissioner, 
126; devises “American system,” 149; re- 
election endangered, 161; presidential am¬ 
bition, 163, 175, 323; views on slavery, 166; 
suggests second Missouri Compromise, 167; 
sympathy with Spanish colonies, 168; dis¬ 
approves Mexican boundary, 169; relations 
with Jackson, 175, 176, 217; corruption 
charged, 176; electoral vote, 176, 218; duel 
with Randolph, 177; tariff views, 181, 204, 
206, 255; internal improvements, 192, 210; 
public lands, 195; Senator, 216, 322; natural 
leader, 217, 245; presidential candidate, 217, 
231, 232, 245, 252, 254; conciliates France, 
228;. financial, 235, 237, 253; relations with 
Harrison, 249, 250; party leader, 252, 254; 
relations with Tyler, 254-256; retires, 260; 
Texas, 306; loses election, 306; character, 
323; Compromise of 1850, 323, 327; death, 
329; education, 365; constructive views, 
396; Pan-American policy., 462, 483. 

Clayton, J. M., arranges British treaty, 333. 

Clayton Anti-Trust Act, 540. 

Cleveland, Grover, mayor of Buffalo, 464; gov¬ 
ernor, 464; elected President, 464; cabinet, 
464; character, 464; vetoes, 464, 465; civil 
service policy, 465; tariff, 468, 469, 473; re¬ 
nomination, 469; defeat, 470; navy, 471; 
reelection, 476; financial policy, 477; sends 
troops to Chicago, 478; Venezuelan policy, 
484; canal, 485; Samoa, 486, 487; Cuba, 488. 

Cleveland (O.), manufactures grow, 379; Fre¬ 
mont convention, 405. 

Clinton, DeW r itt, Republican leader, 89; elec¬ 
toral vote, 117; canal scheme, 138; promotes 
education, 286. 

Clinton, Gov. George, 25, 86; Revolutionary 
leader, 33; opposes Constitution, 40; fol¬ 
lowers, 89; removes opponents, 90; electoral 
vote., 74, 100, 108; death, 117. 

Coal, in South, 436; in New England, 438; 
miners strike, 520; Alaska. S29. 

Cobb, Howell, favors Compromise of 1850, 328. 

Cobb, T. W., cited, 165. 

Cobden, Richard, free-trade advocate, 309. 

Coercion, South resents, 368; under Grant, 429. 

Coffee, West Indian trade, 65. 

Cohens v. Virginia, cited, 129. 

Cold Harbor (Va.), battle, 390. 

Collins Line, rivals Cunard Company, 270; 
fails, 270. 

Colombia, treaty, 333; canal route 485; 
negotiations, 497. 

Colonization Society, objects, 164. 


XVI 




INDEX 


Colorado, mining immigration, 379; admitted ' 
to Union, 439. 

Columbia River, discovery, 277, 486; trade j 
key to northwest, 277. 

Columbian Sentinel , cited, 78. 

Commerce, New England, 5, 9; intercolonial, i 
12; expansion after Revolution, 22, 26, 61, 
66; sectionalism hinders, 23, 62; interstate, 
41, 61, 456, 457, 467; western, 60; foreign, 
61, 65, 66, 104, no, 268, 269, 334, 484, 494, 
514; European wars, 65; with France, 79; 
West Indies, 79, 226; effects of restrictive 
policy, no; injured by War of 1812, 121; 
on rivers, 130; decline, 131, 132, 136; tariff 
and, 136; English competition, 172, 269; 
exports increase, 269, 514; Great Lakes, 270; 
coastwise, 270; South American, 334; dur¬ 
ing Civil War, 370, 380, 387. 

Commerce Court, established, 526. 

Commerce and Labor, Department created, 
520; investigations, 525. 

Commission government, 508, 509. 

Commissions, tariff, 508; Rate, 508; Aldrich 
Monetary, 508; national, 524. 

Committees, importance in Congress, 44, 45, 
116. 

Communism, interest in, 278; Mormon views 
of, 278._ 

Compromise of 1850, provisions, 323; debate, 
324, 325; effects, 328; acceptance, 329; 
abolitionists attack, 330; principles, 336; 
American party indorses, 343. 

Compromises, in Constitution, 33-37; unsatis¬ 
factory, 163. 

Confederacy, plan of Union, 364; attack on 
Sumter, 367; holds unwilling sections, 370, 
371; portions of West, 371; Constitution, 
373; political unity, 373; economic depend¬ 
ence, 373, 374; population, 374; character of 
armies, 374, 375; conscription, 375; re¬ 
sources, 375; enlistments, 375, 379; manu¬ 
factures, 376; finances, 377; centralization, 
377, 383; report of War Secretary, cited, 377, 
378; experienced officials, 380; ports block¬ 
aded, 383-388; foreign relations, 385-389; 
isolation, 389; operations in East, 390, 391; 
in West, 391-393; in South, 394; trans¬ 
portation crippled, 393 , 394 ; fall, 394 J 
cruisers, 424, 441; belligerency, 424. 

Confederation, requisitions, 24; important 
suits under, 25; economic conditions, 26, 27, 
31, 60, 61; reasons for failure, 51, 59; foreign 
policy, 102; Pacific trade, 486. 

Confiscation acts, passed, 399; provisions, 403; 
enforcement, 433. 

Congregationalists ; foster nationalism, 31; 
Unitarian secession, 152; Indian mission, 278. 

Congress under Confederation, marks political 
era, 1; powers, 13, 14, 18, 23, 32; land 
policy, 17, 18, 19, 20; displeases western 
settlers, 21; financial policy (> 24, 27; in¬ 
dorses Constitutional Convention, 32; super¬ 
vises Constitution, 39-41; procedure, 44. 

Congress under Constitution, powers, 36, 39, 54, 
60; first session called, 41; proposes bill of 
rights, 42; organized, 44; committees, 44, 45 J 
Speaker, 45; president of Senate, 45; weak¬ 
ness, 47; relations with executive, 4S; 


establishes courts, 50; caucuses, 74; pro¬ 
cedure, 92, 192, 193; powers over territories, 
98, 317, 321, 343 , 354 , 492 , 493 ; powers, 
130, 166, 167, 197, 244, 295, 3x6; indorses 
slavery compromise, 135; esprit du corps, 
322; southern members withdraw, 382; 
growth of, 421; commerce, 457, 467. 

Conkling, Roscoe, Congressional leader, 421; 
Republican “Stalwart,” 450, 461-463. 

Connecticut, western claims, 17; cedes, 18; dis¬ 
pute with Pennsylvania, 18; emigrants, 21; 
gradual emancipation, 26; adopts Constitu¬ 
tion, 41; trade, 41; electoral vote, 100, 162, 
232; sends commissioners to Washington, 
125, 126; alters Constitution, 150; abolition 
riots, 294; negroes disfranchised, 414; Demo¬ 
cratic victory, 448; governor, 532. 

Connecticut River, trade route, 135. 

Conservation, necessity urged, 502-504; gov¬ 
ernment aid, 503; progress, 524; Taft’s 
policy, 529, 530. 

Constitution, marks political era, 1; signers, 33; 
compromises, 33-37, 163; opposition, 34, 40- 
42, 50; interpretation, 37; form of govern¬ 
ment under, 38; how amended, 39; drawn by 
Morris, 39; submitted to Congress, 39; how 
ratified, 39-42; forbids bill of credit, 40, 148, 
210, 238; favors small states, 41; adopted, 
4i, 47; bill of rights added, 42; few vital 
changes, 43; “Conventions of,” 44, 71; 
powers of executive, 48,49; Eleventh Amend¬ 
ment, 51, 239; construction, 54-56, 97, 98, 
xoo, 101,129,130,152,161,180,192,197,253, 
275, 297,4x4,415, 423, 448; economic effects, 
61; supporters, 62; checks license, 77; a 
compact, 82, 167, 199, 201.; Federalists 
strengthen, 84; Twelfth Amendment, 99,100, 
251; provisions, 135, 174, 176, 192, 197; 
amendments proposed, 173,193, 217, 361,362, 
402, 411-413, 507; Thirteenth Amendment, 
403; Fourteenth, 420; Fifteenth, 420, 430, 
528, 529; Sixteenth, 528, 529; Seventeenth, 
528-529; Eighteenth, Nineteenth, 567* 

Constitution, sinks Gucrriere, 120; Java, 120. 

Constitutional Convention, called, 32; char¬ 
acteristics, 32, 33; temper, 34; leaders, 34; 
discusses representation, 35. 

Constitutional Union party, candidates, 356- 
3 

Construction Construed and the Constitution Vin¬ 
dicated, cited, 88. 

Continental Army, commander in. chief, 46. 

Contraband, disputes over, 66; in Civil War, 
388. 

Contract labor, importation forbidden, 512. 

Contreras (Mcx.), battle, 313. 

Controller Bay, land sale, 529. 

“Conventions of the Constitution,” 44, 71. 

Cooke, Jay, banker, 382, 443. 

Coolidge, Calvin, 568. 

Coolies, used, 441; importation forbidden, S12. 

Cooper, James F., author, 283. 

Cooper, Peter, presidential candidate, 451. 

“Copperheads,” Democratic faction, 402, 448. 

Corinth (Miss.), battle, 392, 393. 

Corporations, build railroad, 265; development, 
441, 458, 520, 521; regulation, 509, 521, 522. 

Corsairs, Algerian, 68,104. See Barbary States. 


XVII 




INDEX 


Cotton, John, cited, 4, 81. 

Cotton, cultivation extended, 6, 87, 113, 140, 
144,145; exported, 132,140.142,143,269,379. 
380; value (1800-1820), 140; cotton gin in¬ 
vented, 140; cultivation increases slave labor, 
140,141; produces economic dependence, 141, 
142; England taxes, 142; price falls, 142, 144, 
197; monopoly, 142, 143; methods of culti¬ 
vation, 144, 435 ; “Cotton Belt,” 144, 145 , 
186, 218, 291, 297, 354; mills, 159, 436, 501; 
dominant southern industry, 267, 379; mo¬ 
nopoly fails in war, 374,386; share system, 434. 

Cotton South, considers secession, 303, 364; 
electoral vote (i860), 357; political tendencies, 
396 .. 

Counties, political importance, 7, 10. 

Courts, under Confederation, 14. 

Crane, Sen. Murray T., retires, 528. 

Crawford, Thomas, sculptor, 282. 

Crawford, William H., presidential candidate, 
161, 163, 174; Secretary of War, 162; 
Treasury, 162; health, 174; supporters, 174, 
175, 178; electoral vote, 176; letter cited, 203. 

Credit Motilier, corruption, 443- 

Creeks, in Georgia, 61,179, 180; final defeat, 122. 

Creole, American vessel, seized, 259, 260, 297. 

Creoles, in Louisiana, 123. 

Crisis of 1819. See Panics. 

Crittenden resolution adopted, 398. 

Crittenden, Sen. J. J., slavery compromise, 361. 

Cromwell, Oliver, moral leader, 292. 

Cuba, Everett’s dispatch, 327; annexation pro¬ 
posed, 331, 332, 362, 363; seizes Black War¬ 
rior, 332; Buchanan’s policy, 344; revolution, 
424; Grant’s policy, 487; Cleveland’s, 488; 
McKinley’s, 488; Sen. Proctor visits, 488; 
independence recognized, 489; effect of rec¬ 
ognition, 489, 490; blockaded, 489; pro¬ 
tectorate, 490, 491; Platt amendment, 491. 

Cullom, Sen. Shelby, frames Interstate Com¬ 
merce Act, 467; defeat, 528. 

Cumberland Gap, route via, 142, 146, 392. 

Cumberland River, route via, 12; settlers, 114; 
Grant’s campaign, 391, 392. 

Cumberland Road. See Roads. 

Cummings v. Missouri, cited, 421. 

Cummins, Sen. A. B., Progressive leader, 527; 
presidential candidate, 531. 

Cunard Company, ocean service, 270; sub¬ 
sidized, 271. 

Cunningham coal claims, 529. 

Currency, paper money, 27, 28; national bank 
note, 54; scarcity, 156, 210; plans to enlarge, 
157, 211; overissues by state banks, 223, 224; 
demand for specie, 236, 237; New York sys¬ 
tem, 241; Whig policy, 252-254; during Civil 
War, 382, 383, 396, 417; greenbacks, 417, 
418, 422, 451, 452; premium in gold, 442; 
national problem, 454; free silver coinage de¬ 
manded, 455, 479; election issue, 480, 481; 
larger production of gold affects, 481; gold 
standard, 500; Aldrich-Vreeland bill, 523. 

Curtin, Gov. A. J., aids Lincoln, 381. 

Curtis, Benjamin R., dissents from Taney, 346; 
attacks Lincoln, 400; Executive Power, cited, 
421. 

Cujtis, George W., civil service reformer, 447; 
“Mugwump,” 463. 


Cushing, Caleb, supports 'lyler, 254. 

Custer, Gen. G. A., Indians defeat, 444. 

Customs, increase of, 94, 95; reduced by war, 
119; service demoralized, 241, 242. See 
Taxes. 

Cutler, Dr. Manasseh, land agent, 20. 

Dallas, Alexander, Secretary of Treasury, 119, 
157; recommendations, 157, 158. 

Dallas, G. M., Vice President, 309. 

Dane, Nathan, draws Ordinance of 1787, 20. 

Danes, immigrants, 511. 

Danville (Va.), railroad seized, 391. 

Dartmouth College v. Woodward, cited, 129. 

Davie, Gov. W. R., commissioner to France, 79. 

Davis, David, nonpartisan, 449. 

Davis, Jefferson, Senator, 322; opposes Com¬ 
promise of 1850, 324, 328; defeated for gov¬ 
ernor, 328; supports Lecompton constitution, 
347; Confederate President, 365; decides to 
attack Fort Sumter, 367; policy toward neu¬ 
trals, 387. 

Day, William R., Secretary of State, 490; heads 
Peace Commission, 490. 

Debs, Eugene, presidential candidate, 506. 

Declaration of Independence, theory of, 3; 
signers, 33; cited by Taney, 346. 

“Declaration of Paris,” provisions, 386. 

Decrees of Napoleon, issued, 103, 104, 112; re¬ 
taliation for, 109; revoked, 112. 

Delaware, plantation system, 8; first to adopt 
Constitution, 41; electoral vote, 100,108,162, 
175; senator from, 126; kept in Union, 369; 
McKinley carries, 481. 

Delaware River valley, character of population, 
8; desires Federal capital, 53. 

de Lesseps, Ferdinand, canal promoter, 462. 

de Lome, Senor, attack on McKinley, 488. 

Democracy, in society, 149, 185 ; politics, 150, 
151, 161, 185-190, 225; religion, 152-153; 
Jeffersonian, 88, 180, 184, 185, 186, 504; 
Jacksonian, 175, 185, 504; frontier, 185; 
northern, 186; changing ideals, 505-507, 517- 

Democrats, use of patronage, 188, 203, 250; 
party organization, 190, 218; internal im¬ 
provement policy, 192,193; leaders, 203, 208, 
260, 261,329,401, 402; Union sentiment, 208, 
368; nominate Jackson, 217; Van Buren, 
230; Polk, 304; policies, 231, 233, 244, 261, 
275, 304; losses, 232, 243, 248; blamed for 
panic, 234; demand hard money, 236; fac¬ 
tions, 236, 237, 249, 308, 320, 329, 401, 419; 
dominate Supreme Court, 238; vote with 
Whigs, 255, 256; favor annexation of Texas, 
304, 305; tariff of 1846, 309; nominate Cass, 
317; ignore slavery issue, 317, 318; indorse 
Compromise of 1850, 329; elect Pierce, 329; 
divide on Kansas-Nebraska bill, 338-340; 
join Republicans, 343; elect Buchanan, 344; 
split on Kansas question, 348, 354; in election 
of 1858, 351; opposing candidates, 354, 355; 
keep party organization, 397; oppose eman¬ 
cipation, 400, 401; congressional victories, 
401; nominate McClellan, 405; assist John¬ 
son, 412; nominate Seymour, 4ig; in election 
of 1876, 448, 449; soft money platform, 455; 
nominate Hancock, 461; platform, 463, 464; 
elect Cleveland, 464; tariff policy, 468, 469; 


XVU1 




INDEX 


control House, 474; reelect Cleveland and 
control Congress, 476; split on silver, 477, 
479; Populists join, 479; Anti-Imperialists, 
493 ; nominate Parker, 521; Bryan, 525; 
control House, 526, 528; nominate Wilson, 
532; factions, 532; campaign, 534. 

Denmark, treaty, 334; friendly to North, 385. 

Deseret. See Utah. 

Detroit, held by Great Britain, 22, 122. 

Dewey, Admiral George, in Manila Bay, 490. 

Dingley, Nelson, frames tariff bill, 481. 

Disarmament Conference, 568. 

Disciples of Christ, growth, 153. 

District of Columbia, importation of slaves for¬ 
bidden, 324; abolition sought, 295; obtained, 

. 399 - 

“Divorce Bill.” See Independent Treasury. 

Dix, John A., Secretary of Treasury, 365. 

Dolliver, Sen. J. P., Progressive leader, 527. 

Donelson, Andrew J., 344. 

Donelson, Fort, taken, 392. 

“ Dorr War,” results, 299. 

“ Dough-faces,” origin of term, 167. 

Douglas, Stephen A., squatter sovereignty 
doctrine, 3 J 7 , 335 , 339, 344, 348; Senator, 
322, 351; rivals, 329; opposition, 336; policy 
defeated, 338; opposes Lecompton constitu¬ 
tion, 348; birthplace, 349; debates with 
Lincoln, 349-351; presidential candidate, 
354 , 355 , 357 5 campaign in South, 357; 
vote for, 357-358; supports Union, 370; 
death, 370, 430; monument dedicated, 412. 

Dow, Neal, prohibition advocate, 288. 

Draft riots, in New York, 402. 

Drago, Prof. L. M., on collection of debts, 496. 

Dred Scott decision, 492; Congress overruled, 
399 , 421. 

Duane, William J., Secretary of Treasury, 221; 
removed, 221. 

Dutch, in Hudson valley, 8; political inexperi¬ 
ence, 9, 10; policy toward neutrals, 66. 

Early, Gen. Jubal, defeated, 391. 

East, trade connections, 61, 138. 

East Indies, trade with, 61, 69. 

Economic legislation, tendency, 509. 

Edison, Thomas, inventor, 503. 

Education, southern system, 7,428; land grants 
support, 19; progress slow, 285; develop¬ 
ment of free, 286, 287; leaders, 286; separa¬ 
tion from church, 287; influence of lyceums, 
287; specialization, 504, 505; immigrant, 
513; negro, 515, 516. 

Edwardsville (Ill.), land question, 173. 

Egypt, cotton exports, 374. 

“ Egypt,” Illinois district, 349. 

Elections, congressional, 78, 156, 401, 412, 444, 
526, 540; presidential, 100,108,117,161,167, 
174, 182, 216-218, 226, 230, 246-248, 260- 
262,314,317-318,328, 329, 356 - 358 , 4x8-420, 
429, 430, 448, 461, 463, 464, 469, 470, 476, 
479, 480, 493, 521, 522, 525, 531-534- 

Electoral Commission, chooses Hayes, 448. 

Electoral vote, (1789), 46; (17921,74; (1800), 
83; (1804), 100; (1808), 108; (1812), 117; 
(1816), 162; (1820), 167; (1824), 175-176; 
(1828), 185-187; (1832), 218; (1836), 231; 
(1840), 248; (1844), 306; (1852), 329; 


4 °S; 

533 , 


(1856,344; (i860), 357 - 358 ; (1864), 
(1876), 447; (1896), 481; (1912), 

534 - 

Electors, presidential, how chosen, 46, 150; 
use discretion, 74. 

Elements of Union, 12, 13, 31. 

Ellsworth, Oliver, plan of judiciary, 50; com¬ 
missioner to France, 7g. 

Emancipation, states adopt, 164; District of 
Columbia, 399; demand for, 399; Proclama¬ 
tion issued, 389, 400; results, 389; oath to 
support, 404. 

Embargo, Federalists adopt, 68; Jefferson 
favors, 105, 106; effects, 106, 133, 374; 

repeal, 106; Napoleon, 112; Madison pro¬ 
poses, 116. 

Emerson, Ralph W., theology, 152, 285; praises 
John Brown, 353; cited, 153. 

Emmanuel, American trade vessel, 94. 

English, in Middle States, 8, 9; labor in mills, 
440; immigrants, 511. 

English Bill, provisions, 348. 

English Constitution, as precedent, 38. 

Episcopal church, fosters nationalism, 31. 

“Era of Good Feeling,” causes, 128. 

Ericsson, John, inventor, 385. 

Erie Canal, effect on trade, 138; importance, 
146; completed, 178; cheap route, 264-266. 

Erie Railroad, rivals waterways, 266; managers, 
442; Tammany connection, 445. 

Erskine, D. M., British Minister, 109; treaty 
rejected, 1x0, 111. 

Essex, American trade vessel, 102. 

Essex Junto, Federalist clique, 80; aristocratic 
leanings, 129. 

Europe, imports foodstuffs, 66, 456; Holy Alli¬ 
ance, 170, 171; expected to aid South, 374; 
effect of bad harvests, 379, 380; relations with 
Confederacy, 385, 386; emigration, 434, 438, 
439; Spanish-American creditor, 496. 

European wars, affect America, 102, 103, 543. 

Evarts, William, counsel for Johnson, 415; 
Secretary of State, canal policy, 485. 

Everett, Edward, discusses secret societies, 216; 
lyceum lecturer, 287; Washington and the 
Union, 287; Secretary of State, 327; vice- 
presidential candidate, 356. 

Ewing, Thomas, Secretary of Treasury, 253. 

Executive, organization, 48-50; growth of power, 
400-402, 421, 465, 493. 

Expansion of industry in South, 436; in North 
and West, 439-441, 446; of farming, 439, 451; 
business, 458; effects, 476, 484. 

Expansion of territory, constitutional questions, 
97. 98, 346; Louisiana Purchase, 97; Florida, 
169, 170; Texas, 302, 307; Oregon, 305, 310, 
315; Alaska, 423; Philippines, 490, 491, 493. 
See Population. 

Ex parte Milligan, cited, 421. 

Expatriation, diplomatic problem, 426. 


Factory system, in New England, 133, 440; 
conditions of work, 133, 134; fails in South, 
142; children protected, 289; conditions of 
labor, 458; supervision, 510. See Manu¬ 
factures. 

Fall River (Mass.), manufactures, 440. 

Fallen Timbers, battle of, 61. 


xix 





INDEX 


Farmers’ Alliances, formation, 475. 

“ The Federalist,” 40. 

Federal Reserve Banks, 539. 

Federal Trade Commission, 540. 

Federalists, origin of name, 40; support Con¬ 
stitution, 41; English policy, 68, 70, 71; can¬ 
didates, 74, 75, 81, 100, 162; factions, 75, 80, 
83; badge, 77; policies, 77, 78, 82; defeat, 
83, 84, 86, 100, 108; achievements, 84, 85; 
removal from office, 90; impeachments of, 
93; urge French war, 96,105; criticise Louisi¬ 
ana Purchase, 97, 98; discuss secession, 106; 
oppose British war, 117, 124; disappear, 128, 
161; leaders, 135, 156; tariff of 1816, 158; 
carry three states, 167; aristocratic tendency, 
189, 236; oppose Twelfth Amendment, 250. 

Fenians, in America, 426. 

Fessenden, Sen. William P., 409, 413. 

Filipinos, leader, 490; rights, 493. 

Fillmore, Millard, succeeds Taylor, 325; favors 
Compromise of 1850, 325; cabinet, 327; fails 
of renomination, 328; presidential candidate, 
344; electoral vote, 344. 

Finances, disorder after Revolution, 24, 26, 27; 
Gallatin’s, system, 94, 95. See Currency. 

Finns, immigrants, 511. 

“Fire Eaters,” southern nickname, 322. 

Fish, Hamilton, Secretary of State, 424; deal¬ 
ings with ^England, 424; Cuban policy, 487, 
488. 

Fish, trade in, 23. 

Fisheries, Newfoundland, 5; treaties, 425. 

Fisk, James, tries to corner gold, 442. 

Flagg, Gerson, letter cited, 173. 

Fletcher v. Peck, cited, 102, 129. 

Florida, Spanish colonies, 64; plan to acquire, 
79; boundaries, no, in, 169; ceded to 
Spain, 111; purchase, 169; Jackson’s cam¬ 
paign, 169, 175; Seminoles, 192, 242; repu¬ 
diates debt, 238; admitted to Union, 239, 
335; Whigs carry, 320; secedes, 364; recon¬ 
struction, 448, 449; double election returns, 
448; growth of population, 501. 

Flour, trade, 119; manufacture, 440. 

Floyd, John, electoral vote, 218. 

Foch, Marshal, 554. 560. 

Foote, H. S., defeats Jefferson Davis, 328. 

Foote, Sen. S. A., 194, 201. 

Forbes, J. M., cited, 356. 

Force Bill (1832), 207, 208; (1890), fails of 
passage, 470. 

Forest Service, chief, 529. 

Forster, W. E., friend of North, 385. 

Fort Dearborn, British occupy, 122. 

Fort Henry, taken, 392. 

Fort McHenry, attacked, 123. 

Fort Mimms, massacre, 122. 

Fort Monroe, North holds, 384. 

Fort Pickens, North holds, 384. 

Fort Pulaski, seized, 384. 

Fort Sumter, attack on, unites North, 397. 

Foss, Gov. E. N., presidential candidate, 532. 

Foster, A. J., envoy from England, 116. 

Foster, J. W., Secretary of State, 487. 

Fourier, Ch., followers, 279. 

Fox, Gustavus, assistant secretary of navy, 
384. 

Fox Indians, habitat, 191. 


France, treaty with, 22, 79~8r, 95 . 96. 227; 
relations with England, 62, 63, 66, 95, 97, 109, 
125; colonial ambitions, 63, 65; loan to 
United States, 63; West Indian possessions, 
63, 65, 79, 95; sends Genet to America, 64; 
recalls, 65; policy toward neutrals, 66, 67, 
104-106, 109; Jefferson favors, 71, 75; objects 
to Jay treaty, 75; war with, 76-78; relations 
with Spain, 78, 95, hi, 170; minister to, 79; 
peace commissioners, 79; Jacobin clubs, 8g; 
acquires Louisiana, 95, in; relations with 
Austria, 97, 170; relations with America, 
104-106, 109, 113, 114, 227, 258;. foreign 
minister, 112; trade, 131,142; relations with 
Russia, 170; with Prussia, 170; joins Holy 
Alliance, 170; resents Jackson’s message, 227, 
228; bad harvests, 379; friendly attitude, 
495; assents to open door policy, 498; arbi¬ 
tration treaty, 529. 

Franklin, Benjamin, drafts Articles of Confedera¬ 
tion, 31; in Constitutional Convention, 34; 
intellectual ability, 47; cited, 34. 

Frayser’s Farm (Va.), battle, 390. 

Fredericksburg (Va.), battle, 390. 

Free-Soil party, elements, 318, 319; platforni 
cited, 319; large vote, 319, 320; losses in 
1852, 329; power in Massachusetts, 336. 

Free trade, advocates, 308, 309; tariff of 1846, 
309, 320; tendency checked, 382. 

Freedmen’s Bureau, functions, 410; Act of 
1865, 410; 1866, 411. 

Freedom of speech, endangered, 400. 

Freemasonry, attacked, 216. 

Frelinghuysen, Frederick T., Secretary of State, 
462. 

Fremont, John C., explorer, 320; presidential 
candidate, 343, 405; electoral yote, 344; 
Illinois vote, 349; embarrasses administration, 
398. 

French, canal schemes, 485; buy Spanish bonds, 
494 - 

French Canadians, in New England, 440; im¬ 
migrants, 511. 

French Revolution, affects America, 62, 63, 71; 
humanitarian influence, 290. 

Fries, John, trial for treason. 82. 

Frolic, Wasp defeats, 120. 

Frontier, characteristics (1783), 10-12; area, 
12; population, 12, 115, 146; transportation 
problem, 56, 135, 147, 193, 264; relations 
with Spanish settlements, 64; England holds 
forts, 68; land sales, 114; advance of, 114, 
115, 146, 268, 270, 276, 379, 438, 474. 501, 
502; squatters, 115, 194, 195; political im¬ 
portance, 117, 185, 231; characteristics of 
settlers, 146, 151-153, 185; tariff views, 148, 
185; leaders, 149, 151, 231; democracy, 151, 
152, 185, 188; views on slavery, 165; love of 
Union, 180; electoral vote, 185; Indians, 190- 
192; internal improvements, 192; bank,210- 
213, .223; land speculation, 223; bank sus¬ 
pension, 238, 239; Canada, 243,502; isolation, 
247; squatter sovereignty, 316; financial dis¬ 
tress, 475, 478; disappearance, 502. 

Fugitive Slave Law, in Compromise of 1850, 
323; violated, 330; repealed, 402. 

Fugitive slaves, surrender, 295. 

Fuller, H. M., candidate for Speaker, 340. 


XX 



INDEX 


Fuller, Margaret, 283. 

Fulton, Robert, granted monopoly, 130; in¬ 
ventor, 147. 

Fur trade, English, 22; American, 22. 

Gadsden Purchase, provisions, 334. 

Gaines, Gen. E. P., in Texas, 229. 

Gaines’ Mills (Va.), battle, 390. 

Gallatin, Albert, party leader, 77, 89, 93; Secre¬ 
tary of Treasury, 88, 94, 109; financial 
policy, 94, 95, 119; favors internal improve¬ 
ments, 101, 160; Yazoo policy, 101; un¬ 
popular, 119; successor, 119; peace com¬ 
missioner, 119, 126; friend, 161; vice-presi¬ 
dential candidate, 174; treaty with Creeks, 
180; cited, 160. 

Galveston (Tex.), Confederate port, 385; com¬ 
mission government, 508. 

Garfield, James A., congressional leader, 420; 
elected President, 461; civil service reformer, 
461,462; death, 462. 

Garrison, William L., place in history, 291; 
character, 292 ; editor, 292 ; southern hatred 
of, 293; cited, 292, 293. > 

General Land Office, commissioner, 525. 

Genet, E. C., French Minister, 63 ; instructions, 
64, 65 ; recall, 65 ; western schemes, 76. 

Geneva, arbitration court, 425, 429. 

Genius of Universal Emancipation, editors, 292. 

Georgia, plantation system, 8; cedes western 
lands, 17, 18, 101; adopts Constitution, 41; 
opposes tariff, 52, 144, 181; Indians, 61; 
electoral vote, 74, 218, 231; lands bought, 
99, 179; frontier conditions, 115, 185; cot¬ 
ton industry, 140, 146; slavery sentiment, 
141; immigration, 146; Indian raid, 169; 
favors Crawford, 174; Creek treaties, 179, 
180; resents national interference, x8o; 
governs Cherokee Indians, 191; nullifica¬ 
tion convention proposed, 205; Whigs carry, 
320; leaders, 328, 339; secedes, 363, 364; 
governor, 377; negro education, 409; recon¬ 
struction delayed, 420; 421; finished, 426, 
428; movement of population, 434. 

German-Americans, join Republicans, 343. 

Germans, in Hudson and Susquehanna valleys, 
8, 273; political inexperience, 9, 10; on 
frontier, 11; immigrants, 274, 511; politi¬ 
cal views, 274, 275, 282; religious, 274; 
influence, 274, 282; support Union, 371. 

Germany, emigration, 273, 274; Revolution 
of 1848, 274, 27s; treaty, 334; Spanish- 
Arnerican trade, 483; Samoa, 486, 487, 493 ; 
desires Philippines, 491, 404 ; friendly atti¬ 
tude, 495; assents to open door policy, 498; 
war with, 550. f-* 

Gerry, Elbridge, opposes Constitution, 40; 
envoy to France, 76; elected Governor, 87; 
vice-presidential candidate, 117. 

Gettysburg (Pa.), battle, 391, 393 ; effects, 402. 

Ghent, treaty of, 126. 

Gibbons v. Ogden, cited, 130. 

Gilman v. McClary, cited, 25. 

Gilmer, T. W., Tyler supporter, cited, 236. 

Ginseng, trade in, 22. 

Girondists, fall of, 65. . 

Gist, Gov. S. R., calls South Carolina legis¬ 
lature, 360. 


Gladstone, William E., American policy, 386. 

Goethals, Col. G. W., engineer, 528. 

Goethe, J. W. von, influence in America, 
282. 

Gold, discovered in California, 320; increased 
production, 327, 481; premium, 383, 418, 
442, 452; paid for customs, 417; exported, 
442; currency basis, 481, 500; discovery 
affects immigration, 511. 

Gorgas, Col. W. C., sanitation expert, 528. 

Gough, John B., temperance worker, 288. 

Gould, Jay, tries to corner gold, 442; Tam¬ 
many connection, 445. 

Gould railroads, 460, 521. 

Government, Puritan theory of, 3; colonial 
methods, 13; direct control of, 306, 507; 
commission form, 508, 509. 

Granger Cases, cited, 436. 

Granger movement, organizes farmers, 436; 
political power, 456, 467 ; successor, 474. 

Grant, U. S., western campaigns, 391-393; 
Virginia campaigns, 391; commander-in¬ 
chief, 394; presidential candidate, 419; char¬ 
acter, 419; election, 420; relations with Con¬ 
gress, 421, 424; foreign policy, 424-426; 
break with Sumner, 424, 425, 429, 447; re¬ 
construction, 429; opponents, 429; reelection, 
430; financial policies, 442, 443; desires third 
term, 461. 

Graves v. Georgia, cited, 191. 

Gray, Capt. Robert, explorer, 277. 

Great Britain, colonial land policy, 17; western 
forts, 22, 64, 68, 70; commercial relations 
with, 22, 23, 62; financial, 27; influence over 
Indians, 60, 61, 68; relations with Spain, 62, 
79, 95, 119, 169, 172, 332; France, 62, 64, 66, 
75, 96, 97, 102-105, 109, 118, 122; policy 
toward neutrals, 65-69, 73, 102-104, 109, 
112, 118; relations with United States, 71, 
7g, 81, 96, 105, 106, 109, 112, 172, 226, 
256-260; ministers, 78, 109, 112; War of 
1812, 114, 116-126; American dislike of, 
114, 116; relations with Russia, 118: naval 
supremacy, 120, 121; southern trade, 142, 
143, 437 ; American competitor, 172, 194, 
270, 271, 441; abolishes slave trade, 258; 
West Indian ports, 259; repeals corn laws, 
269, 309; friendly to Texas republic, 277, 
303, 307; Oregon claims, 277, 278, 310; 
Mexican creditor, 279; slavery, 290; Nicara¬ 
gua, 333; commercial treaty, 334, 425; right 
of search settled, 344; bad harvests, 379, 
380, 387; relations with Confederacy, 385- 
389; North, 387-389, 424-426; Treaty of 
Washington, 425; expatriation policy, 425; 
influence in Spanish America, 483; Vene¬ 
zuela dispute, 484; Samoa, 486, 487, 493 5 
treaty with (1846), 486; American minister, 
494; cordiality increases, 49s; Hay treaty, 
497; assents to open door policy, 498. 

Great Horseshoe Bend, battle, 122. 

Great Northern Railroad, builder, 521; m 
merger, 521. 

Great Salt Lake, Mormons at, 278, 279. 

Great War, in Europe, 543 * 

Greeks, immigrants, 5x2. 

Greeley, Horace, editor, 281; supports Douglas, 
348; favors peaceable separation, 367; 


XXI 





INDEX 


presidential candidate, 42Q; “Prayer of 
Twenty Millions,” cited, 399. 

Green, Dutf, editor, 187. 

Green Mountains, location, 2; roads, 135. 

Greenback party, nominates Peter Cooper, 451; 
platform, 451; influence, 451; secures Bland 
act, 455; strength, 456; candidate, 476. 

Greenbacks. See Currency. 

Greenville (O.), Indian treaty, 61. 

Grenville, Lord, treats with Jay, 69. 

Grundy, Felix, political leader, 116. 

Guadalupe Hidalgo, treaty, 313. 

Guam, ceded to United States, 490. 

Guerriere, sunk by Constitution, 120. 

Gulf of Mexico, control of, 277. 

Habeas corpus, writ suspended in North, 369, 
400, 421; in South, 377. 

Hague conference, 496. 

Hail, Columbia, author, 77. 

Haiti, French possession, 79; black republic, 179. 

Hale, Sen. Eugene, retires, 528. 

Hale, John R., Free-Soil senator, 320. 

“Half-Breeds,” Republican faction, 450. 

Halifax, admiralty court, 103; trade, 119. 

Halleck, Gen. H. W., at Corinth, 392. 

Hamilton, Alexander, attacks Articles of Con¬ 
federation, 3; demands Constitutional Con¬ 
vention, 32; extreme views, 34; pseudonym 
“Federalist,” 40; wins state convention, 41; 
social authority, 48, 92; Secretary of Treas¬ 
ury, 50, 52; assumption of state debts, 53; 
National Bank, 54, 130, 157; character, 55; 
relations with Jefferson, 56, 84; favors 
internal improvements, 60, 78; attitude 
toward France, 63,64, 71,78-80; England, 68; 
resigns, 71; relations with Adams, 74, 75, 78- 
Si, 83; head of army, 76; Burr challenges, 
100; death, 100; constructive views, 396; 
cited, 78. 

Hampton Roads, naval fight, 385. 

Hancock, John, Governor, 25; disapproves 
Constitution, 41. 

Hancock, Gen. Winfield S., presidential candi¬ 
date, 461. 

Hanna, Mark, party manager, 480, 520, 528. 

Harding, Warren G., President, 566, 568. 

“Hards,” Democratic faction, 319. 

Harmar, Gen. Josiah, Indians defeat, 61. 

Harmon, Gov. Judson, Attorney-General, 532; 
presidential candidate, 532. 

Harper, Robert G., member of Congress, 156. 

Harpers Ferry (Va.), seized by John Brown, 353; 
by Virginians, 369. 

Harper’s Magazine, contributors, 283. 

Harper’s Weekly, editor, 447. 

Harriman, E. H., financier, 521. 

Harrisburg (Pa.), tariff convention, 181; Whig, 
245; Lee’s army near, 391. 

Harrison, Benjamin, protectionist, 469; presi¬ 
dential candidate, 469; Hawaiian policy, 487; 
fails of reelection, 476; ability, 476. 

Harrison, W. H., delegate to Congress, 59; de¬ 
feats Indians, ns, 122, 192, 231; presidential 
candidate, 231,246; vote for, 231-232; cam¬ 
paign methods, 246, 247; nicknames, 246; 
cabinet, 249, 252; quarrel with Clay, 250; 
death, 250; successor, 302. 


Hartford Convention, action, 124, 125, 128. 

Harvard University, Germanic museum, 495. 

Hatteras Inlet, seized, 384. 

Hague, seat of World Court, 568. 

Havana (Cuba), trade with, 21; Maine visits, 
488. 

Hawaiian Islands, early traders, 486; American 
policy, 487; territory, 493. 

Hawley, Sen. J. R., death, 528. 

Hawthorne, Nathaniel, influences, 153, 282; 
Marble Faun, 283; author, 285. 

Hay, John, Lincoln’s secretary, 493; Ambassa¬ 
dor to England, 494; Secretary of State, 494, 
496; British treaty, 497; successor, 497; 
open door policy, 498. 

Hayes, Rutherford B., presidential candidate, 
447; chosen by electoral commission, 448, 
449; civil service reformer, 450; canal policy, 
485; successor, 461. 

Hayne, Robert Y., debate with Webster, 201, 
205, 207. 

Helper, Hinton R., author, 352. 

Hemp, article of commerce, 148. 

Henry, Prince of Prussia, visits America, 495. 

Henry, John, British spy, 116. 

Henry, Patrick, typical planter, 7; governor, 
25; Revolutionary leader, 33; opposes Con¬ 
stitution, 40-42. 

Hepburn v. Griswold, cited, 422. 

“Hermitage,” Jackson’s home, 234. 

Hill, B. H., leads faction in South, 428. 

Hill, Isaac, member ‘‘Kitchen Cabinet,” 187. 

Hill, James J., financier, 521. 

Hitchcock, F. H., Postmaster-General, 528. 

Hoar, Judge Samuel, forced to leave South 
Carolina, 293. 

Holland, treaty with, 22; bankers loan to 
United States, 24. 

Holmes, Oliver W., influence, 153. 

Holmes v. Walton, cited, 25. 

Holy Alliance, affects America, 170. 

Homestead (Pa.), labor strike, 478. 

Homestead Act, provisions, 396; operation, 438. 

Hood, Gen. T. B., supersedes Johnston, 394. 

Hoover, Herbert C., Food Administrator, 554. 

Hopkinson, Joseph, writes national anthem, 77. 

House of Representatives, representation in, 35, 
163, 164; how chosen, 39; relations with Sen¬ 
ate, 46; first clash with executive, 48; supports 
Adams, 76; speakers, 80, 88, 116, 167, 447, 
468, 470, 527; chooses President, 83, 176; 
admits reporters, 92; speakership contests, 
34 °, 352; impeaches Johnson, 415; procedure, 
470. 

Houston, Gen. Samuel, in Texas, 229. 

Hoyt, Jesse, Collector of Port, 242. 

Hudson Bay Company, in Oregon, 277. 

Hudson River valley, character of population, 
8; patroon grants, 299. 

Hughes, Charles E., 568. 

Huguenots, in South Carolina, 113. 

Hull, Capt. Isaac, 120. 

Hull, Gen. William, surrenders Detroit, 122. 

Hull House, aims, 513. 

Hulsemann, Baron, Austrian representative, 327. 

Humanitarianism, shown in literature, 153; 
growth, 289-290, 517. 

Hungarians, immigrants, 511. 


xxii 



INDEX 


“Hunkers,” Democratic faction, 319. 

Hunter, Gen. David, embarrasses administra- 

^ tion, 398. 

“Hunters’ Lodges,” Canadian sympathizers 
form, 243. 

Hylton v. United States, cited, 51. 

Iberville River, boundary, in. 

Icelanders, immigrants, 511. 

Idaho, admitted to Union, 471. 

Illinois, in Revolution, 64; Indians, 115; ad¬ 
mitted to Union, 146, 164; state rights 
party, 166; land question, 173; electoral 
vote, 175; Indian title extinguished, 179, 
191; population, 192, 501; builds canals, 
225,264; Oregon emigrants, 278; Mormons, 
279; abolition newspaper, 294; free state, 
345. 359; . elements of population, 349, 439, 
511; political tendencies, 349; Lincoln- 
Douglas debates, 349~35i; elects Douglas, 
351; Democrats, win, 401; Copperheads, 
402; public domain, 438; power of Grangers, 
456; governor, 478; farms increase, 439; 
primaries, 528. 

Illinois Central Railroad, 266, 521. 

Immigration, increase of foreign, 271, 272, 275; 
causes, 271; financial panics affect, 271; 
sources, 272, 273; causes labor troubles, 
272; political issue, 273; distribution, 433, 
440, 510-513; ceases during war, 437; re¬ 
vival, 438, 439; character, 512, 513; prob¬ 
lems, 513, restriction, 568. 

Impeachments, Federalist judges, 93; Johnson, 
414-416. 

Impending Crisis, creates sensation, 352. 

Imperialism, political issue, 493, 522. 

“ Implied Powers,” discussed, 82, 97, 130. 

Impressments, 67, 103, 104, 117. 

Inclosures. See Sheep raising. 

Income tax, 537. 

Indemnities, trouble with France over, 227. 

Independence, acknowledged, 1. 

Independent Treasury, Van Buren’s plan, 237; 
act repealed, 252; reestablished, 308. 

India, exports cotton, 142,374; silver policy, 477. 

Indiana, Indians, 115; territorial governor, 
115; admission to Union, 146, 164; state 
rights party, 166; Indian title extinguished, 
179; builds canals, 225, 264; presidential 
vote, 232, 470; sources of population, 349; 
governors, 381, 532; Democrats, 401, 448; 
Gopperheads, 402. 

Indians, friends of Spain, 21, 60; England, 22, 
60,68; policy towards (1790), 60, 61; trea¬ 
ties, 61, 71; begin war in Northwest, 61, 114; 
defeated, 70, 115, 122, 126, 192; Jefferson’s 
policy, 99, 114, 190; object to land sales, 
114, 179, 242; leaders, 115, 122; trouble 
with, in Georgia, 169,179,180; J. Q. Adams’s 
policy, 179, 180; Jackson’s, 190, 191, 206, 
213; removed beyond Mississippi, 191, 242; 
in Oregon, 277; threaten frontier, 438; de¬ 
frauded, 444; defeat Gen. Custer, 444; in 
reservations, 501, 502. , 

Indian Territory, in Civil War, 371. 

Indigo, staple southern product, 6; cotton 
displaces, 140. 

Industrial unions, formation, 475, 


Industrial Workers of World, organization, 513. 

Initiative, states adopt, 507. 

In re Garland, cited, 421. 

Insular Cases, cited, 492. 

Insurance, regulation, 509. 

Interior Department, Secretary, 464, 525. 

Internal improvements, Hamilton favors, 78; 
Jefferson, 101; Republicans, 109, 343; New 
England, 136, 139; Middle States, 139; po¬ 
litical issue, 139, 217; West, 147, 192; Clay, 
149, 210; Congress aids, 160, 161, 173, 266, 
3351 J- Q. Adams, 178, 179, 210; Jackson’s 
views, 192, 195, 210; by states, 225; Demo¬ 
crats oppose, 231. 

Interstate commerce. See Commerce; also 
Railroads. 

Interstate Commerce Act, provisions, 467, 527; 
amended, 522. 

Interstate Commerce Commission, established, 
467; aided by state laws, 510; powers, 522; 
extended, 526; decisions, 531. 

Iowa, Fourierism, 279; prohibition law, 289; 
pioneers, 335; population, 439; power of 
Grangers, 456; growth, 501. 

Ireland, causes of emigration, 272; Fenian agi¬ 
tation, 426. 

Irish, causes of immigration, 272; labor com¬ 
petition, 272, 440; religion, 272; political 
activity, 272, 274; rioting against, 273; in 
Fenian agitation, 426; immigrants, 511; 
adaptability, 513. 

Iron, tariff, 159; in South, 436; mining, 501. i 

Iroquois, in New York, 61. 

Irrigation, development, 502, 503; government 
aid, 524. 

Irving, Washington, author, 153, 283. 

Isthmus of Panama, neutrality guaranteed, 333. 

Italy, friendly to North, 385; emigration, 512. 

Jackson, Andrew, defeats Indians, 122, 192; at 
New Orleans, 125,126; seizes Florida, 169; re¬ 
lations with Clay, 175; character, 175; elec¬ 
toral vote, 176,182,185-187, 218, 231; popu¬ 
lar vote, 177, 182, 231; supporters, 178, 182, 
194, 214; tariff views, 181, 182, 204, 206; 
elected President, 182; “democracy,” 184, 
186,2x3,220; inauguration, 184, 185; cabi¬ 
net, 187, 203; advisers, 187, 202, 214; Indian 
policy, 190, 191, 213, 218, 292; internal im¬ 
provement, 192, 193, 217; vetoes, 192, 193, 
215, 226; relations with Calhoun, 202, 203, 
217, 2x8; supports Union, 202, 208, 210; 
deals with nullification, 205, 208, 220; fears 
banks, 212, 213; bank message cited, 214; 
political courage, 215, 224; opposition to 
reelection, 216, 232; reelection, 218, 220; re¬ 
moves deposits, 221; Senate censures, 222; 
foreign policy, 226; commercial policy, 226, 
227; issues “Specie Circular,” 226, 235, 236, 
477; French policy, 227, 228; dealings with 
Mexico, 228-230; retirement, 233, 234; suc¬ 
cess, 233, 249; judicial appointments, 238; 
Van Buren, 261, 304; Kendall, 293 ; favors 
annexation of Texas, 304; education, 365; 
legislative program, 396; state rights, 430; 
cited, 188, 190, 191, 194, 206, 212. 

Jackson, Francis James, British Minister, 
no. 


xxiii 




INDEX 


Jackson, Gen. Thomas J., characteristics, 374, 
375; campaigns, 390. 

Jacksonian Democracy, character, 184, 231. 

Jacobins, nickname of Republicans, 78, 89. 

James River, route via, 60; trade route, 139; 
Grant crosses, 390. 

Japan, opens ports, 486; assents to open door 
policy, 498; peace with Russia, 523. 

Japanese, immigration problem, 5x2, 513. 

Java, Constitution defeats, 120. _ 

Jay, John, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 14; 
treaty with Spain, 23; pseudonym “Feder¬ 
alist,” 40; Chief Justice, 49, 50; treaty with 
England, 68, 69; violates instructions, 69. 

Jefferson, Thomas, typical planter, 7; plans 
surveys, 19; plan for Northwest, 19; comage 
scheme, 24; favors disestablishment,. 25; 
Secretary of State, 50, 53; opposes National 
Bank, 54, 55; Hamilton, 56; resigns, 56, 71; 
heads new party, 56, 68; commercial policy, 
62, 68, 374; friend of France, 63, 64, 71; 
electoral vote, 74; Vice President, 75; skill as 
leader, 82,83,89,100; writes Kentucky Reso¬ 
lutions, 82, 200; presidential candidate, 83; 
election, 84, 99; inauguration, 86; character, 
87, 88,90; home, 87; followers, 88, 89; ap¬ 
pointment policy, 91; reduces diplomatic 
copxs, 94; army and navy, 94, 118, 120; 
Mississippi policy, 95-97; Indian policy, 99; 
encourages exploration, 99; broad construc¬ 
tion view, 100, 101, 129; foreign policy, 102- 
106; successor, 108; favors religious liberty, 
109; relies on militia, 123; cabinet, 175; 
checks centralization, 184; removals, 188; 
internal improvements, 193; bank, 212; 
founds University, 283; legislative program, 
396;! cited, 54, 55, 91,92, 94,96, 100,101, 163. 

Jefferson City (Mo.), saved for Union, 371. 

Jeffersonian Democracy, character of, 180, 184, 
232, 246, 308. 

Jenckes, Thomas, civil service reformer, 447. 

Jesup, Gen. T. S., in Seminole War, 242. 

Jews, Roumanian, 496. 

Johnson, Andrew, military governor, 403; Vice 
President, 405; President, 407; character, 
408; reconstruction policy, 408, 409; amnesty 
proclamation, 408; struggle with Congress, 
410, 411, 430; impeachment, 414-416, 422. 

Johnson, Col. Richard M., political leader, 116, 
156; vice-presidency candidate, 230; Senate 
elects, 233. 

Johnson-Clarendon agreement, rejected, 425. 

Johnson, Sen. Hiram, 567. 

Johnston, Gen. Albert S., at Shiloh, 392. 

Johnston, Gen. Joseph E., campaign, 394. 

Jones, Willie, Anti-Federalist leader, cited, 42. 

Judiciary, high character, 25, 50, 51; organiza¬ 
tion of national, 50, 78; criticized, 82, 92, 93, 
530; increased prestige, 130. 

Juillard v. Greeman, cited, 422. 

Kanawha River, trade routes, 12, 139, 146. 

Kansas, organization proposed, 336; struggle 
for, 340; popular sovereignty in, 341; first 
election, 341; Topeka convention, 341; 
territorial governors, 341; violence in, 346, 
347. 352 J second election, 347; Lecompton 
constitution, 347; Buchanan recommends 


admission, 347; Lecompton debate, 347, 348; 
refuses to ratify Constitution, 348; popula¬ 
tion, 439; admitted to Union, 439; power of 
Grangers, 456; economic distress, 475; 
People’s party, 475, 476. 

Kansas-Nebraska Bill, provisions, 336; debate, 
337; effect on party lines, 337 - 339- 

Kansas River, surveys demanded, 335. 

Kendall, Amos, member “Kitchen Cabinet,” 
187; Postmaster-General, 293. 

Kentucky, blue-grass region, 8; immigration, 
12; in War of 1812,14, 125; part of Virginia, 
20, 28; settlers, 21; Spanish influence in, 
22; district court, 50; admitted to Union, 
59, 164; electoral vote, 74, 218; character of 
settlers, 87; frontier conditions, 115; polit¬ 
ical leaders, 116; bank failures, 148; favors 
tariff, 148; supports Jackson, 192; state 
banks, 212; school system, 286; anti- 
slavery sentiment, 291; proslavery, 294; 
stays in Union, 370, 371; Confederate 
soldiers, 374; invaded, 392; McKinley 
carries, 481. 

Kentucky Resolutions, cited, 82, 83. 

Key, Francis Scott, author, 123. 

King, Rufus, Minister to England, 78, 178; 
electoral vote, 100, 162; vice-presidential 
candidate, xoo, 108; member of Congress, 
128, 156; presidential candidate, 162; favors 
restriction of slavery, 166. 

Kings Mountain, battle, 11. 

“Kitchen Cabinet,” members, 187. 

“Knights of Golden Circle.” See Copperheads. 

Knights of Labor, Noble Order of, founded, 458. 

Know-Nothing party. See American party. 

“Know ye” party, origin of name, 28. 

Knox, Gen. Henry, Secretary of War, 14, 50. 

Knox, P. C., Attorney-General, 525; Secretary 
of State, 525. 

Knox v. Lee, cited, 422. 

Kramer, George, member of Congress, 176; 
cited, 177. 

Ku-Klux Klan, methods, 428; suppression, 429. 

Labor, legislation, 289, 438, 458, 459, 463; 
slavery, 290, 356-357; problem in South, 
433-436, 516; in North, 437, 440; strikes, 
437. 458, 478, 520; scarcity, 438; coolie, 
441; changing conditions, 458; struggle with 
capital, 458; organization, 458, 461, 478, 
513; political activity, 459, 461; in protected 
industries, 468, 469, 511; foreign, 511-5x3; 
department of, created, 520. 

Lafayette, Marquis de, flees from France, 63. 

La Follette, Robert M., Progressive leader, 527, 
568; presidential candidate, 531, 532. 

Lake Champlain, trade route, 69, 135; in War 
of 1812, 122, 123. 

Lake Erie, as boundary, 18; Perry controls, 
122; canal route to, 138. 

Lake Shore Railroad, rioters, 299. 

“Lancastrian System,” in New York, 286. 

Lands, colonies cede western, 17, 18; govern¬ 
ment surveys and sales, 18, 19, 59-61; boun¬ 
ties, 18, 20, 21; speculation, 19, 223-225, 
241; purchase of Indian, 99, 114, 179; 
offices, 114; conditions of sale, 114, 144, 173, 
174. 193-196; Jackson’s policy, 193-196, 


XXIV 




INDEX 


210; amount of public sales, 224, 240; 
prices, 228, 229; distribution of proceeds, 
255, 256, 438, 441, 524; railroad grants, 
266, 438; Homestead Act, 396, 438; pre¬ 
emption law, 473. 

Langdon, John, elected Governor, 86. 

Lawrence (Kan.), burned, 347. 

League of Nations, 565. 

Lecompton (Kan.), proslavery convention, 347. 

Ledyard, John, explorer, 09. 

Lee, Robert E., southern ideal, 374, 375; 
campaigns, 390, 393, 394; surrender, 393, 405; 
reconstruction views, 428. 

Lemmon case, appealed, 351. 

l’Enfant, Major P. C., plans city of Washington, 

86 . 

Leopard, fires on Chesapeake, 194. 

Lewis, Major W. B., member “Kitchen 
Cabinet,” 187, 214. 

Lewis, Meriwether, explorer, 99, 277. 

Lexington (Mass.), first normal school in Amer¬ 
ica, 286. 

Liberal Republicans, 429, 430.. 

Liberator, founded, 292; abolition organ, 293. 

Liberia, negro colony, 291. 

Liberty Loans, 552 - 553 - 

Liberty party, formation, 295; candidate, 
295, 306; holds balance of power, 306; 
nucleus of Free-Soil party, 318, 319. 

Lincoln, Abraham, views ;on national conven¬ 
tions, 190; Wilmot Proviso, 315; nominated 
for senator, 349; debates with Douglas, 
349-35i; defeated, 351; presidential nomi¬ 
nation, 355, 336; election, 357; electoral 
vote, 358; result of election, 360, 363; re¬ 
fuses Crittenden amendment, 361, 362; 

inauguration, 365, 367; characterized, 365, 
367, 381; decides to relieve Fort Sumter, 
367; calls for troops, 368; Maryland, 370; 
Kentucky policy, 370; appointments, 380; 
cabinet, 380, 381; declares blockade, 384. 
387; states object of war, 386; emancipa¬ 
tion, 389, 399, 4°°> 4° 2 ; guiding purpose, 
398; usurpation of power attacked, 400, 
401, 402; reconstruction policy, 403, 404; 
reelection, 405; assassination, 407; suc¬ 
cessor, 407, 408; favors education of negroes, 
409; disregards Supreme Court, 421; cited, 
304, 362. 

Lincoln, Gen. Benjamin, Secretary of War, 14. 

Linn, Sen. L. F., knowledge of Far West, 278. 

Liverpool, cotton market, 140, 142. 

Livingston, Edward, Secretary of State, 203, 

Livingston, Robert R., Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs, 14; Minister to France, 97; patron 
of Fulton, 130. 

Local government, in New England, 4; South, 
7; Middle States, 10. 

Locke, John, theory of government, 3; in¬ 
fluence, 33. 

Loco-Focos, favor annexation, 304. 

Lodge, Sen. Henry C., frames Force Bill, 47 °- 

Longstreet, Gen. James, at Chattanooga, 393. 

Lookout Mountain, battle, 393. 

Lopez, Gen. Narcisco, Cuban filibuster, 332. 

Louis XVI, friend of America, 63; effect of 
death, 63, 64. 


Louisiana, French population, 63; Spanish, 
64; ceded to France, 95; to United States, 
97; organization, 98, 99; frontier conditions, 
115; admitted to Union, 115, 145, 164; 
population (1814), 123; economic conditions, 
145, 146; favors sugar tariff, 159; treaty 
of purchase, 166, 169; electoral vote, 175; 
Indian title extinguished, 179; Whigs carry, 
320; holds specie reserves, 345; secedes, 
364; invaded, 392; military governor, 403; 
reconstruction, 404, 408, 448, 449; double 
election returns, 448. 

Louisiana Purchase, indefinite terms, 305; con¬ 
stitutional points, 307; status of slavery, 346. 

Louisville (Ky.), trade, 139; Confederates 
threaten, 392. 

Lovejoy, Elijah P., murdered, 294. 

Lowell, F. C., inventor, 133. 

Lowell, James Russell, Biglow Papers, cited, 
318. 

Lowell (Mass.), growth, 133; factory condi¬ 
tions, 134; strike of 1912, 513. 

Lowndes, William, in Congress, 114,156; favors 
navy, 116; protection, 142. 

Loyalists, become English officials, 22; settle in 
Canada, 121. 

“Loyalists,” in South, 426. 

Lumber, exported, 23; in Northwest, 439, 440; 
South, 436. 

Lundy, Benjamin, emancipationist, 292. 

Lusitania, 545. 

Lyceums, influence, 287. 

Lynchburg (Va.), rail route via, 389, 391. 

Lyon, Capt. Nathaniel, St. Louis, commandant, 
37 i- 

Lyons, Lord, Minister to United States, 387. 

Maclay, Sen. William, cited, 42. 

McClellan, Gen. George B., in Virginia. 390; 
political views, 401; presidential candidate, 
405. 

McCormick reaper, invented, 267. 

McCulloch, Hugh, Secretary of Treasury, 417; 
currency plan, 418, 442. 

McCulloch v. Maryland, cited, 130. 

Macdonough, Commodore Thomas, victory, 
123. 

McDuffie, George, opposes tariff, 143, 197 . 198; 
favors Bank, 214; cited, 144. 

Macedonian, United States defeats, 120. 

McGillivray, Alexander, Creek chief, 61. 

McHenry, James, letter to, cited, 23. 

McKean, Thomas, elected Governor, 86; re¬ 
moves opponents, 9°- _ 

MacKenzie, William L., attacks Van Buren, 243. 

McKinley, William, frames tariff, 471, 473 ; 
Ohio Governor, 479; presidential candidate, 
479,520; campaign, 480; election, 481; for¬ 
eign policy, 483, 487, 494 ; Cuban, 488-490; 
de Lome attacks, 488; reelection, 493 ; as¬ 
sassination, 519- , 

McLane, Louis, Secretary of Treasury, 203, 214, 
221; of State, 221. , ^ 

McLaughlin, Dr. John, Hudson s Bay Company 
factor, 277. . .. 

McLean, member of Congress, 156; dissents 
from Taney, 346. # . 

McLean, John, Illinois politician, 213. 


XXV 




INDEX 


McLeod, Alexander, causes international flurry, 
257 - 

Macon, Nathaniel, Speaker, 88; defeated, 102; 
commercial bills, no; in Congress, 156. 

Macon Bill, provisions, no, 112, 1x3. 

Madison, James, favors disestablishment, 25; 
centralization, 31; leader in Constitutional 
Convention, 33; interpreter of Constitution, 
37; plans of Confederacies, 38; break with 
Hamilton, 52; drafts Virginia Resolutions, 
82, 200; Secretary of State, 88, 175; party 
leader, 89, 101, 108; elected President, 108, 
117; appointments, 109; domestic policy, 
109; foreign, 109-113, 1x6, 118; reelected, 
117; lacks vigor, 120; favors limited protec¬ 
tion, 158; vetoes “Bonus Bill,” 161, 192; 
civil service practice, 178; cited, 43. 

Madison (Wis.), early land sales, 224. 

Madrid, Spanish capital, 489. 

Maine, Massachusetts includes, 4; frontier 
population, 12 ; threatens to secede, 28; dis¬ 
trict court, 50; sheep raising, 134; applies for 
admission, 166; electoral vote, 218; troubles of, 
248, 259, 260; Whigs lose, 260; adopts prohi¬ 
bition, 288; Republican party organized, 338. 

Maine, battleship, sent to Havana, 488; de¬ 
stroyed, 489. 

Malvern Hill (Va.), battle, 390. 

Manassas (Va.), battles, 390. 

Mangum, Willie P., electoral vote, 233. 

Manila (P. I.), Dewey attacks, 490. 

Mann, Horace, educator, 286. 

Manufactures, in New England, 133, 136, 138, 
440; amount of woolen, (1815) 133; factory 
conditions,-133, 134; in South, 142, 376; 
owners petition Congress, 158; cotton, 142, 
159, 374J English competition, 172, 194; 
growth, 268, 440, 458, 501; markets, 268, 269, 
514; in North, 379; by corporations, 441. 

Marbury v. Madison, cited, 129. 

Marcy, W. L., Secretary of War, 308; Demo¬ 
cratic leader, 329; Secretary of State, 331, 
332 , 333 - 

Marietta (O.), founded, 21. 

Marshall, John, urges adoption of Constitution, 
41; envoy to France, 76; Secretary of State, 
80; Chief Justice, 84, 93; dominates Court, 
93, 129; decisions, 129-130, 191; influence, 

130.131.174, 201, 213, 218; personality, 131; 
death, 237; successor, 237; cited, 29. 

Marshall, Thomas, vice-presidential candidate, 
532 . 

Martin, Luther, in Constitutional Convention, 
34; opposes adoption, 40. 

Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, cited, 129. 

Maryland, plantation system, 8; Catholics in, 
13; urges western cessions, 17; joins Con¬ 
federation, 17; dispute with Virginia, 32; 
adopts Constitution, 41; electoral vote, 100, 

108.151.175, 232,344,481; favors protection, 
136; antislavery sentiment, 141; taxes United 
States Bank, 158; character of Democracy, 
186; politically uncertain, 230; held in Union, 
369, 371; secession, 369; Confederate soldiers, 
374; Lee invades, 390, 392; adopts emancipa¬ 
tion, 402; new constitution, 427. 

Mason, George, in Constitutional Convention, 
34 - 


Mason, J. Y., Minister to France, 332. 

Mason, James M., Confederate envoy, 388. 

Mason, Jeremiah, member of Congress, 156. 

Mason and Dixon Line, sectional boundary, 163, 
293 , 356 , 357 , 500. 

Massachusetts, claims western lands, 17; cedes 
to government, 18; dispute with New York, 
18; abolishes slavery, 26; and Maine, 28; 
favors sound money, 28; Shays’s Rebellion, 28, 
32; Vermont, 29; votes in state constitu¬ 
tion, 40; national, 41; governs, 87, 381, 532; 
Republicans gain, 91; protest of legislature, 
106; shipping, 110; calls Hartford Convention, 
124; sends commissioners to Washington, 125, 
126; sheep raising, 134; banks, 148, 238, 240; 
alters constitution, 150; religious sects, 152, 
285; electoral vote, 162, 231; divides terri¬ 
tory, 166; Fourierism, 279; school system, 
286; slavery ended, 290; trouble with South 
Carolina, 293; rioting, 299; Whigs, strong, 
337; growth of population, 501; educational 
suffrage, 507; park commission, 508; labor 
laws, 438. 

Matamoras (Mex.), skirmish, 312; smuggling, 

385, 387. 

Matthews, Father, temperance worker, 288. 

Maysville Road Bill, vetoed, 192. 

Meade, Gen. George, defeats Lee, 391. 

Meat Inspection Law, enforcement, 524. 

Mechanicsville (Va.), battle, 390. 

Mediterranean Sea, pirates infest, 22, 102. 

Memphis (Tenn.), rail connections, 392. 

Merchant marine, development, 270, 335; 
British rivalry, 271; decline, 386, 424, 441. 

Merrimac, made into Virginia, 385. 

Merrimac River, trade route, 135. 

Merryman case, cited, 421. 

Methodist church, fosters nationalism, 31; 
growth, 153; Indian mission, 277; divides, 
298; Clay joins, 323. 

Metternich, Prince, cited, 239. 

Mexican war, causes, 311, 312; battles, 312, 
313; results, 313, 314; political issue, 314. 

Mexico, gains independence, 168; American 
boundary, 169; Texas revolts from, 228, 229, 
277; president, 229; withdraws minister, 229, 
311; American debtor, 230; emigration to, 
279; British debtor, 280; resents annexation, 
310; negotiations with, 311, 315; war begins, 
312, 486; treaty, 313, 320, 486; Wilmot Pro¬ 
viso, 315; Gadsden treaty, 334; disturb¬ 
ances (1857), 344, (recent) 542; possible slave 
territory, 362; French in, 389, 423. 

Michigan, British control, 122; Indian title ex¬ 
tinguished, i7g; admission to Union, 231, 
276; repudiates debt, 239; electoral vote, 
306; Republican convention, 338; public 
domain, 438; salt industry, 440; growth of 
population, 501. 

Middle States, topography, 8, 9; character of 
population, 8-10; economic conditions, 9, 10; 
political, 9, 10; population (1783), 10; emi¬ 
gration, 21; exports, 23; favor protection, 136; 
internal improvements, 138, 139; western 
trade, 138,139; vote on Missouri Compromise, 
167; electoral vote, 176; intellectual awaken¬ 
ing, 283; Confederacy hopes for, 364. See 
also the several states. 


XXVI 




INDEX 


Midway Island, coaling station, 493. 

Migration, 134, 138, 144, 275, 280, 439, 501. 

Milan Decree, issued, 104; revoked, 112. 

Miles, Gen. Nelson A., occupies Porto Rico, 490. 

Militia, mobilization (1813), 122; Jefferson 
relies on, 123; disaffected, 124, 125. 

Mills BUI. See Tariff. 

Milwaukee (Wis.), manufactures, 440. 

Mining, in California, 321; Colorado and 
Nevada, 379; South, 436; gold, 442; ex¬ 
tension, 474; silver, 477; Bureau established, 
520. 

Minneapolis (Minn.), manufactures, 440. 

Minnesota, free soil, 345; admission, 348; 
farms increase, 439; power of Grangers, 456; 
foreign immigration, 511. 

Miranda, Don Francisco de, plots revolution, 
79; death, 168. 

Missionaries, in Oregon, 277, 278; Hawaii, 486. 

Missionary Ridge (Tenn.), battle, 393. 

Mississippi, cotton cultivation, 144; admitted 
to Union, 146, 164; Indian lands, 179, 191; 
population, 192; electoral vote, 218; state 
bank failures, 238; debt repudiated, 238; 
calls southern convention, 322; favors 
Compromise of 1850, 328; secedes, 364; 
invaded, 392; reconstruction late, 420, 421; 
movement of population, 434; public do¬ 
main, 438; farms increase, 439. 

Mississippi River, as boundary, 17, 18, 26, 438, 
500; navigation disputed, 21, 23, 65; strug¬ 
gle for control, 96, 100, 123; Indian lands 
bought, 99; trade route, 121, 145, 202, 265- 
267, 369; navigation methods, 147; res¬ 
ervation beyond, 191; cotton culture, 267; 
military operations, 392; effect of closing, 
441. 

Mississippi valley, settlers, 114, 146; democ¬ 
racy, 151, 152; growth of population, 276; 
Confederacy hopes for, 364. 

Missouri, character of settlers, 144; land sales, 
144; admitted to Union, 146, 167, 242, 276; 
congressional debate on, 165, 166; Compro¬ 
mises, 166, 167; constitution, 167, 421, 427; 
Mormons, 279; school system, 286; rejects 
Benton, 329; pioneers, 335; sends voters 
into Kansas, 341 ; Union element, 371; 
Confederate soldiers, 374; adopts emanci¬ 
pation, 402; Republican factions, 429; 
farms increase, 439; Bryan carries, 481. 

Missouri Compromise, extension, 307, 3 J 4 , 
315; interpretation, 316, 339, 346,' discussion 
of, 317; repeal, 335, 336 ; 

Missouri Pacific Railroad, in merger, 521. 

Missouri River, explored, 99; trade route, 
266, 277; fur trade, 278; as boundary, 
438, 481; settlements, 439. 

Mobile (Ala.), Americans seize, 169; Confed¬ 
erate port, 385; rail connections, 392. 

Mohawk valley, New England immigrants, 5; 
canal, 138. 

Molasses, trade in, 23; duty on, 52. 

Monarchy, considered, 31. , 

Money Trust, investigated, 530. 

Monitor, fights Virginia, 385. 

Monongahela River, route via, 21. 

Monroe, James, commissioner to France, 75, 
96, 97; views, 88, 101; Minister to England, 


103; Secretary of State, 113, 117, 119, 161, 
162, 175; presidential candidate, 108, 161; 
cabinet, 162; governor of Virginia, 162; 
Secretary of War, 162; character, 162; elec¬ 
toral vote, 162, 163, 167; crisis of adminis¬ 
tration, 163; signs Missouri Compromise, 
167; in Florida Purchase, 169; favors Eng¬ 
lish alliance, 170; announces “Doctrine, 
171, 172; vetoes toll-road bill, 173, 192. 

Monroe Doctrine, announced, 171; effects, 
172; bearing on Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 
333 ; Oregon dispute, 310; Maximilian affair, 
423; Venezuela, 484; Hawaii, 487; Cuba, 
493; undisturbed, 483; new extension, 484, 
540. 

Montana, admitted to Union, 471; Roosevelt’s 
residence, 519. 

Monterey (Mex.), Taylor occupies, 312. 

Montgomery (Ala.), constitutional convention, 
364- 

Montreal, American trade, 69. 70. 

Morgan, J. Pierpont, 478, 520, 521, 530. 

Morgan, William, exposes Masonry, 216. 

Mormons, founder, 278; settlements, 278, 279; 
missionaries, 279. 

Morocco, treaty with, 22. 

Morrill Act. See Tariff. 

Morris. Gouvemeur, opposes Twelfth Amend¬ 
ment, 250. 

Morris, Robert, Superintendent of Finance, 14; 
favors National Bank, 24; models treasury 
department, 49. 

Morton, Gov. O. P., aids Lincoln, 381. 

Mount Vernon, navigation commission at, 32; 
home of Washington, 47, 71; national me¬ 
morial, 287. 

“Mugwump Campaign,” 463, 464. 

Muhlenberg, Frederick A. C., first Speaker of 
House, 45. 

Municipalities, problems, 445, 508. 

Murray, William Vans, commissioner to France, 
79 - 

Muscat, treaty with, 227. 

Nacogdoches (Mex.), strategic position, 229. 

Napoleon, neutral trade, 67, 103, 104, 118; 
colonial policy, 95-97 ; decrees, 103, 104,109, 
112; and English, 105; American policy, 
110-113, 175; invades Russia, 118; abdica¬ 
tion, 122; power wanes, 125,126; continental 

. system fails, 168; wars affect America, 171, 
227. 

Napoleon III, American policy, 389; Mexican 
scheme, 423. 

Nashville (Tenn.), convention, 322, 328; taken, 
392; battle, 394. 

Nassau, British port, 259; smuggling, 387. 

Nast, Thomas, cartoonist, 446. 

National debt (1783), 24; (1789), 52; under 
Federalists, 82; Gallatin reduces, 94, 95,118; 
wiped out, 95, 223, 224; Dallas and, 159; 
decreases, 193, 204; increase, 241; Civil W T ar, 
416, 417. 

National Progressive party, 531-532. 

National Republicans, convention (1831), 217; 
candidates, 231, 246; allies, 232. 

Nat Turner’s rebellion, effects, 293. 

Natural gas, source of wealth, 440. 





INDEX 


Naturalization, conditions, 77, 94; diplomatic 
problem, 426. 

Navigation Acts, British, 22, 23, 61; discussed 
in Constitutional Convention, 36; act of 
1789, 62; help New England, 132. 

Navy, in War of 1812, 120-124; increase, 160, 
254; in 1861, 384; growth during war, 384; 
reduction, 416; expenses of new, 471; world 
cruise, 524. 

Navy Department, organized, 76; secretaries, 
203, 308, 380, 384, 464, 471, 490, 519. 

Nebraska, organization proposed, 337; settled 
by northerners, 340; population, 439; ad¬ 
mitted to Union, 439; economic distress, 475 ; 
People’s party, 475; Bryan carries, 480. 

Negroes, enlistment, 402; postbellum laws, 409; 
Freedmen’s Bureau, 410; suffrage problem, 
413, 414, 420, 427-429; in office, 426; free 
labor conditions, 434, 435; move North, 439; 
vote suppressed, 448, 449, 470, 515 ; southern 
whites solid against, 449; growth of popula¬ 
tion, 515; education, 515, 516; political 
factor, 516. 

Neutral rights, disputed, 65-69; obligation to 
defend, 75; in Civil War, 386-388. 

Neutral trade, English policy, 102-104,109,118; 
French, 104, 109, 118; European peace ends, 
I 3 I * 

Neutrality, policy adopted, 62, 64; French 
Revolution endangers, 63 ; maintained, 71, 72; 
restored by Adams, 80, 81, 84; difficulties of, 
113, 118, 169, 170, 229, 243; European peace 
affects, 126; law of 1817, 169; of 1838, 243; 
of Panama, 333; Tehuantepec, 334; Cuba, 
424, 488; during Civil War, 424-426; of 
interoceanic canals, 485. 

Nevada, mining immigration, 379; admitted to 
Union, 439; Chinese question, 461, 463. 

New England, topography, 2, 3, 4; character of 
settlers, 3; industries, 3, 5, 9, 23; area (1783), 
4; population, 4; emigration, 4, 5, 20, 21, 134, 
135,.146, 278, 284, 349; self-government, 10; 
religious sects, 31, 152; objects to molasses 
duty, 52; political parties, 89, 108; secession 
proposed, 98; British spy visits, 116; ports 
blockaded, 119; British harry, 123; dis¬ 
affection, 124, 125; decline of trade, 132; 
revival of shipbuilding, 132; manufactures 
increase, 133, 136, 138, 142, 379, 440; sheep 
raising, 135; farms deserted, 135, 275; 
favors protection, 136, 181; cotton manu¬ 
facture, 142, 159, 374; cotton market, 143; 
party organization, 152; conservatism, 152; 
divided on tariff, 160; vote on Missouri Com¬ 
promise, 167; electoral vote, 175, 176, 187; 
Antimasons, 2x6; intellectual awakening, 284; 
moral awakening, 284; dogmatism, 284, 285; 
political equality, 285; prohibition laws, 288, 
289; opposes Mexican war, 314; negro suf¬ 
frage, 414; factory conditions change, 458, 
513; French Canadians, 511; railroad merger, 
521. See also the several states. 

New Hampshire, frontier population, 12; 
Supreme Court decision, 25; abolishes slavery, 
26; claims Vermont territory, 29; adopts Con¬ 
stitution, 41; governor, 86; sheep raising, 134; 
electoral vote, 218; frontier troubles, 248; 
Free-Soil vote, 320. 


New Harmony, communist settlement, 278. 

New Haven (Conn.), protest of merchants, 
9 i- 

New Jersey, New England immigrants, 5; 
gradual emancipation in, 26; paper-money 
party, 27; adopts Constitution, 41; trade 
with, 41; favors protection, 136; adopts eman¬ 
cipation, 164; electoral vote, 218, 232, 357; 
campaign of i860, 356; Democrats control, 
401; growth of population, 501; governor, 
532 - 

New Mexico, American claim, 311; occupation, 
312; applies for admission, 321, 322; possible 
slave state, 335, 348, 362; in Civil War, 371; 
denied admission, 471; admitted, 502. 

New Orleans (La.), trade center, 21, 266, 267; 
Genet’s expedition against, 64; place of de¬ 
posit, 70, 95; plan to acquire, 79; France 
acquires, 95-97; sells, 97 ; British expedition 
against, 123, 125; battle of, 125; importance, 
145; slave market, 259; North captures, 384; 
negro riot, 412. 

New Orleans, river steamer, 147. 

New York, New England immigrants, 5; politi¬ 
cal conditions, 9, 10; cedes western lands, 17; 
gradual emancipation, 26; paper-money 
party, 28; tariff laws, 32, 41; adopts Con¬ 
stitution, 41; electoral vote, 46, 74, 175, 187, 
218, 306, 470; Indians, 61; governors, 86, 
100, 161, 187, 401, 446, 464, 493, 519; or¬ 
ganization, 89, 150, 189; Republican factions, 
89, 108, 117; militia disaffected, 124; grants 
monopoly, 130; favors protection, 136; 
builds Erie Canal, 138; emigration, 146, 349; 
alters Constitution, 150; emancipation, 164; 
supports Crawford, 174; Antimasons, 216; 
Loco-Focos, 236; banking system, 240; Ger¬ 
mans, 274; Mormons, 279; New England 
influence, 284; schools, 285, 287; extradition 
trouble, 294; rioting, 299; Democratic factions, 
308, 319, 320; opposes Mexican war, 314; 
Whigs, strong, 320; Lemmon case, 357; 
campaign of i860, 356; manufactures grow, 
379; negro suffrage, 414; salt industry, 440; 
growth of population, 501; commissions, 501; 
labor conditions, 513. 

New York Central Railroad, rivals waterways, 

266. 

New York city, early importance, 8; cosmo¬ 
politan, 9; first congress, 41; financial center, 
54. 394; mayor, 89; Washington inaugu¬ 
rated, 47; blockaded, 103; Federalist con¬ 
vention, 117; port, 132, 456; rivals, 138; 
bank notes discounted, 156; collectors, 241, 
242, 462; anti-Catholic riots, 273; publica¬ 
tions, 280, 283; Zouaves, 353; draft, 402; 
southern trade, 437; Tweed Ring, 445; mu¬ 
nicipal problems, 445; commercial growth, 
501; police board, 519. 

New York Herald, editor, 281; Sun, 281; Times, 
supports Johnson, 412; Tribune, editor, 281, 
399 , 429 - 

New York, New Haven, and Hartford Railroad, 
monopoly, 521. 

New Zealand, government methods, 507. 

Newburyport (Mass.), trade declines, 132. 

Newfoundland, fisheries, 5. 

Newport (R. I.), trade declines, 132. 


XXVU1 




INDEX 


Newspapers, development, 281; influence, 281, 
282; Washington, 281; New York, 281. 

Niagara, held by Great Britain, 22. 

Niagara River,.fighting along, 122. 124, 257. 

Nicaragua, canal proposed, 333,.485; relations 
with England, 333; negotiations, 497. 

Niles, Hezekiah, editor, 160. 

Niles’' Register, favors protection, 160. 

Non-importation, Jefferson favors, 105. 

Non-intercourse, succeeds embargo, 109; with 
England, 110-113; France, na-113; act 
disobeyed, no; Macon bill, number two, 
no; western policy, 114; encourages manu¬ 
factures, 133. 

Non-intervention, Calhoun’s doctrine, 316, 339, 
340. 346, 350. 

Norfolki(Va.), seized, 384. 

North, resents slave representation, 163, 297; 
southern dominance, 165; nationalistic poli¬ 
cies, 175; politics unfashionable, 184; 
growth of democracy, 186; population, 276, 
374 , 439 , 5 °i, 502; rapid development, 276; 
sentiment on slavery, 294, 296, 298-299, 330; 
lawlessness, 299, 330; Texas sentiment, 302, 
315; Free-Soil vote, 320; divided on Kansas- 
Nebraska bill, 337; roused by attack on 
Sumter, 342, 368; sympathy with John 
Brown, 353; military preparations, 353; 
campaign of i860, 356, 357; devotion to 
Union, 368; manufactures grow, 379, 440; 
administrative problems, 380, 381; financial, 
381,382; business conditions, 383; political 
tendencies, 383, 396, 430, 431; angry with 
England, 388, 424; reaction against coercion, 
429; labor, 437, 438; migration South, 515. 
See also the several states and sections. 

North American Review, founded, 153. 

North Anna River, fighting along, 391. 

North Carolina, Highland Scotch, 13; cedes 
western lands, 18, 20; dissolution threatened, 
28; adopts Constitution, 41, 42, 46, 50, 53; 
governor, 79; character of settlers, 87; elec¬ 
toral vote, 74,108; Quakers, 141, 291; cotton 
manufacture, 142; Democracy, 186; secedes, 
368; Union element, 370, 374; peace party, 
377; reconstruction, 408, 428; disfranchise 
negroes, 414. 

North Dakota, explored, 99; admitted to 
Union, 471; McKinley carries, 480. 

Northern Army, 378-379. 

Northern Pacific Railroad, promoters, 443; in 
merger, 521. 

Northern Securities Company, formed, 521. 

Northwest, Indians, 61; population. 61; open¬ 
ing, 70; trade connections, 138; southern 
immigration, 164; opposes Missouri Com¬ 
promise, 167; land question, 173; agricul¬ 
tural conditions, 267, 268; German influence, 
289, 343; Free-Soil vote, 320; political in¬ 
fluence, 3ss; Confederacy hopes for, 364. 
See also the several states. 

Northwest Territory, organized, 20, 59; diplo¬ 
matic problems, 22; commercial, 22, 59; 
delegate to Congress, 59; governor, 61; 
power of Congress over, 166, 317. 

Norwegians, immigrants, 511. 

Nueces River, as boundary, 311, 312. 

Nullification, proposed (1800), 83; doctrine 


stated, 199, 200; supporters, 202; applied, 
205, 207, 218; postponed, 206; withdrawn, 
207; repudiated by states, 207; political 
effect, 208. 

Ogden v. Saunders, cited, 130. 

Ohio, character of settlers, 87, 284, 345; fron¬ 
tier conditions, 115; sheep raising, 148; ad¬ 
mitted to Union, 164; Indian title distin¬ 
guished, 179; builds canals, 225, 264; presi¬ 
dential vote, 232; Mormons, 279; Free-Soil 
vote, 320; Democrats win, 401; Copperheads, 
402; campaign of 1868, 420; natural gas, 
44?; governors, 447, 479, 532. 

Ohio Company of Associates,” organized, 20; 
settlements, 20, 21. 

“Ohio Idea,” 418. 

Ohio River, route via, 12, 21, 60, 138, 139, 266, 
267; as boundary, 18-20, 22, 26, 500; In¬ 
dians along, 99; settlers, 114; branches, 264. 

Ohio valley, division, 266-267, 369; transpor¬ 
tation, 379. 

Oklahoma, admitted to Union, 502. 

Olliwochica, Indian leader, 115. 

Olney, Richard, Secretary of State, 484; Vene¬ 
zuelan negotiations, 484. 

Omnibus Bill, provisions, 470, 471. 

Ontario, American Loyalists in, 121. 

Orders in Council, adopted, 103; retaliation 
for, 109; recall proposed, 112, 113; recalled, 
117. 

Ordinance of 1787, provisions, 19, 20, 26, 59, 
166; as model, 98; interpretation, 316, 317, 
339 - 

Oregon, joint occupancy, 239; development, 
277; disputed territory, 277; Indian missions, 
277, 278; American settlers, 278, 280; po¬ 
litical issue, 305, 310; partition, 310; ad¬ 
mitted as territory, 315; free state, 348; 
Republican, 448; electoral vote, 480; early 
coast trade, 486. 

Oregon Short Line, in merger, 521. 

Osborn et al. v. Bank of United States, cited, 
130. 

Osceola, Seminole leader, 242. 

Owen, Robert Dale, communist, 279. 

Pacific Ocean, as United States boundary, 169, 
170; trade, 221, 486, 487; islands, 493, 497. 

Pacific Railroads, land grants, 396. 

Paine, Thomas, demands Constitutional Con¬ 
vention, 32. 

Palfrey, J. G., Massachusetts Whig, 314. 

Palmer, Gen. J. M., Gold Democrat, 479. 

Palmerston, Lord, American policy, 385. 

Palo Alto (Mex.), battle, 312. 

Panama Congress, 172, 179. 

Panama, route by Isthmus, 321; revolts from 
Colombia, 497; United States recognizes, 
497; grants canal strip, 498; canal begun, 
523; canal construction, 528. 

Pan-American conferences, 172, 179, 472, 484. 

Pan-American Exposition, at Buffalo, 519. 

Panics (1819), 158, 159, 179, 194, 212; (1833), 
221; (1837), 234, 235, 241, 271; (1841), 239; 
(1857), 271, 345, 383; (1861), 383; (1873), 
443,448,450,458; (18931,476,478; (1907), 
522, 523, 525. 


XXIX 




INDEX 


Paper money, political issue before 1789, 27, 28, 
40, 42; overissues, 212, 223, 224; drives 
out specie, 225, 234, 235; not receivable for 
public lands, 226; Jackson opposes, 226, 231; 
during Civil War, 382; discounted, 451. Sec 
also Currency. 

Parcel Post, established, 528. 

Paris, treaty at, 79; Americans visit, 282; 
peace commission, 490. 

Parish, government unit, 7. 

Parker, Alton J., presidential candidate, 521, 
525; defeat, 522. 

Parker, Joel, attacks Lincoln, 401. 

Paterson, William, in Constitutional Conven¬ 
tion, 34. 

Patronage. Sec Spoils System. 

Patrons of Husbandry. See Granger movement. 

Pawtucket (R. I.), growth, 133. 

Payne, Sereno, frames tariff bill, 526. 

Payne-Aldrich Tariff, commission, 509; bill, 
S26, 527- 

Peace Commission (1898), head, 490. 

Peace Convention, Virginia calls, 362. 

Peel, Sir Robert, American policy, 256; free¬ 
trader, 309. 

Pendleton, Gen. G. H., currency plan, 418; 
presidential candidate, 419. 

Pendleton Bill, provisions, 463. 

Pennington, William, Speaker, 352. 

Pennsylvania, New England immigrants, 5; 
local government, 10; emigrants, 10, n; 
boundary dispute, 18; grants bank charter, 
24; gradual emancipation in, 26; paper- 
money party, 27; dissolution threatened, 28; 
adopts Constitution, 41; power of speaker 
in Legislature, 45; revolt on frontier, 57; 
resists direct tax, 82; governors, 86,381 ; Re¬ 
publican factions, 89, 93; party organization, 
90, 150, i8g; electoral vote, 117, 174, 534; 
iron industry, 136, 181; favors protection, 
136, 181, 356, 464; canal commission, 138, 
139; spoils system, 150; alters constitution, 
150; taxes United States Bank, 158; Anti¬ 
masons, 216; political alliances, 232; Ger¬ 
man immigration, 274; school system, 285; 
railroads, 299; Democrats, 305, 308, 309; 
opposes Mexican war, 314; Whigs carry, 320; 
pivotal state, 343; manufactures grow, 379; 
Lee invades, 390; Democrats win, 401; 
natural gas, 440; population, 501; foreign 
labor, 511, 513. 

Pennsylvania Canal, cheap route, 264. 

“Pennsylvania Dutch.” See Germans. 

Pennsylvania Railroad, rivals waterways, 266;. 
forest reserve, 503. 

Pensions, expenditure for, 471. 

“People’s Party,” candidate, 456, 476; in¬ 
fluence, 459; growth, 474-476; platform, 
475; fuses with Democrats, 479; causes, 501. 

Perdido River, boundary, no. 

Perry, Commodore Matthew, treaty with Japan, 
334- 

Perry, Commodore Oliver Hazard, controls 
Lake Erie, 122. 

Penyville (Ky.), battle, 392. 

Persia, treaty, 330. 

Personal Liberty laws, passed in North, 330. 

Peru, gains independence, 168; treaty, 334. 


Petersburg (Va.), siege, 391. 

Petition, right of, 295, 296. 

Petroleum, source of wealth, 440, 441; super¬ 
sedes whale oil, 486. 

Phi Beta Kappa, secret society, 216. 

Philadelphia (Pa.), financial center, 8, 9, 21, 54; 
Constitutional Convention, 32, 37; Federal 
capital, 53, 65; arrival of Gendt, 63; trade 
rivals, 138, 139, 299; bank notes discounted, 
156; printing, 283; anti-Catholic riots, 273; 
abolition, 294; political conventions, 319, 
343; growth, 445; Centennial Exposition, 450. 

Philippine Islands, ceded to United States, 490, 
491; government, 491, 492; political issue, 
493; governor, 525. 

Phillips, Wendell, lyceum lecturer, 287; labor 
champion, 437. 

Pickering, Judge John, impeached, 93. 

Pickering, Timothy, Secretary of State, 71, 80; 
discusses secession, 98; in Congress, 156; 
cited, 123. 

Piedmont, cotton cultivation, 87, 140; settlers, 
114, 271; relations with tidewater, 141. 

Pierce, Franklin, President, 329; cabinet, 331; 
Cuban policy, 332; Central America, 333; 
removes Governor Reeder, 341; Lincoln 
attacks, 351. 

Pierce, John, killed, 103. 

Pike, Zebulon, explorer, 99. 

Pinchot, Gifford, in forest service, 524; con¬ 
troversy with Ballinger, 529; dismissed, 531. 

Pinckney, Charles, in Constitutional Conven¬ 
tion, 34- 

Pinckney, Charles C., mission to France, 75; 
colleagues, 76; refuse bribe, 77; vice-presi¬ 
dential candidate, 81; presidential candi¬ 
date, 100, 108; electoral vote, 100. 

Pinckney, Thomas, negotiates Spanish treaty, 
74- 

Pinkney, William, commissioner to England, 
103; Minister, 116; in Congress, 156; op¬ 
poses restriction of slavery, 166, 167, 317. 

Pioneers, characteristics, 11, 12; conditions of 
settlement, 59; relations with Spain, 64. 

Pipe lines. See Transportation. 

Pitt, William, relations with Talleyrand, 76; 
Spanish policy, 78. 

Pittsburg Landing (Miss.), battle, 392. 

Pittsburgh (Pa.), captured in Whisky Rebel¬ 
lion, 57; route via, 60; trade, 139. 

Plantation system, described, 5, 6; extended, 
6 , 7, 11 3 , 141. 144-146, 164, 179. 186, 197, 
228, 267, 291; government under, 7, 8; in 
Virginia, 87, 267; bond of union, 146; in 
South Carolina, 267; aristocratic tendency, 
151 ; political effects, 164, 165; based on 
slave labor 433; overthrown, 433 ~ 455 - 

Planters, character, 6, 7, 47, 87, 232; embargo 
injures, 106; increase holdings, 141, 144, 267 ; 
economic problems, 143-145, 148, 197, 198, 
203; raise hemp, 148; political powers, 151; 
aristocratic, 151; oppose tariff, 160; polit¬ 
ical views, 186, 232; continue governing 
class, 433; divide lands, 434; disappear as 
class, 435, 516. 

Planters Bank, failure, 238, 239. 

Plata River, trade route, 334. 

Platt, O. H., death, 528. 


XXX 




INDEX 


Platt, Sen. Thomas C., quarrel with Garfield, 
463; Roosevelt opposes, 520. 

Platt Amendment, provisions, 491. 

Platte River, surveys demanded, 335. 

Plattsburg (N. Y.), battle near, 123. 

PobSdonostsev, moral leader, 292. 

Poe, Edgar A., influence, 153; author, 283. 

Poles, immigrants, 512. 

Political parties, formation, 40; caucuses, 74, 
90, 162, 174, 466; in 1793, 741 in 1797, 75; 
conventions, 90, 189, 190, 216, 217; inactive, 
128; organization, 150, 151, 189, 190, 454, 
461, 466, 470; spoils system, 150; distinct 
policies, 178; national committees, 189; 
first national platforms, 217; new combina¬ 
tions, 339, 340, 397; stability, 454; funds, 
461, 507 ; legal control of primaries, 466, 507 ; 
improved methods, 466; convention or¬ 
ganization, 531. 

Polk, James K., presidential candidate, 304; 
character, 305, 307; policies, 305, 306; writes 
“Kane letter,” 305, 306; election, 306; 
cabinet, 308; Oregon policy, 310, 315; Mexi¬ 
can, 311, 312; party ruler, 319, 331. 

Polly, American trade vessel, 95, 102. 

Poor relief, southern system, 7. 

Popular sovereignty. See Squatter sovereignty. 

Population (1783), 2; (1790), 163; (1820), 

103,164; (1870), 500; (1910), 500, 501; on 
frontier (1810-1830), 146; rapid increase, 
275; shifting, 275; of North (i860), 374; 
of South, 374; foreign-born, 510, 511. 

Populists. See People’s party. 

Port Hudson, taken, 393. 

Port Royal (S. C.), taken, 384. 

Portland (Me.), trade, 135. 

Porto Rico, Gen. Miles occupies, 490; govern¬ 
ment, 491. 

Portsmouth (N. H.), trade, 132, 135. 

Portugal, loses Brazil, 168. 

Post Office, administration improved, 528. 

Postal Savings Bank, established, 528. 

Potomac River, disputed, 32; trade route, 39, 
60; navigation closed on lower, 369; Lee 
crosses, 390. 

Potomac River valley, desires Federal capital, 53. 

Pottawatomie massacre, 347. 

Preemption laws. See Lands. 

Presbyterian Church, fosters nationalism, 11, 
31; mission, 278; divides, 298.. 

President, compromise over election method, 
35; powers, 38, 39. 48, 49; bow chosen, 46, 
74, 100; salary, 48; appointments, 49, 50; 
election by House, 176. 

Presidential electors, how chosen, 46, 150, 151. 

Price, Gen. Sterling, at Corinth, 392 - 

Primaries, regulation, 507; in Wisconsin, 517. 

Prince Albert, in Trent affair, 338. 

Princeton, gunboat, 302. 

Princeton University, president, 532. 

Privateers, French, 64, 104; equipped in United 
States, 65, 69; American, 121; British, 121. 

Proctor, Gen. Redfield visits Cuba, 488. 

Progressive Republicans, split from old party, 
527; growth, 528; bolt convention, 531; 
divide, 535. 

Prohibition, Maine law passed, 288; in other 
states, 288, 289. 


Protection in first tariff, 51; New England, 136, 
440; Middle States, 136; South, 142, 144, 
197; manufactures demand, 158; (1816), 

159; (1824), 173; (1828), 181; constitution¬ 
ality, 197,198, 206, 207; (1832), 204; Repub¬ 
lican policy, 217, 268, 356, 357,381, 430, 464, 
469, 472, 481; (1842), 255; (1846), 309; 

(Morrill), 397; Democrats support, 468. See 
Tariff. 

Providence (R. I.), threatens secession, 42; 
trade center, 133, 135, 140. 

Provincialism, increase of, 131; decreases, 506. 

Prussia, treaty with, 22; in Holy Alliance, 170. 

Pujo, A. P., Member of Congress, 531. 

Pullman Company, employees strike, 478. 

Pure Food Law, enforcement, 524, 530. 

Puritans, theory of government, 3. 

Quakers in Delaware valley, 8, 9,; oppose 
slavery, 25, 291; leave slave states, 141; 
North Carolina, 291. 

Quebec, American trade, 69. 

“Quids,” Republican faction, 88, 101, 108. 

Quincy, Josiah, opposes embargo, 106; British 
war, 107; successor in Congress, 132; cited, 
90.1 

Quitman, J. A., southern radical, 322; Cuban 
filibusterer, 332. 

Railroads, development, 265, 440; government 
aid, 266, 335, 396, 438, 441, 443; strategic 
importance, 266, 376, 392, 393; rivalries, 299, 
335; transcontinental, 335, 441, 443; spec¬ 
ulations, 345, 442; southern, 436, 437; rate 
question, 456, 458, 467; public service cor¬ 
porations, 457; management, 457; govern¬ 
ment regulation, 457, 467, 521, 525, 527; con¬ 
solidation, 460, 520, 521; Pullman strike, 478; 
centralize trade, 500. See Transportation. 

Rambouillet Decree, issued, 112. 

Randall, Gov. A. W., aids Lincoln, 381. 

Randall, Samuel J., Speaker, 468. 

Randolph, Edmund, Attorney-General, 50; 
Secretary of State, 71; resigns, 71. 

Randolph, John, state rights views, 83, 200; 
administration leader, 88, 92, 93; heads 
“Quids,” 101,108; opposes Yazoo claims, 101, 
102; embargo, 105, 106; British war, 117; 
tariff of 1816, 158; in Congress, 156; attacks 
Clay, 177,” cited, 92, 105, 167, 177, 181. 

Rapidan River, campaigns, 391. 

Rappists, communal settlements, 278. 

Raymond, Henry J., editor, 412. 

Reagan, J. H., frames Interstate Commerce Act, 
467. 

Recall, of delegates, 13; of senators, 93; states 
adopt, 507; judicial proposed, 508, 530. 

Reciprocity, commercial, 226, 227; treaties, 
472; limited, 482. 

Reconstruction, in Virginia, 403; Tennessee, 
404; Louisiana, 404; Arkansas, 404; Lin¬ 
coln’s plan, 403, 404; Johnson’s, 408, 409; 
joint committee reports, 411, 412; 

“Through,” 413, Tenure of Office bill, 414, 
415; negro suffrage, 420; Supreme Court 
decisions, 421, 422; agricultural changes 
during, 433, 435! manufactures, 436. 

Reed, Thomas B., Speaker, 45, 470, 481. 527. 


XXXI 





INDEX 


Reeder, Gov. A. H., protests Kansas election 
frauds, 341; removed, 341. 

Referendum, states adopt, 507. 

Reforms, movements, 287, 289; civil service, 
446, 447, 465; tariff, 469; in government, 

507. 

Reign of Terror, effects in America, 63. 

Relay House, troops at, 369. 

“Relief” party, in Kentucky, 211. 

Representation, compromise in Constitution,. 
35, 36; North and South (1820), 164; (1840), 
296; (1866), 411. 

Republican party (Jeffersonian), policy under 
Washington, 32, 57, 68, 70; leaders, 77, 156; 
later policies, 78, 82, 89, 91, 101, no, 161; 
Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, 82, 83; 
factions, 88, 89, 101, 106, 108, 117, 159; 
organization, 89, 90; state victories, 91; 
repeal Federalist laws, 92, 93, 109; main¬ 
tain implied powers, 98; adopt Federalist 
policies, 128, 161; favor national roads, 135. 

Republican party, adoption of name, 338; 
opposes Kansas-Nebraska bill, 338; elects 
Speaker, 340; platforms, 343, 356, 4x8, 419; 
nominates Frdmont, 343; opposes Lecomp- 
ton constitution, 348; in election of 1858, 351, 
352; rejects Crittenden amendment, 361; 
extends national powers, 383; indorses 
Union ticket, 397; growth of abolition ele¬ 
ment, 398, 400; controls Congress, 412; 
indorses negro suffrage, 414; nominates 
Grant, 419; divides on coercion, 429; leaders, 
429; renominates Grant, 430; party co¬ 
hesion, 430, 431; nominates Hayes, 447; 
factions, 450, 463,. 527, 528; nominates 
Garfield, 461; Blaine, 463; defeat, 464; 
elects Harrison and controls Congress, 470; 
reduction of surplus, 471; tariff policy, 469; 
passes Sherman Act, 473; defeat in 1892, 
476; splits on silver, 479; nominates Mc¬ 
Kinley, 480; campaign, 480; success, 481; 
passes Dingley tariff, 481; reelects Mc¬ 
Kinley, 493; convention of 1900, 520; elects 
Roosevelt, 521, 522; divides, 531. 

Repudiation, of state debts, 238, 255, 383. 

Resaca de la Palma, battle, 312. 

Revenue, sources, 51, 52, 95, 119, 158, 159, 174, 
195, 196, 224, 240, 255, 416, 417; surplus, 

193, 195. 224, 239, 468, 471, 472; deficit, 

237, 241, 253, 255, 377, 378; during Civil 

War, 382, 383, 416. 417 - 

Revolution, causes, 13, 17; bounties to soldiers, 
18; Loyalists, 22; economic effects, 25, 27, 
61; tests Washington, 46, 47; state war 
debts, 53; weakens Indians, 61; French 
aid, 63, 495; frontier leader, 64; affects 
Europe, 118; effects, 171; Germans, 273. 

Revolution, principles revived, 86, 149; em¬ 
phasized humanitarianism, 290. 

Rhode Island, population, 13, 501; gradual 
emancipation, 26; paper-money party, 28,42; 
disorders in, 32; low tariff, 32; adopts Con¬ 
stitution, 41, 42, 53; delays adoption, 46, 50; 
Republicans gain, 91; popular discontent, 150; 
state bank question, 211; presidential vote, 
232; prohibition, 289; rioting, 299. 

Rice, staple southern product, 6; and cotton, 
140. 


j Richardson, William A., candidate for Speaker 
340.. 

Richelieu River, route via, 69. 

Richmond (Va.), trade, 139; literary center, 
283; Democratic convention, 355; manu¬ 
factures war supplies, 376; railroad com¬ 
munications, 389, 391, 393; threatened, 390; 
evacuated, 391. 

Richmond Enquirer, editor, 308. 

Right of search (1793), 67; (1806), 103; in Civil 
War, 388. 

Rio Grande, as boundary, 228, 311, 312. 

Riots, anti-Catholic, 273; antislavery, 294; 
religious, 299; “Dorr War,” 299; antirent, 
299; railroad, 299; fugitive slave, 330; draft, 
402; negro, 412. 

Ripon (Wis.), name "Republican”adopted, 338. 

Ritchie, Thomas, editor, 308. 

Rives, J. C., founds Globe, 203. 

Roads, in South, 7; toll roads, 60, 264; national, 
101, 135, 173; Cumberland, 101, 109, 146, 
160, 173, 193; turnpikes, 135, 173; Mays- 
ville, 192. 

Roanoke Island, seized, 384. 

Rochambeau, Gen., statue, 495. 

Rockefeller, John D., financier, 460. 

“Rock of Chickamauga,” nickname, 394. 

Rocky Mountains, explored, 99; as boundary, 
277- 

Roman Catholics, in Maryland, 13; foster 
nationalism, 31; growth in numbers, 272, 
274; prejudice against, 273; missions in 
Oregon,.278; position on public schools, 
287; political opposition to, 327. 

Rome, Americans visit, 282. 

Roosevelt, Theodore, opposes Blaine, 463; at 
Santiago, 489; governor, 493; Vice President, 
493 ; canal policy, 497, 523; daughter, 495; 
political career, 519, 520; presidential nomi¬ 
nation, 521; election, 522; corporation policy, 
522; land, 524; foreign, 494, 498, 523; 
Japanese, 512; Nobel Peace prize, 523; 
names successor, 525; relations with La 
Follette, 527, 532; Progressive candidate, 
531 , 533 , 539 - 

Roosevelt, Miss Alice, christens yacht, 495. 

Root, Elihu, Secretary of State, 497, 525. 

Rosecrans, Gen. W. S., at Chattanooga, 393. 

Rough Riders, at Santiago, 489; Colonel, 519. 

Roumania, immigration from, 496. 

“Rule of 1756,” revived, 66 ; protested, 389. 

Rum, trade in, 23; New England, 159. 

Russell, Jonathan, peace commissioner, 126. 

Russell, Lord, in Trent affair, 388. 

Russia, trade with, no; British ally, 118; offers 
mediation, 125; in Holy Alliance, 170; en¬ 
croachments in Northwest, 170; boundary, 
171; friendly to North, 385, 424; sells Alaska, 
423; assents to open door policy, 498; emigra¬ 
tion, 512; peace with Japan, 523. 

Russo-Japanese War, attitude of United States, 
498 . 

Ryan, Judge E. G., rate decision cited, 456. 

Sabine River, as boundary, 169, 228, 229. 

Sacs, habitat, 191. 

St. Clair, Arthur, governor of Northwest Ter¬ 
ritory, 61. 




INDEX 


St. Lawrence River, English control, 22; 
opened to Americans, 69, 425. 

St. Louis, commercial growth, 335, 379; Union 
City, 371; manufactures, 440. 

Salem (Mass.), trade declines, 132; political 
leaders, 254. 

Salisbury, Lord, cited, 495. 

Salt, source of wealth, 440; trust controls, 
460. 

Saluda Gap, trade route, 142. 

Samoan Islands, independence, 486, 487, 493. 

Sampson, Admiral W. T., at Santiago, 489. 

San Francisco, importance of port, 280; growth, 
445; earthquake, 522. 

San Ildefonso, treaty of, 95. 

San Jacinto, battle, 229. 

San Jacinto, captain, 388. 

San Martin, Gen. Jose dc, frees Chile, 168. 

Santa Anna, A. L. de, Mexican president, 229; 
in Mexican war, 312, 313. 

Sante Fe, Americans occupy, 312. 

Sante Fe Railroad, in merger, 521. 

Santiago (Cuba), battle, 489; taken, 490. 

Santo Domingo, revolts, 97; republic, 179; an¬ 
nexation proposed, 424, 425; United States 
assists, 496. 

Savage’s Station (Va.), battle, 390. 

Savannah (Ga.), trade, 139; captured, 394- 

“Scalawags,” in South, 426. 

Schley, Admiral W. S., at Santiago, 489. 

Schofield, Gen. J. M., Secretary of War, 416. 

Schools, fund from land sales, 225. 

Schurz, Carl, opposes coercion, 429; cabinet 
member, 449; cited, 356. 

Schuyler, Gen. Philip, daughter marries, 55. 

Scioto River, as boundary, 18. 

Scotch, immigrants, 5, n, 13. 

Scotch-Irish, in Susquehanna valley, 9; po¬ 
litical inexperience, 9; on frontier, n ; South 
Carolina, 113. 

Scott, Dred, case of, 345 , 346; political issue, 
350 , 351 , 355 - , 

Scott, John, member of Congress, 177. 

Scott, Sir William, admiralty decision cited, 94, 
95, ro2. 

Scott, Gen. Winfield, ordered to Charleston, 
205 ; on Canadian border, 243, 259; presiden¬ 
tial candidate, 245, 328; electoral vote, 329; 
advises Buchanan, 361; favors peaceable 
separation, 367. 

Secession, Republicans discuss, 83; Federalists, 
106; South Carolina proposes, 198, 205; in 
campaign of i860, 357; Ordinance of, 360; 
Cotton States consider, 363; accomplished, 
368; Supreme Court decisions, 422. 

Sectionalism, 2, n, 26, 29, 33; in Congress, 23, 
32, 51, 52; Constitutional Convention, 36; 
Washington warns against, 72; in Jeffersonian 
party, 88, 89; increases, 128; in tariff ques¬ 
tion, 136, 139, 142-146, 148, 159, 181; trade 
effects, 138, 139; divides North from South, 
166, 298, 302, 305, 318, 337; Webster attacks, 
201; affects western development, 267, 268; 
in election of 1848, 319; (18561,343; (i860), 
357,358; (1868), 419; (18961,480; results 
in secession, 360, 362. 

Sedgwick, Theodore, Speaker of House, cited, 
80. 


Sedition Act, Federalist measure, 78; prosecu¬ 
tions, 82; expiration, 94. 

Segasta, Senor P. M., Cuban policy, 488. 

Selectmen, duties, 4. 

Self-government, on frontier, 152. 

Seminoles, in Florida, 192; war, 242. 

Senate, representation in, 35; check on Presi¬ 
dent, 38, 39; how chosen, 39; claims su¬ 
periority over House, 46; relations with 
executive, 48; debates reported, 92; im¬ 
peachments, 93; southern bulwark, 164, 296. 

Seven Days’ Battle, 390. 

Sevier, John, political leader, 116. 

Seward, William H., Antimasonic leader, 216; 
governor, 287, 294; Senator, 321, 322; op¬ 
poses Compromise of 1850, 324; squatter 
sovereignty, 336; presidential candidate, 355; 
Secretary of State, 380; in Trent affair, 388; 
favors early emancipation, 398; colonization 
schemes, 400; conservatism, 404; expansion, 
423,424; English policy, 425; cited, 337. 

Seymour, Horatio, Governor, 401; heads faction, 
401, 402; presidential candidate, 419. 

Shafter, Gen. W. R., at Santiago, 489. 

Shakers, communistic settlements, 278. 

Shannon, defeats Chesapeake, 120. 

Shays, Capt. Daniel, leads rebellion, 28; causes 
of revolt, 451. 

Sheep raising, increases, 134; in New' England, 
134, 136; New York, 136; Ohio, 148; West, 
473 , 5 oi. 

Shenandoah, Confederate cruiser, 386. 

Shenandoah valley, campaigns, 390, 391. 

Sheridan, Gen. Philip, in Virginia, 391. 

Sherman, John, candidate for Speaker, 352; 
currency compromise, 451; Secretary of 
Treasury, 452; Anti-Trust law, 473; Silver 
Purchase, 473, 474; Secretary of State, 490. 

Sherman Anti-Trust law', operation, 510, 521, 
522, 53°- 

Sherman, Gen. William T., march to sea, 394. 

Sherman, Roger, in Constitutional Convention, 

34 , 35 - . v , 

Shiloh (Miss.), battle, 392. 

“Shin plasters,” currency, 383. 

Shipbuilding, in New England, 5; growth of 
industry, 62, 66; after war, 441. 

Ship subsidies, 270, 271, 273. 

Shipping Board, 554. 

Siam, government, 43; treaty, 227, 334. 

Sicilies, treaty, 334. 

Silver, free coinage, demanded, 455, 474 . 475 , 
479, 481; Bland Act, 455, 474 ; party, 456; 
Sherman’s Purchase Act, 473, 474 ," repealed, 
477; market value declines, 477; Democrats 
split on, 477, 479 ; Republicans, 479; gold 
production affects, 481. 

Sitting Bull, defeats Custer, 444 - t . 

Slater, Samuel, imports English inventions, 
133. 

“Slaughter House” cases, cited, 423. 

Slave trade., 5; compromise in Constitution, 36; 
abolition of foreign, 140, 163, 164, 290; 
action of European nations, 258, 290; case 
of Creole, 259, 260; domestic, 295. 

Slavery, extension to back country, 6, 7; 
abolished in North, 26; compromise in Con¬ 
stitution, 35; affects cotton raising, 140, 


XXXI11 




INDEX 


141, 14S, 433; unites South, 145, 163; dis¬ 
satisfaction with, 163; effect on representa¬ 
tion, 163; moral issue, 164, 292; economic 
issue, 164, 165; political, 166, 296, 297, 304, 
306; restriction debated, 165, 166; effects of 
Missouri Compromise, 166, 167; southern 
sentiment, 179, 290; in Texas question, 242, 
243,303,314; Germans oppose, 275 ; abolished 
by England, 290; status in territories, 314- 
323, 336; Wilmot Proviso, 3x5, 316; excluded 
from Oregon, 315; struggle in Kansas, 340, 
341; Dred Scott decision, 345; Lincoln- 
Douglas debates, 350, 351; national aspects, 
351; in campaign of i860, 356, 358; Critten¬ 
den compromise, 361, 362; abolished, 399- 

403- 

Slaves, how represented, 35; price, 140; num¬ 
ber (i860), 276; escape assisted, 293; insur¬ 
rection, 293; character, 375; importation 
prohibited, 512. 

Slidell, John, Minister to Mexico, 311, 312; 
Confederate envoy, 388. 

Smith, C. B., Secretary of Interior, 380. 

Smith, Joseph, Mormon leader, 278, 279. 

Smith, Gen. Kirby, invades Tennessee, 392. 

Smith, Robert, Secretary of State, 109. 

Social legislation, tendency, 510, 524, 525. 

Socialist movement in Europe, 504; America, 
S° 5 - „ 

"Softs, Democratic faction, 319. 

“ Sons of Liberty.” See Copperheads. 

Soule, Pierre, Minister to Spain, 332. 

South, relations with West, 138, 139, 201; 
cotton growing, 140, 141, 144; economic 
dependence, 141; favors protection, 142; 
monopoly, 143; opposes protection, 160; 
emigration, 144, 164, 276; political unity, 
145, 163, 296, 337 , 344 . 449 , 45 °; repre¬ 
sentation in legislatures, 151; needs new 
states, 165, 277, 296, 302, 348; supports 
Missouri Compromise, 167; opposes spoils 
system, 189; nullification attitude (1832), 
205; foreign immigration, 275, 433, 511, 
514; growth, 275, 276, 374, 502; intellectual 
awakening, 283, 284; schools, 287, 428; de¬ 
pendence on slavery, 290; antislavery senti¬ 
ment, 290, 291; fears insurrections, 293; 
proslavery arguments, 294, 298; lawlessness, 
299; cotton states united, 297, 309; supports 
Compromise of 1850, 328; solid for Kansas- 
Nebraska bill, 337; party changes, 338; 
sustains Brooks, 342; resists panic of 1857, 
345; and Buchanan, 344, 361; Brown's raid, 
353; strengthens militia, 353 j campaign 
of i860, 357; secession sentiment, 368; 
reconstruction, 409, 412-415, 420, 426, 428; 
governmental corruption, 427; agricultural 
readjustment, 433-435; economic conditions, 
435-437; manufactures increase, 436; trans¬ 
portation, 436, 437; suppresses negro vote, 
448, 449 . 470, 53 i; People’s party, 475 ; 
negro problems, 514-516; northern immigra¬ 
tion, 515; political situation, 516. See also 
Confederacy, Plantation System, and the 
several states. 

South America, trade with, 334, 335. 

South Carolina, cedes western lands, 18, 20; 
adopts Constitution, 41; presidential elec¬ 


tors, 46, 150, 186, 218, 233, 305; growth of 
state unity, 113, 197, 363; nationalities, 113; 
cotton industry, 140, 186; slavery’ senti¬ 
ment, 141, 294; trade with West, 142; op¬ 
poses tariff, 143, 181, 197; character of 
democracy, 186; proposes secession, 198, 
205; nullification, 205-208, 361; seizes 

negro sailors, 293; proposes southern con¬ 
vention, 322; secession, 360; political cor¬ 
ruption, 427; reconstruction, 448, 449 ; 

double election returns, 448; political situa¬ 
tion, 516. 

South Carolina Exposition, author, 200. 

South Dakota, admitted to Union, 471; Bryan 
carries, 480. 

Southern Army, 374-375. 

Southern Pacific Railroad, in merger, 521. 

Southwest, population (1790-1800), 61; In¬ 
dians, 6r. 

Sovereignty, under Confederation, 29; under 
Constitution, 37-38; Marshall on, 130; 
Webster and Haync on, 205; Jackson on, 
205, 208; national established, 430. 

Spain, trade with, $, 23, 62; Mississippi policy, 
2,2^; influence in Kentucky, 22; trade with 
Indians, 60; relations with England, 62, 119, 
170, 172; France, 64, 78, 79, 95. hi; colo¬ 
nies in Louisiana, 64, 95; Florida, 64, in, 
169, 277, 486; favorable treaty with, 70. 99; 
loses American colonies, 168, 170; repub¬ 
lics revolt, 170; Oregon, 277; slavery in 
colonies, 290; Cuban question, 331, 332, 487; 
war methods, 488; American minister, 488; 
war with. 489; treaty, 490. 

Spaniards, Pike encounters, 99. 

Spanish America, relations with United States, 
172; British trade, 483; European debts, 
49*5- 

Spanish-American Revolution, causes, 168; 
leaders, 168; success, 168, 170. 

Spanish War, causes, 487-489; battles, 489, 
490; results, 490, 491-493. 

Speaker of House, growth of power, 45, 470, 
527; election deadlocked, 3^.0, 350. 

"Specie Circular,” Jackson issues, 226, 235, 
477; Van Buren supports, 236. 

Specie payments, resumed (1817), 158; sus¬ 
pended (1861), 383; resumed (1879), 451, 
452 , 455 - . 

Speculation, in lands, 18, 223-225, 441; rail¬ 
road, 442. 

Spoils system, beginnings, 90-92; development, 
150-152, 163, 187, 188; established, 189, 
190, 241, 262; South opposes, 189; Whigs, 
250; under Lincoln, 380. See Civil service. 

Spooner, Sen. John C., resigns, 528. 

Springfield (Ill.), speech of Lincoln, 351, 366. 

Squatter sovereignty, doctrine of Lewis Cass, 
316-318; Douglas advocates, 336, 339, 350, 
357 ; supporters, 340; practical workings, 340. 

“Stalwarts,” Republican faction, 450. 

Standard Oil Company, formed, 460; dis¬ 
solved, 530. 

Stanton, Edwin M., Attorney-General, 365; 
Secretary of War, 381, 412; removed, 415, 416. 

Star Spangled Banner, author, 123. 

State banks, bad management, 148, 233; 

numbers increase, 148; notes discounted, 


XXXIV 



INDEX 


156; oppose National Bank, 158, 211; dis¬ 
tension of credit, 235; independent, 237; 
currency taxed, 382, 417; discredited, 383; 
paper currency, 417. 

State Department, secretaries, 50, 56, 71, 80, 88, 
105,109,113,117,162,172,187, 203, 205, 221, 
249 . 259 , 3°2, 307, 327, 331 , 333 , 344 , 365, 
380, 423, 424, 462, 464, 472, 483, 485, 487, 
490, 494 , 497 , 525 , 536 , 543 . 

State rights, doctrine stated, 82, 166; West 
favors, 152, 166; supporters, 166, 167, 297; 
Georgia maintains, 180; differing theories, 
208; overthrown, 430. 

State sovereignty, versus territorial, 317. 

Steamboats, on Mississippi, 147. 

Steam navigation, monopoly denied, 130; on 
Mississippi, 147; development, 269-271. 

Stephens, Alexander H., favors Compromise of 
1850,328; leaves Whigs, 338; view of squat¬ 
ter sovereignty, 339; secession, 363; Confed¬ 
erate Vice President, 365; cited, 393. 

Stevens, Thaddeus, Antimasonic leader, 216, 
286; educational, 286; reconstruction views, 
404,413; death, 420. 

Story, Joseph, opposes embargo, 106; cited, 
185. 

Story, W. W., sculptor, 282. __ . 

“Strict construction,” 82; Republicans divide 
on, 101; West opposes, 152; Calhoun and, 
199; Tyler supports, 253. 

Suez Canal, promoter, 462. 

Sugar, West Indian trade, 65; southern staple, 
145; tariff, 159, 472, 476, 482; imported, 
269; trust controls, 460. 

Sumner, Sen. Charles, 336; opposes squatter 
sovereignty, 336; oratory, 341, 342 ; offends 
Sen. Butler, 342; attacked by Brooks, 342; 
in Trent affair, 388; favors early emancipa¬ 
tion, 398; Alaska Purchase, 423; reconstruc¬ 
tion views, 404, 413; expansion, 424; English 
policy, 425; civil service reformer, 440; 

cited, 341- , _ , . - T .1. 

Sumter, Fort, fired on, 367; effect in North, 

Supreme Court, antecedents, 25; how chosen, 
39; organization, 50; Justices, 50, 68, 93, 
400, 421; appeals to, 351; decisions cited, 51, 
102, 129-131, 158, I 9 U 237, 238, 345, 387, 
388, 421-423, 456, 478, 492 , 521, 529. 53 °; 
authority, 200, 201, 206, 2x3, 354, 421- 

Susquehanna River, trade route, 139 > L ee 
reaches, 39 °-. „ , , , , 

Susquehanna River valley, character of popula¬ 
tion, 8, 9; desires Federal capital, 53. 

Swartwout, Samuel, collector of port, 241; suc¬ 
cessor, 241; cited, 188. 

Sweden, treaty, 22; emigrants, 511. 

Sweeney, Peter B., Tammany boss, 445. 


Taft, William H., governor of Philippines, 491; 
Secretary of War, 525; President, 525; cab¬ 
inet, 525; tariff policy, 526, 529; opponents, 
527 , 529 , 530 ; nominee, S 3 1. 

Talleyrana, C. M. de, methods, 76; American 
policy, 79, 95; loses influence, 97. 

Tallmadge, James, member of Congress, i 65 ; 

Tammany Hall, founded, 89; connection with 
financiers, 442; controls New York city, 445 - 


Taney, Roger B., Attorney-General, 203,221; 
Secretary of Treasury, 221; Chief Justice, 
238; Dred Scott decision, 345, 346; Lincoln 
attacks, 351; death, 421; successor, 421. 

Tanning, growth of industry, 440. 

Tariff, Rhode Island law, 32; New York, 41; of 
1789, 51, 52, 62; Jefferson’s policy, 101, 133; 
revenue small, 119; New England demands 
protective, 136; political issue, 139, 197, 202, 
522,533; on cotton, 143; southern attitude, 
144, 197; Louisiana, 145; sugar, 145; fron¬ 
tier attitude, 148; “American system,” 148, 
149; sectional bargains, 148, 159, 181, 345; 
(1816), 158, 159; (1824),. 173, 198; (1828), 
181, 198, 204; constitutionality, 197, 198; 
(1832), 204, 217, 218; nullified, 205; (1833), 
206, 207, 210, 255; Whig policy, 255, 256, 
260; (1842), 306; (1846), 309; (1857). 345; 
war, 381, 396, 416, 417, 428, 440; Morrill, 
387. 397 5 Schedule K, 4x7; discussion, 454, 
464, 467-469; revision of 1883, 468; for 
revenue, proposed, 468; Mills Bill, 468, 469; 
Republican policy, 469; McKinley, 471, 472, 
481; Wilson, 477, 478; Dingley, 481, 482; 
Porto Rican, 491; Philippine, 491; Payne- 
Aldrich, 508, 526, 527; Taft vetoes, 529; 
Underwood, 537; Fordney-McCumber, 568. 

Tariff Commission (1882), reduces duties, 468; 
president of, cited, 468; functions, 508; 
established (1910), 526. 

Taxes, customs duties under Confederation, 13, 
32; heavier after Revolution, 26, 28; excise, 
52, 56, 57, 93, ii9, 159, 416; on ships, 62; 
direct, 76, 82, 159, 382, 471; increase, 94, 95; 
war, 119, 132, 158, 381, 382; income, 382, 

416, 478; internal revenue, 382, 396, 416, 

417. 

Taylor, John, state rights, 83; author, 88; de¬ 
fends state courts, 130. 

Taylor, Gen. Zachary, occupies Texas, 312; vic¬ 
tories, 312, 313; presidential candidate, 318; 
election, 319; territorial policy, 321,322; Cen¬ 
tral America, 333; death, 325; successor, 
325; cited, 321. 

Tecumseh, organizes Indians, 115; defeat, 115, 
122; death, 122; slayer, 230. 

Tehuantepec, Isthmus of, neutrality guaranteed, 

334 * 

Teller, Sen. H. M., free silver advocate, 479. 

Temperance movement, development, 287, 288; 
results, 289. 

Temple, in London, law students, 33. 

Tennessee, influence of Spain in, 22; admitted 
to Union, 59, 164; Indian lands bought, 99; 
frontier conditions, 115 ^political leaders, 116; 
Indians defeated, 122; in War of 1812, 125; 
cotton cultivation, 144, 146; immigration, 
146; presidential vote, 232, 306; transporta¬ 
tion, 266; secedes, 368; Union element, 370, 
371, 374; invaded, 392-394; military gov¬ 
ernor, 403; reconstruction, 404,408,428; read¬ 
mitted, 412; disfranchises negro, 414- 

Tennessee Coal and Iron Company, 523- 

Tennessee River, route via, 12; settlers, 114; 
cotton culture, 267; Grant’s campaign, 391, 
39 2 - 

“Tenure of Office” act, provisions, 414, 416; 
modified, 421; repealed, 466. 


XXXV 



INDEX 


Territories, government, 98; power of Congress 
over, 316, 321, 336, 339, 345 , 35 °, 354 , 399 , 
492 , 493 - 

Texas, claims of United States, 169; boundary 
dispute, 228, 3x1; American settlers, 228, 229, 
276; independence, 229, 276, 311; neutrality 
violations, 229; political issue, 229, 262, 302- 
306, 319; government recognized, 230, 242, 
277; annexation discussed, 230, 242, 243, 277, 
303; strategic importance, 277; British re¬ 
lations, 277, 303; population, 277, 501; de¬ 
sires California, 279; Congress annexes, 307; 
Mexico claims, 310,311; Taylor occupies, 312; 
dispute with government, 322, 323; secedes, 
364; reconstruction late, 420; admitted to 
Union, 493; foreign immigration, 511. 

Texas v. White, cited, 422. 

Thames River (Can.), battle, 122, 231. 

Thomas, Gen. George, defeats Hood, 394. 

“Thorough,” reconstruction plan, 413. 

Ticknor, George, cited, 239, 367. 

Tilden, Samuel J., reformer, 444; fights Tweed 
Ring, 446; presidential candidate, 447; elec¬ 
tion contested, 448; defeat, 449. 

Tillman, Sen. Benjamin, politician, 5x6. 

Tippecanoe, battle, 115, 231. 

Tobacco, southern staple, 6, 140, 141; exhausts 
land, 291; trust controls, 460; dissolved, 
530 . 

Toledo (O.), site of Indian battle, 61. 

Tompkins, Gov. D. D., presidential candidate, 
161; Vice President, 162. 

Toombs, Robert, favors Compromise of 1850, 
328; advocates secession, 363; protests 
against attack on Fort Sumter, 367. 

Topeka (Kan.), Constitutional Convention, 
341 - 

Town, unit of government, 4, 10; townships, 
how surveyed, 19; in South, 427. 

Trafalgar, effect of battle, 102, 104. 

Transcendentalism, in New England, 284. 

Transportation, economic problem, 12, 56, 59, 
60; wagons, 60; toll roads, 60, 264; canals, 
135 . 138-140, 146, 147 , 178, 193, 225, 264, 
265, 333, 369. 462, 485, 497, 498; on turnpikes, 
135, 173; railroads, 139, 265, 269, 299, 333, 
335. 369, 376, 379, 440; by rafts, 147; river 
steamers, 147 264; expense, 148, 179; na¬ 
tional aid, 192; state, 225; improved, 264- 
267; sailing vessels, 269; ocean, 270, 514; 
transcontinental, 332, 333; during Civil 
War, 376,379, 393; lake boats, 379; monopoly, 
420, 521, 531; pipe lines, 440; rates, 456, 467; 
automobiles, 500. See Railroads, etc. 

Treason, trial for, 82. 

Treasury Department, Secretaries, 50, 52, S4» 
55, 71, 88, 94, 119, 157, 162, 203, 214, 221, 
253, 365, 380, 404, 417, 450, 452; powers, 223; 
deals with freedmen, 410. 

Treaties, Paris, 1, 22; how made, 38; with 
Indians, 60, 61; commercial, 62, 69, 172, 226, 
227, 334; France, 63, 64, 76, 95. 97, no, 227; 
Great Britain, 68-71, 75, 103, 109, no, 126, 
310, 334, 425, 486; Spain, 74, 76, 99, 169, 170, 
486, 490; Amiens, 95; San Ildefonso, 95; 
Jay, 103, 227; Erskine, 109-111; Ghent, 126; 
Russia, 171, 334, 423; Creeks, 179, 180; 
Cherokees, 191; Muscat, 227; Siam, 227, 334; 


Webster-Ashburton, 257-260; Texas, 304; 
Clayton-Bulwer, 333,485,497; Colombia, 333; 
Argentine Republic, 334; Denmark, 334; 
Japan, 334; Persia, 334; Sicily, 334; Washing¬ 
ton, 425; Germany, 426; Mexico, 334, 486; 
Hay-Herran, 497; Canadian* reciprocity, 526; 
arbitration, 529; Versailles, 565-566. 

Trent, affair of. 388. 

Trevett v. Wceden, cited, 25, 28. 

Tripoli, war with, 102. 

Trist, N. P., Mexican treaty, 313. 

Troup, Gov. G. M., defiance of Adams, cited, 
180. 

Trumbull, Sen. Lyman, favors Freedmen’s 
Bureau, 409; reconstruction plan, 413. 

Trusts, development, 460, 468, 469, 494; atti¬ 
tude of parties toward, 473; discussion, 523. 

Tuskegee Institute, 515. 

Tweed, William M., Tammany boss, 445. 

Tyler, John, abandons Jackson, 232; vicc-prcsi- 
dential candidate, 246; President, 250; 
character, 251, 252; strict constructionist, 
251; cabinet, 252; cabinet resigns, 254; 
financial policy, 253-255; tariff, 255, 256; 
Whigs assail, 254; “Corporal’s Guard” 
supports, 254; Senate censures, 256; im¬ 
peachment threatened, 256; proposes com¬ 
promise, 258; Whigs desert, 260; use of 
patronage, 262; presidential candidate, 
302; favors annexation of Texas, 302, 304, 
306; relations with Polk, 307; presides at 
Peace Convention, 362. 

Uncle Toni’s Cabin, effects, 330, 331, 352. 

Underground Railroad, development, 293. 

Underwood, O. W., presidential candidate, 
532. 

Union, menaced, 28, 29,123-125, 329; strength¬ 
ened by Washington, 50, 51; Hamilton, 53, 
54; Genet’s plot against, 65, 68; right of 
expansion, 98; strengthened by Louisiana 
Purchase, 99; by treaty of Ghent, 126; love 
of, 129, 152; strong in West, 180; South 
debates value, 198, 202; Webster supports, 
201, 205, 324; Northeast, 202; Jackson, 202, 
205, 208, 210, 231; Democrats, 231; 

strengthened by War of 1812, 330; effect of 
Brown’s raid, 353; political issue, 356, 357; 
secession from, 360-364; devotion of Lin¬ 
coln, 366, 367, 386, 400; of North, 368; 
Douglas, 370; sectional support, 370, 371; 
party of, 397; reconstruction of, 403, 404; 
permanence established, 454. 

“Union Leagues,” of negroes, 426. 

Union Pacific Railroad, completed, 441; in 
merger, 521. 

Union party, elements, 397; losses, 401; nomi¬ 
nates Lincoln, 405. 

Unitarians, beliefs, 152; growth, 152, 153; 
influence, 285. 

United States Bank, founded, 54; Hamilton 
favors, 54, 130; first expires, 94, 119, 148; 
charter of second, 157, 214, 222; branches, 
157, 2ii, 214; bad management, 158, 212; 
officers, 158, 212, 220; dividends, 160; de¬ 
bated, 194; political issue, 210, 213-218, 220, 
222; opposition, 211, 212; monopoly, 211, 
212, 215; influence in politics, 212, 216; 


XXXVI 





INDEX 


constitutionality, 213-216; deposits with¬ 
drawn, 220, 223, 235; state charter, 222; 
fails, 222; Whig policy, 253. 

United States, defeats Macedonian, 120. 

United States v. Judge Peters, cited, 129. 

United States Sanitary Commission, efficiency, 
381. 

United States Steel Company, organization, 
520; growth, 523. 

Universalists, growth, 153. 

Upshur, A. P., Secretary of State, 302; death, 
302. 

Utah, settled, 278; applies for admission, 321; 
excludes slavery, 322; admitted, 502; elec¬ 
toral vote, 534. 

Vallandigham, Clement L., peace Democrat, 
402; banished, 402; candidate for gov¬ 
ernor, 402 ; defeated, 402 ; writes Democratic 

E )latform, 405; unites with Liberal Repub- 
icans, 429. 

Valley Falls (R.I.), growth, 133. 

Van Buren, Martin, supports Crawford, 175; 
Jackson, 187, 202; governor, 187; Secretary 
of State, 187, 226; influence grows, 202; 
vice-presidential candidate, 217; Senate 
rejects, 226; electoral vote, 230, 231, 233, 
280; opponents, 231-233, 244, 249; elected 
President, 233; calls extra session, 234; 
financial policy, 235-237, 243, 252; appoint¬ 
ments, 241, 250; Indian policy, 242; Texas, 
242, 243, 304; maintains neutrality, 243; 
unpopular, 243, 244; renomination, 244; 
popular vote, 247; and Calhoun, 261, 303; 
Free-Soil candidate, 319; retirement, 329. 
Vancouver Island, England retains, 310; boun¬ 
dary, 425. 

Vanderbilt, Commodore Cornelius, sources of 
fortune, 271; promoter, 333, 441. 

Vanderbilts, control railroads, 460. 

Van Dorn, Gen. Earl, at Corinth, 392. 

Van Rensselaer,Gen. Stephen, in War of 1812,124. 
Venezuela, gains independence, 168; dispute 
with Great Britain, 484, 485. 

Vera Cruz (Mex.), captured (1847), 313; 
(1914), 542 . 

Vermont, independent, 2, 4, 28, 29; frontier, 
12, 115; treats with England, 22; abolishes 
slavery, 26; admitted to Union, 57, 164; 
trade routes opened, 69, 70; electoral vote, 
108, 534; sheep raising, 134. 

Vice President, lack of power, 46; how chosen, 
46, 74, 100, 251; Senate chooses, 233; suc¬ 
ceeds President, 250, 325, 407, 462, 519. 
Vicksburg (Miss ), rail connections, 392; cap¬ 
tured, 393; effect of fall, 402. 

Vilas, William F., Postmaster-General, 464; 

Secretary of Interior, 464. 

Virginia, plantation system, 8; self-govern¬ 
ment, 10; migration into, 12; population 
(1783), 13; cedes western lands, 17, 20; Ken¬ 
tucky, part of, 20; migration from, 21; 
abolishes entail, 25; .church, 25; early 
emancipation sentiment, 26; dispute with 
Kentucky, 28; Maryland, 32; requests 
commercial convention, 32; adopts Con¬ 
stitution, 41; largest colony, 46; character 
of planters, 47; favors tariff, 51; revolt on 


frontier, 57; transportation problem, 60; 
electoral vote, 74, 108; political influence, 
87, 161; religious liberty, 109; courts, 129, 
130; antislavery sentiment, 141, 291; west¬ 
ern emigration, 146; conservatism, 152; 
governor, 162; return to old Republicanism, 
174; influence of university, 283; no cabinet 
member, 187; slave trade, 259; German 
immigration, 274; slave insurrection, 293; 
extradition trouble, 294; calls Peace Con¬ 
vention, 362; secedes, 368; seizes Harpers 
Ferry, 369loses western portion, 370, 
403; campaigns, 390, 391; reconstruction, 
403, 408, 424, 428. 

Virginia, remade from Merrimac, 385; fights 
Monitor, 385. 

Virginia Resolutions, doctrines, 200; cited, 82, 


Wabash River, Indians on, 99, 1x5. 

Wade-Davis bill, reconstruction compromise, 
404. 

Wakarusa War, in Kansas, 347. 

Wake Island, coaling station, 493. 

Walker, Robert J., Secretary of Treasury, 308; 
advocates free trade, 308-310; governor, 347. 

Walker, William, filibustering expedition, 344. 

War of 1812, begun, 116; causes, 117, 118; 
European situation, 118; preparation, 118, 
119; revenues, 119; growth of American 
navy, 120; naval duels, 120; effect on trade, 
121; in Northwest, 122; on Lakes, 122; 
battle of Thames, 122; New England harried, 
123; Washington burned, 123; battle of 
Plattsburg, 123; New Orleans threatened, 
123; disaffection, 124, 125; Hartford Con¬ 
vention, 124; battle of New Orleans, 125; 
peace proposed, 125; treaty signed, 126; 
close marks epoch, 128; encourages American 
manufactures, 133; effects, 160, 161; sup¬ 
porters, 198; strengthens Union, 330; taxes, 
382. 

War Department, secretaries, 50, 162, 163, 
203, 308, 380, 412, 415, 443 , 5 i 9 , 525 , S 44 J 
survey by, 334; deals with freedmen, 410. 

“War Hawks,” favor British war, 116. 

Ware v. Hylton, cited, 51. 

Washington, admitted to Union, 471; Bryan 
carries, 480; electoral vote, 534. 

Washington, Booker T., educator, 516, 522. 

Washington (D. C.), seat of government, 86, 92, 
125,126,152,175,176,185,187,198,312,360, 
362, 365, 372, 387; British burn, 123; canal 
convention, 139; social changes, 185; office¬ 
holders, 188; political, 217; railroad center, 
266; newspapers, 281, 308; Telegraph, in¬ 
fluence, 187; Globe, 203, 261; Union, editor, 
308; communication cut, 369;, threatened, 
390, 400; French delegation visits, 495. 

Washington, George, urges centralization, 31; 
Madison’aids, 31,108; presides over Constitu¬ 
tional Convention, 34; why chosen com¬ 
mander-in-chief, 46; President, 46; character 
and ability, 47, 48; first veto, 48; organizes 
cabinet, 49; appointments, 49, 5?; signs 
bank bill, 54, 55 ! agrees with Hamilton, 56, 
80; deals with Whisky Rebellion, 57, 89; 
understands western problems, 60, 114, 264; 


xxxvu 




INDEX 


attitude toward France, 63, 64; England, 64; 
Jay’s treaty, 69; reelection, 70, 74; retire¬ 
ment, 71; Farewell Address, 71, 72; neutral 
policy, 80; death, 81; compared with Lee, 
374; third term policy, 525; cited, 22, 23, 

43 * „ „ 

“Washington movement. See Temperance. 

Wasp, defeats Frolic, 120. 

Wayne, Gen. Anthony, defeats Indians, 61, 70; 
GenSt’s plot, 65. 

Weaver, James B., presidential candidate, 456, 
476, 480. 

Webster, Daniel, in Congress, 128, 132, 156; 
counsel for Dartmouth College, 129; favors 
protection, 136, 181; bank plan, 157; debate 
with Hayne, 201, 202, 205; vote for, 231, 232, 
247; Secretary of State, 249, 327; stands by 
Tyler, 254; British negotiations, 256-260, 
262, 280; leaves cabinet, 260, 302; views on 
Oregon, 310; Texas, 311; controversy with 
Cass, 317; Senator, 322; supports Com¬ 
promise of 1850, 324, 325, 327; blamed by 
North, 328; presidential candidate, 328; 
death, 329; friend of Choate, 344; self- 
confidence, 366. 

Webster, Pelatiah, demands Constitutional Con¬ 
vention, 32. 

Webster-Ashburton Treaty, provisions, 257- 
260. 

Weed, Thurlow, Antimasonic leader, 216; skill¬ 
ful politician, 245, 318, 321; supports John¬ 
son, 412. 

Welles, Gideon, Secretary of Navy, 384. 

Wellesley, Marquis of, American policy, 112. 

Wellington, Lord, soldiers in America, 125; 
advises concessions, 126. 

West, land problem, 59-61; Genet’s plan to 
separate, 65, 68; influenced by coast states, 
87; question of allegiance, 99; Burr’s 
schemes, 100; growth of population, 114, 115, 
13S; political influence, 115, 117, 163; New 
England immigrants, 134, 138, 146; southern 
immigration, 141, 144; transportation, 135, 
147, 225, 264, 266, 335; competes with New 
England, 135, 138; relations with South, 141, 
142, 201, 202; financial troubles, 148, 210, 
212; religious sects, 153; sympathy with 
Spanish colonies, 168; nationalistic policies, 
175; leaders, 175; electoral vote, 176; tariff 
sentiment, 202; state rights, 202; Unionist, 
202; land speculation, 223-225; growth of 
sectionalism, 267, 268; lawless, 298, 299; 
campaign of i860, 357; growth of manufac¬ 
tures, 379, 440; Civil War campaigns, 391; 
unsettled districts, 438; Granger movement, 
467,474; sheep raising, 473; People’s party, 
476. See also Frontier, and the several states. 

West Indies, trade, 5, 23, 79, 95, 226; birth¬ 
place of Hamilton, 55; French possessions, 
63, 65, 66; buy American provisions, 65; 
English courts of admiralty, 68; trade re¬ 
strictions, 69; slavery abolished, 290; 
smuggling center, 38s; Danish possessions, 
424 - 

West Virginia, admitted to Union, 370; Union 
soldiers, 374; organized, 403; natural gas 
discovered, 440; McKinley carries, 481; 
growth of population, 501. 


Western Reserve, origin of name, 18; settled, 
21. 

Weyerhauser companies, timber holdings, 

504. 

Weyler, Gen. V., war methods, 488. 

Whaling industry, 335; declines, 441; in Pacific, 
486. 

Wheat, importation, 268; increased cultiva¬ 
tion, 269; exportation, 387. 

Wheaton, Henry, publicist, 227. 

Whigs, reject commercial treaty, 227; adoption 
of party name, 244; leaders, 245; policies, 245; 
national convention, 245; campaign methods, 
246, 247; popular vote, 247; electoral, 248; 
elements, 249, 251; use of patronage, 250; 
financial policy, 252-255; party split, 254, 
260; distribution act, 255, 256; tariff policy, 
255, 256, 260, 469; lose Maine, 260; lose con¬ 
trol of House, 260; presidential candidates, 
260, 305, 328; oppose Mexican War, 314; 
factions, 314, 318, 344; ignore slavery issue, 
318; nominate Taylor, 318; victory, 320; 
nominate Scott, 328; defeat, 329; divide on 
Kansas-Nebraska bill, 338, 339; divide, 343. 

Whisky Rebellion, causes, 56; ended, 57; 
political significance, 77, 89. 

Whisky Ring, frauds, 444. 

White, Judge Hugh L., presidential candidate, 
232,233,246,247. 

White House, inaugural reception, 185; in¬ 
fested by office seekers, 250. 

White Oak Swamp (Va.), battle, 390. 

Whitman, Walt, influence, 153; Leaves of Grass, 
283. 

Whitney, Eli, inventor, 140. 

Whitney, William C., Secretary of Navy, 464, 
471. 

Whittier, John G., mourns Jail of Webster, 

328. 

Whittimore, Amos, inventor, 133. 

Wickersham, G. W., Attorney-General, 531. 

Wilderness (Va.), battles, 391. 

Wiley, Dr. Harvey, Pure Food Commissioner, 
524; resigns, 530. 

Wilkes, Capt. Charles, in Trent affair, 388. 

Williamson, Hugh, land survey system, 19. 

Wilmington (N. C.), Confederate port, 385, 
391 - 

Wilmot, David, member of Congress, 315. 

Wilmot Proviso, provisions, 3x5; significance, 
316; repeal, 323. 

Wilson, James, education, 33; in Constitutional 
Convention, 34. 

Wilson, William L, frames tariff bill, 478. 

Wilson, Woodrow, career, 532; presidential 
candidate, 532; election, 533; President, 536; 
reelected, 547; Congressional Government, 532; 
quoted, 562; “fourteen points,” 563; on Peace 
Commission, 564-565. 

Winnebago Indians, habitat, 191. 

Winthrop, John, cited, 81. 

Winthrop, R. C., Speaker of House, 314. 

Wirt, William, Attorney-General, 163; presiden¬ 
tial candidate, 216; electoral vote, 218. 

Wisconsin, British expeditions, 122; Indian title 
extinguished, 191; German immigration, 274; 
Fourierism, 279; opposes fugitive slave law, 
330; war governor, 381; Democrats win, 401; 


XiXYlll 



INDEX 


public domain. 438; movement of population, 
439; transportation rates, 456; power of 
Grangers, 456; school issue. 474; growth, 501; 
progressive policies, 508, 509, 527; Norwegian- 
ism, 51X. 

Wise, Henry A., opposes squatter sovereignty, 
339; support. Tyler, 254 

Wolcott, Oliver, Secretary of Treasury, 71 

Women, frontier hardships, 247; in temperance 
movement, 288; women’s rights movement, 
289, 507; nation-wide suffrage, 567. 

Wood, Gen. Leonard, occupies Cuba, 491; chief 
of staff, 524; presidential candidate, 567. 

Woodbury, Levi, Secretary of Navy, 203. 

Woodford, Gen. S. L., Minister to Spain, 489. 

WorcesterJMass.), trade, 135. 


Worcester v. Georgia, cited, 191. 

World War, or Great War, 543-568. 

Wyoming, admitted to Union, 471; Bryan car¬ 
ries, 480; grants woman’s suffrage, 507. 

“X YZ” correspondence, sent to Congress, 76; 
published, 77. 

Yazoo claimants, 101, 102. 

Yoder, Jacob, early trader, 31. 

York River, military movements, 390. 

Young, Brigham, Mormon leader, 279. 

Yucatan, revolts from Mexico, 313. 

Zollverein, treaty with, 227. 





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